\ 


RED  EAGLE'S  LEAP. 


FAMOUS    AMERICAN    INDIANS. 


RED    EAGLE 


AND  THE 


WARS  WITH    THE    CREEK    INDIANS 
OF  ALABAMA. 


BY 

GEORGE   GARY   EGGLESTON. 


NEW    YORK: 
DODD,   MEAD  &   COMPANY, 

751   BROADWAY. 


\  d-  f 


COPYRIGHT    B? 

DODD,  MEAD  AlsfD  COMPANY* 
1878. 


PREFACE. 


A  WORK  of  this  kind  necessarily  makes  no  pre 
tension  to  originality  in  its  materials  ;  but  while 
all  that  is  here  related  is  to  be  found  in  books, 
there  is  no  one  book  devoted  exclusively  to  the 
history  of  the  Creek  war  or  to  the  life  of  William 
Weatherford,  the  Red  Eagle.  The  materials  here 
used  have  been  gathered  from  many  sources — 
some  of  them  from  books  which  only  incidentally 
mention  the  matters  here  treated,  touching  them 
as  a  part  of  larger  subjects,  and  many  of  them 
from  books  which  have  been  long  out  of  print, 
and  are  therefore  inaccessible  to  readers  gen 
erally. 

The  author  has  made  frequent  acknowledg 
ments,  in  his  text,  of  his  obligations  to  the  writ 
ers  from  whose  works  he  has  drawn  information 
upon  various  subjects.  By  way  of  further  ac 
knowledgment,  and  for  the  information  of  read 
ers  who  may  be  tempted  to  enlarge  their  reading 
in  the  interesting  history  of  the  South-west,  he 
appends  the  following  list  of  the  principal  books 

M116221 


IV  PREFACE. 

that  have  been  consulted  in  the  preparation  of 

this  volume  : 

Parton's  "  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson." 

Eaton's  "  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson." 

Pickett's  "  History  of  Alabama." 

Drake's  "  Book  of  the  Indians." 

McAfee's  "  History  of   the  Late    War  in  the 

Western  Country." 

Claiborne's  "  Notes  on  the  War  in  the  South." 
Meek's  "  Romantic  Passages  in  South-western 

History." 

"  Indian  Affairs,  American  State  Papers." 
Kendall's  "  Life  of  Jackson." 
Waldo's  "  Life  of  Jackson." 
Russell's  "  History  of  the  Late  War." 
Brackenridgc's  "  History  of  the  Late  War." 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    I. 

PAGE 

Showing,  by  way  of  Introduction,  how  Red 
Eagle  happened  to  be  a  Man  of  Consequence 
in  History,  .  ....  13 

CHAPTER    II. 

Red  Eagle's  People,       .  •         •     27 

CHAPTER    III. 
Red  Eagle's  Birth  and  Boyhood,  ....     37 

CHAPTER    IV. 
The  Beginning  of  Trouble, 47 

CHAPTER   V. 

Red  Eagle  as  an  Advocate  of  War — The  Civil 
War  in  the  Creek  Nation,  .  .  .  •  59 


6  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    VI. 

PAGE 

The  Battle  of  Burnt  Corn,     .         .         .         .         .71 

CHAPTER   VII. 
Red  Eagle's  Attempt  to  abandon  his  Party,  .         .78 

CHAPTER   VIII. 
Claiborne  and  Red  Eagle,      .  ...     84 

CHAPTER   IX. 
Red  Eagle  before  Fort  Mims,  .         .         -     95 

CHAPTER   X. 
The  Massacre  at  Fort  Minis, .  .103 

CHAPTER   XI. 
Romantic  Incidents  of  the  Fort  Mims  Affair,       .  114 

CHAPTER   XII. 

The  Dog  Charge  at  Fort  Sinquefield  and  Affairs 
on  the  Peninsula, 120 


CONTENTS.  7 

CHAPTER   XIII. 

PAGE 

Pushmatahaw  and  his  Warriors,    .         .         .         .132 

CHAPTER   XIV. 
Jackson  is  helped  into  his  Saddle,          .         .         .136 

CHAPTER   XV. 
The  March  into  the  Enemy's  Country,  .         .  146 

CHAPTER   XVI. 
The  Battle  of  Tallushatchee, 161 

CHAPTER   XVII. 
The  Battle  of  Talladega, 167 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

General  Cocke's  Conduct  and  its  Consequences,  180 

CHAPTER   XIX. 
The  Canoe  Fight, 19* 


8  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   XX. 

PAGE 

The  Advance  of  the  Georgians— The  Battle  of 
Autosse 207 

CHAPTER   XXI. 

How  Claiborne  executed  his  Orders— The  Battle 
of  the  Holy  Ground— Red  Eagle's  Famous 
Leap,  .  -214 

CHAPTER   XXII. 
I  low  Jackson  lost  his  Army,          ....  230 

CHAPTER   XXIII. 
A  New  Plan  of  the  Mutineers,     ....  243 

CHAPTER   XXIV. 
Jackson's  Second  Battle  with  his  own  Men,          .  254 

CHAPTER   XXV. 

Jackson  dismisses  his  Volunteers  without  a  Bene 
diction,  259 


CONTENTS,  9 

CHAPTER    XXVI, 

PAGB 

How  Jackson  lost  the  rest  of  his  Army,        .         .  267 

CHAPTER   XXVIL 

Battles    of    Emuckfau  and    Enotachopco— How 
the  Creeks  "whipped  Captain  Jackson,"         .  282 

CHAPTER    XXVIII. 

How  Red   Eagle   "whipped    Captain   Floyd"— 
The  Battle  of  Calebee  Creek,  .         .         .         .303 

CHAPTER   XXIX. 
Red  Eagle's  Strategy,     ......  308 

CHAPTER   XXX. 

Jackson  with  an  Army  at  last,       .         .        .         .  314 


I0  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   XXXI. 

PAGE 

The  Great  Battle  of  the  War,  .         •  3l8 

CHAPTER   XXXII. 

Red  Eagle's  Surrender,  .         .         •         •  329 

CHAPTER   XXXIII. 
Red  Eagle  after  the  War,       ...  -  34° 


RED    EAGLE 


WARS  WITH  THE  CREEK  INDIANS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

SHOWING,  BY  WAY  OF  INTRODUCTION,  HOW 
RED  EAGLE  HAPPENED  TO  BE  A  MAN  OF 
CONSEQUENCE  IN  HISTORY. 

IT  is  a  long  journey  from  the  region  round 
about  the  great  lakes,  where  Tecumseh  lived,  to 
the  shores  of  the  Alabama  and  the  Tombigbee 
rivers,  even  in  these  days  of  railroads  and  steam 
boats  ;  and  it  was  a  much  longer  journey  when 
Tecumseh  was  a  terror  to  the  border  and  an 
enemy  whom  the  United  States  had  good  rea 
son  to  fear.  The  distance  between  Tecumseh 's 
home  and  that  of  Red  Eagle  is  greater  than  that 
which  separates  Berlin  from  Paris  or  Vienna  ; 
and  when  Tecumseh  lived  there  were  no  means 
of  communication  between  the  Indians  of  the 
North-west  and  those  of  the  South,  except  by 
long,  dangerous,  and  painful  journeys  on  foot. 

A  man  of  smaller  intellectual  mould  than  Te 
cumseh  would  not  have  dreamed  of  the  possi 
bility  of  establishing  relations  with  people  so 
distant  as  the  Creeks  were  from  the  tribes  of  the 
North-west.  But  Tecumseh  had  all  the  qualities 


RED   EAGLE. 


.qf  k:man'<pf;genjiu£,'  the  chief  of  which  are  breadth 
and  comprehensiveness  of  view  and  daring  bold 
ness  of  conception.     The  great  northern  chieftain 
did  many   deeds  in  his  day   by  which  he  fairly 
won  the  reputation  he  had  for  the  possession  of 
genius,  both  as  a  soldier  and  as  a  statesman  ;  but 
nothing  in  his  history  so  certainly  proves  his  title 
to  rank  among  really  great  men  as  his  boldness 
and   brilliancy   in   planning    the   formation  of  a 
great  confederacy  of  the  tribes,  which  extended 
in  a  chain  from  the  lakes  on  the  north  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  on  the  south.     He  was  wise  enough 
to  learn  of  his  foes.     He  saw  that  their  strength 
lay  in  their  union  ;    that   it  was  by    "  joining  all 
their   camp-fires,"  as    he   phrased     it,   that  they 
made  themselves  irresistible  ;  and  as  he  saw  with 
consternation  that  the  great  tide  of  white  men 
was  steadily  advancing  westward,  he  understood, 
as  few  men  of  his  race  were  capable  of  doing, 
that  there  was  but  one  possible  way  for  the  red 
men   to  withstand  the   ever-encroaching   stream. 
Separately    the  tribes    were    powerless,    because 
separately    they    could    be   beaten   one   by    one. 
Troops  who  were  engaged  in  reducing  an  Illinois 
tribe  during  one  month  could  be  sent  the  next  to 
oppose  another  tribe  in  Mississippi  or  Alabama. 
Thus    the    secret    of    the    white    men's   success, 


INTRODUCING   RED   EAGLE.  15 

Tecumseh  saw,  lay  in  two  facts  :  first,  that  the 
whites  were  united,  working  together  for  a  com 
mon  purpose,  and  helping  each  other  in  turn  ; 
and,  second,  that  the  whites  used  the  same  troops 
over  and  over  again  to  fight  the  separately  acting 
tribes. 

Seeing  all  this  and  understanding  it,  Tecumseh 
conceived  his  great  plan — a  plan  equally  great, 
whether  we  regard  it  as  a  stroke  of  statesman 
ship  or  a  brilliant  scheme  of  military  combina 
tion.  He  determined,  as  he  said,  to  build  a  dam 
against  the  stream.  He  undertook  to  form  a 
confederacy  of  all  the  tribes  from  north  to  south, 
to  teach  them  to  act  together,  and  to  oppose  the 
advance  of  the  white  men  by  uniting  that  power 
which  they  were  wasting  separately. 

It  was  in  execution  of  this  plan  that  Tecumseh 
made  that  journey  to  the  South  in  the  year  1811 
which,  in  combination  with  other  causes  to  be 
mentioned  in  their  place,  induced  the  Creeks  of 
Southern  Alabama  to  abandon  all  that  they  had 
gained  of  civilization,  and  to  plunge  first  into  a 
war  among  themselves,  and  afterward  into  that 
struggle  with  the  white  men  which  destroyed 
their  nation  almost  utterly. 

In  that  war  there  was  one  man  more  conspicu 
ous  than  any  other — more  relentless,  more  dar- 


16  RED   EAGLE. 

ing,  more  desperate  in  his  refusal  to  give  or 
to  accept  quarter,  and  at  the  same  time  more 
brilliant  in  attack  and  defence,  abler  in  counsel, 
and  having  greater  skill  in  the  field  than  any  of 
his  fellow-chiefs — a  man  who  fought  Jackson, 
Claiborne,  Flournoy,  Floyd,  and  Coffee,  whose 
troops,  coming  from  different  quarters  of  the 
country,  surrounded  him  on  every  side  and  out 
numbered  him  on  every  field  ;  fighting  them  with 
credit  to  his  own  skill  and  daring,  and  with  no 
little  damage  to  these  skilled  enemies*— a  man  of 
whom  Jackson  said,  "  He  is  fit  to  command 
armies." 

This  man  was  Red  Eagle,  or,  in  his  native 
Muscogee  tongue,  Lamochattee. 

To  the  white  men  with  whom  he  lived  a  great 
part  of  his  life,  and  to  his  enemies  in  war,  he  was 
better  known  as  William  Weatherford  ;  and  as 
the  historical  accounts  of  the  war  in  which  he 
won  his  renown  were  all  written  by  white  men, 
because  Red  Eagle  could  not  write,  his  white 
name,  Weatherford,  is  the  one  by  which  he  is 
generally  known  in  books.  His  fame  was  won  as 
an  Indian,  however  ;  it  was  the  Indian  warrior 
Red  Eagle,  not  the  half-breed  planter  Weather- 
ford,  who  did  the  deeds  which  gave  him  a  place 
in  American  history  ;  and  this  neglect  of  his 


INTRODUCING   RED    EAGLE.  \J 

Indian  name  in  all  historical  works  which  refer  to 
him  is  an  example  of  the  sarcasm  of  destiny.  It 
reminds  one  of  the  hero  of  whom  Byron  tells  us, 
who,  falling-  in  battle  covered  with  glory,  lost  his 
only  chance  for  fame  by  the  blunder  of  a  printer, 
who  misspelled  his  name  in  the  gazette.  We 
have  preferred  to  call  the  great  commander  of 
the  Creeks  by  his  Indian  name,  Red  Eagle,  on 
the  title-page  of  this  book,  but  in  writing  of  him 
it  will  be  necessary  frequently  to  use  the  name 
Weatherford  instead. 

The  story  of  the  Creek  war  naturally  follows 
the  life  of  Tecumseh,  with  which  this  series  of  In 
dian  biographies  was  introduced  ;  and  indeed  the 
one  story  is  necessary  to  the  complete  telling  of 
the  other.  It  may  be  best  told  in  the  form  of  a 
life  of  Red  Eagle,  who  commanded  on  one  side, 
and  whose  genius  for  command  alone  made  the 
war  an  affair  worth  writing  about  ;  but,  un 
luckily  for  the  biographer,  the  materials  for  a 
biography  of  Red  Eagle,  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  word,  are  meagre  and  difficult  to  get  at. 

I  hinted  at  the  chief  cause  of  this  meagreness 
and  obscurity  when  I  said,  just  now,  that  Red 
Eagle  could  not  write.  I  always  thought,  in 
reading  Caesar  De  Bello  Gallico,  that  the  Roman 
commander  had  a  great  advantage  over  the  poor 


1 8  RED   EAGLE. 

Gauls  in  his  rather  remarkable  dexterity  in  the  use 
of  the  pen.  We  do  not  know  how  good  or  how 
bad  his  handwriting  was  ;  but  whether  he  wrote 
with  perfect  Spencerian  precision  or  in  a  scrawl 
as  illegible  as  Mr.  Greeley's,  Caesar  knew  how 
to  tell  his  side  of  the  story,  and  there  was  nobody 
to  tell  the  other  side.  Perhaps  the  tale  would 
read  very  differently  if  some  clever  Gaul  had 
been  able  to  write  an  account  of  the  war  in  classic 
Latin  for  the  school-boys  of  the  nineteenth  cen 
tury  to  puzzle  out  with  the  aid  of  a  dictionary. 
So  Red  Eagle,  if  he  had  known  how  to  write, 
would  probably  have  given  us  a  view  of  the 
things  done  in  the  Creek  war  which  we  do  not 
get  from  his  enemies. 

It  is  not  merely  in  the  military  sense  that  the 
word  enemies  is  here  used,  but  in  the  literal  one 
as  well  ;  for  very  nearly  all  the  information  AVC 
have  about  Red  Eagle  and  his  performances  is 
drawn  from  the  writings  and  the  spoken  testi 
mony  of  men  who  hated  him  with  a  degree  of 
violence  of  which  one  can  scarcely  conceive  in 
our  time.  These  men  wrote  while  boiling  with 
the  passions  of  a  war  which  seriously  threatened 
the  existence  of  this  American  nation,  and  they 
hated  Red  Eagle  as  one  of  the  men  who  added 
very  greatly  to  the  country's  peril,  and  sorely 


INTRODUCING   RED   EAGLE.  19 

taxed  its  resources  when  its  resources  were  few 
est.  Their  hatred  was  so  violent  that  they  could 
not  restrain  its  expression  ;  while  they  granted 
to  Red  Eagle  the  possession  of  courage  and  abil 
ity,  they  could  not  write  of  him  without  flying 
into  a  passion  and  heaping  hard  names  upon  his 
head. 

One  of  them,  in  a  grave  treatise  about  the  war, 
scolded  in  this  way  about  him  : 

"  Among  the  first  who  entered  into  the  views 
of  the  British  commissioners  was  the  since  cele 
brated  Weatherford,  with  whom  it  may  not  be 
amiss  to  make  the  reader  better  acquainted  at 
this  time.  Weatherford  was  born  in  the  Creek 
nation.  His  father  was  an  itinerant  pedler, 
sordid,  treacherous,  and  revengeful  ;  his  mother 
a  full-blooded  savage  of  the  tribe  of  the  Semi- 
noles.  He.  partook  of  the  bad  qualities  of  both 
his  parents,  and  engrafted  on  the  stock  he 
inherited  from  others  many  that  were  peculiarly 
his  own.  With  avarice,  treachery,  and  a  thirst 
for  blood,  he  combines  lust,  gluttony,  and  a 
devotion  to  every  species  of  criminal  carousal." 

That,  certainly,  is  as  pretty  a  bit  of  angry  vitu 
peration  as  one  hears  from  the  lips  of  the  worst 
of  scolds,  and  so  wholly  did  the  distinguished 
author  of  the  book  from  which  it  is  taken  lose  his 


20  KED    EAGLE. 

temper,  that  he  lost  his  discretion  with  it,  and 
forgot  that  so  coarse  and  brutal  a  fellow  as  he 
here  declares  Reel  Eagle  to  have  been — a  man  so 
wholly  given  over  to  debauchery — is  sure  to  show 
in  his  face,  his  person,  and  his  intellectual  opera 
tions  the  effects  of  his  character,  impulses,  and 
habits.  In  the  very  next  paragraph  this  writer 
tells  us  certain  things  about  Red  Eagle  which 
forbid  us  to  believe  that  he  was  a  drunkard,  a  de 
based  creature,  a  glutton,  or  a  brute.  He  says  : 

"  Fortune  in  her  freaks  sometimes  gives  to  the 
most  profligate  an  elevation  of  mind  which  she 
denies  to  men  whose  propensities  are  the  most 
virtuous.  On  Weatherford  she  bestowed  genius, 
eloquence,  and  courage.  The  first  of  these  qual 
ities  enabled  him  to  conceive  great  designs,  the 
last  to  execute  them  ;  while  eloquence,  bold, 
impressive,  and  figurative,  furnished  him  with  a 
passport  to  the  favor  of  his  countrymen  and  fol 
lowers.  Silent  and  reserved,  unless  Avhen  excited 
by  some  great  occasion,  and  superior  to  the 
weakness  of  rendering  himself  cheap  by  the  fre 
quency  of  his  addresses,  he  delivered  his  opinions 
but  seldom  in  council  ;  but  when  he  did  so  he 
was  listened  to  with  delight  and  approbation." 

That  does  not  read  like  an  account  of  the  par 
liamentary  methods  of  a  brutish  man,  degraded 


INTRODUCING   RED    EAGLE.  21 

by  vice  and  debauched  with  drunkenness  and 
gluttony  ;  it  sounds  rather  like  a  description  of 
the  wise  ways  of  some  Webster  or  Clay. 
Drunken  men  with  the  gift  of  eloquent  speech  do 
not  hoard  it  and  use  it  in  this  adroit  way.  This 
is  not  all,  however.  Men  who  are  given  over  to 
vice,  glutton}^,  and  drunkenness  usually  carry 
the  marks  of  their  excesses  in  their  appearance 
and  their  ways  of  thinking  ;  but  our  writer  who 
has  told  us  that  Weatherford  was  such  a  man, 
tells  us  how  he  looked  and  acted,  and  what  his 
ability  was,  in  this*wise  : 

"  His  judgment  and  eloquence  had  secured  the 
respect  of  the  old  ;  his  vices  made  him  the  idol 
of  the  young  and  the  unprincipled.  It  is  even 
doubted  whether  a  civilized  society  could  behold 
this  monster  without  interest.  In  his  person  tall, 
straight,  and  well-proportioned  ;  his  eye  black, 
lively,  and  penetrating,  and  indicative  of  courage 
and  enterprise  ;  his  nose  prominent,  thin,  and 
elegant  in  its  formation  ;  while  all  the  features  of 
his  face,  harmoniously  arranged,  speak  an  active 
and  disciplined  mind."  A  little  further  down 
the  page  this  writer  calls  Weatherford  "  the  key 
and  corner-stone  of  the  Creek  confederacy,"  and 
characterizes  him  as  "  this  extraordinary  man." 
Our  purpose  is  not  now  to  defend  Red  Eagle's 


22  RED   EAGLE. 

memory  or  to  extol  his  character,  though  there 
is  good  reason  to  remember  him  with  honor  for 
his  courage  in  war .  and  for  his  good  faith  in 
peace  ;  and  there  are  abundant  proofs  that  the 
praise  which  the  hostile  writer  whom  we  have 
quoted  could  not  deny  to  the  fallen  chieftain,  was 
far  juster  than  the  abuse  he  heaped  upon  him. 
We  have  made  these  extracts  merely  to  show  in 
what  spirit  of  unfair  prejudice  all  the  contempo 
raneous  accounts  of  Weatherford's  life  and  deeds 
were  written.  It  will  be  better  to  form  our  own 
opinions  of  the  Creek  warrior's  character  after  we 
shall  have  reviewed  the  events  of  his  life  ;  and  no 
one  who  so  examines  the  facts,  although  they 
come  to  us  only  from  his  enemies,  can  fail  to  form 
a  much  higher  opinion  of  the  unfortunate  man  than 
that  which  the  chroniclers  of  his  day  have  offered 
to  us  ready-made. 

The  enmity  and  prejudice  of  'which  we  have 
spoken  operate  still  more  strongly  in  another 
way  to  embarrass  the  biographer  who  seeks  to 
learn  details  of  Weatherford's  life.  Where  the 
writers  of  his  day  have  misrepresented  his  char 
acter  or  conduct,  it  is  not  difficult  to  discover 
the  fact  and  to  correct  the  misjudgment ;  but, 
unluckily,  they  too  often  neglected  even  to  mis 
represent  him.  Caring  only  for  their  own  side 


INTRODUCING   RED   EAGLE.  23 

and  their  own  heroes,  these  historians,  who  were 
generally  participants  in  the  events  they  chron 
icled,  took  the  utmost  pains  to  tell  us  just  where 
each  body  of  American  troops  fought ;  who  com 
manded  them  in  the  first,  second,  third,  and  so  on 
to  the  tenth  degree  of  subordinate  rank  ;  how 
many  Americans  and  how  many  friendly  Indians 
there  were  in  each  part  of  every  field  ;  how  many 
of  these  were  killed  and  wounded — every  thing,  in 
short,  which  they  could  find  out  or  guess  out 
about  the  details  of  their  side  of  the  fight,  while 
the  other  side  seemed  to  them  unworthy  of  any 
thing  more  than  the  most  general  attention. 
They  were  so  careless  indeed  of  the  Indian  side 
of  these  affairs  that  it  is  in  many  cases  impossible 
to  discover  from  any  of  the  accounts  what  chiefs 
commanded  the  Creek  forces  in  important  bat 
tles,  or  even  what  chiefs  were  present.  In  other 
cases  this  information  is  given  to  us  by  accident, 
as  it  were,  not  in  the  accounts  of  the  battles,  but 
by  means  of  a  casual  reference  in  an  account  of 
something  else.  Thus  one  of  the  writers  devotes 
many  pages  and  a  good  deal  of  stilted  rhetoric  to 
his  account  of  the  Fort  Mims  massacre,  a  bloody 
affair,  in  which  Weatherford  won  solely  by  rea 
son  of  the  fact  that  he  was  a  better  and  more 
skilful  officer  than  the  American  commander, 


24  RED   EAGLE. 

manifesting  indeed  some  of  the  best  qualities  of 
an  able  general  ;  but  with  all  this  historian's 
minuteness  of  detail,  he  wholly  forgets  to  men 
tion  the  fact  that  Weatherford  had  anything  to 
do  with  the  matter.  His  neglect  is  not  the  result 
of  any  want  of  information,  as  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that,  in  writing  of  other  things  afterward,  he 
incidentally  mentions  the  Creek  warrior  as  the 
leader  of  the  Indians  at  Fort  Minis. 

To  the  carelessness  of  the  contemporaneous 
writers,  to  whom  alone  we  can  at  this  day  look 
for  information  upon  detailed  points  of  interest, 
must  be  added,  as  a  cai  se  of  the  meagreness  of 
the  record,  their  lack  of  opportunity.  The  In 
dians  kept  their  own  secrets.  They  were  fight 
ing  to  destroy  the  whites,  not  to  win  renown  ; 
and  the  Americans  who  fought  them  had  little 
chance  to  hear  news  of  any  kind  from  the  forces 
on  the  other  side. 

Notwithstanding  this  lack  of  detailed  informa 
tion  respecting  Red  Eagle's  life  and  deeds,  how 
ever,  we  know  with  certainty  that  he  was,  as  the 
writer  quoted  a  few  pages  back  said,  the  "  key 
and  corner-stone  of  the  Creek  confederacy,"  the 
commander  of  the  Creek  armies,  the  statesman 
who  guided  the  Creek  councils,  and  the  general 
who  planned  and  conducted  the  Creek  cam- 


INTRODUCING   RED   EAGLE.  25 

paigns.  His  was  the  master  mind  on  the  Indian 
side,  as  positively  as  Jackson's  was  on  the  side  of 
the  Americans  ;  and  therefore  while  there  is  an 
unfortunate  lack  of  information  of  a  strictly  bio 
graphical  nature  concerning  this  remarkable  man, 
it  is  still  possible  to  write  his  life  by  writing  an 
account  of  the  Creek  war.  After  all,  it  is  the 
things  a  man  does  which  make  up  his  life  ;  and 
the  story  of  his  deeds  is  his  biography,  whether 
or  not  it  includes  the  dates  of  his  birth  and  his 
death,  or  tells  with  precision  when  or  how  he  did 
this  or  that. 

Accordingly,  instead  of  beginning  this  story 
of  Red  Eagle's  life  with  a  chapter  about  his 
birth  and  parentage,  after  the  customary  manner 
of  grave  biographers,  and  following  his  career 
incident  by  incident,  confining  the  narrative  to 
an  account  of  his  direct,  personal  share  in  each 
transaction,  I  shall  write  an  account  of  the  war 
he  made,  regarding  the  whole  series  of  events  as 
properly  parts  of  one  great  affair  which  Red 
Eagle  devised  and  executed. 

To  make  such  an  account  clearly  intelligible, 
however,  it  will  be  necessary  first  to  recount 
briefly  the  history  of  the  Southern  Indians,  and 
to  show  who  and  what  the  Creeks  were,  what 
their  condition  was  at  the  time  of  the  war's  be- 


26  RED    EAGLE. 

ginning,  and  what  they  hoped  to  gain  by  their 
contest  with  the  whites — which  was  not  by  any 
means  a  mere  outbreak  of  savagery  like  some  of 
the  Indian  troubles  of  our  time,  but  rather  a  war 
deliberately  undertaken  with  very  definite  pur 
poses,  after  long  consideration  and  no  little  get 
ting  ready. 

Upon  many  points  the  best  authorities  are  con 
flicting,  partly  because  their  works  were  written 
each  with  a  special  purpose  and  from  a  special 
point  of  view,  and  partly  because  of  carelessness 
in  the  collection  and  weighing  of  facts  ;  but  it  is 
still  possible  to  arrive  at  the  truth  in  all  essential 
particulars,  and  to  construct,  out  of  the  frag 
mentary  materials  at  command,  a  consecutive 
account  of  the  brilliant  campaign  of  1813-14,  in 
which  Red  Eagle  wras  the  foremost  figure  on  one 
side,  and  Andrew  Jackson  the  master  spirit  on 
the  other. 


CHAPTER   II. 

RED   EAGLE'S    PEOPLE. 

RED  EAGLE,  or  William  Weatherford,  was 
only  in  part  an  Indian,  as  we  shall  see  presently  ; 
but  his  life  was  so  entirely  the  life  of  an  Indian, 
in  that  part  of  it  at  least  which  gave  him  his  title 
to  a  place  in  history,  that  we  must  naturally 
think  of  him  as  a  member  of  his  mother's  race, 
rather  than  as  a  white  man,  and  we  must  regard 
the  Indian  nation  to  which  he  belonged  as  his 
people.  He  was  born  a  Creek,  arid  not  only  so, 
but  a  great  chief  of  the  Creek  nation  ;  that  is  to 
say,  a  chief  of  the  highest  hereditary  rank. 

The  Creek  nation  was  not  a  tribe,  but  a  confed 
eracy  of  tribes,  united  as  the  Roman  Empire  was 
by  successive  conquests.  The  original  Romans 
in  this  case  were  the  Muscogees,  a  tribe  of  In 
dians  so  much  further  advanced  toward  civiliza 
tion  when  white  men  first  encountered  them  thaij 
most  of  the  Indian  tribes  were,  that  they  had  been 
able  to  preserve  greatly  more  of  their  own  his 
tory  than  savages  are  ordinarily  able  to  do.  They 
had  fixed  laws,  too,  not  merely  rules  of  the  chase, 


23  RED   EAGLE. 

but  laws  by  which  they  were  governed  in  the  or 
dinary  affairs  of  life  ;  and  many  of  their  practices 
when  the  tribe  was  first  known  to  white  men  in 
dicate  that  they  were  then  rapidly  working  out  a 
system  of  government  and  semi-civilization  for 
themselves,  or  else  that,  as  they  themselves  be 
lieved,  they  were  descended  from  a  race  formerly 
civilized,  of  whose  civilization  they  still  retained 
traces  in  their  customs. 

About  the  year  1775,  an  adventurous  young 
Frenchman  named  Le  Clerc  Milfort  visited  the 
Creeks,  and  marrying  a  woman  of  the  nation  be 
came  a  chief  among  them.  After  living  with  them 
for  twenty  years,  he  returned  to  France  and  was 
made  a  brigadier-general.  In  the  year  1802,  Mil- 
fort  published  a  book  about  the  strange  people 
among  whom  he  had  lived  half  a  lifetime,  and 
from  him,  or  rather  through  him,  the  world  has 
learned  what  the  Creeks  believe  to  be  the  history 
of  their  nation. 

This  history,  Milfort  says,  existed  in  the  shape 
of  a  sort  of  record— not  a  written  record,  of 
course,  but  not  merely  oral  tradition.  The  Creek 
historians  had  certain  strings  of  beads,  shells,  and 
pearls  which  aided  them  somewhat  as  written 
books  aid  civilized  men  to  preserve  the  memory 
of  their  nation's  past.  These  beads  meant  differ- 


RED  EAGLE'S  PEOPLE. 


29 


ent  things  according  to  their  arrangement,  and 
by  their  aid  the  historians  were  able  to  remember 
and  transmit  the  traditions  committed  to  their 
charge  with  something  like  accuracy. 

The  story,  as  they  tell  it,  is  probably  apocry 
phal  in  most  of  its  details,  but  it  is  less  improba 
ble,  at  worst,  than  is  the  story  of  the  foundation 
and  early  history  of  Rome.  According  to  the 
Creek  historians,  the  Muscogees  fought  with  the 
Aztecs  against  Cortez,  and  when  the  Spanish  in 
vader  gained  a  secure  foothold  in  Mexico  they 
took  up  their  march  northward.  On  their  way 
they  encountered  the  Alabamas,  whom  they 
drove  before  them  for  years,  following  them  from 
one  part  of  the  land  to  another,  and  giving  them 
no  rest.  They  chased  the  Alabamas  to  the  Mis 
souri  River,  thence  to  the  Ohio,  and  thence  to 
Alabama,  whither  they  followed  their  steps. 
Finally,  in  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth  cen 
tury,  the  persecuted  Alabamas  despaired  of  find 
ing  a  secure  refuge  from  their  relentless  persecut 
ors,  and  to  save  themselves  Irom  further  destruc 
tion  consented  to  form  a  close  alliance  with  the 
Muscogees,  submitting  to  the  laws  of  their  con 
querors  and  becoming  in  ettect  Muscogees.  This 
was  the  beginning  ot  that  confederacy  which  at- 
terward  became  the  Creek  Nation.  The  Tooka- 


30  RED   EAGLE. 

batcha  tribe,  fleeing  from  their  enemies  in  the 
north,  sought  the  protection  of  the  Muscogees 
next  and  became  members  of  the  nation.  Other 
tribes  were  added  to  the  nation  one  after  another, 
until  the  confederacy,  whose  seat  was  in  the  region 
along  the  Alabama,  Coosa,  and  Tombigbee  rivers, 
became  an  empire,  embracing  in  its  rule  all  the 
people  round  about  them,  and  carrying  terror 
even  to  the  tribes  beyond  the  Savannah  River. 

The  country  which  the  Muscogee  confederacy 
inhabited  was  and  still  is  singularly  well  watered 
and  fertile.  Their  two  great  rivers,  the  Alabama 
and  the  Tombigbee,  are  fed  by  numberless  creeks 
of  large  and  small  size,  and  the  number  of  these 
streams  prompted  the  white  men  who  traded 
with  the  Muscogees  to  call  their  land  the  Creek 
country,  and  from  the  land  the  name  was  trans 
ferred  to  its  people,  who  were  thereafter  called 
the  Creeks. 

These  Creeks,  as  we  have  said,  had  a  sort  of 
semi-civilization  of  their  own  when  the  whites 
first  visited  them.  They  had  fixed  rules  and  cus 
toms  governing  marriage  and  divorce.  They 
lived  in  houses,  wore  scanty  but  real  clothing, 
and  were  governed  by  a  rude  system  of  laws. 
Curiously  enough,  they  even  had  a  system  ol  so 
cial  caste  among  them,  a  sort  oi  graduated  order 


RED  EAGLE'S  PEOPLE.  31 

of  nobility.  There  were  certain  families  who  held 
high  hereditary  rank,  hereditary  privileges,  and 
hereditary  authority — the  family  of  the  Wind,  the 
family  of  the  Bear,  the  family  of  the  Deer,  etc. ; 
and  of  these  the  family  of  the  Wind  was  the 
highest  in  rank  and  authority.  They  constituted, 
indeed,  a  sort  of  royal  family,  the  family  of  the 
Bear  ranking  just  below  them. 

When  Colonel  Benjamin  Hawkins  was  sent  on 
an  important  mission  to  the  Creeks  in  the  year  1798 
he  found  an  organized  and  somewhat  complicated 
system  of  government  in  existence  among  them. 
Each  town  had  its  separate  local  government,  pre 
sided  over  by  a  Micco,  who  belonged  always  to 
one  of  the  chief  families.  They  had  their  public 
buildings  and  pleasure  houses,  their  fixed  rules  for 
the  conduct  of  public  business,  for  the  promotion 
of  warriors,  and  for  all  the  other  things  which 
need  systematic  regulation. 

Beginning  thus  with  a  foundation  of  recognized 
customs  upon  which  to  build  a  civilization,  the 
Creeks  improved  rapidly  under  the  influence  of 
the  white  men  when  they  were  brought  into  con 
tact  with  them.  They  already  cultivated  the 
ground,  and,  according  to  their  tradition,  had  al 
ways  done  so.  From  the  white  men  they  learned 
to  trade,  to  carry  on  their  commerce  with  regu- 


32  RED   EAGLE. 

larity,  and  even  to  manufacture  cloths  and  other 
needed  articles.  They  lived  generally  in  peace 
with  the  white  men,  and,  when  the  war  that  de 
stroyed  all  this  good  beginning  came,  these  peo 
ple  had  their  horses  and  their  houses,  their  farms, 
their  hoes,  and  their  looms.  They  were  not  yet 
civilized,  but  they  were  well  advanced  toward  the 
acquisition  of  the  arts  of  peace.  They  had  too 
much  hunting  land,  and  the  spontaneous  or  near 
ly  spontaneous  productions  of  their  rich  soil  and 
genial  climate  made  living  somewhat  too  easy  for 
their  good  ;  but  in  spite  of  these  strong  incentives 
to  idleness,  the  Creeks  were  steadily  improving. 
Many  of  them  intermarried  with  the  whites,  and 
in  part  adopted  white  men's  modes  of  living. 
Missionaries  went  among  them,  and  even  the 
traders  were  in  an  important  sense  missionaries. 
Many  of  the  Creeks  learned  to  read  and  write,  a 
few  were  educated  men,  most  of  these  being  half- 
breeds,  whose  fathers  sent  them  north  to  attend 
schools. 

Their  condition  was  made  the  more  favorable 
for  advancement  by  the  good  treatment  they  re 
ceived  at  the  hands  of  the  United  States  Govern 
ment.  It  is  constantly  said  in  our  time  that  the 
government  has  never  dealt  justly  or  kept  honest 
faith  with  the  Indians,  and  this  reproach  is  usually 


RED  EAGLE'S  PEOPLE.  33 

coupled  with  a  reference  to  the  wiser,  better,  and 
more  humane  methods  of  the  British  in  Canada  ; 
but  if  one  were  disposed  to  argue  the  question, 
it  might  easily  be  shown  that  both  the  assertion 
of  the  uniform  failure  of  the  Americans  to  deal 
justly  with  Indians,  and  the  implication  that  the 
English  have  as  uniformly  treated  the  savages 
well,  are  false.  In  the  case  of  the  Creeks,  it  ap 
pears  to  be  certain  that  the  American  Government 
did  all  that  could  be  done  to  elevate  the  savages, 
and  was  only  thwarted  in  the  attempt  by  the  in 
terference  of  British  agents — red  and  white— who 
incited  Red  Eagle's  people  to  undertake  the  war 
which  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  their  pros 
perity  and  their  ultimate  removal  from  the  land 
they  inhabited. 

Mr.  Nathaniel  Herbert  Claiborne,  a  prominent 
citizen  of  Virginia,  and  a  man  specially  well  in 
formed  on  the  subject,  in  a  work  which  was  writ 
ten  immediately  after  the  Creek  war  ended, 
wrote  as  follows  on  the  subject  of  the  govern 
ment's  treatment  of  the  Creeks  : 

14  It  has  been  demonstrated  that  the  conduct  of 
the  United  States  to  the  Creek  Indians  was  both 
just  and  honorable.  Without  any  consideration 
save  that  which  arises  from  the  consciousness  ot 
doing  a  good  act,  the  government  of  the  United 


34  RED  EAGLE. 

States  had,  for  more  than  twenty  years,  en 
deavored  to  reclaim  them  from  a  savage  to  a 
civilized  state.  By  the  exertions  of  government, 
bent  only  on  augmenting  the  stock  of  human  hap 
piness,  it  was  evident  that  the  situation  of  the 
Creeks  was  greatly  ameliorated.  Many  of  them 
spoke  and  wrote  our  language.  Pious  men  were 
sent,  at  the  expense  of  government,  to  instruct 
them  in  the  religion  oi  Christ.  The  rising  gene 
ration  were  instructed  in  numerous  schools.  .  .  . 
A  sentiment  of  pity,  a  fit  cement  for  lasting  friend 
ship,  had  taken  possession  of  the  American  breast 
toward  the  Indians  ;  and  our  citizens  and  govern 
ment  vied  with  each  other  in  acts  of  benevolence 
and  charity  toward  them.  They  were  instructed 
in  the  fabrication  of  the  implements  of  husbandry. 
The  loom  and  the  spinning-wheel  were  in  full 
operation  through  the  whole  nation  ;  while  the 
art  of  house-building,  so  essential  to  the  accom 
modation  of  man  and  his  protection  irorn  the 
winds  and  waters  of  heaven,  was  rapidly  approxi 
mating  to  perfection.  If  any  of  our  citizens  in- 
iured  them  a  punishment  was  provided  by  law, 
and  the  temper  of  the  nation,  in  unison  with  the 
temper  of  the  government,  rendered  its  infliction 
certain.  And  such  was  the  progress  of  the 
Creeks  in  civilization,  and  the  obligations  they 


RED  EAGLE'S  PEOPLE.  35 

were  under  to  the  United  States,  that  no  one  be 
lieved  they  could  be  cajoled  into  a  confederacy 
against  us." 

One  other  point  must  not  be  overlooked,  be 
cause,  although  its  bearing  upon  the  prospects  ot 
the  Creeks  may  not  be  fully  evident  to  readers 
who  have  given  the  subject  no  attention,  it  was 
really  the  most  promising  thing  in  their  situation. 
The  tribal  relation  among  them  was  weakening. 
They  were  taking  the  first  steps  from  communism, 
which  is  the  soul  of  savage  life,  to  that  individu 
alism  which  is  the  foundation  of  civilization. 
They  were  beginning  to  hold  individual  property, 
and  thereby  to  become  men,  with  interests  and 
wills  of  their  own,  instead  of  mere  members  of  a 
tribe.  This  \vas  brought  about  in  part  by  their 
trading  with  the  whites  and  in  part  by  their  in 
termarriages.  The  traders  who  married  Creek 
wives  and  lived  in  the  nation  were  shrewd  fel 
lows,  strongly  inclined  to  look  sharply  after  their 
own  interests  ;  and  their  half-breed  children,  who 
retained  their  rank  as  Creeks,  many  of  them  being 
chiefs  of  high  degree,  inherited  their  fathers'  in 
stincts  and  learned  their  fathers'  ways.  It  would 
not  have  required  many  years  of  peace  in  these 
circumstances  to  have  made-of  the  Creeks  a  na 
tion  of  civilized  men.  Until  the  seeds  of  hostility 


36  RED   EAGLE. 

to  the  Americans  were  sown  among  them  by  the 
agents  of  the  British  and  the  Spanish,  their  ad 
vancement  was  steady,  and  the  effort  which  the 
Americans  were  making  to  civilize  them  was  the 
fairest  and  most  hopeful  experiment  perhaps  that 
has  ever  been  made  in  that  direction  on  this  con 
tinent. 


CHAPTER   III. 

RED   EAGLE'S    BIRTH   AND  BOYHOOD. 

WILLIAM  WEATHERFORD,  the  Red  Eagle,  was 
born  in  the  Creek  country,  and  born  a  chieftain. 
The  exact  date  of  his  birth  is  not  known,  but  as 
he  was  a  man  of  about  thirty  or  thirty -five  years 
of  age  when  the  Creek  war  broke  out  in  1813,  his 
birth  must  have  occurred  about  the  year  1780. 
He  is  commonly  spoken  of  in  books,  and  especial 
ly  in  books  that  were  written  while  a  feeling  of 
intense  antipathy  to  him  continued  to  exist,  as 
the  son  of  a  Scotch  pedler,  or  the  son  of  a  Geor 
gia  pedler,  the  phrase  carrying  with  it  the  sugges 
tion  that  Red  Eagle  was  a  man  of  contemptible 
origin.  This  was  not  the  case.  His  father  was 
a  Scotch  pedler,  certainly,  who  went  to  the  Creek 
country  from  Georgia,  but  he  was  by  no  means 
the  sort  of  person  who  is  suggested  to  our  minds 
by  the  word  pedler.  He  was  a  trader  of  great 
shrewdness  and  fine  intellectual  ability,  who 
managed  his  business  so  well  that  he  became  rich 
in  spite  of  his  strong  taste  for  the  expensive  sport 
of  horse-racing. 


38  RED    EAGLE. 

Besides  this,  men  usually  luive  two  parents, 
and  Red  Eagle  was  not  an  exception  to  this  rule. 
If  he  was  the  son  of  a  Scotch  pudler  from  Geor 
gia,  he  was  also  the  son  of  an  Indian  woman,  who 
belonged  to  the  dominant  family  of  the  Wind  ; 
that  is  to  say,  she  was  a  princess,  her  rank  among 
the  Creeks  corresponding  as  nearly  as  possible  to 
that  of  a  daughter  of  the  royal  house  in  a  civi 
lized  monarchy. 

Red  Eagle's  connection  with  persons  of  distinc 
tion  did  not  end  here.  He  was  the  nephew  of  the 
wife  of  Le  Clerc  Milfort,  the  Frenchmar  men 
tioned  in  a  former  chapter,  who,  after  a  t\venty 
years'  residence  among  the  Creeks,  returned  to 
France  and  received  a  brigadier-general's  commis 
sion  at  the  hands  of  Napoleon.  Red  Eagle  was 
the  nephew,  through  his  mother,  of  AlexanderJMc- 
Gillivray,  a  man  of  mixed  Scotch,  French,  and  In 
dian  blood,  \v\\o  by  dint  of  his  very  great  ability 
as  a  soldier,  a  ruler  of  the  Creeks,  and  a  wily, 
unscrupulous  diplomatist,  made  a  prominent 
place  for  himself  in  history.  He  was  commis 
sioned  as  a  colonel  in  the  British  service  ;  later 
he  became  a  commissary  of  subsistence  in  the 
Spanish  army,  with  the  rank  and  pay  of  colonel  ; 
and  f'nnlly  he  received  from  Washington  an  ap 
pointment  as  brigadier-general,  with  full  pay. 


RED  EAGLE'S  BIRTH  AND  BOYHOOD.        39 

He  is  described  by  Mr.  A.  J.  Pickett,  in  his  His 
tory  of  Alabama,  as  "  a  man  of  towering  intellect 
anj  vast  infoimation,  who  ruled  the  Creek  coun 
try  for  a  quarter  of  a  century."  Another  writer 
says  that  Alexander  McGillivray  "  became  the 
great  chief  or  emperor,  as  he  styled  himself,  of 
all  the  confederate  Muscogee  tribes;"  and  adds, 
"  He  was  a  man  of  the  highest  intellectual  abilities, 
of  considerable  education,  and  of  wonderful  tal 
ents  for  intrigue  and  diplomacy.  This  he  ex 
hibited  conspicuously  through  the  period  of  the 
American  Revolution,  in  baffling  alike  the  schemes 
of  our  countrymen,  both  Whig  and  Tory,  of  the 
Spaniards  in  Florida,  of  the  British  at  Mobile,  and 
of  the  French  at  New  Orleans,  and  by  using  them 
simultaneously  for  his  o\vn  purposes  of  political 
and  commercial  aggrandizement.  A  more  wily 
Talleyrand  never  trod  the  red  war  paths  of  the 
frontiers  or  quaffed  the  deceptive  black  drink  at 
sham  councils  or  with  deluded  agents  and  emis 
saries." 

Reading  these  descriptions  of  the  character 
and  abilities  of  his  uncle,  knowing  how  shrewd 
a  man  his  father  was,  and  remembering  that  his 
mother  was  a  member  of  that  family  of  the  Wind 
who  had  for  generations  managed  to  retain  for 
themselves  the  foremost  place  in  the  councils  and 


4O  RED  EAGLE. 

campaigns  of  their  warlike  race,  we  may  fairly 
assume  that  Red  Eagle  came  honestly  by  the 
genius  for  intrigue  and  lor  command  which 
brought  distinction  to  him  during  the  Creek  war. 
He  may  fairly  be  supposed  to  have  inherited 
those  qualities  of  mind  which  fitted  him  to  be  a 
leader  in  that  fierce  struggle,  and  as  a  leader  to 
hold  his  own  surprisingly  well  against  greatly 
superior  numbers  of  good  troops,  commanded  by 
Andrew  Jackson  himsell. 

When  Charles  Weatherford,  the  Scotch  trader 
Irom  Georgia,  married  the  sister  of  General  Alex 
ander  McGillivray,  or  Emperor  Alexander  Mc- 
Gillivray,  as  he  preferred  to  be  called,  he  ac 
quired  by  that  alliance  a  measure  of  influence 
among  the  Creeks  which  few  men  even  of  pure 
Muscosree  blood  could  boast.  This  influence  was 

o 

strengthened  as  his  shrewdness  and  the  soundness 
of  his  judgment  made  themselves  apparent  in  the 
councils  of  the  nation.  More  especially  he  made 
himself  dear  to  the  hearts  of  the  Creeks  by  his 
skill  in  managing  their  diplomatic  relations  with 
the  Spanish  authorities  in  Florida,  and  the  Ameri 
can  agents. 

In  all  this,  however,  the  wily  Scotchman  served 
himself  while  serving  the  nation,  and  he  rapidly 
grew  to  be  rich.  He  lived,  literally  as  a  prince, 


RED  EAGLE'S  BIRTH  AND  BOYHOOD.        41 

at  his  home  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Alabama 
River,  on  the  first  high  ground  below  the  con 
fluence  of  the  Coosa  and  Tallapoosa  rivers. 

Here  he  built  for  himself  a  home,  and,  still  re 
taining  his  interest  in  commerce,  set  up  a  trading 
house.     His  love  of  horse-racing  has  already  been 
mentioned,  and  now  that  he  was  a  man  of  wealth 
and  consequence  it  was  natural  that  he  should  in 
dulge  this  taste  to  the  full.     He  laid  out  a  race 
track  near  his  trading  house,  and  devoted  a  large 
share  of  his  attention  to  the  business  of  breeding 
fine  horses.     Even  in  thus  indulging  his  passion 
for  horse-racing,   however,  Charles  Weatherford 
was  shrewd  enough  to  make  the  sport  contribute 
to  his  prosperity  in  other  ways  than  by  means  of 
profitable  gambling.     He  so  managed  the  races 
as  to  attract  his  neighbors,  principally  the  Alaba- 
mas,  to  his  place  of  business,  and  so  secured  to 
himself  their  trade,  which  would  otherwise  have 
gone  to  the  traders  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river,  in  the  village  of  Coosawda. 

Here  William  Weatherford  was  born,  the  son 
of  the  wealthiest  man  in  that  part  of  the  country, 
and  by  inheritance  a  chief  of  the  ruling  family  of 
the  nation.  He  had  for  tutors  no  less  competent 
men  than  his  two  uncles,  Alexander  McGillivray, 
and  the  accomplished  Frenchman  Le  Clerc  Mil- 


42  RED   EAGLE. 

fort.  Young  Weatherford  evinced  the  best  ca 
pacity  for  acquiring  knowledge,  but  it  was  only 
such  knowledge  as  he  wanted  to  acquire.  Caring 
nothing  about  reading  and  writing,  he  refused  to 
learn  to  read  and  write,  and  no  persuasions  would 
overcome  his  obstinacy  in  this  particular.  lie 
took  pains,  however,  to  acquire  the  utmost  com 
mand  of  the  English  language,  partly  because  it 
was  useful  to  him  as  a  means  of  communication 
with  the  Americans,  and  partly  because  he  found 
that  command  of  a  civilized  tongue  gave  him  a 
greater  force  in  speaking  his  native  Creek  lan 
guage,  and  it  was  a  part  of  his  ambition  to  be  dis 
tinguished  for  eloquence  in  council.  He  learned 
French,  also,  but  less  perfectly,  and  acquired 
enough  of  Spanish  to  speak  it  in  ordinary  conver 
sation.  He  travelled,  too,  for  improvement,  mak 
ing  several  journeys  while  yet  a  boy  to  Mobile 
and  Pensacola,  picking  up  as  he  went  whatever 
information  there  was  to  acquire. 

He  thus  became  in  an  important  sense  an  edu 
cated  man.  He  could  not  read  or  write,  it  is 
true  ;  but  it  is  probable  that  Homer  was  equally 
ignorant,  and  not  at  all  certain  that  Hannibal  or 
Richard  Cceur  de  Lion,  great  commanders  as 
they  were,  were  much  better  scholars. 

The  chief  function  of  education  is  to  train  the 


RED  EAGLE'S  BIRTH  AND  BOYHOOD.        43 

mind,  and  the  chief  difference  between  the  edu 
cated  man  and  one  who  is  not  so  is  that  the  mind 
of  the  one  has  been  trained  into  a  state  of  high 
efficiency  while  that  of  the  other  has  not.  Read 
ing  and  writing  offer  the  shortest  roads,  the  sim 
plest  means,  to  this  end  ;  but  they  are  not  the  only 
ones,  and  if  Red  Eagle  had  little  or  no  knowledge 
of  letters,  he  had  nevertheless  an  active  intellect, 
trained  under  excellent  masters  to  a  high  degree 
of  efficiency,  and  hence  was,  in  the  true  sense  of 
the  term,  a  man  of  education. 

In  his  tastes  and  instincts  this  son  of  a  Scotch 
man  was  altogether  an  Indian.  He  devoted  him 
self  earnestly  to  the  work  of  acquiring  the  knowl 
edge  of  woodcraft  and  the  skill  in  the  chase  which 
his  people  held  in  highest  esteem.  He  was  a  nota 
ble  huntsman,  a  fine  swimmer,  a  tireless  walker. 
He  was  a  master  marksman,  alike  with  the  bow 
and  with  the  rifle.  He  was  passionately  fond  of 
all  athletic  sports,  too,  and  by  his  skill  in  them 
he  Avon  the  admiration — almost  the  worship — of 
all  the  youth  of  his  nation.  He  was  the  fleetest 
of  foot  of  all  the  young  men  who  ran  races  in  the 
Creek  villages,  and  his  fondness  for  the  sports  of 
his  people  was  so  great  that  he  was  never  absent 
from  any  gathering  of  the  young  men  for  contests 
of  strength,  activity,  or  skill,  however. distant  the 


44  RED   EAGLE. 

place  of  meeting  might  be.  He  was  their  chief 
by  right  of  his  accomplishments,  as  well  as  by  in 
heritance  as  the  son  of  Sehoy  the  princess.  Es 
pecially  in  the  great  Creek  game  of  throwing  the 
ball — a  game  which  closely  resembled  a  battle  be 
tween  hundreds  of  men  on  each  side,  and  one  in 
which  success  was  achieved  only  by  great  per 
sonal  daring  and  endurance  added  to  skill,  bones 
being  broken  frequently  in  the  rude  collisions  of 
the  opposing  forces,  and  men  being  killed  and 
trampled  under  foot  not  infrequently — the  young 
Red  Eagle  was  an  enthusiastic  and  successful 
player. 

While  yet  a  little  child,  Red  Eagle  showed  that 
he  had  inherited  his  father's  love  for  horses,  and 
his  persistence  in  riding  races,  breaking  unruly 
colts,  and  clashing  madly  over  the  roughest  coun 
try  on  the  back  of  some  one  of  his  father's  untamed 
animals,  gave  him  the  finest  skill  and  most  con 
summate  grace  of  a  perfect  horseman.  An  old 
Indian  woman  who  knew  the  young  chief  in  his 
youth,  telling  of  his  daring,  his  skill,  and  his 
grace  as  a  horseman,  said,  "  The  squaws  would 
quit  hoeing  corn,  and  smile  and  gaze  upon  him 
as  he  rode  by  the  corn-patch." 

All  these  things  added  to  Red  Eagle's  popular 
ity  with  the  old  and  young  of  his  nation,  and  the 


RED  EAGLE'S  BIRTH  AND  BOYHOOD.        45 

daring  and  enthusiasm  which  he  showed  in  the 
sports  of  his  people  were  exercised  frequently  in 
their  service.  In  the  wars  of  the  Creeks  with 
neighboring  nations,  the  Choctaws  and  the  Chick- 
asaws,  and  in  their  campaigns  on  the  borders  of 
Tennessee,  Red  Eagle  distinguished  himself  for 
courage,  tireless  activity,  and  great  skill  in  war 
fare,  even  before  he  had  reached  manhood,  so  that 
when  his  growth  was  fully  gained  he  was  already 
a  man  of  the  widest  and  most  controlling  in 
fluence  among  the  Creeks,  by  reason  both  of  his 
birth  and  of  his  achievements. 

His  popularity  was  enhanced  doubtless  by  the 
beauty  of  his  face  and  the  comeliness  of  his  per 
son,  for  all  the  writers  who  have  described  Red 
Eagle,  and  all  the  men  of  that  time  who  have  given 
oral  accounts  of  him,  agree  in  telling  us  that  he 
was  a  singularly  handsome  man,  with  brilliant 
eyes,  well-cut  features,  shapely  limbs,  and  impos 
ing  presence. 

That  nothing  which  could  help  him  to  influence 
and  power  might  be  lacking,  Red  Eagle  was  gifted 
with  eloquence  at  once  stirring  and  persuasive. 
His  natural  gift  had  been  cultivated  carefullv, 
and,  as  we  have  seen  in  a  former  chapter,  he 
adroitly  hoarded  his  power  in  this  respect,  taking 
care  not  to  weaken  the  force  of  his  oratorv  bv 


46  RED   EAGLE. 

making  it  cheap  and  common.  He  would  not 
speak  at  all  upon  light  occasions.  While  others 
harangued,  he  sat  silent,  permitting  decisions  to 
be  made  without  expressing  any  opinion  what 
ever  upon  the  matters  in  dispute.  It  \vas  only 
when  a  great  occasion  aroused  deep  passions  that 
Red  Eagle  spoke.  Then  his  eloquence  was  over 
whelming.  He  won  his  audience  completely,  and 
bent  men  easily  to  his  will.  He  knew  how  to 
arouse  their  passions  and  to  play  upon  them  for  his 
own  purposes.  Opposition  gave  way  before  the 
tide  of  his  speech.  His  opponents  in  debate 
were  won  to  his  views  or  silenced  by  his  over 
whelming  oratory  ;  and  he  who  was  his  people's 
commander  in  the  field  was  no  less  certainly  their 
master  in  the  council  on  all  occasions  which  were 
important  enough  to  stir  him  to  exertion.  He 
had  vices,  certainly,  but  they  were  the  vices  of 
his  time  and  country,  and  there  is  no  sufficient 
evidence  that  he  carried  them  to  excess,  while  his 
retention  of  physical  and  intellectual  vigor  afford 
the  strongest  possible  proof  of  the  contrary. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

THE   BEGINNING   OF   TROUBLE. 

WE  all  know  how  trouble  begins.  Whether  a 
big  or  a  little  quarrel  is  the  thing  about  which  we 
inquire,  and  whoever  the  parties  to  the  dispute 
may  be,  the  trouble  may  always  be  traced  back 
to  some  small  occurrences  which  led  to  larger 

o 

ones,  which  in  their  turn  provoked  still  greater, 
until  finally  the  trouble  came. 

We  have  seen  that  there  was  peace  and  justice 
between  the  Americans  and  the  Creek  Nation,  and 
that  the  Creeks  had  every  reason  in  their  own  in 
terest  to  continue  living  upon  friendly  terms  with 
the  whites.  A  good  many  of  them  fully  under 
stood  this,  too,  and  sought  to  persuade  others  of 
it  ;  and  it  is  probable  that  when  the  first  troubles 
came  the  great  majority  of  the  Creeks  earnestly 
wished  to  keep  the  peace,  and  to  make  use  of  the 
means  of  advancement  offered  to  them  by  the 
American  Government  and  people.  Unluckily, 
they  were  the  victims  of  bad  advice,  and  the  old 
story  followed  :  one  thing  led  to  another. 

It  is  not  easy,  in  this  case,  to  say  precisely  what 


48  KED   EAGLE. 

the  one  thing  was  which  led  to  another.  That  is 
to  say,  it  is  not  easy  to  determine  what  was  the 
first  of  the  long  chain  of  events  which  led  the 
prosperous  and  improving  Creeks  into  dissensions, 
and  thence  into  the  war  out  of  which  they  came 
a  broken  and  disheartened  remnant  of  a  once 
powerful  nation  ;  but  tracing  the  matter  as  far 
back  as  it  is  necessary  to  carry  the  inquiry,  we 
discover  that  a  public  road  was  one  of  the  earliest 
causes  of  the  trouble. 

The  Creeks  were  made  masters  of  their  own 
country  by  the  Treaty  of  1790,  and  their  absolute 
title  to  their  lands  was  respected  by  the  United 
States  Government,  which  defended  them  rigor 
ously  against  encroachments  upon  their  domain. 
That  government,  having  become  possessed  of  a 
wide  tract  of  territory  lying  west  of  the  Creek 
Nation,  toward  which  the  tide  of  emigration  was 
rapidly  turning,  wished  to  provide  a  more  direct 
and  better  road  than  any  that  existed,  and  with 
that  end  in  view  sought  permission  of  the  Creeks 
to  run  the  new  Federal  Road,  as  it  was  called,  by 
a  direct  route  through  the  Creek  territory.  The 
principal  chiefs,  beginning  to  learn  some  of  the 
natural  laws  thai  govern  commerce,  saw  that  the 
passage  of  a  good  road  through  the  heart  of  the 
nation  would  necessarily  benefit  them,  and  make 


THE   BEGINNING  OF   TROUBLE.  49 

their  commerce  with  the  outer  world  easier  and 
more  profitable.  Accordingly  these  chiefs  gave 
the  Creek  Nation's  consent,  and  the  road  was 
made.  Over  this  the  people  quarrelled  among 
themselves,  dividing,  as  wiser  people  are  apt  to 
do,  into  two  fiercely  antagonistic  parties.  Those 
of  them  who  objected  to  the  thoroughfare  were 
seriously  alarmed  by  the  great  numbers  of  emi 
grants  who  were  constantly  passing  through  their 
country  to  the  region  beyond.  They  said  that 
they  would  soon  be  walled  up  between  white  set 
tlements  on  every  side.  The  land  on  the  Tom- 
bigbee  River  was  already  becoming  peopled  to 
such  an  extent  that  the  hope,  which  many  of  the 
Creeks  had  secretly  cherished,  of  driving  the 
whites  away  from  the  banks  of  that  river  and  re 
covering  the  territory  to  themselves  must  soon 
be  abandoned,  and  they  held,  therefore,  that  in 
granting  the  right  of  way  for  the  road  the  chiefs 
had  betrayed  the  nation's  interests. 

There  never  yet  was  a  quarrel  which  somebody 
did  not  find  it  to  his  interest  to  stimulate,  and  in 
this  case  the  Spanish  settlers,  or  squatters  as  they 
would  have  been  called  if  they  had  lived  thirty 
or  forty  years  later,  did  all  they  could  to  in 
crease  the  bitterness  of  the  Creeks  toward  those 
chiefs  who  were  disposed  to  be  friendly  with  the 


50  RED   EAGLE, 

Americans,  and  toward  the  Americans.  These 
Spaniards  still  insisted  that  the  territory  in.  which 
they  lived,  and  from  which  they  were  gradually 
driven  away,  belonged  of  right  to  Spain,  and 
they  saw  with  great  jealousy  the  rapid  peopling 
of  that  territory  with  Americans.  The  agents  of 
the  British,  with  whom  the  United  States  was  on 
the  point  of  going  to  war,  added  their  voice  to 
the  quarrel,  stimulating  the  Spanish  and  the  In 
dians  alike  to  hostility.  It  was  very  clearly  seen 
by  these  agents  that  an  Indian  war,  especially  a 
war  with  the  powerful  Creeks,  would  greatly 
weaken  this  country  for  its  contest  with  Great 
Britain.  Emissaries  of  the  British  infested  the 
Creek  country,  stirring  up  strife  and  sowing  the 
seeds  of  future  hostility  among  them.  The 
Spanish  in  Florida,  although  our  government 
Avas  at  peace  with  Spain,  willingly  became  the 
agents  for  the  British  in  this  work,  and  secret 
messages  were  constantly  sent  through  them 
promising  arms,  ammunition,  and  aid  to  the 
Creeks  in  the  event  of  a  war. 

All  these  things  gave  great  anxiety  to  Colonel 
Hawkins,  the  agent  who  had  charge  of  the 
Creeks,  but  the  trouble  was  not  yet  in  a  shape 
in  which  he  could  deal  vigorously  with  it.  He 
called  a  council,  and  did  all  that  he  could  to  con- 


THE  BEGINNING  OF  TROUBLE.  5  I 

vince  the  Indians  of  the  government's  kindly 
disposition.  The  friendly  chiefs  assured  him  of 
their  constancy,  and  their  assurance  lulled  his 
suspicions  somewhat.  He  knew  these  chiefs  to 
be  sincere,  but  neither  he  nor  they  knew  to  what 
extent  their  influence  with  the  nation  had  been 
weakened. 

Then  came  Tecumseh,  who,  in  the  spring  of 
the  year  1811,  arrived  in  the  Creek  country,  ac 
companied  by  about  thirty  of  his  warriors.  He 
came  with  a  double  mission  :  as  the  agent  of  the 
British  he  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  prepar 
ing  the  tribes  of  the  South  to  join  in  the  approach 
ing  war,  as  soon  as  a  state  of  war  should  be  de 
clared  ;  as  Tecumseh  he  came  to  execute  his  own 
purpose,  namely,  the  formation  of  a  great  offen 
sive  and  defensive  alliance  between  the  tribes  of 
the  North  and  those  of  the  South,  against  the 
A  nerican  nation  and  people. 

Tecumseh  did  not  come  as  a  stranger  to  the 
Creeks.  The  fame  of  his  exploits  in  the  North 
had  reached  them,  and  he  was  known  to  them 
even  "more  favorably  in  another  way.  Nearly 
twenty-five  years  before,  Tecumseh,  then  a 
young  man,  had  dwelt  among  the  Creeks  for 
about  two  years,  and  the  stories  of  his  feats  as  a 
hunter  had  lived  after  him  as  a  tradition.  Hence 


52  RED   EAGLE. 

when  he  came  again  in  1811  he  was  a  sort  of 
hero  of  romance  to  the  younger  Creek  warriors, 
a  great  man  of  whose  deeds  they  had  heard 
stories  during  their  childhood. 

On  his  way  to  the  South,  Tecumseh  tarried 
awhile  with  the  Choctaws  and  the  Chickasaws, 
trying  to  win  them  to  his  scheme,  but  without 
success.  In  Florida,  he  made  easy  converts  of 
the  warlike  Seminoles  ;  and  returning  thence  he 
visited  the  Creeks,  arriving  in  October.  While 
Colonel  Hawkins  wras  holding  the  Grand  Council 
at  Tookabatcha,  of  which  we  have  spoken,  and 
was  trying  to  placate  the  Creeks,  Tecumseh,  fol 
lowed  by  his  warriors,  dressed  in  their  most  im 
pressive  savage  costumes,  consisting  of  very  little 
else  than  buffalo  tails  and  other  ornaments, 
marched  into  the  meeting.  Marching  solemnly 
round  and  round  the  central  square  of  the  town, 
Tecumseh,  when  he  had  sufficiently  impressed 
the  lookers-on  with  a  proper  sense  of  his  dignity, 
went  through  the  most  solemn  ceremonies  of 
friendship  with  his  hosts.  Greeting  the  chiefs  in 
the  most  cordial  fashion,  he  and  his  followers  ex 
changed  tobacco  with  them — a  proceeding  which 
attested  their  fellowship  in  the  strongest  possible 
way. 

In   the   main   the   Creeks   received   Tecumseh 


THE   BEGINNING   OF  TROUBLE.  S3 

cordially,  returning  his  protestations  of  brother 
hood  in  kind  ;  but  one  chief,  Captain  Isaacs, 
whose  fidelity  to  his  obligations  as  a  friend  of  the 
\vhites  was  proved  afterward  on  the  battle-field, 
rejected  the  overtures  of  the  men  from  the  North. 
He  shook  his  head  when  asked  to  shake  hands  ; 
he  refused  to  exchange  tobacco  ;  and,  with  the 
frankness  of  a  brave  man  convinced  of  his  duty, 
he  told  Tecumseh  to  his  face  that  he  was  a  bad 
man,  and  added,  "You  are  no  greater  than  I 
am." 

Tecumseh  had  come  to  the  council  for  the  pur 
pose  of  using  it  for  his  own  ends,  but  while 
Colonel  Hawkins  remained  he  made  no  effort  to 
put  his  plan  into  execution.  Colonel  Hawkins 
could  have  thwarted  him,  in  part  at  least,  if  the 
wily  Indian  had  openly  avowed  the  object  of  his 
visit ;  but  Tecumseh  was  too  shrewd  to  do  that. 
Colonel  Hawkins  prolonged  the  council  from  day 
to  day,  but  still  Tecumseh  kept  silence.  Each 
day  he  would  say,  "  The  sun  has  gone  too  far  to 
day  ;  I  will  make  my  talk  to-morrow."  But  the 
to-morrow  of  the  promise  did  not  come  while 
Colonel  Hawkins  remained,  and  finally,  worn  out 
with  the  delay,  that  officer  brought  his  conference 
with  the  chiefs  to  an  end  and  departed. 

Then  Tecumseh  opened  his  lips.     Calling  the 


54  RED   EAGLE. 

people  together,  he  made  them  a  speech,  setting 
forth  his  views  and  urging  them  upon  the  Creeks. 
He  told  them  that  the  red  men  had  made  a  fatal 
mistake  in  adopting  the  ways  of  the  whites  and 
becoming  friendly  with  them.  He  exhorted 
them  to  return  at  once  to  their  former  state 
of  savagery  ;  to  abandon  the  ploughs  and  looms 
and  arms  of  the  white  men  ;  to  cast  off  the 
garments  which  the  whites  had  taught  them  to 
wear  ;  to  return  to  the  condition  and  customs  of 
their  ancestors,  and  to  be  ready  at  command  to  be 
come  the  enemies  of  the  whites.  The  work  they 
were  learning  to  do  in  the  fields,  he  said,  was  un 
worthy  of  free  red  men.  It  degraded  them,  and 
made  them  mere  slaves.  He  warned  them  that 
the  whites  would  take  the  greater  part  of  their 
country,  cut  down  its  forests  and  turn  them  into 
cornfields,  build  towns,  and  make  the  rivers  mud 
dy  with  the  washings  of  their  furrows,  and  then, 
when  they  were  strong  enough,  would  reduce  the 
Indians  to  slavery  like  that  of  the  negroes.  There 
is  every  reason  to  believe  that  Tecumseh  was  con 
vinced  of  the  truth  of  all  this.  He  was  con 
vinced,  too,  that  the  whites  had  no  right  to  live 
on  this  continent.  He  told  the  Creeks,  as  he  had 
told  General  Harrison,  that  the  Great  Spirit  had 
given  this  land  to  the  red  men.  He  said  the 


THE   BEGINNING   OF  TROUBLE.  55 

Great  Spirit  had  provid  cl  the  skins  of  beasts  for 
the  red  men's  clothing,  and  that  these  only  should 
they  wear.  Then  he  came  to  the  subject  of  the 
British  alliance,  telling  the  Creeks  that  the  King 
of  England  was  about  to  make  a  great  war  in  be 
half  of  his  children  the  red  men,  for  the  purpose 
of  driving  all  the  Americans  off  the  continent,  and 
that  he  would  heap  favors  upon  all  the  Indians 
who  should  help  him  to  do  this. 

A  prophet  who  accompanied  Tecumseh  fol 
lowed  him  with  a  speech,  in  which  he  reiterated 
what  his  chief  had  said,  but  gave  it  as  a  message 
from  the  Great  Spirit  ;  still  further  to  encourage 
the  war  spirit  among  them,  this  teacher  by  au 
thority  promised  a  miracle  in  behalf  of  the  Creeks. 
He  assured  them  that  if  they  should  join  in  the 
war  they  would  do  so  at  no  personal  risk  ;  that 
not  one  of  them  should  be  hurt  by  the  enemy  ; 
that  the  Great  Spirit  would  encircle  them  wher 
ever  they  went  writh  impassable  mires,  in  which 
the  Americans  would  be  utterly  destroyed,  with 
no  power  or  opportunity  to  harm  the  divinely 
protected  Indians. 

All  this  was  well  calculated  to  stir  the  already 
moody  and  discontented  Creeks  to  a  feeling  of 
hostility,  and  when  the  speech-making  was  over 
there  was  a  strong  party,  probably  more  than  a 


56  RED   EAGLE. 

majority  of  the  Creeks,  ready  and  anxious  to 
make  immediate  war  upon  the  Americans. 
Colonel  Hawkins's  Ion 2:  labors  in  the  interest  of 

O 

peace  had  been  rendered  fruitless,  and  the  war 
party  in  the  nation  was  more  numerous  and  more 
firmly  resolved  upon  mischief  than  ever. 

Tecumseh's  labors  were  not  yet  finished,  how 
ever.  As  a  shrewd  politician  works  and  argues 
and  pleads  and  persuades  in  private  as  well  as  in 
his  public  addresses,  so  Tecumseh,  who  was  a 
particularly  shrewd  politician,  went  all  through 
the  nation  winning  converts  to  his  cause.  He 
won  many,  but  although  he  was  received  as  an 
honored  guest  by  the  chief  Tustinnuggee  Thluc- 
co,  or  the  Big  Warrior,  he  could  make  no  impres 
sion  upon  that  wise  warrior's  mind.  It  was  not 
that  Big  Warrior  was  so  firm  a  friend  to  the 
whites  that  nothing  could  arouse  him  to  enmity. 
He  had  his  grudges,  and  was  by  no  means  in  love 
with  things  as  they  were  ;  but  he  foresaw,  as  Te 
cumseh  did  not,  that  the  war,  if  it  should  come, 
would  bring  destruction  to  his  nation.  He  esti 
mated  the  strength  of  his  foes  more  accurately 
than  his  fellows  did,  and  was  convinced  that  there 
was  no  hope  of  success  in  the  war  Avhich  Tecum 
seh  was  trying  to  bring  about.  He  was  valorous 
enough,  but  he  was  also  discreet,  and  he  there- 


THE   BEGINNING  OF  TROUBLE.  $/ 

fore  obstinately  remained  true  to  his  allegiance. 
His  obstinacy  at  last  roused  Tecumseh's  ire,  and 
it  was  to  him  that  Tecumseh  made  his  celebrated 
threat  that  when  he  reached  Detroit  he  would 
stamp  his  foot  on  the  ground  and  shake  down  all 
the  houses  in  Tookabatcha — a  threat  which  it  is 
said  that  an  earthquake  afterward  led  the  Creeks 
to  believe  he  had  carried  out.  The  story  of  the 
earthquake  is  repeated  by  all  the  writers  on  the 
subject,  but  some  of  the  accounts  of  it  contradict 
facts  and  set  dates  at  defiance  ;  and  so,  while  it  is 
not  impossible  and  perhaps  not  improbable  that 
an  opportune  earthquake  did  seem  to  make  Te 
cumseh's  threat  good,  the  story  must  be  received 
with  some  caution,  as  the  different  versions  of  it 
contradict  each  other.  So,  for  that  matter,  it  is 
not  safe  to  trust  the  records  upon  any  point,  with 
out  diligent  examination  and  comparison.  Thus 
the  fact  that  the  battle  of  Tippecanoe  was  fought 
during  this  Southern  journey  of  Tecumseh  makes 
it  certain  that  the  mission  was  accomplished  in 
the  year  1811  ;  yet  Pickett,  in  his  History  of  Ala 
bama,  gives  1812  as  the  year,  and  several  other 
writers  follow  him.  Again,  some  of  the  writers 
to  whom  we  must  look  for  the  facts  of  this  part 
of  American  history  confound  Tecumseh's  two 
years'  sojourn  among  the  Creeks  about  the  year 


58 


EAGLE. 


1787  with  his  visit  in  1811,  saying  that  that  visit 
lasted  two  years—  a  statement  which  would  make 
great  confusion  in  the  mind  of  any  one  familiar 
with  the  history  of  events  in  the  North  in  which 
Tecumseh  bore  a  part.  A  careful  comparison  of 
dates  shows  that  Tecumseh  started  to  the  South 
in  the  spring  of  the  year  i8n,and  returned  to 
the  North  soon  after  the  battle  of  Tippecanoe  was 
fought—  that  is  to  say,  near  the  end  of  the  same 
year. 


CHAPTER  V. 

RED    EAGLE   AS    AN   ADVOCATE    OF   WAR— 
THE  CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  CREEK  NATION. 

WE  have  called  Tecumseh  a  wily  politician,  and 
in  whatever  he  undertook  his  methods  were 
always  those  of  the  political  manager.  He  was 
quick  to  discover  the  temper  of  individuals  as  well 
as  of  bodies  of  men,  and  he  was  especially  shrewd 
in  selecting  his  agents  to  work  with  him  and  for 
him.  He  was  not  long  in  picking  out  Red  Eagle  as 
the  man  of  all  others  likely  to  draw  the  Creeks  into 
the  scheme  of  hostility.  Red  Eagle's  tastes  and 
temper,  as  we  have. already  seen,  were  those  of 
the  savage.  He  was  a  rich  man,  and  had  all  the 
means  necessary  to  the  enjoyment  of  those  sports 
and  pastimes  which  he  delighted  in  ;  but  above 
all  else  he  was  an  Indian.  He  looked  upon  the 
life  of  the  white  men  with  distaste,  and  saw  with 
displeasure  the  tendency  of  his  people,  and  more 
especially  of  his  half-breed  brothers,  to  adopt 
the  civilization  which  he  loathed.  Moreover,  he 
cherished  a  special  hatred  for  the  Americans — a 
hatred  which  his  uncle  and  tutor,  General  Me- 


60  RET)   EAGLE. 

Gillivray,  had  sedulously  instilled  into  his  mind 
in  his  boyhood  ;  and  this  detestation  of  the  Ameri 
cans  had  been  strengthened  by  the  British  and 
Spanish  at  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  during  his  fre 
quent  visits  to  those  posts.  His  favorite  boast 
was  that  there  was  "  no  Yankee  blood  in  his 
veins." 

Besides  his  prejudice,  Red  Eagle's  judgment 
taught  him  to  fear  the  encroachments  of  the 
Americans,  and  men  are  always  quick  to  hate 
those  whom  they  fear.  Red  Eagle  saw  with 
genuine  alarm  that  the  white  men  were  rapidly 
multiplying  in  the  Tombigbee  country,  and  he 
knew  that  the  Americans  had  made  acquisitions 
of  new  territory  which  would  still  further  invite 
American  emigration  into  the  neighborhood  of 
the  Creek  Nation.  All  this  he  saw  with  alarm,  be 
cause  he  was  convinced  that  it  boded  ill  to  his 
people.  With  many  others  he  feared  that  the 
race  which  held  black  men  in  a  state  of  slavery 
would  reduce  red  men  to  a  similar  condition  as 
soon  as  their  own  numbers  in  the  country  should 
be  great  enough  to  render  resistance  useless. 
Convinced  of  this,  Red  Eagle  believed  that  it  was 
the  part  of  wisdom  to  make  a  fight  for  freedom 
before  it  should  be  forever  too  late. 

Tecumseh,  finding  in  the  young  chief  a  man  of 


RED   EAGLE   AS   AN   ADVOCATE   OF   WAR.        6 1 

the  highest  influence  in  the  nation,  whose  preju 
dices,  fears,  and  judgment  combined  to  make 
him  an  advocate  of  war,  took  him  at  once  into  his 
councils,  making  him  his  confidant  and  principal 
fellow-worker.  Red  Eagle  eagerly  seconded  Te- 
cumseh's  efforts,  and  his  influence  won  many,  es 
pecially  of  the  young  warriors,  to  the  war  party 
in  the  nation.  His  knowledge  of  the  Creeks,  too, 
enabled  him  to  suggest  methods  of  winning  them 
which  his  visitor  would  not  have  thought  of, 
probably.  One  of  these  was  to  work  directly 
upon  their  imaginations,  and  to  enlist  their  super 
stition  on  the  side  of  war  through  prophets  of 
their  own,  who,  by  continuous  prophesyings, 
could  do  much  to  counteract  the  influence  of  the 
older  Creek  chiefs,  most  of  whom  were  attached 
to  the  Americans,  and  being  well-to-do  were  op 
posed  to  war,  which  might  lose  them  their  houses, 
lands,  cattle,  and  negro  slaves.  The  possession 
of  property,  even  among  partly  savage  men,  is  a 
strong  conservative  influence  always. 

Acting  upon  Red  Eagle's  hint,  Tecumseh  di 
rected  his  prophet  to  "  inspire"  some  Creeks  with 
prophetic  powers.  The  first  man  selected  for 
this  purpose  was  wisely  chosen.  He  was  a 
shrewd  half-breed  named  Josiah  Francis,  a  man 


62  RED   EAGLE. 

whose  great  cunning  and  unscrn.pulousness  fitted 
him  admirably  for  the  business  of  "  prophet." 

The  prophet  of  the  Shawnees  took  Francis  to  a 
cabin  and  shut  him  up  alone  for  the  space  of  ten 
days.  During  that  time  the  inspiring  was  ac 
complished  by  the  Shawnee,  who  danced  and 
howled  around  the  cabin,  and  performed  all  man 
ner  of  rude  gesticulations.  At  the  end  of  the  ten 
days  he  brought  the  new  prophet  forth,  telling 
the  people  that  he  was  now  blind,  but  that  very 
soon  his  sight — which  may  be  said  to  have  been 
taken  away  to  be  sharpened — would  be  restored 
to  him,  so  improved  that  he  could  see  all  things 
that  were  to  occur  in  the  future. 

Francis,  of  course,  lent  himself  willingly  to  this 
imposture,  and  consented  to  be  led  about  by  the 
Shawnee  prophet,  stepping  like  a  blind  man  who 
fears  to  stumble  over  obstacles.  Suddenly  he  de 
clared  that  he  had  received  his  vision,  duly  made 
over,  with  modern  improvements  and  prophetic 
attachments. 

Francis  used  his  new  powers  both  directly  and 
by  proxy  in  the  interest  of  the  war  party,  creat 
ing  many  other  prophets  to  help  him,  among  them 
Sinquista  and  High  Head  Jim  ;  and  the  diligence 
with  which  all  these  workers  for  war  carried  on 
their  prophesyings,  pleadings,  and  speech-making 


RED   EAGLE  AS   AN  ADVOCATE   OF   WAR.        63 

increased  the  numbers  of  the  war  party,  and 
added  to  the  ill-feeling,  which  was  already  in 
tense,  between  the  Creeks  who  wished  to  make 
war  and  those  who  sought  to  keep  the  peace. 
The  Creek  nation  was  ripe  for  a  civil  war — a  war 
of  factions  among  themselves  ;  it  only  needed  a 
spark  to  create  an  explosion,  and  the  spark  was 
not  long  in  coming,  as  we  shall  see. 

Tecumseh,  having  secured  so  good  a  substitute 
for  himself  in  Red  Eagle,  felt  that  his  own  pres 
ence  was  no  longer  needed  in  the  Creek  coun 
try.  He  accordingly  took  his  departure  for  the 
north  by  a  circuitous  route,  in  order  that  he 
might  visit  the  tribes  on  the  Missouri  River  and 
in  Illinois,  and  stir  them  up  to  hostility.  He 
took  with  him  the  Creek  chief  Little  Warrior, 
and  thirty  men  of  the  nation.  These  Creeks  ac 
companied  him  in  all  his  wanderings  until  they 
reached  Canada,  where  they  remained  a  consid 
erable  time,  receiving  attentions  of  the  most  flat 
tering  kind  from  British  officers  and  from  the 
secret  agents  of  the  British.  Upon  their  depart 
ure  for  the  return  journey,  they  were  provided 
with  letters  which  directed  the  British  agents  at 

O 

Pensacola  to  provide  the  Creeks  with  arms  and 
ammunition  in  abundance. 

On  their  way  back  they  committed  an  outrage 


64  RED    EAGLE. 

which,   although  it  had  no  direct  bearing  upon 
the  quarrel  among  the  Creeks  at  home,  proved  in 
the  end  to    be    the  beginning  of  that  civil  war 
which  grew  into  a  war  with  the  whites.     In  the 
Chickasaw    country   they   murdered   seven   fam 
ilies,  and  making   a  prisoner  of  a  Mrs.  Crawley, 
carried    her   with    them    to   their    own    country. 
This  outrageous  conduct  was  at  once    reported 
by  the  Chickasaw  agent  to  Colonel  Hawkins,  the 
agent  for  the    Creeks,    and    he  immediately   de 
manded     the    punishment    of    its    perpetrators. 
Under   the  compact  which  existed  between   the 
Creeks   and   the  government,    the    chiefs  of  the 
tribe  were  bound  to  comply   with  this  demand, 
upon  pain  of  bringing   the   responsibility  for  the 
misdeed  upon  the  nation,  and   as  we   have  said 
the  majority  of  the  chiefs  were  anxious  to  fulfil 
their  duties  and  thus  to  preserve  peace.     Accord 
ingly,  a  council  of  friendly  chiefs  determined   to 
arrest  Little   Warrior's  band   and    punish   them. 
They  sent  two  parties  of  warriors  to  do  this,  one 
under  command  of  Chief  Mclntosh,  and  the  other 
led  by  Captain  Isaacs.      These  forest  policemen 
speedily    accomplished    their    mission,    pursuing 
and  fighting  the  offenders  until  all  of  them  were 
put  to  death.     This  was  in  the  spring  of  1812. 
Justice  being  satisfied,  the  Creeks  might  now 


RED   EAGLE   AS   AN  ADVOCATE   OF   WAR.        65 

have  remained  at  peace  with  the  whites  if  they 
had  joined  the  older  chiefs  in  wishing  to  do  so  ; 
but  unfortunately  that  which  placated  the  whites 
only  served  to  incense  the  war  party  among  the 
Creeks  against  both  the  whites  and  the  peace 
ful  men  of  their  own  nation.  Murders  and  other 
outrages  occurred  frequently.  The  men  of  the 
war  party  became  truculent  in  their  bearing,  and 
matters  were  in  a  ferment  throughout  the  nation. 
The  prophets  prophesied,  and  the  orators  made 
speeches  denouncing  the  "  peacefuls, "  as  they 
called  the  Creeks  who  opposed  war,  as  bitterly 
as  they  did  the  whites.  The  Alabamas  were 
especially  violent,  probably  in  consequence  of 
their  close  neighborhood  with  Red  Eagle,  whose 
influence  over  them  was  almost  without  limit. 
They  committed  outrages  especially  designed  to 
force  the  beginning  of  war,  among  other  things 
killing  a  mail-carrier,  .seizing  the  United  States 
mail  and  carrying  it  to  Pensacoia,  where  they 
robbed  the  bags  of  their  contents. 

Big  Warrior,  who  had  stood  so  firmly  against 
Tecumseh's  threats,  still  held  out,  but  he  was 
now  thoroughly  aroused.  He  invited  the  chiefs 
of  the  war  party  to  a  council,  but  they  scorned  to 
listen  to  his  pleas  for  a  hearing.  Failing  to  bring 
them  to  him,  he  sent  a  messenger  to  them  with 


66  RED   EAGLE. 

his  "talk,"  which  was  in  these  words:  'You 
are  but  a  few  Alabama  people.  You  say  that  the 
Great  Spirit  visits  you  frequently  ;  that  he  comes 
in  the  sun,  and  speaks  to  you  ;  that  the  sun 
comes  clown  just  above  your  heads.  Now  we 
want  to  see  and  hear  what  you  have  seen  and 
heard.  Let  us  have  the  same  proof,  then  we  will 
believe.  You  have  nothing  to  fear  ;  the  people 
who  did  the  killing  on  the  Ohio  are  put  to  death, 
and  the  law  is  satisfied. 

This  was  a  perfectly  sensible,  logical,  reason 
able  talk,  and  for  that  reason  it  angered  the  men 
to  whom  it  was  sent.  Men  in  a  passion  always 
resent  reason  when  it  condemns  them  or  stands 
in  the  way  of  their  purposes.  The  Alabamas 
answered  Big  Warrior's  sensible  proposition  by 
putting  his  messenger  to  death.  Thus  the  civil 
war  among  the  Creeks,  for  it  had  become  that 
now,  went  on.  The  peaceful  Indians  remained 
true  to  their  allegiance,  and  fought  their  hostile 
brethren  when  occasion  required,  although  they 
did  what  they  could  to  avoid  collisions  with  them. 
In  such  a  time  as  that  even  civilized  men  be 
come  disoiderly,  and  the  hostile  Creeks  grew  daily 
more  and  more  turbulent.  They  collected  in 
parties  and  went  upon  marauding  expeditions, 
sometimes  sacking  a  plantation,  sometimes  mur- 


RED  EAGLE  AS  AN  ADVOCATE  OF  WAR.    67 

dering  a  party  of  emigrants,  sometimes  making  a 
descent  upon  the  dwellings  of  peaceful  Creeks, 
and  doing  all  manner  of  mischief. 

The  long-threatened  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  had  been  formally 
declared  in  the  year  1812,  and  it  was  now  the 
spring  of  1813.  The  Americans  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war  had  asserted  their  title  to  the  town 
and  harbor  of  Mobile,  which,  although  a  part  of 
the  territory  ceded  many  years  before  to  this 
country  by  the  French,  had  until  now  been  held 
by  the  Spanish.  The  affair  was  so  well  managed 
that  the  place  was  surrendered  without  bloodshed 
and  occupied  by  the  American  iorces  ;  but  its 
surrender  served  to  increase  the  hostility  of  the 
Spanish  in  Florida,  and  although  we  were  nomi 
nally  at  peace  with  Spain,  the  Spanish  authori 
ties  at  Pensacola,  Avho  had  already  done  much  to 
stir  up  Indian  hostilities,  lent  themselves  readily 
to  the  schemes  of  the  British.  During  the  lat 
ter  part  of  August,  1812,  they  went  so  far  as 
to  permit  a  British  force  to  land  at  Pensacola, 
take  possession  of  the  fort  there,  and  make  the 
place  a  base  of  military  operations  against  us. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  troubles  the 
Indians  had  maintained  communication  with 
Pensacola,  and  parties  of  them  went  thither  fre- 


68  RED   EAGLE. 

quently  to  procure  arms  and  ammunition,  whicfc 
were  freely  furnished.  It  was  with  one  of  these 
parties,  on  their  return  from  Pensacola,  that  the 
first  battle  of  the  Creek  war  was  fought.  Of 
that  we  shall  hear  in  another  chapter.  Meantime 
it  is  worth  while  to  explain  how  the  plans  of  the 
war  party  were  discovered  in  time  to  save  many 
lives. 

A  friendly  half-breed,  McNac  by  name,  was 
driven  from  his  home  by  one  of  the  petty 
marauding  parties  spoken  of  a  few  pages  back, 
and  his  cattle  were  carried  to  Pensacola  by  the 
marauders,  and  sold.  After  hiding  in  the 
swamps  for  some  time,-  McNac  at  last  ventured 
out  at  night  to  visit  his  home  and  see  precisely 
what  damage  had  been  done.  He  was  unlucky 
enough  to  meet  High  Head  Jim.at  the  head  of  a 
party  of  hostile  Indians,  and  as  there  was  no 
chance  of  safety  either  in  flight  or  fight,  McNac 
resorted  to  diplomacy,  which  in  this  case,  as  in 
many  others,  meant  vigorous  lying.  He  declared 
that  he  had  abandoned  his  peaceful  proclivities, 
and  had  made  up  his  mind  to  join  the  war  party. 
McNac  appears  to  have  had  something  like  a 
genius  for  lying,  as  he  succeeded  in  imposing  his 
fabrications  upon  High  Head  Jim,  who,  suspi 
cious  and  treacherous  as  he  was,  believed  Me- 


RED    EAGLE  AS  AN  ADVOCATE   OF   WAR.        69 

Nac  implicitly,  and  confided  to  him  the  plan  of 
the  hostile  Creeks.  This  plan  was  to  kill  Big 
Warrior,  Captain  Isaacs,  Mclntosh,  Mad  Drag 
on's  Son,  and  the  other  friendly  chiefs,  before  go 
ing  finally  upon  the  war-path,  and,  having  thus 
deprived  the  friendly  Creeks  of  their  leaders,  to 
compel  them  to  join  in  the  war  upon  the  Ameri 
cans.  Then,  High  Head  Jim  said,  the  war 
would  begin  by  simultaneous  attacks  upon  the 
various  settlements.  Having  exterminated  the 
whites  upon  their  borders,  they  were  to  march  in 
three  columns  against  the  people  of  Tennessee, 
Georgia,  and  Mississippi,  receiving  assistance 
from  the  Choctaws  and  the  Cherokees. 

McNac  bore-  this  information  at  once  to  the 
intended  victims,  and  thus  enabled  them  to  secure 
their  safety  in  various  ways  ;  but  the  civil  war 
increased  in  its  fury.  The  hostile  bands  still 
confined  themselves  as  yet  chiefly  to  attacks  upon 
the  peaceful  members  of  their  own  nation,  de 
stroying  their  houses,  killing  or  driving  off  their 
cattle,  and  stealing  whatever  portable  property 
they  possessed. 

Colonel  Hawkins  still  hoped  for  peace,  rather 
unreasonably,  it  must  be  confessed,  and  avoided 
interference  as  far  as  possible  ;  but  he  extended 
protection  to  Big  Warrior,  and  with  the  assist- 


70  RED   EAGLE, 

ance  of  a  force  of  friendly   Creeks  rescued  that 
chieftain  and  escorted  him  to  a  place  of  safety. 

•In  such  a  state  of  affairs,  of  course,  a  collision 
between  the  whites  and  the  Indians  was  inevi 
table,  and  when  it  came,  as  will  be  related  in  the 
next  chapter,  the  Creek  war  of  1813  was  begun. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BURNT  CORN. 

IN  the  month  of  July,  1813,  Peter  McQueen, 
High  Head  Jim,  and  the  Prophet  Francis,  having 
collected  a  large  amount  of  plunder  in  their  de 
scents  upon  the  homes  of  peaceful  Indians  and  the 
plantations  of  half-breeds,  sought  a  market  for 
their  booty.  Collecting  their  followers  to  the 
number  of  about  three  "hundred  men,  they  loaded 
a  number  of  pack-horses,  and  set  out  for  Pensa- 
cola,  driving  a  herd  of  stolen  cattle  before  them. 
It  was  their  purpose  to  exchange  these  things  at 
Pensacola  for  arms,  ammunition,  whiskey,  and 
whatever  else  they  wanted  ;  and  combining  pleas 
ure  with  business,  they  amused  themselves  on  the 
route  by  burning  villages  and  committing  mur 
ders  upon  Indians  who  persisted  in  their  friend 
ship  for  the  whites. 

Meantime  the  white  people  had  at  last  become 
thoroughly  alarmed.  The  news  which  McNac 
brought  of  his  conversation  with  High  Head  Jim 
convinced  even  the  most  sceptical  that  a  war  of 
greater  or  smaller  proportions  was  at  hand,  and 


72  RED  EAGLE. 

it  was  the  conviction  of  the   wisest   men   among" 

o 

them  that  the  best  way  to  save  themselves  from 
impending  destruction  was  to  strike  in  time. 
The  British  had  now  begun  seriously  to  threaten 
a  descent  upon  the  south-west,  and  it  seemed  to 
be  more  than  probable  that  the  savages  were 
only  delaying  their  general  outbreak  until  their 
allies  the  British  should  appear  some\vhere  upon 
the  coast,  and  force  the  militia  of  the  Tensaw  and 
Tombigbee  settlements  to  march  away  to  meet 
them.  Then  the  country  would  be  defenceless, 
and  the  Indians  could  easily  exterminate  all  that 
remained  of  the  white  population. 

The  pioneers  who  lived  in  that  part  of  the 
country  were  brave,  hardy,  and  resolute  men,  and 
they  no  sooner  saw  their  danger  distinctly  than 
they  took  up  arms  with  which  to  defend  them 
selves.  They  resolved  to  assert  their  resolution 
by  attacking  not  the  Indian  towns,  but  the  roving 
parties  of  Indian  outlaws  who  were  bringing  the 
war  about.  If  they  could  crush  these,  punishing 
them  effectually,  they  thought,  the  great  body  of 
the  Creeks  would  think  twice  before  deciding  to 
make  the  contemplated  war. 

Accordingly  a  summons  was  sent  out  for  volun 
teers.  About  two  hundred  men,  or  nearly  that 
number,  some  of  them  white  men,  some  half- 


THE   BATTLE   OF   BURNT   CORN.  73 

breeds,  and  some  friendly  Indians,  promptly 
answered  the  call.  Among  theme  was  Captain 
Samuel  Dale,  better  known  in  history  as  Sam 
Dale,  the  hero  of  the  canoe  fight,  one  of  the 
strangest  and  most  desperate  affairs  of  the  war, 
some  account  of  which  will  be  given  in  its  proper 
place. 

This  little  army  was  commanded  by  Colonel 
Caller,  assisted  by  one  lieutenant-colonel,  four 
majors,  and  more  captains  and  lieutenants  than 
have  been  counted.  Deducting  these  from  the 
total  force,  we  are  led  to  the  conviction  that 
there  must  have  been  an  average  of  about  one 
officer  to  every  two  men  ;  but  even  this  enormous 
proportion  of  officers  did  not  prevent  the  men 
from  behaving  badly  in  the  presence  of  the 
enemy  and  getting  sharply  beaten,  as  will  be  re 
lated  presently. 

When  the  several  companies  composing  this 
expedition  were  brought  together,  the  line  of 
march  was  taken  toward  Pensacola,  with  the  pur 
pose  of  encountering  Peter  McQueen  and  his 
force  on  their  return.  On  the  morning  of  July 
2/th,  1813,  the  advance  scouts  came  in  and  re 
ported  that  McQueen's  force  was  encamped  upon 
Burnt  Corn  Creek,  just  in  advance  of  Caller's 


74  RED   EAGLE. 

column,  and  that  officer  promptly  determined  to 
attack  them. 

Forming  his  men  in  line  he  advanced  cautiously 
through  the  reeds  until  the  Indian  camp  lay  just 
below.  Then,  with  a  yell,  the  men  dashed  for 
ward  to  the  charge,  and  after  a  few  moments' 
resistance  the  surprised  and  beaten  Indians  aban 
doned  their  camp  with  its  horses  and  its  rich 
stores  of  ammunition  and  food,  and  fled  precipi 
tately  to  the  creek,  by  which  the  camp  was  en 
circled  except  upon  the  side  from  which  the 
white  men  came.  Dale,  who  was  a  born  Indian 
fighter,  Captain  Dixon  Bailey,  and  Captain 
Smoot — who  were  also  resolute  men  and  good 
officers,  Bailey  being  an  eduated  half-breed — saw 
at  a  glance  that  to  pursue  the  flying  savages  was 
to  crush  them  utterly  ;  and  they  therefore  led 
their  men,  some  seventy-five  or  eighty  in  number, 
forward,  and  crowded  the  Indians  as  closely  as 
possible.  Had  they  been  promptly  supported, 
McQueen's  force  would  have  been  utterly  de 
stroyed,  and  there  might  have  been  no  Creek  war 
or  us  to  write  and  read  about.  Unluckily  the 
other  officers  were  less  wise  than  Dale  and  Bailey 
andSmoot.  When  the  Indians  gave  way  and  ran, 
leaving  their  camp  with  its  pack-horses  loaded 
with  goods,  the  officers  and  men  of  the  main 


THE   BATTLE  OF  BURNT  CORN.  75 

body  supposed  that  their  work  was  done.  In 
stead  of  joining  in  the  pursuit,  they  broke  their 
ranks,  threw  down  their  arms,  and  busied  them 
selves  securing  the  plunder. 

Peter  McQueen  was  a  shrewd  fellow  in  his 
way,  and  he  was  not  long  in  discovering  the 
weakness  of  the  force  which  had  followed  him 
to  the  creek.  Rallying  his  men  he  gave  them 
battle,  and  began  pressing  them  back.  Colonel 
Caller,  who  was  leading  the  advance,  instead  of 
ordering  his  main  body  to  the  front,  as  a  more 
experienced  officer  would  have  done,  determined 
to  fall  back  upon  them  as  a  reserve.  Dale, 
Smoot,  and  Bailey  could  have  maintained  their 
position  while  waiting  for  the  reinforcements  to 
come  up,  but  when  ordered  to  fall  back  upon  the 
main  body,  their  brave  but  untrained  and  inex 
perienced  men  retreated  rather  hastily.  The 
men  of  the  main  body,  having  broken  ranks  to 
plunder,  were  in  no  condition  to  resist  panic,  and 
seeing  the  advance  companies  retreating,  with  the 
yelling  Indians  at  their  heels,  they  fled  precip 
itately.  Caller,  Dale,  Bailey,  and  Smoot  tried 
to  rally  them,  but  succeeded  only  in  getting 
eighty  men  into  line.  This  small  force,  com 
manded  by  their  brave  officers,  made  a  desperate 
stand,  and  brought  the  advancing  savages  to  a 


?6  RED  EAGLE, 

halt.  Dale  was  severely  wounded,  but  he  fought 
on  in  spite  of  his  suffering  and  his  weakness. 
Finally,  seeing  that  they  were  overmatched  and 
that  their  comrades  had  abandoned  them  to  their 
fate,  the  little  band  retreated,  fighting  as  they 
went,  until  at  last  the  Indians  abandoned  the 
pursuit.  Some  of  the  Americans  went  home, 
others  became  lost  and  were  found,  nearly  dead 
with  fatigue  and  starvation,  about  a  fortnight 
later, 

Thus  ended  the  battle  of  Burnt  Corn.  It  was 
lost  to  the  white  men  solely  by  the  misconduct  of 
officers  and  men,  but  that  misconduct  was  the 
result  of  inexperience  and  a  want  of  discipline, 
not  of  cowardice  or  any  lack  of  manhood. 

The  Indians  were  badly  hurt.  Their  losses, 
though  not  known  definitely,  are  known  to  have 
been  greater  than  those  of  the  whites,  of  whom 
only  two  were  killed  and  fifteen  wounded.  They 
had  lost  their  pack-horses,  and  nearly  all  the 
fruits  of  their  journey  to  Pensacola,  so  that  they 
were  forced  to  return  to  that  post  to  procure 
fresh  supplies. 

The  affair  was  a  much  more  serious  disaster  to 
the  whites,  however,  than  at  first  appeared.  The 
expedition  had  been  undertaken  for  the  purpose 
of  destroying  McQueen's  party,  and  thereby  in- 


THE   BATTLE   OF   BURNT   CORN.  77 

timidating  the  war-inclined  Creeks.  In  that  it 
had  utterly  failed.  The  Creeks  were  victors, 
though  they  had  suffered  loss.  Their  victory  en 
couraged  them,  and  their  losses  still  further  in 
censed  them.  The  war  which  before  was  threat 
ened  was  now  actually  begun.  The  first  battle 
had  been  fought,  and  others  must  follow  of  neces 
sity.  The  Creeks  believed  themselves  to  be  able 
to  exterminate  the  whites,  and  they  were  now 
determined  to  do  so. 

In  this  determination  they  were  strengthened 
not  merely  by  the  general  countenance  given  to 
them  at  Pensacola,  but  by  very  specific  and 
urgent  advice  from  the  British  and  Spanish  offi 
cers  there,  Avho,  as  we  learn  from  official  doc 
uments,  urged  the  Creeks  to  make  the  war  at 
once,  saying  : 

;<  If  they  [the  Americans]  prove  too  hard  for 
you,  send  your  women  and  children  to  Pensacola 
and  we  will  send  them  to  Havana  ;  and  if  you 
should  be  compelled  to  fly  yourselves,  and  the 
Americans  should  prove  too  hard  for  both  of  us, 
there  are  vessels  enough  to  take  us  all  off 
together." 


CHAPTER  VII. 

RED  EAGLE'S  ATTEMPT  TO  ABANDON  HIS 
PARTY. 

RED  EAGLE,  as  we  have  already  related,  was 
the  most  active  and  efficient  leader  of  the  war 
party  during  all  the  time  of  preparation.  At  last 
the  war  which  he  had  so  earnestly  sought  to  bring 
about  had  come,  but  it  had  not  come  in  the  way 
in  which  he  had  hoped,  and  Red  Eagle  hesitated. 

In  the  first  place  the  war  had  come  too  soon. 
Red  Eagle  was  too  shrewd  and  too  well  informed 
to  believe  the  predictions  of  his  prophets  Sin- 
quista  and  Francis,  \vho  told  the  Creeks  that 
if  they  would  completely  abandon  those  things 
which  they  had  learned  of  the  whites  and  become 
utter  savages,  not  one  of  them  should  be  killed  in 
the  war  ;  that  the  Great  Spirit  would  rain  down 
fire  upon  the  whites,  create  quagmires  in  their 
path,  cause  the  earth  to  open  and  swallow  them, 
and  draw  charmed  circles  around  the  camps  ol 
the  Creeks,  into  which  no  white  man  could  come 
without  immediately  falling  down  dead.  Like 
many  another  shrewd  leader,  Red  Eagle  was 


ATTEMPT   TO   ABANDON   HIS   PARTY.  79 

willing  to  make  use  of  this  sort  of  appeals  to 
superstition,  while  he  was  himself  unaffected  by 
them.  He  saw  clearly  enough  that  the  white 
men  were  strong,  because  he  knew  that  their 
numbers  and  resources  were  not  limited  by  what 
he  could  see.  He  knew  that  armies  would  come 
from  other  quarters  of  the  country  to  aid  the  set 
tlers  on  the  Tombigbee  River  and  in  the  Tensaw 
settlement.  Therefore  he  did  not  wish  to  under 
take  what  he  knew  would  be  a  severe  contest, 
single-handed.  He  wanted  to  wait  until  Tecum- 
seh,  who  had  promised  to  return,  should  come  ; 
he  was  disposed  to  wait  also  for  the  British  to 
land  a  force  somewhere  on  the  coast  before  be 
ginning  the  war. 

Moreover,  his  schemes  and  his  advocacy  01 
war  had  been  from  the  first  founded  upon  his  con 
viction  that  the  friendship  of  the  Creeks  and  half- 
breeds  in  the  lower  towns  for  the  whites  would 
give  way  when  they  should  see  that  the  war  was 
inevitable.  He  had  sought  to  bring  about  a  war 
in  which  the  whole  Creek  nation  should  be  united 
against  the  whites  ;  what  he  had  brought  about 
was  a  very  different  affair.  He  now  saw  that  the 
friendliness  of  the  people  of  the  lower  towns, 
who  were  his  nearest  friends  and  kinsmen,  in 
cluding  his  brother,  Jack  Weatherford,  and  his 


80  RED   EAGLE. 

half-brother,  David  Tait,  was  much  more  firmly 
fixed  than  he  had  imagined.  He  had  supposed 
that  it  was  merely  the  indisposition  of  rich  men 
to  imperil  their  property  by  bringing  on  a  state 
of  war  ;  he  now  knew  that  it  was  a  fixed  purpose 
to  remain  at  peace  with  the  white  men,  and  even 
to  join  them  in  fighting  the  Creeks  whenever  the 
war  should  come.  If  he  had  cherished  a  doubt 
of  this  so  long,  he  had  proof  of  it  in  the  presence 
of  some  of  these  friends  of  his  in  the  American 
force  at  the  battle  of  Burnt  Corn,  whither  they 
had  gone  as  volunteers. 

All  this  put  a  totally  different  face  upon  mat 
ters.  Red  Eagle  was  eager  for  a  war  between 
the  Creeks  and  whites,  but  a  war  between  a  part 
of  the  Creeks  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  rest  of  the 
Creeks  with  the  whites  on  the  other,  a  Avar  in 
which  he  must  fight  his  own  brothers  and  his 
nearest  friends,  was  a  very  different  and  much 
less  attractive  affair. 

There  was  still  another  cause  of  Red  Eagle's 
hesitation  at  this  time — perhaps  a  stronger  cause 
than  either  of  the  others.  He  was  in  love,  and 
his  sweetheart  was  among  the  people  whom  he 
must  fight  if  he  fought  at  all.  He  was  a  rich 
planter,  and  lived  at  this  time  on  a  fine  place  near 
the  Holy  Ground,  and  being  a  young  widower 


ATTEMPT  TO   ABANDON  HIS  PARTY.  8 1 

he  had  conceived  a  passionate  fancy  for  one  Lucy 
Cornells,  a  young  girl  of  mixed  Indian  and  white 
blood,  who  has  been  described  by  persons  who 
knew  her  as  very  attractive  and  beautiful.  How 
ever  that  may  be,  it  is  certain  that  Red  Eagle's 
devotion  to  her  was  profound. 

This  girl's  father,  when  McNac's  discovery  of 
the  Indian  plans  spread  consternation  through 
the  settlements,  fled  with  his  daughter  to  the 
Tensaw  country  and  took  refuge  in  Fort  Minis  ; 
and  Red  Eagle  had  thus  a  sweetheart  added  to 
the  list  of  persons  near  and  dear  to  him,  whose 
lives  he  must  put  in  danger  if  he  went  to  war. 
Anticipating  the  events  of  this  history  somewhat, 
it  may  as  well  be  added  here  that  Red  Eagle's 
love  for  this  maiden  prompted  him,  Avhen  he  was 
about  to  attack  Fort  Minis,  to  give  secret  warn 
ing  to  her  father,  as  is  believed  upon  evidence 
accepted  at  the  time  as  satisfactory.  Cornells 
left  the  fort  before  the  attack,  and  although  he 
remained  with  the  whites  and  fought  with  them 
in  the  war,  Red  Eagle  was  permitted  to  carry  off 
his  daughter  to  the  nation. 

Let  us  return  to  the  time  of  which  we  write  in 
this  chapter.  All  these  things  were  strong  in 
ducements  to  Red  Eagle  to  abandon  his  warlike 
purposes,  but  it  was  now  too  late  for  him  to  still 


82  RED   EAGLE. 

the  storm  he  had  raised.  Had  he  now  preached 
peace  among  his  warlike  followers,  his  life  would 
not  have  been  worth  a  day's  purchase. 

He  kept  his  own  counsel,  and  in  his  perplexity 
determined,  about  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Burnt 
Corn,  to  seek  the  advice  of  his  brother,  Jack 
Weatherford,  and  his  half-brother,  David  Tait. 
Making  his  way  to  their  places  on  Little  River, 
he  laid  the  whole  case  before  his  relatives.  They 
advised  him  secretly  to  remove  his  family,  his 
negroes,  and  so  much  of  his  live-stock  as  might 
be,  to  their  plantations,  which  lay  within  the 
friendly  district,  and,  quitting  the  nation,  to  re 
main  quietly  with  them  until  the  troubles  should 
come  to  an  end,  taking  no  part  in  the  war  on 
either  side. 

After  reflecting  upon  the  matter,  Red  Eagle 
determined  to  act  vipon  this  advice  ;  and  thus  the 
Creeks  were  very  near  losing  the  services  of  that 
chieftain  whose  genius  alone  enabled  them  to 
maintain  their  w^r  with  any  hope  of  success. 
When  Red  Eagl<?  returned  to  his  plantation  to 
put  this  plan  into  operation,  however,  he  found 
that  it  was  now  to/  late.  Knowing  at  least  some 
of  the  reasons  the/  chief  had  for  abandoning  his 
support  of  their  canse,  some  of  the  hostile  Creeks 
had  visited  his  house  in  his  absence,  and  had 


ATTEMPT  TO   ABANDON   HIS  PARTY.  83 

seized  upon  his  children  and  his  negroes,  holding 
them  as  hostages  for  his  fidelity.  They  plainly 
told  him  of  their  doubts  of  him,  and  threatened 
to  kill  his  children  if  he  should  falter  for  a 
moment. 

There  was  nothing  left  for  him  to  do  but  yield 
to  his  fate,  and  boldly  lead  his  men  to  battle 
against  the  foes  whom  he  cordially  hated.  His 
Rubicon  was  crossed,  his  die  was  cast,  and  there 
was  no  possibility  of  retreat. 


CHAPTER    VIII. 

CLAIBORNE   AND    RED    EAGLE. 

IF  Weatherford  was  at  last  ready  to  enter  upon 
the  long-contemplated  war,  so  too  the  white 
people  at  last  began  to  understand  that  their 
hopes  of  a  reconciliation  of  some  kind  with  the 
Creeks  were  delusive,  and  they  began  to  take 
measures  for  their  defence.  Even  yet,  however, 
they  seem  to  have  had  no  adequate  conception  of 
the  real  nature  and  extent  of  the  storm  that  was 
brewing.  Their  measures  of  defence  were  not 
proportioned  to  the  need,  were  not  of  the  right 
kind,  except  in  part,  and  were  carried  forward 
lazily,  listlessly,  and  apparently  with  a  deep- 
seated  ccnviction  that,  after  all,  the  making  of 
preparation  might  be  a  useless  waste  of  labor  in 
anticipation  of  a  danger  which  might  never  come. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  if  these  people 
had  fully  understood  their  own  situation  they 
could  and  would  have  saved  themselves  by  adopt 
ing  a  vigorous  offensive  policy  from  the  outset. 
Colonel  Caller's  expedition  to  Burnt  Corn  was  a 
type  and  example  of  what  they  ought  to  have 


CLAIBORNE   AND   RED   EAGLE.  85 

attempted.  They  should  have  struck  the  first 
blows,  and  should  have  followed  them  up  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  If  they  had  understood  their 
own  situation  they  would  probably  have  done 
this.  They  would  have  organized  the  whole 
population  into  an  aVmy,  and  if  they  had  done 
this  they  might  almost  certainly  have  conquered 
a  peace  with  comparatively  small  loss  to  them 
selves  before  Weatherford  had  time  to  bring  his 
roving  parties  together  for  the  contest. 

Instead  of  this,  however,  the  only  attempt  that 
was  made  to  meet  hostility  half-way — the  Burnt 
Corn  expedition — ended  in  failure,  and  the  men 
who  had  undertaken  it  dispersed  to  their  homes. 
It  was  now  too  late  for  a  policy  of  offensive  de 
fence.  The  battle  of  Burnt  Corn  was  followed 
by  an  immediate  concentration  of  the  hostile 
Creeks,  and  the  most  that  could  be  done  by  the 
whites  to  avert  the  threatened  destruction  was  to 
fortify  certain  central  posts  and  send  messengers 
for  assistance. 

The  method  of  fortifying  was  the  same  in  all 
cases,  with  such  variations  of  detail  as  the  na 
ture  of  the  ground,  the  number  of  men  engaged 
in  the  construction  of  the  works,  and  the  other 
circumstances  of  each  case  rendered  necessary. 
In  general  plan  the  so-called  forts  were  nearly 


86  RED   EAGLE. 

square,  the  most  elaborate  of  them  being  con 
structed  upon  the  plan  of  Foit  Minis,  which  is 
represented  on  another  page.  Whatever  their 
form  was,  they  were  made  of  timbers  set  on  end 
in  the  ground,  as  close  together  as  possible,  form 
ing  a  close  and  high  wall,  pierced  with  port-holes 
for  the  use  of  riflemen.  Heavy  gates  were  pro 
vided,  and  within  the  inclosure  strong  block 
houses  were  built,  in  which  a  stout  resistance 
could  be  made  even  after  the  outer  works  should 
be  carried. 

There  were  more  than  a  score  of  these  forts  in 
different  parts  of  the  settlements.  In  that  part 
of  the  peninsula  formed  by  the  Alabama  and 
Tombigbee  rivers  which  now  constitutes  Clarke 
County,  Alabama,  there  were  stockades  built, 
which  were  known  as  Fort  Glass,  Fort  Sinque- 
field,  etc.,  each  taking  its  name  from  the  owner 
of  the  place  fortified. 

Into  these  forts  the  people  now  began  to  flock 
in  anticipation  of  a  general  outbreak  ;  and  they 
were  none  too  soon,  as  Weatherford  had  already 
collected  his  men  in  considerable  numbers.  The 
principal  tort  was  on  the  plantation  of  one  Samuel 
Minis,  a  rich  Indian  or  man  of  mixed  blood,  who 
lived  on  the  little  lake  called  Tensaw,  or  Tensas, 
as  it  is  now  sometimes  spelled  on  the  maps,  which 


CLAIBORNE   AND   RED   EAGLE.  87 

lies  within  about  a  mile  of  the  Alabama  River,  a 
few  miles  above  the  confluence  of  that  river  with 
the  Tornbigbee.  Mims's  place  was  near  the  high 
road  which  led  to  Mims's  ferry,  and  hence  was 
a  natural  centre  of  the  neighborhood. 

Minis  and  his  neighbors,  with  the  help  of  a 
number  of  half-breed  refugees  from  the  Creek 
nation,  constructed  there  a  large  stockade  fort 
ress,  and  the  people  of  the  surrounding  country, 
white,  black,  red,  and  mixed,  congregated  there 
for  safety. 

Meantime  the  appearance  of  a  British  fleet  off 
the  coast  had  awakened  the  government  to  the 
danger  in  which  Mobile  lay,  and  on  the  28th  of 
June,  1813,  Brigadier-General  Ferdinand  L.  Clai- 
borne,  a  distinguished  soldier  who  had  won  a 
fine  reputation  in  the  Indian  wars  of  the  North- 
\vest,  was  ordered,  with  what  force  he  had,  to 
march  from  the  post  of  Baton  Rouge  to  Fort 
Stoddard,  a  military  station  on  the  Mobile  River, 
not  far  below  the  confluence  of  the  Alabama  and 
Tombigbee  rivers. 

Upon  receiving  this  order  General  Claiborne 
made  application  for  the  necessary  funds  and  sup 
plies,  but  the  quartermaster  could  put  no  more 
than  two  hundred  dollars  into  his  army  chest— 
a  sum  wholly  inadequate   to  the  purpose.     But 


88  RED   EAGLE. 

Claiborne  was  not  a  man  to  permit  small  obstacles 
to  interfere  with  affairs  of-  importance.  He  bor 
rowed  the  necessary  funds  upon  his  personal 
credit,  giving  a  mortgage  upon  his  property  as 
security,  and  boldly  set  out  with  his  little  army. 
It  is  worth  while  to  note  in  passing  that,  in  con 
sequence  of  the  loss  of  vouchers  for  his  expendi 
tures  upon  the  expedition,  General  Claiborne's 
patriotic  act  cost  him  the  whole  amount  bor 
rowed,  his  property  being  sold  after  his  death,  as 
we  learn  from  a  note  in  Pickett's  History  of 
Alabama,  to  satisfy  the  mortgage. 

Arriving  at  Fort  Stoddard  with  his  army  of 
seven  hundred  men  on  the  thirtieth  clay  of  July, 
General  Claiborne  at  once  sought  the  fullest  and 
most  trustworthy  information  to  be  had  with  re 
spect  to  the  condition  of  the  country,  the  forces 
and  designs  of  the  Indians,  and  the  strength  and 
situation  of  the  various  forts. 

Having  thus  made  himself  master  of  the  con 
ditions  of  the  problem  which  he  was  set  to  solve, 
he  distributed  his  forces  and  the  volunteers  who 
were  at  command,  among  the  various  stockade 
posts  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  the  best  protection 
he  could  to  every  part  of  the  country. 

To  Fort  Mims  he  sent  Major  Beasley,  with  one 
hundred  and  seventy-five  men,  who,  with  seventy 


CLAIBORNE   AND    RED   EAGLE.  89 

militiamen  already  there,  swelled  the  force  at  that 
post  to  two  hundred  and  forty-five  fighting  men. 
Major  Beasley,  upon  taking  command,  organized 
his  raw  troops  into  something  resembling  a  bat 
talion,  and  strengthened  the  fort  by  erecting  a 
•second  line  of  picketing  outside  the  original  gates. 
Believing  the  post  to  be  strong  enough  to  spare 
a  part  of  the  force  under  his  command,  Major 
Beasley  sent  detachments  to  various  other  and 
Aveaker  posts,  acting  upon  the  principle  of  pro 
tecting  all  points,  which  had  governed  General 
Claiborne. 

Besides  the  troops,    who  were  simply  all  the 
men  in  the  fort,  every  man  capable  of  shooting 
a   gun  being    enrolled  as   a   soldier,   there  were 
women  and  children  at  Fort  Minis,  who  had  fled 
thither  from  the  country  for  protection,  so  that 
the  total  number  of  persons  there  exceeded  five 
hundred  ;  the  exact  number  is  differently  stated 
by   different   writers,    but  the   most   trustworthy 
account,    drawn   from  several   original    sources, 
places  the  population  of  the  place  at  five  hundred 
and   fifty-three    souls.      The    lives    of    all   these 
people  were  committed  to  the  keeping  of  Major 
Beasley,  who  was  clothed  with  ample  authority, 
and  free  from  embarrassing  dictation  or  interfer 
ence  of  any  kind.     His   fort  was  a  strong  one, 


QO  RED    EAGLE. 

and  in  sending  away  some  of  his  men  to  assist  the 
garrisons  of  other  posts  he  himself  testified  that 
the  force  which  remained  was  sufficient  for  the 
need.  His  failure  to  use  these  means  effectually 
for  the  protection  of  the  lives  over  which  he  was 
set  as  guardian  was  clearly  inexcusable,  and  al 
though  he  bravely  sacrificed  his  own  life  in  an 
attempt  to  retrieve  his  fault,  he  could  do  nothing 
to  undo  its  terrible  consequences.  His  fault  was 
not  cowardice,  but  a  lack  of  caution,  an  utter  and 
inexcusable  lack  of  that  prudence  and  foresight 
which  are  as  indispensable  in  a  commander  as 
personal  courage  itself. 

It  appears  that  alarms  were  frequent  in  the 
fort,  as  was  to  be  expected  in  a  place  full  of 
women  and  children,  credulous  negroes,  and 
excited  militiamen.  These  alarms  Beasley  re 
ported  to  General  Claiborne,  and  in  doing  so  he 
probably  gave  that  capable  and  experienced 
officer  some  hint  of  his  own  lack  of  prudence. 
At  any  rate,  General  Claiborne  thought  it  neces 
sary  to  issue  a  general  order  to  Major  Beasley, 
directing  him  to  strengthen  his  works,  use  caution 
in  the  conduct  of  affairs,  and  neglect  no  means  of 
making  the  safety  of  the  fort  certain.  The  order 
ended  with  this  significant  sentence  :  '  To  re 
spect  an  enemy  and  prepare  in  the  best  possible 


CLAIBORNE   AND    RED   EAGLE  QI 

way  to  meet  him,  is  the  certain  means  to  insure 
success."  All  the  work  done  by  Major  Beasley 
to  strengthen  the  works  was  done  in  obedience 
to  special  orders  from  Claiborne,  and  even  what 
he  specifically  ordered  done  appears  to  have  been 
done  only  in  part.  He  directed  Major  Beasley, 
for  one  thing-,  to  build  two  additional  block 
houses,  but  that  officer  contented  himself  with 
beginning  to  build  one,  which  was  never  finished. 

With  matters  in  Fort  Minis,  and  the  results  of 
Major  Beasley 's  management  there,  we  shall  have 
to  do  in  another  chapter.  We  have  first  to  look 
at  the  general  situation  of  affairs  as  they  stood 
during  August,  1813,  before  Weatherford — for  by 
that  name,  rather  than  Red  Eagle,  he  is  known 
to  the  history  of  what  followed — struck  his  first 
tremendous  blow. 

Weatherford  had  collected  his  men  in  the 
upper  towns,  and  was  now  moving  down  the 
river,  managing  his  advance  very  skilfully,  after 
the  manner  of  regularly  educated  military  men. 
In  small  affairs  the  Indian  general  followed  the 
tactics  of  his  race,  depending  upon  cunning  and 
silent  creeping  for  the  concealment  of  his  move 
ments,  but  he  was  too  able  an  officer  to  fall  into 
the  mistake  of  supposing  that  an  army  could  be 
advanced  in  this  way  for  a  long  distance  in 


92  RED   EAGLE. 

secret.  He  knew  that  his  movements  would  be 
watched  very  closely  and  promptly  reported. 
He  therefore  resorted  to  strategy — or  rather  to 
sound  methods  of  grand  tactics — as  a  means  of 
concealing,  not  the  fact  that  he  was  advancing, 
but  the  real  direction  and  objective  point  of  his 
advance.  lie  moved  southward,  taking  care  to 
make  demonstrations  upon  his  flank  which  were 
calculated  to  deceive  his  enemy.  He  threatened 
the  settlements  in  the  peninsula,  and  constantly 
kept  up  a  front  of  observation  in  a  direction  dif 
ferent  from  that  in  which  his  main  body  was 
actually  moving.  In  this  way  he  managed  to  ad 
vance  to  McGirth's  plantation,  on  the  Alabama 
River,  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  place  where 
the  town  of  Claiborne  now  stands,  without  re 
vealing  the  purpose  of  his  advance,  and  as  this 
halting  point  was  one  at  which  his  presence 
seemed  to  threaten  an  attack  upon  Fort  Glass, 
Fort  Sinquefield,  and  the  other  posts  in  what  is 
now  Clarke  County,  his  real  purpose  was  still 
effectually  concealed. 

Meantime  General  Claiborne  was  not  disposed 
to  lie  still  and  permit  his  wily  adversary  to  deter 
mine  the  course  of  the  campaign.  We  said  in  the 
beginning  of  this  chapter  that  by  a  timely  resort 
to  offensive  measures  the  settlers  might  have 


CLAIHORNE   AND   RED   EAGLE.  93 

averted  a  general  war.  It  was  now  General 
Claiborne's  opinion  that  with  the  troops  at  com 
mand  a  policy  of  this  kind  offered  even  yet  the 
best  prospect  of  success.  Even  before  he  had 
finished  his  defensive  preparations  he  planned  an 
offensive  campaign,  which  he  was  confident  of  his 
ability  to  execute,  while  he  was  equally  confident 
that  its  execution  would  save  a  very  much  severer 
effort  in  future. 

On  the  2d  of  August,  1813,  he  wrote  to  his  com 
manding  general,  explaining  the  situation,  and 
adding  these  words  : 

"  If  you  \vill  authorize  my  entering  the  Creek 
nation,  I  will  do  so  in  ten  days  after  the  junction 
of  the  Seventh  Regiment,  and  if  I  am  not  disap 
pointed,  will  give  to  our  frontiers  peace,  and  to 
the  government  any  portion  of  the  Creek  country 
they  please.  Some  force  ought  to  enter  the 
nation  before  they  systematize  and  are  fully  pre 
pared  for  war.  With  one  thousand  men  and 
your  authority  to  march  immediately,  I  pledge 
myself  to  burn  any  town  in  the  Creek  nation. 
Three  months  hence  it  might  be  difficult  for  three 
thousand  to  effect  what  can  be  done  with  a  third 
of  the  number  at  present.  They  gain  strength, 
and  their  munitions  of  war  enlarge  every  day." 

How  accurately  General  Claiborne  estimated 


94  RED  EAGLE. 

the  difficulties  which  delay  would  produce  will 
be  abundantly  seen  as  we  follow  the  course  of  the 
campaign.  There  can  be  little  reasonable  doubt 
that  the  blow  \vhich  this  gallant  and  enterprising 
officer  wished  to  strike  then  would  have  saved 
many  hundreds  of  lives  on  both  sides,  if  he  had 
been  permitted  to  carry  his  plan  into  effect  ;  but 
there  was  a  difficulty  in  the  way — the  Creeks  had 
not  yet  openly  attacked  the  white  settlements 
beyond  their  border,  and  until  they  did  so  the 
commanding  general  had  no  authority  to  permit 
his  troops  to  invade  the  nation. 


FORT  MIMS. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

RED  EAGLE  BEFORE  FORT  MIMS. 

Now  .that  it  was  determined  that  General 
Claiborne  should  not  invade  the  Creek  country 
and  crush  Weatherford  before  that  chieftain's 
forces  should  be  fully  gathered  and  fully  armed, 
there  was  nothing  for  General  Claiborne  to  do 
but  wait  the  attack  of  his  Indian  adversary  with 
what  patience  he  could,  taking  care  to  neglect  no 
precaution  which  might  help  to  secure  safety. 
He  visited  all  the  forts  one  after  another,  in 
spected  them,  and  gave  minute  and  careful  in 
structions  for  their  strengthening,  everywhere 
cautioning  their  commanders  to  beware  of  sur- 
p/ise,  and  to  avoid  the  danger  of  falling  into  care 
less  habits.  He  knew  the  Indians  well,  and  knew 
that  they  would  seek  with  great  care  to  make 
their  first  attack  unexpectedly,  and  also  that  they 
would  bring  as  heavy  a  force  as  possible  to  bear 
upon  the  point  of  attack.  He  knew  the  temper* 
of  the  militiamen  too,  and  seems  to  have  speci 
ally  feared  that  they  would  be  lulled  into  a  dan- 


96  RED   EAGLE. 

gerous  feeling  of  security  by  delay  and  by  re 
peated  false  alarms. 

Against  all  of  these  dangers  this  thoroughly 
capable  commander  continually  cautioned  his  sub 
ordinate  officers  to  whom  he  committed  the  com 
mand  of  the  several  forts.  Had  his  warnings 
been  duly  heeded,  a  result  far  different  from  that 
which  wre  shall  have  to  record  would  have  fol 
lowed. 

Having  delivered  his  orders,  General  Claiborne 
wrent  to  the  most  exposed  point,  a  small  fort 
about  sixty  miles  further  into  the  Indian  country, 
confidently  believing  that  Red  Eagle  would  make 
his  first  attack  there,  with  a  view  of  freeing  the 
country  of  wrhite  men  before  making  a  decided 
advance  against  any  of  the  forts  near  the  conflu 
ence  of  the  two  rivers.  In  this  he  erred,  as  the 
event  showed,  but  the  error  was  one  which  r.o 
foresight  or  judgment  could  have  avoided.  Kcd 
Eagle  was  a  bold  and  a  shrewd  wrarrior,  end 
when  he  was  free  to  choose  his  time  and  place  of 
attack,  as  he  was  at  this  time,  it  was  simply  im 
possible  to  conjecture  with  accuracy  w^here  or 
when  he  would  strike.  He  was  like  the  light 
ning,  dealing  his  blows  without  a  hint,  in  advance, 
of  their  object.  General  Claiborne  having  no 
means  of  ascertaining  what  his  adversary  would 


RED   EAGLE   BEFORE   FORT   MIMS.  97 

do,  and  no  chance  to  guess,  simply  went  to  the 
front  as  a  brave  commander  should. 

Meantime  Major  Beasley  soon  began  to  neglect 
proper  precautions.  He  left  the  new  blockhouse 
and  the  new  line  of  picketing  unfinished,  although 
he  had  idle  men  in  plenty  who  could  have  com 
pleted  them  with  very  little  effort.  The  accounts 
which  have  been  given  of  the  life  in  the  fort  indi 
cate  that  the  commander  was  utterly  wanting  in 
the  first  qualification  of  an  officer  for  command 
—namely,  a  due  regard  for  discipline.  He  had 
raw  troops  under  his  command — troops  whose 
efficiency  as  soldiers  would  have  been  more  than 
doubled  during  those  days  of  inaction  and  wait 
ing  if  daily  or  twice  daily  drills  had  been  ordered 
and  anything  like  discipline  or  military  order 
maintained.  That  a  commander  intrusted  with 
the  charge  of  so  important  a  fort,  especially  with 
the  lives  of  so  many  helpless  women  and  children 
committed  to  his  care,  should  have  neglected  so 
good  an  opportunity  to  convert  his  raw  recruits 
into  drilled  and  disciplined  soldiers,  would 
scarcely  be  credible  if  the  fact  were  not  fully  at 
tested. 

Instead  of  improving  the  precious  days  of  wait 
ing  in  this  way,  Major  Beasley  wholly  relaxed 
the  reins  of  discipline.  The  men  gave  themselves 


98  RED   EAGLE. 

up  to  roystering,  card-playing,  and  uproarious 
fun-making. 

About  this  time  a  negro,  whom  Weathcrford 
had  captured  near  McGirth's  plantation,  escaped, 
and,  making  his  way  to  Fort  Mims,  informed 
Major  Beasley  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  Indian 
force,  telling  him  also  that  the  Indian  chieftain 
had  made  careful  inquiries  about  this  particular 
fort,  its  strength,  the  number  of  persons  in  it, 
and  other  details,  his  anxiety  about  which  indi 
cated  his  purpose  to  attack  the  post.  Major 
Beasley  sent  out  scouting  parties  ;  but  as  they 
discovered  no  Indians  in  the  neighborhood  he 
appears  immediately  to  have  relapsed  into  his 
former  state  of  listlessness.  He  did  not  respect 
his  enemy,  as  Claiborne  had  so  earnestly  warned 
him  to  do.  The  men,  calling  the  negro  from 
McGirth's  plantation  a  liar,  returned  to  their 
frolics  and  their  idleness. 

Red  Eagle,  wiser  than  his  enemy,  respected 
him,  and  advanced  so  cautiously  that  he  actually 
placed  his  army  within  striking  distance  of  the 
fort  without  Beasley 's  knowledge,  and  concealed 
his  men  so  adroitly  that  Beasley 's  scouting  par 
ties  failed  to  discover  them.  Beasley  was  as 
brave  a  man  as  Red  Eagle,  but  'Red  Eagle  had 
the  other  qualities  of  a  soldier — sagacity,  caution, 


RED  EAGLE  BEFORE  FORT  MIMS.  99 

tireless  watchfulness— which  Beasley  lacked  ;  in 
a  contest  between  the  two  as  commanders,  Red 
Eagle  was  Beasley's  master.  One  day,  while 
Red  Eagle  was  thus  hovering  about  the  fort, 
watching  it  as  a  cat  watches  its  prey,  two 
negroes,  who  had  been  guarding  some  cattle,  ran 
in  great  terror  to  the  fort,  and  reported  that  they 
had  seen  Indians  in  the  immediate  neighborhood. 
Major  Beasley  at  once  sent  a  body  of  horsemen 
under  command  of  Captain  Middleton  to  ascer 
tain  the  facts  of  the  case.  Captain  Middleton, 
accompanied  by  the  negroes,  went  to  the  spot 
where  they  said  they  had  seen  the  savages  ;  find 
ing  no  Indians  there,  Captain  Middleton,  who 
appears  to  have  thought  that  Indians  are  like 
trees,  staying  in  one  place,  returned  to  the  fort 
and  reported  that  a  false  alarm  had  been  given. 
The  poor  negroes  were  denounced  as  liars,  and 
0:1  e  of  them  was  flogged  for  having  given  a  false 
alarm.  The  other  was  saved  for  a  while  by  the 
intercession  of  his  master,  but  he  was  afterward 
arraigned  again,  his  master's  consent  having  been 
gained  by  Major  Beasley's  threat  to  expel  him 
and  his  family  from  the  fort  if  he  persisted  in  his 
refusal ;  and  it  is  upon  record  that  when  the  fort 
was  attacked  the  negro  was  standing  tied,  and 
awaiting  his  flogging. 


100  RED   EAGLE 

This  incident  is  mentioned  here  in  illustration 
of  the  unaccountable  folly  of  Major  Beasley. 
The  writers  who  have  recorded  the  facts  of  this 
officer's  behavior  have  touched  them  as  lightly  as 
possible,  sparing  him  probably  because  he  fought 
manfully  and  fell  at  his  post  at  last  ;  but  it  is  im 
possible  to  regard  his  conduct  with  any  thing  like 
respect  or  even  patience.  His  carelessness  was 
a  crime,  and  history  must  condemn  it  as  such. 
Charged  with  the  duty  of  defending  an  import 
ant  post,  he  neglected  the  most  essential  measures 
of  defence  ;  intrusted  with  the  lives  of  more  than 
five  hundred  persons,  he  carelessly,  criminally, 
permitted  them  to  be  butchered.  We  have 
already  seen  that  he  neglected  discipline  in  the 
fort  ;  he  neglected  also  to  surround  the  fort,  as 
he  should  have  done,  with  a  cordon  of  picket- 
guards,  who  might  have  been  so  placed  that 
ample  warning  would  have  been  given  of  the 
approach  of  the  enemy.  Instead  of  that,  he 
actually  subjected  the  negroes  who  gave  warning 
to  ignominious  punishment,  and,  most  incredible 
thing  of  all,  permitted  the  gates  of  the  fort  to  stand 
open  until  the  accumulation  of  sand  at  their  base 
rendered  it  impossible  to  shut  them  promptly  ! 

The  alarm  given  by  the  negroes  was  given  on 
the  29th  day  of  August.  The  next  morning  the 


RED   EAGLE   BEFORE-  'I>'O S.T.  ,MIMS.  }Gf 

negro  who  had  been  flogged  was  again  sent  out 
to  guard  the  cattle,  and  his  companion  was  de 
tained  to  receive  his  punishment. 

Meantime  Red  Eagle  lay  within  a  few  hundred 
yards  of  the  fort,  at  the  head  of  a  thousand  war 
riors.  While  Major  Beasley  was  using  his 
authority  to  compel  the  negro's  master  to  consent 
to  the  infliction  of  the  penalty,  Red  Eagle  and  his 
men  were  quietly  watching  the  fort,  looking  in  at 
the  open  gate  and  making  ready  to  destroy  the 
garrison.  The  negro  who  had  been  whipped 
again  saw  the  Indians,  he  being  where  a  picket- 
guard  ought  to  have  been  ;  but  he  was  afraid  to 
report  the  fact  lest  he  should  be  whipped  again, 
and  so  between  his  fear  of  the  Indians  on  the 
one  hand  and  of  Major  Beasley's  peculiar  notions 
of  discipline  on  the  other,  the  poor  fellow  de 
termined  to  flee  to  another  fort,  two  or  three 
miles  east  of  Fort  Minis.  No  alarm  was  given, 
therefore.  Nobody  in  the  fort  suspected  Red 
Eagle's  presence  or  prepared  to  meet  his  assault. 
Nobody  shut  the  gate.  Nobody  did  any  thing,  in 
short,  which  ought  to  have  been  done,  or  any 
thing  which  indicated  that  this  was  a  fort,  or  that 
its  commander  knew  that  a  war  existed  or  was 
likely  to  exist  anywhere  on  earth.  Worst  of  all, 
Red  Eagle  lay  there  watching  his  prey  like  a 


IJC52      '.  R         EAGLE. 

tiger,  and  seeing-  just  how  matters  stood.  The 
able  commander  of  the  red  men  knew  his  business 
and  attended  to  it.  His  plan  was  formed,  his 
men  were  ready,  and  he  only  awaited  the  coming 
of  the  right  moment  to  spring  upon  his  unsus 
pecting  prey.  It  was  nearly  noon,  and  it  was  the 
most  critical  hour  of  the  war. 


FORT    MI  MS   (iNTERIORj.; 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE    MASSACRE    AT    FORT    MIMS. 

THE  accounts  of  what  followed,  \vhich  are 
given  in  the  various  books  that  treat  the  subject, 
are  for  the  most  part  very  meagre,  and  upon  one 
or  two  points  of  minor  importance  they  conflict 
with  each  other.  Luckily,  we  have  one  account 
which  is  much  more  minute  than  any  other,  and 
at  the  same  time  is  entirely  trustworthy.  This 
account  is  found  in  Mr.  A.  J.  Pickett's  History 
of  Alabama,  a  work  remarkable  for  the  diligence 
of  research  upon  which  it  is  founded,  the  author 
having  been  at  great  pains  to  gather  details  from 
the  survivors  of  the  various  historical  events  of 
which  he  writes.  Mr.  Pickett  had  access  to  the 
private  papers  of  General  Claiborne,  and  to 
several  survivors  of  the  Fort  Minis  affair,  and 
from  these  sources  he  gathered  a  mass  of  particu 
lars  which  no  other  writer  upon  the  subject  had 
within  reach.  In  writing  here  of  the  affair,  we 
must  depend  mainly  upon  Mr.  Pickett's  pages  for 
all  matters  of  detail. 

We  left  Red  Eagle   at   the  head   of  his   men, 


104  RED   EAGLE. 

within  a  short  distance  of  the  fort,  quietly  con 
templating  it.  His  prey  was  apparently  wJthin 
his  grasp  and  his  men  were  ready,  but  still  Red 
Eagle  waited,  repressing  the  eagerness  of  his  fol 
lowers  sternly.  The  people  in  the  fort  were 
singing,  playing  games,  and  occupying  them 
selves  in  every  way  but  the  soldierly  one.  They 
were  not  on  the  alert — they  were  completely  off 
their  guard.  Apparently  the  time  had  come  to 
strike,  but  Red  Eagle  knew  his  business,  and 
waited.  He  knew  that  to  take  a  stockade  fort 
ress  without  the  aid  of  artillery  he  must  surprise 
the  garrison  completely,  and  this  was  what  he 
sought  to  do  by  delay. 

Noon  came,  and  with  it  came  the  drum  for  din 
ner.  That  was  the  signal  Red  Eagle  had  been 
waiting  for.  It  was  not  enough  that  the  garrison 
should  be  listlessly  off  guard.  Red  Eagle  wished 
them  to  be  occupied  with  something  else,  and 
now  they  were  going  to  dinner.  Giving  them 
time  enough  collect  for  that  purpose,  the  Indian 
commander  advanced  his  line,  doing  so  quietly, 
contrary  to  the  Indian  habit.  He  was  de 
termined  to  make  the  surprise  as  complete  as 
possible.  In  this  way  the  Indian  line,  running 
rapidly  forward,  reached  a  point  within  thirty 
yards  of  the  open  gates  before  their  approach 


THE    MASSACRE  AT.  FORT   MIMS.  10$ 

was  discovered  by  anybody  within.  Then  the 
few  men  who  happened  to  be  near  enough  made 
an  attempt  to  close  the  gate  ;  but  it  was  too  late, 
even  if  the  accumulated  sand  at  its  foot  had  not 
prevented.  The  Indians  rushed  in  pell-mell,  and 
almost  in  the  instant  of  discovering  their  presence 
Major  Beasley  learned  that  they  were  already 
within  the  outer  lines  of  his  tlefensive  works. 

Luckily  there  was  a  second  line  of  picketing  at 
this  point,  partly  completed,  which  prevented  the 
immediate  passage  of  the  Indians  to  all  parts  of 
the  fort,  and  gave  the  whites  a  defensive  work 
from  which  to  fight  their  foes.  Major  Beasley 
was  at  last  awake  to  the  reality  of  the  danger  of 
which  Claiborne  had  warned  him  repeatedly,  his 
last  warning  having  come  in  a  letter  which  Beas 
ley  had  received  only  the  day  before,  and  to 
which  he  had  replied  that  he  was  prepared  to 
repel  the  attack  of  any  force  which  might  come 
against  his  fortress.  If  he  had  scorned  this 
danger  culpably,  and  had  neglected  to  provide 
against  it  as  he  should  have  done,  he  at  least 
did  what  a  brave  man  could  to  repel  it,  now 
that  it  had  come.  He  was  among  the  first  to 
confront  the  enemy,  and  among  the  first  to  fall, 
mortally  wounded.  He  rejected  all  offers  of 
assistance  and  refused  to  be  carried  into  the 


106  RED   EAGLE. 

interior  of  the  fort,  preferring  to  remain  where 
he  was  to  animate  the  troops  by  his  presence  and 
to  direct  their  operations.  He  continued  thus  to 
command  them  until  the  breath  left  his  body. 

The  fighting  was  terrible.  It  was  not  two 
bodies  of  troops  struggling  for  possession  of  some 
strategic  point,  but  a  horde  of  savages  battling 
with  a  devoted  band  of  white  men  in  a  struggle 
the  only  issue  of  which  was  death.  The  savages 
fought  not  to  conquer  but  to  kill  the  whites,  every 
one,  women  and  children  as  well  as  men  ;  and  the 
whites  fought  with  the  desperation  of  doomed 
men  whose  only  chance  of  life  was  in  victory.  It 
was  hand-to-hand  fighting,  too.  It  was  fighting 
with  knives  and  tomahawks  and  clubbed  guns. 
Men  grappled  with  each  other,  to  relinquish  their 
hold  only  in  death. 

Several  Indian  prophets  were  among  the  first 
of  the  savages  to  fall,  and  for  a  time  their  death 
spread  consternation  among  their  followers. 
These  prophets  had  confidently  told  the  Indians 
that  their  sacred  bodies  were  invulnerable  ;  that 
the  bullets  of  white  men  would  split  upon  them, 
doing  no  harm.  When  they  went  down  before 
the  first  volley,  therefore,  the  utter  failure  of 
their  prophecy  caused  the  Indians  to  lose  faith  in 
the  cause,  and  they  were  ready  like  children  to 


THE   MASSACRE   AT   FORT  MIMS.  1 07 

abandon  it  in  their  fright.  Red  Eagle  was  a  man 
of  different  mettle.  He  had  used  these  wretched 
false  prophets  to  aid  him  in  stirring  the  enthusi 
asm  of  the  Creeks,  but  he  had  never  believed 
their  silly  pretences.  With  such  a  commander 
the  Creeks  soon  recovered  their  courage,  and  the 
fight  went  on. 

Although  Weatherford  had  gained  a  great 
advantage  by  his  tactics  of  surprise  and  sudden 
onset,  his  task  was  still  a  very  arduous  one.  He 
had  possession  of  the  outer  gates,  but  the  whites 
were  still  intrenched,  and  he  must  dislodge  them 
— an  undertaking  which  subjected  him  to  heavy 
loss  of  men.  Everybody  within  the  fort  who 
could  shoot  a  gun  or  strike  a  blow  with  axe  or 
club  was  engaged  in  the  fight.  Weatherford, 
like  the  general  of  real  genius  that  he  was,  sent 
some  of  his  men  to  threaten  the  other  sides  of  the 
fort,  thereby  compelling  the  whites  to  distribute 
their  force  all  around  the  inclosure,  and  thus  to 
weaken  the  defence  at  the  main  point  of  attack. 
Captain  Middleton  had  charge  of  the  eastern 
side,  and  fell  at  his  post.  Captain  Jack  fought 
desperately  on  the  southern  face,  and  Lieutenant 
Randon  on  the  west.  Fortunately — if  we  may 
call  any  thing  fortunate  about  an  affair  which 
ended  in  utter  misfortune — the  northern  face  of 


108  RED   EAGLE. 

the  fort,  against  which  Weatherford  hurled  his 
men  in  greatest  numbers  and  with  greatest  des 
peration,  was  defended  by  Captain  Dixon  Bailey, 
a  man  of  mixed  blood,  who,  it  will  be  remem 
bered,  distinguished  himself  in  the  battle  of  Burnt 
Corn,  and  who  seems  to  have  had  some  of  the 
qualities  of  an  able  commander.  He  saw  and 
tried  to  make  use  of  one  chance  of  success.  He 
knew  and  told  his  men  that  the  force  of  an  Indian 
attack  was  greatest  in  its  beginning  ;  that  unless 
success  crowned  their  efforts  Indians  were  apt 
to  weary  of  their  work  after  a  little  while.  He 
urged  his  followers,  therefore,  to  fight  with  de 
termination  and  with  hope.  He  urged  every 
non-combatant  who  could  do  so  to  join  in  the 
defence,  and  even  some  of  the  wTomen  did  so. 
His  judgment  of  the  Indian  character  was  right, 
and  it  was  presently  vindicated  by  the  conduct  of 
the  savages,  who  relaxed  their  efforts  to  take  the 
fort,  and  began  making  off  with  what  plunder 
they  could  secure.  But  Red  Eagle  was  there  ; 
and  his  presence  was  a  factor  for  which  Captain 
Bailey  had  not  made  due  allowance.  Riding 
after  the  retreating  bands  he  quickly  drove  them 
back,  and  stimulated  his  forces  to  renewed  exer 
tions  of  the  most  desperate  character. 

Then   Captain    Bailey  saw  that  his  hope  had 


THE   MASSACRE   AT   FORT   MIMS.  109 

been  made  vain  by  the  resolution  of  this  com 
mander  and  by  his  genius  for  controlling  men. 
It  was  now  three  o'clock,  and  the  battle  had 
lasted  three  hours.  Captain  Bailey  seeing  no 
chance  for  its  cessation  by  the  failure  of  savage 
determination,  resolved  to  abandon  the  defences, 
and  marching  boldly  out,  attempt  to  cut  a  way 
through  Red  Eagle's  hosts  to  Fort  Pierce,  a  few 
miles  distant.  From  this  attempt  he  \vas  re 
strained  only  by  force. 

The  savages  were  now  steadily  gaining  ground. 
One  point  after  another  was  abandoned  by  the 
whites,  wrhose  numbers  were  rapidly  diminishing. 
The  savages  fell  as  fast  as  the  whites  did,  or  even 
faster,  but  as  they  greatly  outnumbered  their 
entrenched  foes  they  could  afford  this.  Deduct 
ing  the  \vomen  and  children  from  the  whole  num 
ber  of  people  in  the  fort,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
savages — \vhose  force  was  estimated  variously  at 
from  one  thousand  to  fifteen  hundred  fighting 
men — outnumbered  the  fighting  men  of  the  fort 
at  least  three  to  one,  and  perhaps  even  as  greatly 
as  six  or  seven  to  one.  With  the  fall  of  each 
white  man,  therefore,  the  relative  superiority  of 
the  Indians  was  increased,  even  though  two  or 
three  of  the  assailants  should  fall  at  the  same 
time. 


IIO  RED   EAGLE. 

Little  by  little  the  fort  yielded.  From  one 
defensive  point  to  another  the  various  bands  of 
white  men  were  driven,  fighting-  as  they  went, 
and  contesting  every  inch  of  the  assailants'  ad 
vance.  Two  brothers  of  Captain  Dixon  Bailey, 
James  and  Daniel  Bailey,  went  with  some  other 
men  into  Mims's  house,  and  piercing  the  roof 
with  portholes  did  excellent  work  upon  bodies  of 
savages  who  were  protected  by  barriers  of  vari 
ous  kinds  against  the  fire  of  men  on  the  ground. 
To  silence  their  fire  some  of  the  Indians  shot 
burning  arrows  into  the  shingles  of  the  house  and 
succeeded  in  setting  it  on  fire.  They  also  fired 
several  other  buildings,  and  the  poor  people  who 
still  remained  alive  were  now  driven  to  their  last 
place  of  refuge,  a  small  inclosure  around  the 
loom  house,  called  in  the  fort  the  bastion.  From 
every  quarter  the  warning  cry  '  To  the 
bastion  !"  went  up,  anel  very  soon  the  small  in 
closure  was  so  full  of  people  that  there  w^as 
scarcely  room  for  any  one  to  move.  Meantime 
the  fire  was  gaining  on  every  hand.  Around  the 
burning  houses  demoniac  savages  danced  and 
shrieked  and  howled,  while  the  women  and  chil 
dren  within  the  burning  buildings  could  do  noth 
ing  but  wring  their  hands  and  commit  themselves 


THE    MASSACRE   AT   FORT   MIMS.  Ill 

to  heaven  while  awaiting  certain  and  horrible  de 
struction. 

Red  Eagle  was  a  soldier,  not  a  butcher  ;  and 
now  th'at  his  victory  was  secure  he  sought  to  stop 
the  bloodshed  and  spare  the  lives  of  the  helpless 
people  who  remained  ;  he  called  upon  his  war 
riors  to  desist  and  to  receive  the  survivors  as 
prisoners,  but  the  yelling  savages  would  not  listen 
to  him.  He  attempted  to  assert  his  authority 
and  compel  them  to  stop  the  carnage,  but  the 
authority  which  he  was  able  to  wield  in  setting 
these  savages  on,  failed  utterly  when  he  tried  to 
call  them  off.  When  he  thus  sought  to  save  the 
lives  of  white  men  and  women  and  children,  his 
followers  remembered  that  he  had  not  long  before 
tried  to  withdraw  altogether  from  the  war,  and 
with  loud  shrieks  of  anger  they  now  turned  upon 
him,  threatening  to  put  him  to  death  if  he  should 
further  plead  for  mercy.  He  could  do  nothing 
but  submit,  and  turn  r.way  in  horror  from  the 
sight  of  the  brutal  slaughter  which  he  had  made 
possible.  Mounting  his  superb  black  horse  he 
rode  away,  resolved  to  have  at  least  no  personal 
share  in  the  horrible  butchery. 

The  few  remaining  people  in  the  fort  were  now 
shut  up  in  a  slaughter-pen.  A  few  of  them  cut 
a  hole  through  the  outer  picketing  and  made  a 


112  RED   EAGLE. 

dash  for  life.  Of  these  about  twenty  escaped  in 
different  directions,  and  in  one  way  or  another 
managed  after  many  hardships  to  reach  other 
forts.  All  the  rest  of  the  people  in  the  fort  were 
butchered,  except  a  few  negroes  kept  by  the 
savages  as  slaves,  and  one  half-breed  family,  of 
whom  we  shall  hear  more  presently. 

The  persons  who  escaped  by  flight  were  Dr. 
Thomas  G.  Holmes,  a  negro  woman  named 
Hester,  a  friendly  Indian  named  Socca,  Lieuten 
ant  Peter  Randon,  Josiah  Fletcher,  Sergeant 
Matthews,  Martin  Rigdon,  Samuel  Smith,  a  half- 
breed,  Joseph  Perry,  Jesse  Steadham,  Edward 
Steadham,  John  Horen,  Lieutenant  W.  R.  Cham 
bers,  two  men  named  Mourrice  and  Jones,  and 
some  others  whose  names  have  not  come  down 
to  us. 

Thus  ended  the  battle  of  Fort  Mims,  in  some 
respects  the  most  remarkable  battle  between 
Indians  and  white  men  of  which  history  any 
where  tells  us.  It  had  lasted  for  five  hours 
without  cessation,  a  most  unusual  thing  in  Indian 
warfare,  which  consists  chiefly  of  sudden  onsets 
that  are  not  long  persisted  in  if  stoutly  resisted. 
At  Fort  Mims  the  assault  was  kept  up,  in  the  face 
of  desperate  resistance,  from  noon  until  nearly 
sunset — a  persistence  due  solely  to  the  fact  that 


THE    MASSACRE   AT   FORT   MIMS.  113 

the  savages  were  for  once  commanded  by  a  real 
soldier,  who  possessed  the  qualities  of  an  able  and 
determined  general.  The  Indians  here,  as  every 
where  else,  were  disposed  after  a  while,  as  has 
been  said,  to  relinquish  their  purpose  and  content 
themselves  with  what  they  had  accomplished  in 
the  wray  of  destruction,  but,  as  we  have  seen, 
Red  Eagle  sternly  drove  them  back  into  battle, 
and  succeeded  in  carrying  the  fort.  If  there 
were  nothing  else  in  his  career  to  prove  his  title 
to  respect  as  a  really  able  military  man,  his  man 
agement  of  this  Fort  Mims  affair  would  suffi 
ciently  establish  his  claim. 


CHAPTER    XL 

ROMANTIC    INCIDENTS    OF   THE    FORT 
MIMS    AFFAIR. 

IT  was  Dr.  Thomas  G.  Holmes  who  planned 
the  sortie  by  which  the  persons  named  in  the  last 
chapter  made  their  escape.  He  cut  the  hole 
through  the  picketing  and  headed  the  desperate 
charge,  which  was  opposed  by  a  thick  line  of  sav 
ages  who,  anticipating  some  such  attempt,  had 
placed  themselves  in  position  along  a  fence  for 
the  purpose  of  making  escape  impossible.  It  is 
indeed  a  marvel  that  anybody  should  have  suc 
ceeded  in  breaking  through  their  line  and  reach 
ing  the  woods  beyond.  Dr.  Holmes  had  his 
clothes  riddled  with  bullets  as  he  ran,  but  he 
managed  to  reach  the  thick  woods  unhurt,  and 
there  concealed  himself  in  the  hole  made  by  the 
uprooting  of  a  large  tree.  Remaining  thus  hid 
den  until  night,  he  was  not  discovered  by  any  of 
the  bands  of  Indians  who  beat  the  bushes  in  every 
direction,  bent  upon  leaving  no  white  man  or 
friendly  Indian  alive.  After  night  he  had  in 
tended  to  make  his  escape  under  cover  of  dark- 


INCIDENTS   OF   THE   FORT    MIMS   AFFAIR.      11$ 

ness  from  the  neighborhood,  but  the  light  from 
burning  buildings  prevented  this  until  midnight, 
when,  by  careful  creeping,  he  made  his  way  with 
out  discovery,  among  the  camp-fires  of  the  sleep 
ing  savages,  who  now  rested  from  their  bloody 
toil.  As  Dr.  Holmes  could  not  swim,  it  was 
impossible  for  him  to  cross  the  river  to  the  forts 
and  settlements  there,  and  hence  he  wandered 
about  in  the  swamp  for  five  clays,  living  upon 
roots  and  other  such  things,  until  finally,  almost 
famished,  he  emerged  from  the  cane-brakes  and 
sought  the  highlands,  really  caring  very  little  in 
his  desperation  whether  he  should  fall  into  the 
hands  of  friends  or  foes.  Coming  upon  some 
horses  which  were  tied,  and  finding  that  they 
belonged  to  white  men  who  were  somewhere 
near,  he  fired  his  gun  to  attract  their  attention  ; 
but  unluckily  it  alarmed  them,  and  they  fled  to 
the  river  and  hid  themselves,  remaining  there  for 
two  days  and  nights.  Left  thus  alone,  Holmes 
went  to  a  house  in  the  neighborhood,  and 
succeeded  in  catching  some  chickens,  which  in  his 
ravenous  hunger  he  ate  raw.  He  was  finally 
discovered  by  a  white  man,  the  owner  of  the 
place,  and  taken  to  a  place  of  safety.  Many 
vears  afterward  he  related  the  story  of  his  ad- 


Il6  RED   EAGLE. 

ventures  to  Mr.  Pickett,  from  whose  pages  we 
have  condensed  it. 

Lieutenant  Chambliss  was  twice  severely 
wounded  in  his  flight,  but  reached  the  friendly 
woods  at  last  and  concealed  himself  in  a  heap  of 
logs,  meaning  to  make  his  way  to  a  place  of  safety 
as  soon  as  night  should  fall.  About  dark,  how 
ever,  a  roving  band  of  the  savages  surrounded 
the  log  heap,  and  to  the  dismay  of  poor  Cham- 
bliss,  set  fire  to  it.  His  position  was  terrible. 
The  fire  rapidly  ate  into  the  pile,  and  to  remain 
there  was  to  be  roasted  alive,  while  any  attempt 
to  come  out  would  be  met,  of  course,  by  imme 
diate  destruction  with  knife  or  tomahawk.  The 
fire  was  now  scorching  him,  but  he  lay  still,  en 
during  it  as  long  as  it  was  possible  to  suffer  in 
silence.  Just  as  it  became  absolutely  necessary 
for  him  to  withdraw,  he  wras  delighted  to  see  the 
Indians,  who  had  now  lighted  their  pipes,  walking 
away.  Silently,  in  order  that  the  savages  might 
not  hear  him,  he  crept  out  of  the  burning  pile 
and  concealed  himself  more  effectually  elsewhere. 
Wounded  and  famishing  he  wandered  about  for 
awhile,  managing  at  last  to  reach  Mount  Vernon. 

The  most  romantic  incident  of  this  terrible 
affair  remains  to  be  told.  Zachariah  McGirth, 


INCIDENTS   OF   THE   FORT   MIMS  AFFAIR.      I  I/ 

with  his  half-breed  wife  and  his  children,  was  one 
of  the  inmates  of  Fort  Mims  until  the  day  of  the 
massacre.  On  the  morning  of  that  day,  a  few 
hours  before  the  attack  was  made,  he  left  the 
fort,  intending  to  visit  his  plantation  at  a  point 
higher  up  on  the  Alabama  River.  Leaving  his 
family  in  the  fort  he  went  to  the  river,  accom 
panied  by  some  negroes,  and  began  his  journey 
in  a  boat.  He  had  gone  but  a  few  miles  when 
the  sound  of  the  firing  at  the  fort  reached  his 
ears,  and  he  thus  learned  that  the  attack  had 
come.  Anxious  about  the  fate  of  his  wife  and 
children,  he  turned  back,  and  secreting  himself  in 
the  woods,  passed  the  long  afternoon  in  a  state  of 
the  most  terrible  suspense.  When  the  sound  of 
musketry  at  last  died  away,  the  great  volumes  of 
smoke  revealed  to  him  the  fact — horrible  in  its 
significance  to  him  —  that  the  savages  had  tri 
umphed.  Desperate  now  with  distress,  he  hid 
the  negroes  and  boldly  went  to  the  scene  of  the 
slaughter,  not  caring  whether  t  le  Indians  had  left 
or  not.  Finding  no  savages  there,  but  seeing 
heaps  of  the  slain  everywhere,  he  summoned  his 
negroes  and  began  a  search  for  the  bodies  of  his 
wrife  and  children.  They  were  nowhere  to  be 
found,  and  McGirth  was  forced  to  conclude  that 


Il8  RED  EAGLE. 

his    family    were   among    those   who    had   been 
burned  in  the  buildings. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  McGirth's  wife  and  chil 
dren  were  the  half-breed  family  who  had  been 
spared,  as  related  in  the  preceding  chapter. 
There  was  a  young  warrior  among  Weatherford's 
men  who,  many  years  before,  when  he  was  an 
orphan  and  hungry,  had  been  tenderly  cared  for 
by  McGirth's  wife,  and  during  the  horrible 
slaughter  at  Fort  Minis  this  young  warrior  hap 
pened  to  recognize  the  woman  who  had  be 
friended  him  in  his  time  of  sorest  need.  To  save 
her  and  her  children  he  had  to  tell  his  comrades 
that  he  wished  to  make  them  his  slaves,  and 
under  this  pretence  he  carried  them  to  his  home 
in  the  nation. 

McGirth  knew  nothing  of  this,  of  course,  and 
as  he  had  very  tenderly  loved  his  family,  he  now 
became  entirely  reckless  of  danger,  not  caring  to 
live,  but  being  desperately  bent  upon  doing  all 
that  he  could  for  the  destruction  of  the  Creeks, 
who,  as  he  believed,  had  bereft  him  of  his  wife 
and  his  children.  He  became  the  most  daring 
scout  and  express  rider  in  the  American  service, 
making  the  most  perilous  journeys,  shrinking  from 
no  danger,  and  many  times  serving  the  Ameri 
can  cause  when  nobody  else  could  be  found  to 


INCIDENTS   OF   THE   FORT   MIMS  AFFAIR.     I  19 

perform  the  important  duties  which  he  under 
took.  One  day,  several  months  after  the  massa 
cre  at  Fort  Minis,  McGirth  was  in  Mobile,  when 
some  one  came  to  him  with  a  message,  saying 
that  a  party  of  poor  Indians  who  had  made  their 
way  down  the  river  from  the  hostile  country 
wished  to  see  him.  Answering  the  summons  he 
was  ushered  into  the  presence  of  his  wife  and 
seven  children,  whom  he  had  thought  of  for 
months,  as  among  the  victims  of  the  savages  at 
Fort  Mims.  It  was  as  if  they  had  suddenly 
arisen  from  the  dead. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  DOG   CHARGE   AT   FORT  SINQUEFIELD 
AND   AFFAIRS    ON   THE    PENINSULA. 

IT  was  a  part  of  Weatherford's  tactics  to  pre 
vent  the  concentration  of  his  enemies  as  far  as 
that  was  possible,  and  to  keep  the  whole  country 
round  about  in  such  a  state  of  apprehension  that 
no  troops  or  militiamen  could  be  spared  from 
one  stockade  fort  for  the  assistance  of  another. 
Accordingly,  when  he  advanced  to  the  assault  on 
Fort  Mims  he  sent  the  prophet  Francis  with  a 
force  of  Creeks  into  the  country  which  lies  in  the 
fork  of  the  Alabama  and  Tombigbee  rivers,  and 
which  in  our  day  constitutes  Clarke  County.  In 
this  part  of  the  country  there  were  several  stock 
ade  forts  erected,  one  in  each  neighborhood,  by 
the  settlers,  as  a  precautionary  measure,  when 
the  disturbed  state  of  the  country  first  aroused 
serious  apprehensions.  Fort  Sinquefield,  named, 
as  all  these  fortresses  were,  after  the  owner  of 
the  place  on  which  it  was  built,  stood  a  few  miles 
north-east  of  the  village  of  Grove  Hill,  which  is 
now  the  county  seat  of  Clarke  County.  Fort 


DOG   CHARGE   AT   FORT   SINQUEFIELD.         121 

White  was  further  to  the  west,  and  Fort  Glass  was 
about  fifteen  miles  to  the  south,  near  the  spot  on 
which  the  present  village  of  Suggsville  stands. 

When  the  battle  of  Burnt  Corn  brought  actual 
war  into  being-,  most  of  the  settlers  removed  with 

O  7 

their  families  into  these  forts  and  prepared  to 
defend  themselves.  When  General  Claiborne 
arrived  with  his  seven  hundred  men  he  sent  some 
small  reinforcements  to  these  posts,  under  com 
mand  of  Colonel  Carson,  who  rebuilding  Fort 
Glass,  christened  it  Fort  Madison,  and  made  it 
his  headquarters  and  the  head-quarters  of  the 
district  round  about. 

It  was  the  mission  of  the  prophet  Francis  to 
harass  this  part  of  the  country,  and  on  the  next 
day  but  one  after  the  massacre  at  Fort  Mims, 
Francis  struck  his  first  blow  within  two  miles  of 
Fort  Sinquefield.  Notwithstanding  the  general 
alarm,  Abner  James  and  Ransom  Kimball,  with 
their  families,  numbering  seventeen  souls  in  all, 
remained  at  Kimball's  house,  intending  within  a 
day  or  two  to  remove  to  the  fort.  Francis  at 
tacked  the  house  and  killed  twelve  of  the  seven 
teen  persons.  The  other  five  escaped  in  various 
ways.  One  of  those  who  escaped  was  Isham 
Kimball,  a  youth  sixteen  years  of  age,  who  sur 
vived  the  war,  became  a  public  officer  in  his 


122  RED    EAGLE. 

county,  and  was  living  there  as  late  as  the  year 
1857  5  from  his  account  and  that  of  Mrs.  Merrill, 
a  married  daughter  of  Abner  James,  who  also 
was  living  in  Clarke  County  in  1857,  the  original 
recorders  of  this  bit  of  history  derived  their  in 
formation  with  respect  to  details. 

Mrs.  Merrill's  adventures  were  very  strange 
and  romantic,  and  as  we  shall  not  again  have 
occasion  to  write  of  her,  it  may  not  be  amiss  to 
interrupt  the  regular  course  of  this  narrative  and 
tell  what  happened  to  her.  At  the  time  of  the 
massacre  at  Kimball's  house,  she,  with  her  infant 
child  in  her  arms,  was  knocked  down,  scalped, 
and  left  as  one  dead  among  the  slain.  She  lay 
senseless  for  many  hours,  but  during  the  night 
she  revived,  and  with  a  mother's  instinct  began 
to  search  among  the  dead  bodies  of  her  kinsmen 
for  her  babe.  She  was  overjoyed  to  find  that  it 
still  breathed,  although  some  member  of  the  sav 
age  band  had  made  an  effort  to  scalp  it,  cutting 
its  head  all  round,  but  failing — probably  because 
the  hair  was  so  short — to  finish  the  horrible  opera 
tion.  The  poor  mother,  wellnigh  dead  though 
she  was,  made  haste  to  give  her  babe  the  breast, 
and  had  the  gratification  of  seeing  it  revive 
rapidly  in  consequence.  Then,  taking  it  in  her 
arms,  she  made  an  effort  to  reach  Fort  Sinque- 


DOG  CHARGE  AT   FORT  SLVQUEF1ELD.         1 23 

fkicl,  about  two  miles  distant.  Finding-  at  last 
that  her  strength  was  failing  rapidly,  and  that  she 
could  carry  the  child  no  longer,  she  secreted  it 
ard  used  the  little  remaining  strength  she  had  in 
crawling  to  the  stockade  and  entreating  some  one 
there  to  rescue  her  child.  This  of  course  was 
quickly  done,  and  notwithstanding  the  severity 
of  her  injuries  both  she  and  the  child  recovered 
under  good  treatment. 

But  the    strangest,    or   at   any    rate    the    most 
romantic,  part  of  the  story  is  yet  to  be  hold,     At 
the  time  of  these  occurrences  Mrs.  Merrill's  hus 
band  was  absent,  serving   as  a  volunteer  under 
General  Claiborne.     The  news  of  the  butchery, 
including  the  positive  information  that  Mrs.  Mer 
rill  and  lur  child  were   slain,  was   carried   to  the 
post  where   Merrill   was  serving,   and   he   heard 
m  thing   of  her  wonderful  escape.      During   one 
(  •   the  battles  which  followed  each  other  rapidly 
that    autumn,    Merrill,    before   his  anxious    wife 
f(  und  any  means  of  communicating  with  him,  was 
terribly  wounded  and  left  for  dead  on  the  battle 
field,  and  the  report  of  his  death  was  borne  to 
his  wife.     Recovering  his  consciousness  after  his 
comrades  had  left  the  field ,  Merrill  fell  in  with 
some  Tennessee  volunteers,   and   was  sent   with 
their  wounded  to  Tennessee,    where,   after  long 


124  RED   EAGLE. 

nursing,  he  was  finally  restored  to  health.  After 
several  years  had  passed  Mrs.  Merrill  married 
again,  without  even  a  suspicion  that  her  first  hus 
band  was  living— believing  indeed  that  she  knew 
him  to  be  dead.  She  was  living  happily  with  her 
second  husband  and  with  a  large  family  grow 
ing  up  about  her,  when  one  evening  a  family 
who  were  emigrating  from  Tennessee  to  Texas 
stopped  at  her  house  and  asked  for  entertainment 
for  a  night.  They  were  hospitably  received  after 
the  generous  custom  of  the  time  and  country,  but 
they  had  scarcely  settled  themselves  as  guests 
before  the  head  of  the  emigrating  family  and  the 
wife  of  the  host  recognized  each  other.  The  one 
was  Merrill  and  the  other  was  his  wife,  and  both 
had  married  again,  each  believing  the  other  to  be 
dead.  After  some  consultation  it  was  decided 
that,  as  each  had  acted  in  perfectly  good  faith, 
and  as  both  the  families  were  happy  as  they 
were,  it  would  be  the  part  of  wisdom  to  let  mat 
ters  stand,  and  to  live  their  new  lives  without 
trying  to  recover  the  old. 

Let  us  now  return  to  the  regular  order  of 
events.  When  the  tidings  of  the  massacre  at 
Kimball's  house  reached  Fort  Madison,  Colonel 
Carson  sent  a  detachment  of  ten  men  to  the  spot, 
and  they  at  once  carried  the  bodies  of  the  dead 


DOG   CHARGE   AT  FORT   SINQUEFIELD.         125 

persons  to  Fort  Sinqueficld  for  burial.  On  the 
third  of  September  the  whole  body  of  people  in 
Fort  Sinquefield,  with  that  inexplicable  careless 
ness  which  so  often  marked  the  conduct  of  the 
v,  hites  at  this  time,  left  the  fort,  unarmed,  and 
went  out  to  a  valley  some  fifty  yards  away,  to 
attend  the  burial  services  over  the  bodies  of  their 
friends.  The  wily  prophet  was  awaiting  pre 
cisely  such  an  opportunity  as  this,  and  while  the 
men  were  filling  the  grave,  he  charged  over  a 
neighboring  hill,  and  tried  to  put  his  force  be- 

» 

tween  the  unarmed  garrison  and  the  gate  of  the 
fort.  Luckily  he  had  somewhat  further  to  run 
than  the  fort  people  had,  and  so  the  men  of  the 
place  managed  to  gain  the  gate  ;  but,  alas  !  the 
women  and  children  were  nearly  all  outside,  and 
Francis's  warriors  were  between  them  and  the 
entrance  to  the  fort.  Their  plight  appeared  to 
be  a  hopeless  one,  and  it  would  have  been  so  but 
for  the  courage  and  the  presence  of  mind  of  one 
young  man,  whose  name  is  given  by  Mr.  Pickett 
as  Isaac  Heaton,  but  who  is  called  Isaac  Haden 
by  Mr.  A.  B-  Meek,  a  very  careful  writer,  and 
one  particularly  well  informed  about  this  part  of 
the  field.  The  latter  name  is  adopted  here,  as  pro 
bably  the  correct  one.  This  young  man  Haden 
was  fond  of  field  sports,  and  kept  a  large  pack 


126  RED    EAGLE. 

of  hounds,  trained  to  chase  and  seize  any  living 
thing  upon  which  their  master  might  set  them. 
At  the  critical  moment,  young  Haden,  mounted 
upon  a  good  horse  and  accompanied  by  his  sixty 
dogs,  arrived  at  the  gate  from  a  cattle  driving  ex 
pedition.  In  an  instant  he  saw  the  situation  of 
affairs,  and  with  a  promptitude  which  showed  re 
markable  presence  of  mind,  he  resolved  upon  a 
daring  attempt  to  rescue  the  women  and  children. 
With  the  whoop  of  the  huntsman  this  gallant  fel 
low  set  spurs  to  his  horse,  and  charged  the  In 
dians  with  his  trained  pack  of  ferocious  hounds. 
The  suddenness  of  the  onset  and  the  novelty  of 
the  attack  threw  the  savages  into  complete  confu 
sion.  The  fierce  dogs  seized  the  naked  savages 
and  tore  them  furiously,  and  for  several  minutes 
their  attention  was  entirely  absorbed  in  an  effort 
to  beat  the  brutes  off.  Meanwhile  the  men  of 
the  fort  reinforced  the  dogs  with  all  their  might, 
and  thus  a  road  was  kept  open  for  the  retreat  of 
the  women  and  children,  every  one  of  whom,  ex 
cept  a  Mrs.  Phillips,  who  was  killed  and  scalped, 
escaped  within  the  gates.  Young  Haden  nar 
rowly  escaped  death  as  the  price  of  his  heroism 
• — for  it  was  heroism  of  the  highest  sort.  His 
horse  was  killed  under  him,  and  when  he  was  at 
last  safe  within  the  fort,  it  was  found  that  five 


DOG   CHARGE   AT   FORT   SINQUEFIELD.         I2/ 

bullets  had  passed  through  his  clothes,  but  the 
brave  fellow  was  not  hurt. 

Francis  speedily  recovered  from  his  tempor 
ary  perplexity,  and  rallying  his  men  he  made  a 
furious  assault  upon  the  fort ;  but  the  gates  were 
now  shut,  and  the  resolute  men  behind  the  pick 
ets  were  skilled  marksmen,  who  delivered  their 
fire  with  deadly  precision.  The  savages  were 
repulsed  and  the  fort's  company  for  the  time 
saved,  with  the  loss  of  but  one  man  and  one  boy, 
who,  with  Mrs.  Phillips  killed  outside  the  gates, 
made  the  total  number  of  the  slain  in  this  assault 
only  three  persons. 

The  wiser  members  of  the  fort's  company  per 
ceived,  however,  that  the  place  was  not  strong 
enough  to  be  successfully  defended  against  a 
really  determined  attack  by  an  adequate  force  ; 
and  accordingly,  after  some  discussion  it  was  re 
solved  to  evacuate  the  place  and  retire  to  Fort 
Madison,  before  the  second  and  more  determined 
attack,  which  Francis  was  sure  to  make,  should 
render  it  too  late.  That  night  the  whole  com 
pany  of  Sinquefield  silently  withdrew^,  and  after 
a  perilous  march  of  fifteen  miles  through  a  coun 
try  infested  with  savages,  reached  their  destina 
tion  in  safety. 

About  this  time  four  men  went  from  Fort  Mad- 


128  RED   EAGLE. 

ison  to  some  fields  in  the  neighborhood  for  sup 
plies  of  green  vegetables,  and  while  gathering 
these  they  were  attacked  and  two  of  them  were 
shot.  Colonel  Carson  having  satisfied  himself 
that  the  peninsula  which  he  was  set  to  guard  was 
full  of  Indians,  and  believing  that  Red  Eagle 
with  the  victors  of  Fort  Minis  would  direct  his 
next  blow  at  Fort  Madison,  resolved  to  call  upon 
General  Claiborne,  who  was  now  at  Fort  Stod- 
dard,  for  assistance.  A  particularly  bold  young 
man,  of  whom  we  shall  hear  more  after  a  while, 
by  name  Jeremiah  Austill — or  Jerry  Austill,  as 
he  was  always  called — volunteered  to  undertake 
the  dangerous  duty  of  carrying  Colonel  Carson's 
despatch.  Mounting  his  horse  about  nightfall, 
he  said  good-by  to  friends  who  had  little  hope 
of  seeing  him  again,  and  rode  away.  After  an 
all  night's  journey  the  brave  young  fellow  ar 
rived  at  General  Claiborne 's  head-quarters,  and 
told  the  general  whence  he  had  come,  greatly  to 
the  surprise  and  admiration  of  that  officer,  who 
highly  commended  his  courage  and  devotion  to 
the  common  cause. 

General  Claiborne  wras  in  great  perplexity, 
however.  The  Fort  Minis  massacre  and  the  rap 
idly  following  depredations  in  other  directions 
had  produced  a  genuine  panic  among  the  set- 


DOG  CHARGE  AT  FORT   SINQUEFIELD.        I2Q 

tiers  who  now  poured  into  the  forts,  crowding 
them  to  overflowing  ;  and  in  the  state  of  alarm 
which  prevailed  everywhere,  the  commanders  of 
all  the  forts  were  convinced  that  their  fighting 
forces  were  insufficient  to  defend  the  posts  in 
trusted  to  their  charge,  When  young  Austill 
arrived,  therefore,  with  Colonel  Carson's  appli 
cation  for  reinforcements,  it  was  only  one  of  a 
dozen  or  a  score  of  similar  demands,  and  with  the 
meagre  force  at  his  disposal  General  Claiborne 
was  wholly  unable  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of 
his  subordinates.  In  his  perplexity  he  saw  but 
one  method  of  solving  the  problem,  and  that  was 
to  order  the  evacuation  of  some  of  the  forts  and 
the  concentration  of  the  fighting  men  at  fewer 
points.  To  this  course  there  was  the  serious  ob 
jection,  that  the  stockade  posts  were  already  in 
conveniently  and  unwholesomely  overcrowded, 
and  a  good  deal  of  sickness  existed  as  a  conse 
quence  ;  but  there  was  no  other  way  of  meeting 
the  exigencies  of  the  situation.  General  Clai 
borne  therefore  sent  young  Austill  back  to  Fort 
Madison  with  a  message  which  has  been  variously 
represented  in  different  accounts  of  the  affair. 
It  appears,  however,  from  General  Claiborne's 
manuscripts,  that  the  message,  as  it  was  given  to 
Austill,  was  to  the  effect  that  as  there  were  no 


130  RED  EAGLE. 

troops  to  spare  for  the  reinforcement  of  Fort 
Madison,  and  as  St.  Stephen's  was  strategically 
a  more  important  post,  Colonel  Carson  should 
evacuate  Fort  Madison  and  retire  with  his  garri 
son  and  the  inmates  of  his  fort  to  St.  Stephen's, 
if  in  his  judgment  that  course  was  wisest  in  the 
circumstances.  In  other  words,  General  Clai- 
borne  wished  Colonel  Carson  to  use  his  discretion, 
after  learning  that  no  troops  could  be  sent  to  his 
assistance  ;  but  either  because  the  message  was 
ambiguous  in  itself,  or  because  young  Austill 
delivered  it  inaccurately,  Colonel  Carson  under 
stood  that  he  was  peremptorily  ordered  to  evacu 
ate  his  fort,  and  the  order  as  thus  understood 
gave  great  dissatisfaction  to  everybody  con 
cerned.  The  people  loudly  complained  that  Gen 
eral  Claibornc  was  abandoning  their  part  of  the 
country  to  its  fate.  Colonel  Carson,  of  course, 
had  no  choice  but  to  obey  the  order  as  he  under 
stood  it,  but  those  of  the  settlers  who  were  not 
regularly  enlisted  soldiers  were  free  to  do  as  they 
pleased,  and  under  the  lead  of  Captain  Evan  Au 
still,  the  father  of  Jeremiah  Austill,  and  himself 
a  very  resolute  man,  fifty  men  of  the  neighbor 
hood  according  to  one  account,  eighty  according 
to  another,  with  their  families,  determined  to  re 
main  at  Fort  Madison.  All  the  rest  of  the  peo- 


DOG   CHARGE   AT   FORT   SINQUEFIELD.         13! 

pie  in  the  fort,  about  four  hundred  in  number, 
marched  to  St.  Stephen's.  The  little  band  who 
remained  were  very  vigilant,  and  managed  to  pro 
tect  themselves  effectually,  until  after  a  time  Col 
onel  Carson  was  instructed  to  return  and  regarri- 
son  the  fort.  Colonel  Carson  had  scarcely  reached 
St.  Stephen's,  indeed,  before  a  second  despatch 
came  from  General  Claiborne,  speaking  of  the 
former  message  as  discretionary,  and  urging  Car 
son  not  to  abandon  the  fort  "  unless  it  is  clear 
that  you  cannot  hold  it."  Among  the  gallant 
little  company  who  remained  at  Fort  Madison 
was  Sam  Dale,  who,  it  will  be  remembered,  led 
the  advance  at  Burnt  Corn,  and  whom  we  shall 
see  again. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 
PUSHMATAHAW  AND   HIS   WARRIORS. 

THERE  was  great  anxiety  felt  from  the  begin 
ning  of  the  war  lest  the  Creeks  should  succeed 
in  drawing  the  Chickasaws  and  Choctaws  into 
the  conflict  as  allies.  At  that  stage  of  affairs  at 
which  we  have  now  arrived  this  fear  had  become 
a  very  nightmare.  The  few  troops  at  Claiborne's 
command,  together  with  the  militia  of  the  coun 
try,  were  barely  sufficient  to  hold  the  forts,  and 
even  this  inadequate  force  was  liable  at  any  time 
to  be  reduced  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  soldiers 
to  assist  in  repelling  an  attack  of  the  British, 
whose  fleet  now  constantly  threatened  the  coast  ; 
and  if  the  forces  of  the  Choctaws  and  Chickasaws 
should  be  added  to  Red  Eagle's  strength,  the 
plight  of  the  whites  would  indeed  be  pitiable. 

About  this  time  a  Choctaw  chief  of  influence 
with  his  people,  by  name  Pushmatahaw,  arrived 
at  St.  Stephen's,  and  declared  that  he  could  in 
duce  a  considerable  number  of  the  Choctaw 
warriors  to  enlist  in  the  American  service,  if  per 
mission  were  given  to  him  to  recruit  among  them. 


PUSHMATAIIAW   AND   HIS   WARRIORS.          133 

Eagerly  grasping  at  this  hope,  Colonel  George  S. 
Gaines*  went  with  the  chief  to  Mobile  to  secure 
the  desired  authority  from  General  Flournoy, 
who  was  now  in  command  of  the  South-western 
Department. 

That  officer,  for  some  reason  which  is  not  ap 
parent,  declined  to  accept  the  proffered  services 
of  the  Choctaws,  and  Colonel  Gaines  and  his 
companion  returned  with  heavy  hearts  to  St. 
Stephen's,  where  the  news  they  brought  created 
the  profounclest  dissatisfaction.  Before  the 
friendly  chief  had  taken  his  departure,  however, 
a  courier  from  General  Flournoy  arrived,  bring 
ing;  an  order  which  directed  Colonel  Gaines  to 

o 

accept  the  chief's  offer  of  assistance,  and  to  ac 
company  him  to  the  Choctaw  Nation  to  enlist  the 
men. 

With  a  single  white  companion  Colonel  Gaines 
went  with  Pushmatahaw  to  the  nation,  where, 
gathering  the  Choctaws  into  a  council,  the  chief 
made  them  a  speech,  saying  that  Tecumseh,  who 
had  suggested  this  war,  was  a  bad  man.  He 
added  : 


*  Colonel  Gaines  was  still  living  in  the  year  1866  at  State  Line, 
Mississippi.  The  author  met  him  in  that  year  engaged,  old  and 
feeble  as  h*e  was,  in  a  charitable  work  that  involved  cousiderable 
labor. 


134  RED   EAGLE. 

"He  came  through  our  country,  but  did  not 
turn  our  heads.  He  went  amo  ig  the  Muscogees, 
and  got  many  of  them  to  join  him.  You  know 
the  Tensaw  people.  They  were  our  friends. 
They  played  ball  with  us.  They  sheltered  and 
fed  us  when  we  went  to  Pensacola.  Where  are 
they  now  ?  Their  bodies  are  rotting  at  Sam 
Mims's  place.  The  people  at  St.  Stephen's  are 
also  our  friends.  The  Muscogees  intend  to  kill 
them  too.  They  want  soldiers  to  defend  them. 
You  can  all  do  as  you  please.  You  are  free  men. 
I  dictate  to  none  of  you  ;  but  I  shall  join  the  St. 
Stephen's  people.  If  you  have  a  mind  to  follow 
me,  I  will  lead  you  to  glory  and  to  victory." 

Pushmatahaw  finished  this  speech  with  his 
drawn  sword  in  his- hand.  When  he  paused,  one 
of  the  hitherto  silent  warriors  stood  up  and, 
striking  his  breast  with  his  open  palm,  after  the 
manner  of  the  Choctaws  on  specially  solemn  oc 
casions,  said,  "  I  am  a  man  ;  I  will  follow  you  ;" 
whereupon  his  fellows  imitated  his  example,  and 
thus  a  considerable  force  of  men,  who  might  have 
been  added  to  Weatherford's  strength  but  for  the 
friendliness  of  Pushmatahaw,  became  active 
friends  of  the  whites. 

But  a  new  factor  of  very  much  greater  value 
was  now  about  to  enter  into  the  problem  and 


PUSHMATAHAW  AND   HIS   WARRIORS.          135 

totally  change  its  conditions.  Andrew  Jackson, 
the  sternest  and  most  energetic  of  Indian  fighters, 
was  coming  with  his  Tennessee  volunteers  to 
reverse  the  situation  of  affairs.  The  Creeks,  who 
were  now  hunting  the  whites  like  wild  beasts, 
were  presently  to  become  the  hunted  party,  with 
Andrew  Jackson  upon  their  track. 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

JACKSON    IS    HELPED    INTO    HIS   SADDLE. 

BAD  news  travels  rapidly,  and  the  news  of  the 
terrible  massacre  at  Fort  Mims  was  soon  known 
in  all  parts  of  the  South  and  West.  There  were 
neither  railroads  nor  steamboats  in  those  days, 
and  between  the  Tensaw  settlement  and  the  rest 
of  the  country  there  were  not  even  stage-coaches 
running,  or  mail-riders  on  horseback.  It  took 
more  than  a  month  for  the  swiftest  messenger 
from  Southern  Alabama  to  reach  New  York,  and 
nearly  as  long  to  reach  Washington  City  ;  but 
when  Red  Eagle  had  shown  of  what  mettle  he 
was  made,  General  Claiborne,  who  in  his  double 
capacity  as  Governor  of  Louisiana  and  general  in 
the  field  was  doubly  interested,  became  greatly 
alarmed,  and  that  with  good  reason.  The  British 
were  threatening  the  coast,  and  Weatherford 
now  appeared  to  threaten  Mobile.  The  situa 
tion  was,  indeed,  an  alarming  one.  It  was  pretty 
clear  that  Weatherford  was  already  acting  in  con 
cert,  more  or  less  direct,  with  the  enemy  with 
out  ;  and  if  he  should  take  the  town  of  Mobile,  as 


JACKSON    IS    HELPED    INTO    HIS    SADDLE.      137 

he  was  probably  able  to  do,  securing  a  base  of 
operations  for  a  British  force,  he  might  easily 
turn  back  and  utterly  destroy  the  settlements, 
while  the  few  troops  within  reach  should  be  en 
gaged  with  the  British. 

In  this  perilous  situation  of  affairs  it  was  use 
less  for  General  Claiborne,  or  his  superior  officer, 
General  Flournoy,  to  appeal  to  the  government 
at  Washington  for  aid.  Even  if  the  troops  of  the 
Government  had  not  been  fully  occupied  already 
in  other  parts  of  the  country,  the  distance  was  so 
great  that  any  assistance  which  the  general  gov 
ernment  might  be  able  to  render  must  of  neces 
sity  come  too  late  to  be  of  any  avail.  It  would 
take  a  month  for  the  messenger  asking  for  help 
to  reach  Washington,  another  month  for  a  force 
to  be  gathered,  and  perhaps  two  months  more  for 
it  to  reach  the  exposed  point.  Three  or  four 
months  at  least,  and  probably  a  greater  time,  must 
pass  before  help  could  come  from  that  quarter, 
and  it  might  as  well  have  taken  a  hundred  years, 
so  far  as  all  practical  purposes  were  concerned. 

The  only  resource,  therefore,  was  an  appeal  to 
the  people  of  the  surrounding  States.  Messen 
gers  were  sent  in  hot  haste  to  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,  and  Tennessee,  carrying  despatches 
which  simply  set  forth  the  facts  and  the  danger, 


I  3  3  RED    EAGLE. 

a;rl  asked  for  help.  The  response  was  quick  and 
generous.  Georgians  and  South  Carolinians  be 
gan  at  once  to  organize  forces,  which  soon  after- 
\vard  invaded  the  Creek  country.  But  the  most 
efficient  aid  was  to  come  from  Tennessee,  a  State 
which  had  already  shown  itself  quick  to  answer 
to  every  demand  made  upon  it.  It  had  furnished 
its  full  quotas  of  men  to  the  national  army  ;  and 
less  than  a  year  before  the  time  of  which  we  now 
write,  it  had  sent  a  full  division  of  volunteers 
under  Jackson  to  reinforce  the  army  at  New 
Orleans.  This  division  had  been  ordered  to  dis 
band  while  at  Natchez,  when  they  were  without 
money  or  provisions  with  which  to  reach  their 
homes,  but  Jackson  had  resolutely  disobeyed  the 
order,  and  instead  of  disbanding  his  division  had 
marched  it  back  to  Tennessee  in  a  body. 

There  had  been  loud  murmurs  at  the  treatment 
these  volunteers  had  received,  but  when  the  news 
came  that  the  people  of  the  Tensaw  country 
were  suffering  brutal  butchery  at  the  hands  of 
savages,  and  that  Mobile  was  threatened,  Ten 
nessee  hushed  her  murmurs,  and  promptly  re 
sponded  to  the  call. 

On  the  1 8th  day  of  September,  the  people  of 
Nashville  assembled  in  a  public  meeting  to  con 
sider  the  news  which  had  just  been  received. 


JACKSON    IS   HELPED    INTO    HIS    SADDLE.      139 

General  Jackson  lay  upon  his  bed,  weak,  emaci- 
Ated,  and  racked  with  pain  from  a  wound  re 
ceived  in  a  street  fight  ;  but  everybody  felt  that 
his  counsel  ia  matters  of  this  kind  was  essential. 
Indeed,  it  was  known  that  upon  the  question  of  his 
ability  to  lead  the  forces  that  were  to  be  raised 
their  success  in  raising  forces  at  all  must  in  a 
great  measure  depend.  The  meeting,  therefore, 
did  no  business  on  the  first  day,  except  to  express 
its  members'  determination  to  render  assistance 
to  their  brethren  in  the  South,  and  to  appoint  a 
committee,  headed  by  Colonel  (afterward  General) 
Coffee,  to  consult  with  the  Governor  of  the  State 
and  with  General  Jackson,  and  to  report  the  result. 

This  committee  went  to  Jackson's  chamber  and 
told  him  the  story  of  Fort  Minis,  and  of  the  need 
there  was  for  him  to  lead  the  Tennessee  volun 
teers.  They  assured  him  also  that  if  they  could 
give  his  name  to  the  people  as  the  leader  who 
would  head  them,  the  volunteers  would  flock  to 
the  standard  of  the  State  at  once. 

Jackson  replied  that  he  was  recovering,  al 
though  he  was  still  confined  to  his  bed,  and  that 
he  thought  he  should  be  well  enough  to  mount 
his  horse  by  the  time  the  troops  could  be  got 
r?aclv  to  march.  In  that  event  he  promised  to 
t..l;2  command. 


140  RED   EAGLE. 

With  this  news  the  committee  went  to  the  cler 
gyman  who  was  chairman  of  the  public  meeting, 
and  that  patriotic  man,  dismissing  all  thought  of 
his  regular  church  services,  called  the  meeting 
together  again  the  next  morning,  which  happened 
to  be  Sunday.  The  voice  of  the  meeting  and  of 
the  people  of  the  State  was  unanimous.  Mr. 
Parton,  in  his  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  writes  : 

"  The  news  of  the  massacre  produced  every 
where  in  Tennessee  the  most  profound  impres 
sion.  Pity  for  the  distressed  Alabamians,  fears 
for  the  safety  of  their  own  borders,  rage  against 
the  Creeks,  so  long  the  recipients  of  the  gover- 
mental  bounty,  united  to  inflame  the  minds  of 
the  people.  But  one  feeling  pervaded  the  state. 
With  one  vow  it  was  decreed  that  the  entire  re 
sources  and  the  whole  available  force  of  Tennessee 
should  be  hurled  upon  the  savage  foe,  to  avenge 
the  massacre  and  deliver  the  southern  country." 

There  was  unfortunately  no  law  of  the  State 
under  which  anybody  was  authorized  to  call  out 
the  needed  men,  and  although  Governor  Blount 
was  ready  to  approve  and  actively  to  encourage 
the  gathering  of  Tennessee's  strength  and  its  use 
in  this  way,  he  had  no  legal  authority  to  promise 
pay  or  support  to  the  troops.  This  defect  was 
repaired  by  the  Legislature  within  a  week.  That 


JACKSON   IS   HELPED   INTO   HIS   SADDLE.      14! 

body  passed  a  bill  authorizing  the  Governor  to 
enlist  three  thousand  five  hundred  men  for  this 
service,  voting  three  hundred  thousand  dollars 
for  expenses,  and  pledging  the  State  to  support 
and  pay  the  men,  if  the  general  government 
should  refuse  or  neglect  to  accept  the  force  as  a 
part  of  its  volunteer  army. 

Meantime,  from  his  sick  bed,  and  without  wait 
ing  for  the  processes  of  law,  General  Jackson 
called  for  volunteers.  He  published  an  address, 
in  which  he  said  to  his  Tennesseeans  : 

'  The  horrid  butcheries  perpetrating  on  our 
defenceless  fellow-citizens  near  Fort  Stoddard 
cannot  fail  to  excite  in  every  bosom  a  spirit  of  re 
venge.  The  subjoined  letter  of  our  worthy  Gov 
ernor  shows  that  the  general  government  has  de 
posited  no  authority  in  this  quarter  to  afford 
aid  to  the  unhappy  sufferers.  It  is  wished  that 
volunteers  should  go  forward,  relying  on  the  jus 
tice  of  the  general  government  for  ultimate  re 
muneration.  It  surely  never  would  be  said  that 
the  brave  Tennesseeans  wanted  other  inducements 
than  patriotism  and  humanity  to  rush  to  the  aid 
of  our  bleeding  neighbors,  their  friends  and  rela 
tions.  I  feel  confident  that  the  dull  calculations 
of  sneaking  prudence  will  not  prevent  you  from 
immediately  stepping  forth  on  this  occasion,  so 


142  RED   EAGLE. 

worthy  the  arm  of  every  brave  soldier  and  good 
citizen.  I  regret  that  indisposition,  which  from 
present  appearances  is  not  likely  to  continue 
long,  may  prevent  me  from  leading  the  van  ;  but 
indulge  the  grateful  hope  of  sharing  with  you  the 
dangers  and  glory  of  'prostrating  these  hell 
hounds,  who  are  capable  of  such  barbarities." 

Jackson  was  in  a  hurry.  Every  day  at  such  a 
time  was  precious,  and  hence  he  was  determined 
to  waste  no  time  coddling  his  worn  and  wounded 
body.  He  issued  his  addresses  and  his  orders 
from  his  sick-bed ;  concerted  measures  with 
General  John  Cocke,  who  was  to  command  the 
troops  from  the  eastern  half  of  the  State,  and 
made  arrangements  for  provisions.  On  the  26th 
day  of  September,  just  one  week  after  the  Sun 
day  when  the  public  meeting  had  been  held,  he 
sent  Coffee  forward  with  the  advance  of  his  army 
a  body  of  horsemen  numbering  somewhat  more 
than  five  hundred.  Coffee  received  volunteers 
at  every  cross-road,  and  by  the  time  he  arrived 
at  Fayetteville,  Alabama,  the  appointed  place  of 
rendezvous,  his  five  hundred  men  had  increased 
to  one  thousand  three  hundred. 

Jackson  had  to  be  helped  on  his  horse  when  he 
set  out  to  join  the  army  he  had  raised  so  speedily. 
His  arm  was  still  encased  in  the  surgeon's  wrap- 


JACKSON   IS   HELPED   INTO    HIS   SADDLE.      143 

pings,  and  carried  in  a  sling.  He  could  put  but 
one  arm  into  his  coat-sleeve,  and  he  was  so  weak 
that  it  was  with  difficulty  that  he  could  ride  at 
all  ;  but  there  was  that  in  his  composition  which 
had  already  gained  for  him  his  nickname,  "  Old 
Hickory  ;"  it  was  the  tough  hickory  of  his  nature 
which  supplied  the  place  of  physical  strength, 
and  enabled  him  to  march.  Everywhere  he  is 
sued  his  proclamations  and  addresses,  couched  in 
strong,  vigorous,  though  not  always  graceful, 
English  :  a  practice  for  which  he  has  been  laughed 
at  sometimes,  but  one  which  was  wise,  neverthe 
less.  He  knew  his  Tennesseeans,  and  adapted  his 
measures  to  their  character.  They  were  an  im 
pulsive  race  of  men,  full  of  warm  blood,  which 
was  easily  stirred  by  such  appeals  as  Jackson 
made  to  them,  though  they  would  not  have  been 
moved  by  a  colder  species  of  address. 

Having  secured  his  men,  Jackson's  next  care 
was  to  convert  them  as  rapidly  as  possible  into 
soldiers,  and  accordingly  his  next  appeal  was 
directed  to  this  end.  Finding  that  he  would  not 
be  able  to  reach  Fayetteville  at  the  exact  time 
appointed  for  the  rendezvous,  he  sent  an  officer 
forward  with 'the  following  address,  which  was 
read  to  the  troops  : 

'  We  are  about  to  furnish  these  savages  a  les- 


144  RED   EAGLE. 

son  of  admonition.     We  are  about  to  teach  them 
that  our  long  forbearance  has  not  proceeded  from 
an  insensibility  to  wrongs  or  an  inability  to  re 
dress  them.     They  stand  in  need  of  such  warn 
ing.     In  proportion  as  we  have  borne  with  their 
insults    and    submitted   to    their   outrages,    they 
have  multiplied  in  number  and  increased  in  atro 
city.    But  the  measure  of  their  offences  is  at  length 
filled.     The  blood  of    our  women    and  children 
recently   spilt  at  Fort    Minis   calls  for   our  ven 
geance  ;  it  must  not  call  in  vain.     Our  borders 
must  no  longer  be  disturbed  by  the  war-whoop 
of  these  savages  and  the  cries  of  their  suffering 
victims.     The  torch  that  has  been  lighted  up  must 
be  made  to  blaze  in  the  heart  of  their  own  coun 
try.     It  is  time  they  should  be  made  to  feel  the 
weight  of  a  power  which,  because  it  was  merci 
ful,  they  believed  to  be  impotent.     But  how  shall 
a  war  so  long  forborne,  and  so  loudly  called  for 
by  retributive  justice,  be  waged  ?     Shall  we  imi 
tate  the  example  of  our  enemies  in  the  disorder 
of  their  movements  and  the  savageness  of  their 
dispositions  ?      Is    it    worthy    the    character    of 
American  soldiers,  who  take  up  arms  to  redfess 
the  wrongs  of  our  injured  country,  to  assume  no 
better  models  than  those  furnished  them  by  bar 
barians  ?     No,  fellow-soldiers,  great   as   are   the 


JACKSON   IS   HELPED   INTO   HIS   SADDLE.      145 

grievances  that  have  called  us  from  our  homes, 
we  must  not  permit  disorderly  passions  to  tarnish 
the  reputation  AVC  shall  carry  along  with  us.  We 
must  and  will  be  victorious  ;  but  we  must  con 
quer  as  men  who  owe  nothing  to  chance,  and 
who  in  the  midst  of  victory  can  still  be  mindful 
of  what  is  due  to  humanity  !  We  will  commence 
the  campaign  by  an  inviolable  attention  to  disci 
pline  and  subordination.  Without  a  strict  observ 
ance  of  these,  victory  must  ever  be  uncertain,  and 
ought  hardly  to  be  exulted  in  even  when  gained. 
To  what  but  the  entire  disregard  of  order  and 
subordination  are  we  to  ascribe  the  disasters 
which  have  attended  our  arms  in  the  north  dur 
ing  the  present  war  ?  How  glorious  will  it  be  to 
remove  the  blots  which  have  tarnished  the  fair 
character  bequeathed  us  by  the  fathers  of  our 
Revolution  !  The  bosom  of  your  general  is  full 
of  hope.  He  knows  the  ardor  which  animates 
you,  and  already  exults  in  the  triumph  which 
your  strict  observance  of  discipline  and  good 
order  will  render  certain." 


CHAPTER    XV.  • 

THE  MARCH  INTO  THE  ENEMY'S  COUNTRY. 

COFFEE  had  pushed  on  with  his  cavalry  bri 
gade  to  Huntsville,  Alabama,  thirty-two  miles 
beyond  Fayetteville,  without  waiting  for  Jackson. 
At  Fayetteville,  Jackson  found  the  army  to  whom 
he  had  issued  his  proclamation,  but  their  num 
bers  were  much  smaller  than  he  had  hoped — not 
exceeding-  a  thousand  men  ;  and  it  would  have 
been  necessary,  probably,  to  wait  for  recruits  to 
come  in,  if  there  had  been  no  other  cause  for 
waiting.  Every  thing  had  to  be  clone,  and  day 
and  night  Jackson  was  busy  with  details  pertain 
ing  to  the  organization,  the  drilling,  and  the  dis 
ciplining  of  the  troops  ;  for  this  volunteer  general 
knew,  as  few  volunteers  do,  how  greatly  disci 
pline  and  drill  increase  the  strength  of  an  armed 
force. 

Luckily  he  had  time  for  this,  somewhat  unex- 
'pectedly.  He  had  supposed  that  the  victorious 
Creeks  would  march  upon  Mobile,  and  his  haste 
was  largely  due  to  his  anxiety  to  attack  them  in 
rear,  and  thus  save  the  important  seaport  and 


INTO  THE  ENEMY'S  COUNTRY.  147 

prevent  a  junction  of  the  Creeks  with  the  British. 
Soon  after  his  arrival  at  Fayetteville,  however, 
which  was  on  the  7th  of  October,  Jackson  received 
a  despatch  from  General  Coffee,  saying  that  in 
stead  of  marching  upon  Mobile  the  Creeks  were 
moving  northward  in  two  columns,  threatening 
Georgia  and  Tennessee. 

Why  Red  Eagle  pursued  this  course  was  long 
a  puzzle  to  students  of  the  campaign.  He 
was  so  manifestly  a  man  of  quick  and  accurate 
perceptions  in  military  matters,  that  he  must  have 
seen  how  entirely  Mobile  was  within  his  grasp, 
and  how  great  an  advantage  it  would  be  to  him 
to  capture  or  destroy  the  town  ;  and  when  he 
neglected  such  in  opportunity  it  was  not  easy  to 
guess  why  he  did  so.  The  mystery  was  solved 
when  a  letter  was  found  in  his  own  house  a 
month  or  so  later,  dated  September  29th,  1813, 
fr  >m  Manxique,  the  Spanish  Governor  of  Florida. 
Tliis  letter  was  addressed  to  the  chiefs  of  the 
Creek  nation,  and  was  in  these  words  : 

"  GENTLEMEN  :  I  received  the  letter  that  you 
wrote  me  in  the  month  of  August,  by  which,  and 
with  great  satisfaction,  I  was  informed  of  the  ad 
vantages  which  your  brave  warriors  obtained  over 
your  enemies.  I  represented,  as  I  promised  you, 


148  RED   EAGLE. 

to  the  Captain-General  of  the  Havana,  the  request 
which,  the  last  time  I  took  you  by  the  hand,  you 
made  me  of  arms  and  ammunitions  ;  but  until  now 
I  .cannot  yet  have  an  answer.  But  I  am  in 
hopes  that  he  will  send  me  the  effects  which  I 
requested,  and  as  soon  as  I  receive  them  I 
shall  inform  you.  I  am  very  thankful  for  your 
generous  offers  to  procure  to  me  the  provisions 
and  warriors  necessary  in  order  to  retake  the  port 
of  Mobile,  and  you  ask  me  at  the  same  time  if  we 
have  given  up  Mobile  to  the  Americans  :  to  which 
I  answer,  for  the  present  I  cannot  profit  of  your 
generous  offer,  not  being  at  war  with  the  Ameri 
cans,  who  did  not  take  Mobile  by  force,  since  they 
purchased  it  from  the  miserable  officer,  destitute 
of  honor,  who  commanded  there,  and  delivered  it 
without  authority.  By  which  reasons  the  sale 
and  delivery  of  that  place  is  entirely  void  and 
null,  and  I  hope  that  the  Americans  will  restore  it 
again  to  us,  because  nobody  can  dispose  of  thing 
that  is  not  his  own  property  ;  in  consequence  of 
which  the  Spaniards  have  not  lost  their  right  to 
it.  And  I  hope  you  will  not  put  in  execution  the 
project  you  tell  me  of,  to  burn  the  town,  since 
these  houses  and  properties  do  not  belong  to  the 
Americans,  but  to  true  Spaniards.  To  the  bear 
ers  of  your  letter  I  have  ordered  some  small  pres- 


INTO  THE  ENEMY'S  COUNTRY.  149 

ents  to  be  given,  and  I  remain  forever  your  good 
father  and  friend,  MANXIQUE.  " 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  reflect,  that  about  a  year 
later,  Jackson,  acting  on  his  own  responsibility, 
marched  to  Pensacola  and  humiliated  the  succes 
sor  of  this  especial  rascal,  who  wrote  about  honor 
in  a  letter  in  which  he  was  encouraging  and  plan 
ning  to  furnish  arms  and  ammunition  to  savages 
who  were  butchering  the  people  of  a  nation  with 
whom  his  own  country  was  at  peace. 

The  letter  explains  Weatherford's  course.  He 
was  acting  from  the  first  in  concert  with  this 
Spanish  governor,  from  whom  he  was  drawing 
his  arms  and  ammunition  ;  and  while  he  wanted 
to  burn  Mobile,  he  knew  that  he  must  first  ask 
Manxique's  permission.  Accordingly,  he  must 
have  sent  a  letter  to  that  ally  on  the  very  day  of 
the  massacre  at  Fort  Minis,  or  on  the  next  day  at 
latest.  That  massacre  began  at  noon  and  ended 
at  five  o'clock  on  the  3Oth  day  of  August ;  and 
Manxique  speaks  of  the  letter  reporting  the  victory 
as  "  the  letter  that  you  wrote  me  in  the  month  of 
August."  It  is  thus  clear  that  Weatherford's 
military  instincts  were  neither  asleep  nor  at  fault 
when  he  finished  that  bloody  day's  work  ;  that 
he  saw  both  the  possibility  and  the  advantage  of 


150  RED   EAGLE. 

destroying  Mobile,  and  at  once  asked  permission 
to  do  so.  The  letter  denying  that  permission  to 
him  was  dated  September  2Qth  ;  and,  as  he  was 
marching  upon  Tennessee  and  Georgia  early  in 
October,  it  is  apparent  that  he  had  only  waited 
for  the  arrival  of  the  Spanish  governor's  reply, 
before  renewing  his  campaign.  While  he  hoped 
for  permission  to  destroy  the  seaport  town,  he 
waited  ;  the  moment  he  knew  that  he  must  not 
do  that,  he  began  his  northward  and  eastward 
march,  to  strike  his  enemies  in  another  quarter. 
His  failure  to  march  upon  Mobile  has  been  cited 
by  some  writers  to  prove  that  Weatherford  was 
after  all  only  an  Indian,  without  real  military 
capacity  ;  in  the  light  of  all  the  facts,  as  they  are 
revealed  by  the  letter  quoted,  his  proceedings 
prove  precisely  the  reverse.  We  are  indebted  for 
the  sparing  of  Mobile,  not  to  incompetency  on 
Weatherford's  part,  but  to  the  greed  of  the  Span 
iard,  who  hesitated  to  permit  the.  destruction  of 
property  which  he  hoped  to  get  possession  of  by 
other  means. 

When  Coffee's  report  of  the  advance  of  the 
Creeks  came,  the  news  greatly  relieved  Jackson 
of  anxiety.  It  freed  him  from  apprehensio.n  con 
cerning  Mobile  ;  it  promised  to  save  him  from  a 
and  wearying  march  through  a  wilderness, 


INTO  THE  ENEMY'S  COUNNRY.  151 

and  to  enable  him  to  meet  the  enemy  sooner  than 
would  otherwise  have  been  possible  ;  and  his  chief 
desire  now  was  to  hurl  his  army  with  crushing 
force  against  the  Creeks,  to  make  unceasing  war 
upon  them,  and  to  break  their  power  as  speedily 
as  possible.  He  was  so  elated  at  the  prospect  of 
an  early  encounter  with  them,  that  he  wrote  in  a 
playful  vein  to  Coffee,  saying  :  "  It  is  surely  high 
gratification  to  learn  that  the  Creeks  are  so  atten 
tive  to  my  situation  as  to  save  me  the  pain  of 
travelling.  L  must  not  be  outdone  in  politeness, 
and  will  therefore  endeavor  to  meet  them  on  mid 
dle  ground/'* 

A  good  deal  remained  to  be  done,  and  arrange 
ments  were  not  yet  complete  for  the  procuring  of 
provisions.  Coffee  was  at  Huntsville,  and  was 
watching  for  the  enemy.  On  the  i  ith  of  October, 
Coffee  reported  the  Indian  advance,  and  Jackson 
marched  on  the  instant,  arriving  at  Huntsville 
that  evening.  At  Huntsville  it  was  necessary  to 
await  the  arrival  of  provisions  for  the  army.  Sup 
plies  from  East  Tennessee  had  been  sent  down 
the  river,  but  a  failure  of  water  in  the  shallow 
stream  detained  them  on  the  way.  Jackson 
marched  to  Ditto's  landing  to  await  their  coming  ; 
but  they  came  not,  and  relief  seemed  to  be  impos 

*  Parton's  "  Life  of  Jackson." 


152  RED    EAGLE. 

sible.  Jackson  was  in  a  sore  strait.  Me  wanted 
to  advance,  but  was  without  provisions  or  an  im 
mediate  prospect  of  getting  any.  He  ordered 
Coffee  with  his  cavalry  to  scour  the  Indian  coun 
try  for  supplies,  while  with  the  main  army  he 
made  a  toilsome  march,  over  a  mountainous  coun 
try,  to  Thompson's  Creek,  about  twenty  miles 
higher  up  the  river,  for  the  double  purpose  of 
meeting  the  expected  provisions  there,  and  of 
putting  himself  in  the  way  of  marching  the  more 
quickly  to  the  relief  of  a  body  of  friendly  Indians 
Avho  occupied  a  fort  at  the  Ten  Islands,  on  the 
Coosa  River. 

Meantime,  Jackson  sent  messengers  in  every 
direction,  urging  everybody  in  any  sort  of  author 
ity  to  hurry  the  supplies  forward.  At  Thomp 
son's  Creek  he  built  a  fort,  as  a  base  of  supplies 
for  the  campaign.  His  plight  was  desperate,  but 
he  would  not  stay  where  he  was  or  fall  back. 
With  food  or  without  it,  he  meant  to  march  into 
the  Indian  country  and  dare  starvation  as  he  braved 
the  other  perils  of  war.  It  is  related  of  him  that 
at  one  time  during  the  campaign,  when  the  men 
^rere  without  provisions,  one  of  them  saw  him 
eating  something,  and  mutinously  demanded  a 
share  of  the  food. 

"  Certainly,"    replied    Jackson,    thrusting    his 


INTO  THE  ENEMY'S  COUNTRY.          153 

hand  into  his  pocket  and  offering  the  man  some 
acorns.  He  was  literally  living  on  acorns  while 
marching  and  fighting  night  and  day. 

The  state  of  affairs  when  Jackson  was  about 
leaving  Fort  Deposit,  on  Thompson's  Creek, 
where  he  tarried  but  a  single  day,  may  be  inferred 
from  a  letter  written  by  Major  John  Reid,  of  the 
general's  staff,  from  which  we  copy  some  pas 
sages.  The  whole  letter  is  printed  in  Parton's 
Life  of  Jackson. 

"  At  this  place  we  have  remained  a  day  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  a  depot  for  provi 
sions  ;  but  where  these  provisions  are  to  come 
from  God  Almighty  only  knows.  We  had  ex 
pected  supplies  from  East  Tennessee,  but  they 
have  not  arrived,  and  I  am  fearful  never  will. 
I  speak  seriously  when  I  declare  I  expect  we 
shall  soon  have  to  eat  our  horses,  and  perhaps 
this  is  the  best  use  we  can  put  a  great  many  of 
them  to. 

'  The  hostile  Creeks,  as  we  learnt  yesterday 
from  the  Path  Killer,  are  assembling  in  great 
numbers  within  fifteen  miles  from  Turkey  Town. 
Chenully,  who  is  posted  with  the  friendly  Creeks 
in  the  neighborhood  of  that  place,  it  is  feared  will 
be  destroyed  before  we  can  arrive  to  their  relief. 
In  three  days  we  shall  probably  have  a  fight.  The 


154  RED   EAGLE. 

general  swears  he  will  neither  sound  a  retreat  nor 
survive  a  defeat.  .  .  .  We  shall  leave  this 
place  with  less  than  two  days'  provisions." 

It  seems  almost  incredible  that  a  general  should 
venture  to  advance  into  an  enemy's  country,  be 
ginning  the  march  with  only  provisions  enough 
to  last  his  force  for  a  day  or  two,  and  with  no 
assurance,  scarcely  even  a  hope,  that  provisions 
were  likely  to  follow  him  ;  but  this  is  what  Jack 
son  did. 

Coffee  joined  him  on  the  march,  bringing  with 
him  a  few  hundreds  of  bushels  of  corn,  and  report 
ing  that  he  had  destroyed  some  Indian  towns,  but 
had  encountered  none  of  the  Indians.  The  corn 
was  a  mere  handful  among  the  men  and  horses  of 
the  army,  but  cries  for  help  were  coming  every 
hour  from  the  friendly  Indians,  whose  situation 
at  the  Ten  Islands  was  desperate,  and  Jackson 
marched  forward,  trusting  to  chance  for  supplies. 
He  meant  to  fight  first  and  find  something  to  eat 
afterward. 

As  has  been  said,  the  army  remained  but  one 
day  at  Fort  Deposit,  and  during  that  day  con 
structed  a  fortress  ;  but  Jackson  found  time  in 
which  to  write  an  address  to  his  men,  whom  he 
was  now  about  to  lead  upon  a  campaign  in  which 
they  would  encounter  famine  and  hardships  of  the 


INTO  THE  ENEMY'S  COUNTRY.  155 

sorest  kind,  as  well  as  the  savage  enemy.  They 
needed  all  the  courage  that  enthusiasm  in  the 
cause  could  give  them,  and  the  address  was  de 
signed  to  key  them  up,  so  to  speak,  to  the  pitch 
of  their  commander's  temper.  The  address  read 
as  follows  : 

"  You  have,  fellow-soldiers,  at  length  penetrat 
ed  the  country  of  your  enemies.  It  is  not  to  be 
believed  that  they  will  abandon  the  soil  that  em 
bosoms  the  bones  of  their  forefathers  without 
furnishing  you  an  opportunity  of  signalizing  your 
valor.  Wise  men  do  not  expect,  brave  men  will 
not  desire  it.  It  was  not  to  travel  unmolested 
through  a  barren  wilderness  that  you  quitted 
your  families  and  homes,  and  submitted  to  so 
many  privations  :  it  was  to  revenge  the  cruleties 
committed  upon  your  defenceless  frontiers  by  the 
inhuman  Creeks,  instigated  by  their  no  less  inhu 
man  allies  ;  you  shall  not  be  disappointed. 

"  If  the  enemy  flee  before  us  we  will  overtake 
and  chastise  him  ;  we  will  teach  him  how  dread 
ful,  when  once  aroused,  is  the  resentment  of  free 
men.  But  it  is  not  by  boasting  that  punishment 
is  to  be  inflicted  or  victory  obtained.  The  same 
resolution  that  prompted  us  to  take  up  arms  must 
inspire  us  in  battle.  Men  thus  animated  and 
thus  resolved,  barbarians  can  never  conquer  ;  and 


156  RED   EAGLE. 

it  is  an  enemy  barbarous  in  the  extreme  that  we 
have  now  to  face.  Their  reliance  will  be  on  the 
damage  they  can  do  you  while  you  are  asleep  and 
unprepared  for  action  ;  their  hopes  shall  fail  them 
in  the  hour  of  experiment.  Soldiers  who  know 
their  duty  and  are  ambitious  to  perform  it  are  not 
to  be  taken  by  surprise.  Our  sentinels  will  never 
sleep,  nor  our  soldiers  be  unprepared  for  action  ; 
yet  while  it  is  enjoined  upon  the  sentinels  vigi 
lantly  to  watch  the  approach  of  the  foe,  they  are 
at  the  same  time  commanded  not  to  fire  at  shad 
ows.  Imaginary  dangers  must  not  deprive  them 
of  entire  self-possession.  Our  soldiers  will  lie 
with  their  arms  in  their  hands  ;  and  the  moment 
an  alarm  is  given  they  will  move  to  their  respec 
tive  positions  without  noise  and  without  confu 
sion.  They  will  thus  be  enabled  to  hear  the  orders 
of  their  officers,  and  to  obey  them  with  prompti 
tude. 

"  Great  reliance  will  be  placed  by  the  enemy, 
on  the  consternation  they  may  be  able  to  spread 
through  our  ranks  by  the  hideous  yells  with  which 
they  commence  their  battles  ;  but  brave  men  will 
laugh  at  such  efforts  to  alarm  them.  It  is  not  by 
bellowings  and  screams  that  the  wounds  of  death 
are  inflicted.  You  will  teach  these  noisy  assail 
ants  how  weak  are  their  weapons  of  warfare,  by 


INTO  THE  ENEMY'S  COUNTRY.  157 

opposing  them  with  the  bayonet.  What  Indian 
ever  withstood  its  charge  ?  What  army  of  any 
nation  ever  withstood  it  long  ? 

"  Yes,  soldiers,  the  order  for  a  charge  will  be 
the  signal  for  victory.  In  that  moment  your  en 
emy  will  be  seen  flying  in  every  direction  before 
you.  But  in  the  moment  of  action  coolness  and 
deliberation  must  be  regarded  ;  your  fire  made 
with  precision  and  aim  ;  and  wrhen  ordered  to 
charge  with  the  bayonet  you  must  proceed  to  the 
assault  with  a  quick  and  firm  step,  without  trepi 
dation  or  alarm.  Then  shall  you  behold  the  com 
pletion  of  your  hopes,  in  the  discomfiture  of  your 
enemy.  Your  general,  wrhose  duty  as  well  as  in 
clination  is  to  watch  over  your  safety,  will  not,  to 
gratify  any  .wishes  of  his  own,  rush  you  unneces 
sarily  into  danger.  He  knows,  however,  that  it 
is  not  in  assailing  an  enemy  that  men  are  de 
stroyed  ;  it  is  when  retreating  and  in  confusion. 
Aware  of  this,  he  will  be  prompted  as  much  by 
a  regard  for  your  lives  as  your  honor.  He  la 
ments  that  he  has  been  compelled,  even  incident 
ally,  to  hint  at  a  retreat  when  speaking  to  freemen 
and  to  soldiers.  Never  until  you  forget  all  that 
is  due  to  yourselves  and  your  country  will  you 
have  any  practical  understanding  of  that  Avord. 
Shall  an  enemy  wholly  unacquainted  with  military 


158  RED    EAGLE. 

evolutions,  and  who  rely  more  for  victory  on  their 
grim  visages  and  hideous  yells  than  upon  their 
bravery  or  their  weapons — shall  such  an  enemy 
ever  drive  before  them  the  well-trained  youths  of 
our  country,  whose  bosoms  pant  for  glory,  and  a 
desire  to  avenge  the  wrongs  they  have  received  ? 
Your  general  will  not  live  to  behold  such  a  spec 
tacle  ;  rather  would  he  rush  into  the  thickest  of 
the  enemy  and  submit  himself  to  their  scalping- 
knives.  But  he  has  no  fears  of  such  a  result.  He 
knows  the  valor  of  the  men  he  commands,  and 
how  certainly  that  valor,  regulated  as  it  will  be, 
will  lead  to  victory.  With  his  soldiers  he  will 
face  all  dangers,  and  with  them  participate  in  the 
glory  of  conquest." 

Nothing1  could  have  been  better  fitted  than  this 

o 

address  was  to  serve  the  end  for  which  it  was 
designed.  Jackson  knew  his  Tennesseeans,  both 
in  their  temper  and  in  their  habits  ;  and  he  adroitly 
managed  to  warn  them  against  the  consequences 
of  those  faults  which  were  most  prominent  in 
their  characters,  while  seeming  merely  to  appeal 
in  a  stimulating  fashion  to  their  pride  of  courage. 
He  knew,  as  they  did  not,  how  trying  the  hard 
ships  of  a  campaign  in  a  wilderness  with  insuffici 
ent  supplies  are  ;  he  knew  how  prone  raw  troops 


INTO  THE  ENEMY'S  COUNTRY.     159 

are  to  fall  into  confusion  and  panic  in  the  excite 
ment  of  a  sudden  attack  ;  and  against  all  these 
things  he  did  what  could  be  done  to  brace  them 
by  an  adroit  appeal  to  their  pride  of  race  and  of 
personal  courage.  If  some  of  his  expressions 
seem  to  suggest  any  thing  like  contempt  of  the 
Creeks  as  foes,  they  were  meant  merely  to  arouse 
the  pride  of  his  own  men,  and  indicated  no  dispo 
sition  on  his  part  not  to  "  respect  his  enemy,"  as 
Claiborne  said.  On  the  contrary,  he  showed  the 
profoundest  respect  for  his  enemy  by  his  extreme 
solicitude  about  the  condition  and  the  conduct  of 
his  own  men. 

The  marching  was  now  as  nearly  continuous 
as  was  possible  in  the  circumstances.  Frequent 
pauses  had  to  be  made,  in  order  that  provisions 
might  be  gathered  from  the  surrounding  country, 
but  as  soon  as  there  was  food  in  camp  the  march 
was  resumed. 

On  the  28th  of  October,  a  detachment  under 
command  of  Colonel  Dyer  left  the  main  body, 
and  the  next  day  attacked  the  Indian  village  of 
Littefutchee,  surprising  it  before  daylight  in  the 
morning,  destroying  it,  and  bringing  in  twenty- 
nine  prisoners  as  the  first-fruits  of  the  campaign. 

This  was  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  battles 


l6o  RED   EAGLE. 

which  followed  each  other  in  as  rapid  succession 
as  the  starving  condition  of  the  army  permitted. 
Jackson  was  now  in  the  enemy's  country,  *  and 
within  striking-  distance  of  his  strategic  points. 
How  vigorously  and  persistently  he  struck,  we 
shall  see  in  the  chapters  which  follow. 


CHAPTER    XVI. 

THE   BATTLE   OF    TALLUSHATCHEE. 

ON  the  second  clay  of  November,  Jackson 
learned  that  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy 
was  gathered  at  Tallushatchee,  an  Indian  town 
about  ten  miles  from  the  Ten  Islands.  He  had 
no  sooner  received  this  information  than  he  or 
dered  Coffee  with  about  nine  hundred  men  to 
attack  the  post. 

Coffee  marched  on  the  moment,  taking  Avith 
him  a  company  of  friendly  Indians,  mostly  Che- 
rokees,  under  Richard  Brown.  To  prevent  er 
rors  the  Indians  in  the  expedition  wore  white 
feathers  and  deer-tails  on  their  heads. 

The  expedition  crossed  the  river  a  few  miles 
above  the  Ten  Islands,  and  advanced  during  the 
night,  arriving  in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of 
the  town  about  daybreak  on  the  3d  of  November. 
The  purpose  was  not  merely  to  defeat  but  to  de 
stroy  the  Indian  force,  and  therefore,  instead  of 
dashing  at  once  into  the  town,  Coffee  divided  his 
force  in  half,  sending  Colonel  Allcorn  with  the 
cavalry  to  the  right,  while  he  himself,  in  com- 


l62  RED   EAGLE. 

pany  with  Colonel  Cannon,  marched  to  the  left 
around  the  place,  keeping  at  a  sufficient  distance 
to  avoid  alarming  the  Indians. 

When  the  heads  of  the  two  columns  met,  the 
town  was  entirely  surrounded.  Notwithstanding 
the  caution  with  which  this  movement  was  exe 
cuted,  the  Indians  discovered  the  presence  of  the 
enemy  when  the  troops  were  half  a  mile  distant. 
They  beat  their  drums  and  yelled  in  savage  fash 
ion,  but  remained  on  the  defensive,  awaiting  the 
attack. 

About  sunrise,  every  thing  being  in  readiness, 
General  Coffee  sent  two  companies  forward  into 
the  town,  without  breaking  his  circular  align 
ment,  instructing  the  officers  in  command  of  them 
to  make  an  assault  and  bring  on  the  action.  The 
manoeuvre  was  altogether  successful.  As  soon 
as  the  two  companies  made  their  attack,  the  In 
dians,  confident  that  this  was  the  whole  of  the 
assaulting  column,  rushed  out  of  their  houses  and 
other  hiding-places;  and  charged  their  assailants 
with  great  vigor.  The  companies  of  whites  there 
upon  began  falling  back  and  the  Creeks  pursued 
them  hotly.  When  the  main  line  was  reached,  it 
delivered  a  volley  into  the  midst  of  the  advancing 
savages,  and  immediately  charged  them,  driving 
them  back  in  confusion  to  the  shelter  of  their 


THE   BATTLE    OF  TALLUSIIATCIIEE.  163 

houses.  Here  the  Creeks  fought  with  the  utmost 
desperation,  refusing  quarter,  obstinately  resisting 
when  resistance  was  manifestly  in  vain,  and  choos 
ing  to  die  where  they  stood,  rather  than  yield 
even  to  Coffee's  overwhelming  numbers. 

General  Coffee  said  in  his  report  of  the  affair  : 
"The  enemy  retreated,  firing,  until  they  got 
around  and  in  their  buildings,  where  they  made 
all  the  resistance  that  an  overpowered  soldier 
could  do.  They  fought  as  long  as  one  existed  ; 
but  their  destruction  was  very  soon  completed. 
Our  men  rushed  up  to  the  doors  of  the  houses, 
and  in  a  few  minutes  killed  the  last  warrior  of 
them.  The  enemy  fought  with  savage  fury,  and 
met  death  with  all  its  horrors,  without  shrinking 
or  complaining  ;  not  one  asked  to  be  spared,  but 
[they]  fought  as  long  as  they  could  stand  or  sit. 
In  consequence  of  their  flying  to  their  houses  and 
mixing  with  their  families,  our  men,  in  killing  the 
males,  without  intention  killed  and  wounded  a 
few  of  the  squaws  and  children,  which  was  re 
gretted  by  every  officer  and  soldier  of  the  detach 
ment,  but  which  could  not  be  avoided." 

Coffee  counted  one  hundred  and  eighty-six  dead 
bodies  of  Indians,  and,  as  many  of  them  fell  in  the 
grass  and  high  weeds,  where  their  bodies  were 
not  easily  found,  he  expressed  the  opinion  in  his 


164  RED  EAGLE. 

report  that  the  number  of  killed  did  not  fall  short 
of  two  hundred,  while  his  own  loss  was  five  men 
killed  and  forty-one  wounded,  most  of  the  wounds 
being  slight  and  none  of  them  mortal.  For  the 
first  time  in  the  history  of  Indian  warfare,  the  fight 
ing  force  of  the  savages  in  this  battle  was  utterly 
destroyed,  not  a  single  warrior  escaping  alive. 

There  were  eighty -four  prisoners  taken,  all  of 
them  being  women  and  children.  Not  only  Gen 
eral  Coffee,  but  his  officers  and  men  also,  would 
gladly  have  ended  the  fight  as  soon  as  victory 
was  theirs,  sparing  the  warriors  who  had  survived 
the  first  onset,  and  they  constantly  offered  quarter 
not  only  to  bodies  of  men  who  were  fighting  to 
gether,  but  to  single  individuals  who  were  mani 
festly  at  their  mercy,  and  to  wounded  warriors  ; 
but  their  offers  of  mercy  were  indignantly  rejected 
in  every  case,  and  they  therefore  had  no  choice 
but  to  convert  the  battle  into  a  massacre  more  com 
plete  than  that  which  had  occurred  at  Fort  Mims, 
except  that  the  women  and  children  were  spared  ; 
but  this  time  the  butchery  was  forced  upon  the 
victors  against  their  will,  while  at  Fort  Mims  the 
triumphant  savages  had  willingly  indulged  in  in 
discriminate  slaughter. 

Coffee  at  once  took  up  his  return  march  and 
rejoined  Jackson,  who  sent  a  brief  despatch  re- 


THE   BATTLE    OF   TAI.LUSHATCHEE.  165 

porting  the  affair  to  Governor  Blount,  praising 
Coffee  and  his  men  in  the  strongest  terms,  and 
ending  with  that  plaintive  plea  for  food  for  his 
army,  which  was  now  constantly  on  his  lips.  "  If 
we  had  a  sufficient  supply  of  provisions,"  he 
wrote,  "  we  should  in  a  very  short  time  accom 
plish  the  object  of  the  expedition." 

The  most  encouraging  thing  about  this  affair 
was  the  good  conduct  of  the  men.  They  mani 
fested  so  little  of  the  spirit  of  raw  and  undiscip 
lined  troops  ;  they  fought  with  so  much  coolness 
and  steadiness,  and  went  through  the  battle  show 
ing  so  few  signs  of  that  excitement  which  com 
monly  impairs  the  efficiency  of  inexperienced 
soldiers,  that  their  commander  felt  a  confidence 
in  them  which  justified  him  in  attempting  more 
than  he  would  otherwise  have  dared  in  the  cir 
cumstances. 

Mr.  Parton,  in  his  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson, 
preserves  a  story  which  grew  out  of  this  battle, 
and  which  so  strongly  illustrates  the  softer  side 
of  a  stern  soldier's  character,  that  we  may  be  par 
doned  for  breaking  the  narrative  to  copy  it  here. 

"  On  the  bloody  field  of  Tallushatchee  was 
found  a  slain  mother  still  embracing  her  living 
infant.  The  child  was  brought  into  camp  with 
the  other  prisoners,  and  Jackson,  anxious  to  save 


1 66  RED   EAGLE. 

it,  endeavored  to  induce  some  of  the  Indian 
women  to  give  it  nourishment.  '  No,'  said  they, 
4  a'l  his  relatives  are  dead;  kill  him  too.'  This 
reply  appealed  to  the  heart  of  the  general.  He 
caused  the  child  to  be  taken  to  his  own  hut,  where 
among  the  few  remaining  stores  was  found  a  little 
brown  sugar.  This,  mingled  with  water,  served 
to  keep  the  child  alive  until  it  could  be  sent  to 
Huntsville,  where  it  was  nursed  at  Jackson's  ex 
pense  until  the  end  of  the  campaign,  and  then 
taken  to  the  Hermitage.  Mrs.  Jackson  received 
it  cordially,  and  the  boy  grew  up  in  the  family, 
treated  by  the  general  and  his  kind  wife  as  a  son 
and  a  favorite.  Lincoyer  was  the  name  given 
him  by  the  general.  He  grew  to  be  a  finely  formed 
and  robust  youth,  and  received  the  education 
usually  given  to  the  planters'  sons  in  the  neigh 
borhood.  Yet  it  appears  he  remained  an  Indian 
to  the  last,  delighting  to  roam  the  fields  and 
woods,  and  decorate  his  hair  and  clothes  with 
gay  feathers,  and  given  to  strong  yearnings  for 
his  native  wilds." 

The  boy  did  not  live  to  reach  manhood,  how 
ever.  In  his  seventeenth  year  he  fell  a  victim  to 
pulmonary  consumption,  and  when  he  died  his 
benefactor  mourned  him  as  bitterly  as  if  he  had 
been  indeed  his  son. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

THE   BATTLE    OF  TALLADEGA. 

WHERE  was  General  Cocke  with  the  troops 
from  East  Tennessee  all  this  time  ?  It  will  be  re 
membered  that  he  was  to  muster  twenty-five  hun 
dred  men  in  his  half  of  the  state,  while  Jackson 
gathered  a  like  number  in  the  west,  and  marching 
southward  the  two  were  to  form  a  junction  in  the 
Creek  country.  Meantime  General  Cocke  had 
undertaken  to  procure  in  East  Tennessee  supplies 
for  the  whole  force.  The  supplies,  as  we  know, 
had  not  come,  and  Jackson  had  marched  without 
them.  Now  he  expected  General  Cocke  daily, 
with  his  force  and  his  supplies;  but  they  came 
not,  and  Jackson  was  greatly  disappointed. 

The  fact  was  that  General  Cocke  had  been  de 
layed  by  precisely  the  same  lack  of  breadstuffs 
that  had  embarrassed  General  Jackson.  He  had 
collected  supplies,  indeed,  and  ordered  them  for 
ward  by  way  of  the  river,  but  for  lack  of  water 
they  had  not  come,  and  at  last,  like  Jackson,  he 
began  his  march  without  them.  He  started  south 
from  Knoxville  on  the  I3th  of  October,  and  after 


1 68  RED   EAGLE. 

a  considerable  delay  on  the  route,  abandoned  all 
hope  of  receiving  the  supplies,  and  depended 
thereafter  upon  such  aid  as  the  friendly  Cherokees 
could  give  him  in  the  way  of  furnishing  provi 
sions.  General  White  had  marched  separately 
with  his  brigade,  and  when  he  joined  General 
Cocke  his  men  were  in  a  starving  condition. 

While  marching  in  a  column  separate  from 
Jackson's,  General  Cocke  was  an  independent 
commander.  If  he  should  join  Jackson,  whose 
commission  was  older  than  his  own,  the  East 
Tennessee  commander  must  become  subordinate 
to  the  authority  of  Jackson.  The  fact  that  he  did 
not  form  the  contemplated  union  of  forces,  but 
acted  separately,  and  the  additional  fact  that  his 
separate  action  led  to  a  blunder  which  added 
greatly  to  the  horrors  of  the  war,  caused  Jackson 
great  annoyance,  and  subjected  General  Cocke  to 
the  severest  criticism.  He  was  accused  of  an  un 
due  and  culpable  jealousy  of  Jackson,  of  self-seek 
ing,  and  of  perverse  disobedience  of  orders.  To 
all  of  this  we  shall  come  presently.  The  matter  is 
mentioned  now  merely  because  it  is  necessary  to 
know  this  much  about  it  in  order  that  we  may 
properly  understand  the  events  to  be  immediately 
narrated. 

As  soon  as  Coffee's  command   returned  from 


THE   BATTLE   OF   TALLADEGA.  169 

the  Tallushatchee  expedition,  General  Jackson 
resumed  his  march  over  a  mountainous  country 
toward  the  Ten  Islands.  Upon  arriving  at  th.it 
point  on  the  Coosa  River,  he  began  the  construc 
tion  of  a  fort  as  a  centre  of  operations,  and  a  de 
fensive  post  at  which  his  supplies — whenever  he 
should  happen  to  have  any  thing  of  that  kind- 
could  be  protected  by  a  comparatively  small 
force.  He  adopted  the  usual  method  of  fortify 
ing  against  Indian  assaults — inclosing  a  large 
space  within  a  line  of  strong  timber  pickets,  and 
building  block-houses,  storehouses,  and  other 
needed  structures  within.  Here  he  was  disposed 
to  await  the  arrival  of  General  Cocke,  hoping  that 
that  officer  would  bring  provisions  of  some  sort 
with  him,  as  the  force  at  Fort  Strother — that  was 
the  name  given  to  the  works  at  the  Ten  Islands- 
was  now  almost  destitute  of  food  and  forage. 

When  Cocke  was  within  three  days'  march  of 
Fort  Strother,  his  advance-guard,  about  one 
thousand  strong,  under  command  of  General 
White,  was  within  a  very  short  distance,  and 
General  White  sent  forward  a  courier  from  Tur 
key  Town  reporting  his  arrival  at  that  point,  and 
asking  for  orders. 

About  this  time  there  came  into  Jackson's  camp 
a  messenger,  who  brought  news  of  a  very  impor- 


1 70  RED   EAGLE. 

tant  nature.  He  came  from  a  little  fort  thirty 
miles  away,  at  the  Indian  town  of  Talladega,  on 
the  spot  where  the  modern  town  of  Talladega 
stands.  In  that  fort  a  handful  of  friendly  Indians, 
about  one  hundred  and  fifty  in  number,  had  gath 
ered  to  escape  butchery  at  the  hands  of  their  hos 
tile  brethren.  Here  they  were  closely  besieged 
by  an  Indian  force  one  thousand  strong,  who, 
contrary  to  their  usual  practice,  made  no  assault, 
but  sought  to  starve  out  the  little  garrison.  They 
surrounded  the  fort  and  maintained  an  unbroken 
siege  line,  confident  that  the  plight  and  even  the 
existence  of  the  beleaguered  tort  were  unknown  to 
the  whites,  and  confident,  therefore,  that  no  relief 
could  be  sent  to  them.  They  knew,  too,  that  the 
supply  of  water,  as  well  as  of  food,  in  the  fort 
was  very  scant,  and  hence  they  had  only  to  await 
the  sure  operation  of  starvation  and  thirst  to  do 
their  work  for  them. 

The  messenger  who  came  to  Jackson  to  pray 
for  the  deliverance  of  the  little  band  from  their 
pitiable  situation  is  described  by  some  writers 
as  an  Indian,  by  others  as  a  chief,  and  by  still 
another  he  is  said  to  have  been  a  Scotchman  who 
had  lived  for  many  years  among  the  Indians  as 
one  of  themselves.  The  last-named  writer  has 
evidently  confused  this  case  with  another.  Who- 


THE  BATTLE  CF  TALLADEGA.  I/I 

ever  and  whatever  he  was,  this  man  had  escaped 
from  the  fort  by  a  characteristic  Indian  stratagem. 
He  had  covered  himself  with  a  swine's  skin,  and 
wandered  about  like  a  hog  in  search  of  roots.  In 
this  way  he  managed  to  work  his  way  at  night 
through  the  lines  of  the  besiegers,  and  when  once 
beyond  them  he  travelled  as  rapidly  as  possible 
toward  Jackson's  camp,  and  reported  the  state  of 
affairs. 

He  arrived  on  the  ;th  of  November,  and  Jack 
son  at  once  began  casting  about  for  ways  and 
means.  He  scarcely  dared  to  march  with  his 
scanty  supplies  of  food,  and  he  scarcely  dared  to 
leave  his  post  with  an  insufficient  force  to  defend 
it  ;  but  he  must  rescue  that  band  of  friendly  Indi 
ans  at  all  hazards  and  at  any  cost.  Their  hard 
situation  appealed  to  his  pity  ;  the  cruelty  of  their 
foes  appealed  to  the  stronger  stuff  in  his  compo 
sition,  arousing  his  anger  and  his  disposition  to 
v.  reak  a  righteous  vengeance.  There  were  rea 
sons  of  polity,  too,  to  move  him  to  activity  in 
their  behalf.  If  they  should  be  left  to  their  fate, 
the  discouragement  of  the  friendly  Indians  every 
where  would  be  great,  and  might  be  calamitous. 

Jackson  quickly  considered  all  of  these  things 
and  formed  his  resolution.  General  White  was 
at  Turkey  Town  at  the  head  of  about  a  thousand 


172  RED   EAGLE. 

men.  Jackson  resolved  to  order  him  to  march 
immediately  upon  Fort  Strother,  and  to  hold  the 
place  while  the  main  army  should  be  absent. 
There  was  great  danger  in  leaving  the  post  un 
guarded  even  for  a  brief  time,  but  the  occasion 
was  so  pressing  that  the  resolute  commander  de 
termined  to  take  the  risk,  hoping  that  White 
would  arrive  in  time  to  prevent  disaster  at  the  fort. 

Having  sent  his  order  to  White,  he  began  his 
preparations  for  an  immediate  march  with  the 
whole  effective  force  at  the  post. 

Between  midnight  and  one  o'clock  the  next 
morning,  November  8th,  the  column  began  its 
march,  two  thousand  strong,  eight  hundred  being 
mounted  men.  The  task  of  fording  the  Coosa 
occupied  the  hours  until  the  dawn  of  day,  the 
horses  of  the  caval^men  being  used  for  the  trans 
portation  oi  the  infantry  across  the  stream. 

A  march  ot  twenty-lour  miles  consumed  the 
day,  and  not  long  before  dark  General  Jackson 
halted  his  men  within  six  miles  of  the  enemy,  in 
order  that  they  might  rest.  It  was  his  purpose 
to  resume  the  march  after  midnight,  and  attack 
the  enemy  early  in  the  morning. 

Thus  far  all  had  gone  well,  but  here  something 
like  calamity  overtook  the  commander  in  the 
shape  of  extremely  bad  news.  A  courier  arrived 


THE   BATTLE   OF  TALLADEGA.  173 

bringing  a  despatch  from  General  White,  in  which 
that  officer  informed  Jackson  that  he  could  not 
obey  the  order  given  him  to  advance  and  protect 
Fort  Strother,  because  of  positive  orders  from 
his  immediate  superior,  General  Cocke,  com 
manding  him  to  return  and  rejoin  the  East  Ten 
nessee  division  of  the  army. 

The  state  of  facts  which  no\v  confronted  Jack 
son  was  most  appalling.  He  was  a.  long  day's 
march  from  his  fortified  camp,  with  an  impending 
battle  on  his  hands  ;  while  his  camp,  to  which  alone 
he  could  retire  when  his  present  task  should  be 
done,  was  lying  open  and  helpless,  at  the  mercy 
of  any  band  of  Indians  which  might  choose  to 
attack  it  !  Worse  still,  Jackson  knew  that  the 
food  supplies  at  the  camp  were  exhausted,  and  as 
General  White  was  not  to  come  up  with  the  pro 
visions  which  he  had  promised  to  bring  with  him, 
Jackson  saw  that  after  fighting  the  Indians  in  his 
front  he  should  be  obliged  to  march  his  exhausted 
and  hungry  army  back  to  a  post  where  there  was 
nothing  for  them  to  eat.  His  was  a  terrible 
dilemma,  neither  horn  of  which  offered  him  hope. 
He  expressed  his  anger  with  General  Cocke  and 
General  White  in  forcible  terms  ;  but  that  did  him 
no  good,  and  the  offending  officers  were  not  pres 
ent  to  profit  by  the  rebuke. 


174  RED    EAGLE. 

The  Indians  in  his  front  probably  had  some 
provisions,  enough  at  least  for  a  meal,  and  Jackson 
determined  to  secure  these  at  any  rate,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  accomplish  the  purpose  of  his  expe 
dition. 

Putting1  his  army  in  motion  very  early  in  the 
morning  he  approached  the  Talladega  town. 
When  within  half  a  mile  of  the  foe  he  formed  his 
line  of  battle,  dividing  the  cavalry  and  placing 
half  of  it  upon  each  wing.  The  advance  was 
made  slowly  in  the  centre,  so  that  the  wings 
might  gradually  encircle  the  enemy,  a  movement 
much  more  difficult  here  than  it  had  been  at 
Tallushatchee,  because  of  the  greater  numbers  of 
the  enemy,  and  because  of  their  distribution  over 
a  wider  area.  For  these  reasons  the  plan  of  battle 
was  less  perfectly  carried  out  on  this  occasion 
than  on  the  former  one,  but  it  proved  effective 
notwithstanding  the  difficulties  which  prevented 
its  perfect  execution. 

At  the  proper  moment  a  small  body  of  troops 
was  thrown  forward  from  the  centre  to  bring  on 
the  action.  This  force  made  a  spirited  attack, 
firing  several  successive  volleys  into  the  ranks  of 
the  surprised  Indians,  before  a  determined  resist 
ance  was  made  to  their  attack.  Then  the  Creeks 
charged  upon  them  in  force,  and  in  accordance 


THE  BATTLE  OF  TALLADEGA.       1/5 

with  the  instructions  they  had  received,  the  offi 
cers  commanding  the  advance  withdrew  toward 
the  main  line,  falling  back  in  good  order  and  at  a 
moderate  speed.  We  cannot  do  better  than  let 
General  Jackson  tell  the  rest  of  the  story.  In  his 
report  of  the  affair  he  said  : 

'  The  enemy  pursued,  and  the  front  line  was 
now  ordered  to  advance  and  meet  him  ;  but, 
owing  to  some  misunderstanding,  a  few  compa 
nies  of  militia,  who  composed  part  of  it,  com 
menced  a  retreat.  At  this  moment  a  corps  of 
cavalry,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dyer, 
which  I  had  kept  as  a  reserve,  was  ordered  to 
dismount  and  fill  up  the  vacancy  occasioned  by 
the  retreat.  This  order  was  executed  with  a 
great  deal  of  promptitude  and  effect.  The  militia 
seeing  this,  speedily  rallied  ;  and  the  fire  became 
general  along  the  front  line,  and  on  that  part  of 
the  wings  which  was  contiguous.  The  enemy, 
unable  to  stand  it,  began  to  retreat,  but  were  met 
at  every  turn  and  repulsed  in  every  direction. 
The  right  wing  chased  them,  with  a  most  destruc 
tive  fire,  to  the  mountains,  a  distance  of  about 
three  miles,  and,  had  I  not  been  compelled,  by 
tilt  faux  pas  ol  the  militia  in  the  outset  of  the  bat 
tle,  to  dismount  my  reserve,  I  believe  not  a  man 
of  them  would  have  escaped.  The  victory,  how- 


176  RED   EAGLE. 

ever,  was  very  decisive  :  two  hundred  and  ninety 
of  the  enemy  were  left  dead,  and  there  can  be  no 
doubt  but  many  more  were  killed  who  were  not 
found.  Wherever  they  ran  they  left  behind 
traces  of  blood,  and  it  is  believed  that  very  few 
will  return  to  their  villages  in  as  sound  a  condi 
tion  as  they  left  them. 

'  In  the  engagement  we  lost  fifteen  killed  and 
eighty-five  wounded  ;  two  of  them  have  since 
died.  All  the  officers  acted  with  the  utmost 
bravery,  and  so  did  all  the  privates,  except  that 
part  of  the  militia  who  retreated  at  the  commence 
ment  of  the  battle  ;  and  they  hastened  to  atone 
for  their  error.  Taking  the  whole  together,  they 
have  realized  the  high  expectations  I  had  formed 
of  them,  and  have  fairly  entitled  themselves  to  the 
gratitude  of  their  country." 

Jackson's  loss  in  wounded  included  General 
Pillow,  Colonel  Lauderdale,  Major  Boyd,  and 
Lieutenant  Barton  ;  but  of  these  only  Lieutenant 
Barton  died  of  his  wounds.  The  friendly  Indians 
rescued  numbered  one  hundred  and  sixty  men, 
with  their  women  and  children. 

In  writing  that  two  hundred  and  ninety  of  the 
enemy  were  found  dead,  General  Jackson  dealt 
in  round  numbers.  General  Coffee,  who  seemed 
always  to  have  an  exacting  curiosity  in  such  mat- 


THE   BATTLE  OF  TALLADEGA,  177 

ters,  said  in  a  letter  which  was  written  soon  after 
the  battle  :  "  We  have  counted  two  hundred  and 
ninety-nine  Indians  dead  on  the  ground,  and  it  is 
believed  that  many  have  not  been  found  that 
were  killed  dead  ;  but  the  battle-ground  was  so 
very  large  we  had  not  time  to  hunt  them  up.  It 
is  believed  that  very  few  got  clear  without  a 
wound." 

General  Coffee  said  also  in  this  letter,  which 
is  preserved  in  the  archives  of  the  Tennessee  His 
torical  Society,  that  \  the  force  of  the  enemy 
was  a  little  upwards  of  one  thousand  warriors, 
picked  men,  sent  forward  to  destroy  our  army." 
By  dint  of  adding  to  the  numbers  of  Indians 
known  to  have  been  killed  in  the  two  battles  thus 
far  fought  as  many  more  as  he  believed  to  have 
been  killed,  and  assuming  that  the  wounded  equal 
led  the  killed  in  numbers,  General  Coffee  arrived 
at  the  conclusion  that  the  battles  of  Tallushatchee 
and  Talladega  had  left  the  fighting  force  of  the 
Creeks  "  a  thousand  men  weaker"  than  when  the 
campaign  began.  The  calculation  was  scarcely 
a  fair  one,  however  ;  assumptions  respecting  dead 
men  not  found  are  necessarily  unsafe,  and  as  there 
were  no  wounded  men  at  all  left  alive  at  Tallus 
hatchee,  the  calculation  respecting  \vounded 
men  was  of  course  founded  upon  an  erroneous 


1/8  RED   EAGLE. 

assumption,  to  say  nothing  of  the  fact  that  the 
only  men  wounded  and  not  killed  at  Talladega 
were  so  slightly  wound jd  that  they  succeeded  in 
getting  away,   and    hence  could  scarcely  be  ac 
counted  lost  to  the  Creeks. 

It  is  easy  to  pardon  the  enthusiastic  general 
his  slight  overestimate  of  the  damage  inflicted 
upon  the  enemy,  whom  he  was  so  earnestly  anx 
ious  to  defeat.  The  damage  was  great,  certainly, 
and  the  success  thus  far  attained  had  been  secured 
at  small  cost  in  the  matter  of  the  lives  of  the 
white  troops. 

The  object  for  which  Jackson  had  marched 
from  Fort  Strother  to  Talladega  was  fully  accom 
plished.  The  hostile  Creeks  in  that  quarter  had 
been  routed  with  heavy  loss,  and  the  little  band 
of  beleaguered  friendly  Indians  were  released  from 
their  dangerous  and  trying  situation  ;  but  Jack 
son's  army  was  hungry,  and  there  was  a  pros 
pect  that  actual  starvation  would  presently 
overtake  it.  The  little  food  that  was  found  at 
Talladega  was  distributed  among  the  men,  suffic 
ing  to  satisfy  their  immediate  needs. 

The  pressing  necessity  of  the  hour  now  was  to 
return  with  all  possible  haste  to  Fort  Strother, 
which  must  not  be  left  in  its  defenceless  state  a  mo 
ment  longer  than  was  absolutely  necessary  ;  but 


THE   BATTLE   OF   TALLADEGA.  1/9 

an  instantaneous  beginning  of  the  return  march 
was  wholly  out  of  the  question.  The  men  had 
begun  their  toilsome  journey  at  midnight  between 
the  7th  and  8th  of  November,  had  marched  all 
day  on  the  8th,  and,  after  a  few  hours'  rest,  had 
begun  to  march  again  a  little  after  midnight,  to 
go  into  battle  early  on  the  morning  of  the  gth. 
Now  that  the  battle  was  done,  they  were  utterly 
worn  out,  and  must  rest.  Accordingly,  the  army 
went  into  camp  for  the  night,  after  they  had  bui% 
ied  their  dead  comrades.  The  next  day  the 
return  march  was  begun,  and  on  the  nth  of 
November  the  weary  army  arrived  at  their  en 
campment. 

The  fort  was  unharmed,  but  it  was  destitute  of 
provisions,  and  for  a  time  it  was  with  great  diffi 
culty  that  Jackson  prevented  a  mutiny  among  the 
troops,  whose  only  food  was  the  meagre  supply 
gleaned  from  the  surrounding  wilderness. 


CHAPTER    XVIII. 

GENERAL  COCKE'S  CONDUCT  AND  ITS  CON 
SEQUENCES. 

IT  is  necessary  now  to  explain  the  circumstan 
ces  which  left.  Fort  Strother  without  the  garrison 
under  General  White,  which  General  Jackson 
had  provided  for  its  defence  during  his  absence, 
and  to  show  to  what  consequences  this  failure  of 
the  East  Tennessee  commander  to  co-operate  with 
General  Jackson  presently  led.  The  writers  up 
on  these  historical  events  differ  very  widely  in 
their  judgment  of  the  case,  and  most  of  them  se 
verely  censure  General  Cocke,  attributing  his  con 
duct  to  an  unworthy  jealousy.  His  rank  was  the 
same  as  that  of  General  Jackson  ;  but,  as  was  said 
in  a  former  chapter,  Jackson's  commission  was 
the  older  one,  and  hence  if  Cocke  had  joined  his 
"ranking  officer,"  Jackson  would  have  been  in 
command  of  the  whole  force.  It  was  alleged  at 
the  time  and  afterward  that  both  the  East  Ten 
nessee  troops  and  their  commander  were  jealous 
of  Jackson  and  his  army,  and  envious  of  that 
army's  success.  To  this  unworthy  motive  Gene- 


GENERAL  COCKE'S  CONDUCT.       l8l 

ralCocke's  conduct  has  generally  been  attributed. 
Mr.  Pickett,  in  his  History  of  Alabama,  gives  an 
account  of  the  matter,  which  is  substantially  the 
same  as  those  given  by  Drake  in  his  Book  of 
the  Indians,  and  by  most  other  writers. 

In  that  account  he  says,  without  doubt  or  quali 
fication,  that  the  want  of  concert  between  the 
two  divisions  of  the  army  grew  "  out  of  a  jealousy 
of  the  former  [the  East  Tennessee  division],  and 
a  strong  desire  to  share  some  of  the  glory  which 
the  latter  had  already  acquired  in  the  few  battles 
they  had  fought." 

Mr.  Parton,  in  his  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson, 
gives  a  different  version  of  the  affair,  attributing 
General  Cocke's  course  to  his  earnestness  in  the 
cause,  and  his  knowledge  of  certain  facts  which 
were  unknown  to  General  Jackson.  To  that  we 
shall  come  presently  ;  but  while  General  Cocke's 
statement,  upon  which  Mr.  Parton  founds  his  opi 
nion,  is  certainly  entitled  to  consideration,  it  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  General  Cocke  was  under  at 
least  implied  orders  to  join  Jackson— orders  which 
he  was  bound  as  a  soldier  to  obey,  whatever  his 
judgment  may  have  dictated  ;  that  whatever  he 
may  have  known,  there  were  two  or  three  things 
which  he  did  not  know  ;  that  one  of  these  things 
unknown  to  him — namely,  the  departure  of  Jack- 


1 82  RED   EAGLE. 

son  from  Fort  Strother — made  his  obedience  to 
orders  very  necessary  to  the  si  ccessful  execution 
of  Jackson's  plans  ;  and  that  his  want  of  knowl 
edge  of  another  fact  led  to  the  perpetration  of  a 
fearful  outrage — the  driving  of  Indians  who  were 
disposed  to  become  peaceful  into  fierce  hostility, 
and  the  increase  of  the  ferocity  of  the  war.  It 
was  General  Cocke's  business  to  obey  his  orders, 
expressed  or  necessarily  implied.  For  reasons 
which  he  thought  good,  he  neglected  to  do  so, 
and  great  evil  resulted. 

.  On  the  march  southward  Cocke's  army  had 
destroyed  two  or  three  deserted  Indian  villages, 
but  had  had  no  encounter  \vith  the  enemy.  When 
General  Cocke  arrived  within  a  few  days'  march  of 
Fort  Strother  he  detached  General  White  and  sent 
him  to  Turkey  Town.  Thence  White  marched 
to  Tallushatchee,  intending  to  attack  the  place, 
but  he  arrived  there  after  Coffee  had  destroyed 
the  force  gathered  at  that  point,  although  his 
visit  was  on  the  same  day.  As  he  was  marching 
to  join  Jackson,  it  does  not  very  clearly  appear 
why  General  White  did  not  follow  Coffee  to  the 
camp  of  the  main  body.  He  returned  to  Turkey 
Town  instead,  and  from  that  point  reported  to 
Jackson,  as  v/e  have  seen,  just  as  the  army  was 
about  to  march  upon  Talladega.  He  was  at  once 


GENERAL  COCKE's  CONDUCT.       183 

ordered  to  advance  and  replace  Jackson's  force 
at  the  fort,  but  before  he  could  execute  the  order 
he  received  the  instructions  from  General  Cocke 
already  referred  to,  directing  him  to  turn  back 
and  join  the  East  Tennessee  division  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Chattooga  River.  Believing  that  in  a  case 

o  o 

of  conflicting  orders  it  was  his  duty  to  obey  that 
which  came  from  his  immediate  superior,  Gene 
ral  White  obeyed  Cocke  rather  than  Jackson. 

Cocke  had  determined  upon  a  separate  opera 
tion  against  the  Hillabees,  and  sending  White  to 
one  of  the  Hillabee  towns,  that  officer  surprised 
and  destroyed  it  on  the  iSth  of  November,  killing 
sixty  of  the  Hillabees  and  taking  two  hundred  and 
fifty  prisoners,  mostly  women  and  children.  Pick- 
ett  says,  "  The  Hillabees,  it  is  asserted,  made  not 
the  slightest  resistance.  At  all  events,  not  a  drop 
of  Tennessee  blood  was  spilt." 

The  unfortunate  feature  of  this  affair  was  that 
to  the  Indians  it  wore  the  appearance  of  the  basest 
and  crudest  treachery.  These  Hillabees  had 
been  great  sufferers  at  Jackson's  hands  in  the  bat 
tle  of  Talladega,  and  becoming  convinced  by  the 
result  of  that  battle  that  resistance  was  useless, 
they  determined  to  surrender  and  make  peace. 
They  sent  Robert  Grayson,  an  old  Scotchman 
who  had  lived  among  them  for  many  years,  to 


1 84  RED    EAGLE. 

Jackson's  camp  to  sue  for  peace,  proposing1  to 
lay  down  their  arms,  and  to  comply  with  what 
ever  terms  Jackson  might  impose  upon  them.  As 
the  object  of  the  war  was  not  to  kill  the  Creeks 
in  wantonness,  but  to  secure  peace  and  good  con 
duct  at  their  hands,  Jackson  properly  regarded 
the  proposed  surrender  of  the  Hillabee  tribe  as 
the  richest  fruit  of  the  campaign.  Accordingly, 
he  sent  Grayson  back  to  them  with  a  lecture,  and 
an  acceptance  of  their  capitulation.  He  said  to 
them  :  "  Upon  those  who  are  disposed  to  become 
friendly,  I  neither  wish  nor  intend  to  make  war  ; 
but  they  must  afford  evidences  of  the  sincerity  of 
their  professions.  The  prisoners  and  property 
they  have  taken  from  us  and  the  friendly  Creeks 
must  be  restored.  The  instigators  of  the  war  and 
the  murderers  of  our  citizens  must  be  surren 
dered." 

While  Jackson  was  yet  rejoicing  in  the  belief 
that  his  hard-fought  battle  at  Talladega  and  the 
hardships  endured  upon  that  expedition  had  ac 
complished  so  much  more  than  the  mere  defeat 
of  the  enemy  there,  his  work  was  utterly  undone 
by  the  ill-timed  and  unfortunate  expedition  of 
White  against  the  Hillabees.  These  people  knew 
nothing  of  the  divided  councils  of  the  Tennessee 
army,  and  when  White  came  down  upon  one  of 


GENERAL  COCKE'S  CONDUCT.        185 

their  towns,  while  their  messenger  was  still  ab 
sent  upon  his  errand  of  peace,  they  naturally  sup 
posed  that  their  assailants  were  Jackson's  men, 
and  that  he  had  sent  them  as  his  relentless  mes 
sengers  to  answer  the  Hillabee  prayer  for  peace 
with  the  merciless  stroke  of  the  sword.  Con 
vinced  that  Jackson  was  implacable,  and  that  no 
hope  remained  to  them,  the  Hillabees  fled  from 
all  their  towns  and  joined  the  hostile  forces, 
wherever  bodies  of  them  could  be  found.  Drake 
says,  in  the  Book  of  the  Indians  : 

'  The  Indians  thought  they  had  been  attacked 
by  General  Jackson's  army,  and  that  therefore 
they  were  now  to  expect  nothing  but  extermina 
tion  ;  and  this  was  thought  to  be  the  reason  why 
they  fought  with  such  desperation  afterwards. 
And  truly  they  had  reason  for  their  fears  ;  they 
knew  none  but  Jackson,  and  supposed  now  that 
nothing  short  of  their  total  destruction  would  sat 
isfy  him,  as  their  conduct  exemplified  on  every 
occasion.  They  knew  they  had  asked  peace  on 
any  terms,  and  their  immediate  answer  was  the 
sword  and  bayonet. ' ' 

In  acting  as  he  did,  without  first  consulting  with 
General  Jackson  and  learning  both  the  exact  situ 
ation  of  affairs  and  the  nature  of  his  superior  offi 
cer's  purposes,  General  Cocke  did  wrong  in  a 


186  RED    EAGLE. 

military  sense.  Of  this  there  seems  to  be  no 
room  whatever  for  doubt  or  question,  and  as 
his  wrong-doing  led  to  disastrous  results,  it  was 
altogether  natural  that  both  General  Jackson 
and  the  historians  should  severely  censure  the 
offending  officer,  as  they  did  ;  General  Jackson 
being  violently  exasperated,  as  well  he  might  be, 
when  he  learned  the  full  results  of  the  blunder. 

In  saying  as  we  do,  that  General  Cocke  was 
clearly  culpable  for  acting  as  he  did,  we  do  not  ne 
cessarily  imply  that  his  course  was  dictated  by  the 
jealousy  and  envy  to  which  it  has  been  attributed, 
or  indeed  by  unworthy  motives  of  any  kind. 
His  motives  may,  perhaps,  have  been  perfectly 
unselfish  ;  his  conduct  the  result  merely  of  bad 
judgment,  or  of  inaccurate  notions  of  military 
duty  ;  but  to  establish  these  facts  is  only  to  palli 
ate,  not  to  excuse  his  offence.  It  is  unjust,  how 
ever,  in  any  discussion  of  these  matters,  to  neglect 
the  defence  which  General  Cocke  made  of  his 
conduct. 

That  defence  was  made  in  the  autumn  of  the 
year  1852,  in  a  letter  published  in  the  National 
Intelligencer,  and  was  prompted  by  the  publication 
of  certain  criticisms  upon  General  Cocke 's  con 
duct.  In  the  letter  he  says  : 

"  About  the  ist  of  October  I  rendezvoused  my 


GENERAL  COCKE'S   CONDUCT.  1 87 

troops  at  Knoxville,  and  they  mustered  into  ser 
vice  ;  and  on  the  twelfth  day  after,  I  took  up  the 
line  of  march.  I  encamped  with  my  command 
on  the  banks  of  the  Coosa,  which  was  the  dividing 
line  between  the  Cherokee  and  Creek  Indians, 
where  I  was  compelled  to  halt  for  want  of  provi 
sions  for  my  own  command  ;  and  at  no  time  after  I 
left  Knoxville  had  I  more  than  five  days'  rations 
for  my  army.  At  this  point  I  waited  for  supplies 
from  the  contractor,  but  owing  to  the  low  water 
they  did  not  arrive,  and  I  was  compelled  to  pro 
cure  supplies  from  the  Cherokees  as  best  I  could. 
General  White  joined  me  with  his  brigade  in  a 
starving  condition  upon  the  second  day  after  my 
arrival  on  the  Coosa." 

Mr.  Parton  offers  the  following  comment  upon 
this  part  of  the  letter  and  upon  the  situation  : 

"  It  thus  appears  that  while  General  Jackson 
was  anxiously  looking  for  supplies  from  General 
Cocke,  General  Cocke  himself  was  as  destitute  as 
General  Jackson.  A  junction  of  the  two  armies 
would  have  had  the  sole  effect  of  doubling  Jack 
son's  embarrassments,  inasmuch  as  he  would  have 
had  five  thousand  men  to  feed  in  the  wilderness 
instead  of  twenty-five  hundred,  and  would  have 
required  twenty  wagon-loads  of  provisions  daily 
instead  of  ten.  General  Cocke  knew  this  ;  knew 


1 88  RED   EAGLE. 

that  Jackson's  anxiety  for  a  junction  had  arisen 
from  an  expectation  that  the  East  Tennesseeans 
would  bring  supplies  with  them  ;  did  not  know 
that  Jackson's  dash  at  Talladega  had  left  Fort 
Strother  unprotected — did  not  know  any  thing 
about  the  Hillabees'  suing  for  peace,  and  Jack 
son's  favorable  reply  to  them." 

This,  we  say,  is  at  most  only  a  palliation  of  the 
offence.  General  Cocke  did  not  know,  as  Mr.  Par- 
ton  says,  that  Jackson's  anxiety  for  a  union  of  the 
two  armies  was  clue  to  his  expectation  that  the 
East  Tennesseeans  would  bring  supplies  with 
them,  because  that  was  not  the  fact.  He  did  expect 
them  to  bring  provisions,  but  his  anxiety  for  a 
junction  was  not  altogether  on  that  account.  He 
wanted  White's  men  for  a  garrison  for  Fort  Stro 
ther,  and  hence  General  Cocke  only  believed  that 
which  Mr.  Parton  assumes  that  he  knew.  Again, 
if  the  junction  had  been  made,  and  the  doubling 
of  the  number  of  men  had  embarrassed  Jackson, 
it  would  have  been  easy  for  him  to  separate  the 
forces  again.  Moreover,  after  the  Hillabee  expe 
dition  was  ended,  General  Cocke  was  ready  and 
willing  to  join  Jackson,  while  the  scarcity  of  pro 
visions  remained  ;  if  his  reason  for  not  forming 
the  junction  was  good  in  the  one  case,  it  was  good 
also  in  the  other.  Indeed,  General  Cocke  has 


GENERAL  COCKE'S  CONDUCT.       189 

himself  contradicted  the  plea  which  Mr.  Parton 
makes  in  his  behalf.  While  General  White  was 
still  absent  on  the  Hillabee  expedition.  General 
Cocke  wrote  a  letter  to  Jackson,  in  which  he  said  : 

' '  I  entertain  the  opinion  that  to  make  the  pres 
ent  campaign  as  successful  as  it  ought  to  be,  it  is 
essential  that  the  whole  force  from  Tennessee 
should  act  in  concert.  I  have  despatched  all  my 
mounted  men,  whose  horses  were  fit  for  duty,  on 
the  Hillabee  towns,  to  destroy  them.  I  expect 
their  return  in  a  few  days.  I  send  the  bearer  to 
you  for  the  sake  of  intelligence  as  to  your  intended 
operations,  and  for  the  sake  of  assuring  you  that 
I  will  most  heartily  agree  to  any  plan  that  will  be 
productive  of  the  most  good." 

From  the  fact  that  he  thus  arranged  to  put  him 
self  within  the  range  of  Jackson's  authority  as 
soon  as  his  Hillabee  campaign  should  be  ended, 
the  inference  is  inevitable  that  General  Cocke  ne 
glected  to  make  the  contemplated  earlier  junction 
in  order  that  he  might  carry  out  this  little  scheme 
of  his  own.  Inasmuch  as  a  court-martial,  com 
posed  of  officers  who,  General  Cocke  says,  were 
his  bitterest  enemies  and  Jackson's  closest  friends, 
fully  acquitted  the  accused  officer  of  guilt,  it  is 
only  fair  to  the  memory  ot  a.  brave  and  conscien 
tious  soldier  to  believe  that,  he  acted  for  the  good 


RED   EAGLE. 


of  the  cause  ;  that  his  anxiety  to  deal  a  blow  at  the 
Hillabees  was  prompted  by  a  desire  to  serve  the 
ends  of  the  campaign,  not  by  unworthy  jealousy 
of  Jackson  ;  but  beyond  this  it  does  not  appear  to 
be  possible  to  go.  We  may  properly  acquit  Gen 
eral  Cocke  of  petty  envy,  and  of  conscious  insub 
ordination,  but  it  is  impossible  not  to  see  that 
nis  course  was  ill-judged  as  well  as  calamitous  in 
its  results,  and  it  is  impossible  also  to  blame  Jack 
son  for  his  displeasure  with  his  subordinate.  The 
most  that  General  Cocke  establishes  in  his  de 
fence,  which  is  elaborate,  is  that  he  acted  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  unanimous  opinion  of  his  field 
officers  ;  that  he  conscientiously  believed  that  his 
course  was  the  best  one  to  be  pursued  in  the  cir 
cumstances,  and  that  it  was  dictated  solely  by  his 
earnest  desire  to  serve  the  cause.  The  most  that 
is  proved  against  him  appears  to  be,  that  he  acted 
with  smaller  regard  to  strict  military  rules  than 
an  officer  of  his  rank  should  have  done.  He  was 
guilty  of  a  blunder,  not  of  a  crime. 


CHAPTER    XIX. 

THE   CANOE   FIGHT. 

WITH  the  affairs  already  described,  Jackson's 
campaign  came  to  a  halt  by  reason  of  his  want  of 
supplies,  and  on  account  of  mutinous  conduct 
upon  the  part  of  his  men.  For  many  weeks  the 
Tennessee  army  did  nothing,  but  remained  at  Fort 
Strother,  while  the  war  went  on  in  other  parts 
of  the  field.  For  the  present,  therefore,  we  leave 
Jackson,  to  follow  the  course  of  affairs  elsewhere. 

The  autumn  having  brought  with  it  the  neces 
sity  of  gathering  what  remained  of  the  crops  in 
that  part  of  the  country  which  lies  on  the  Ala 
bama  and  Tombigbee  rivers,  the  settlers  there 
did  what  they  could  to  clear  the  country  of  prowl 
ing  bands  of  Indians.  They  sent  out  bodies  of 
armed  men  in  different  directions,  and  under 
protection  of  such  forces  as  they  could  muster, 
began  gathering  the  ripened  corn. 

The  danger  of  famine,  if  the  corn  should  be  al 
lowed  to  perish  in  the  fields,  seems  also  to  have 
aroused  General  Flournoy  from  his  dream  of  strict 
adherence  to  law  and  treatv  in  his  treatment  of 


IQ2  RED   EAGLE. 

the  Creeks.  His  predecessor,  General  Floyd, 
had  refused,  it  will  be  remembered,  to  permit 
General  Claiborne  to  invade  the  Creek  Nation 
early  in  the  war,  when  that  officer  confidently 
believed  that  he  could  speedily  conquer  a  peace 
by  pursuing  that  course.  Flournoy  now  re 
ceded  from  the  position  then  taken,  so  far  at 
least  as  to  order  Claiborne  to  advance  with  his 
army  and  protect  the  citizens  while  they  should 
gather  their  crops.  He  still  ordered  no  resolute 
invasion  of  the  Creek  territory,  for  the  purpose 
of  transferring  the  seat  of  war  to  the  soil  of  the 
enemy,  and  putting  an  end  to  the  strife  ;  but  he 
ordered  Claiborne  to  drive  the  Indians  from  tho 
frontier,  and  even  to  follow  them  so  far  as  the 
towns  which  lay  near  the  border,  instructing  him 
to  "kill,  burn,  and  destroy  all  their  negroes, 
horses,  cattle,  and  other  property,  that  cannot 
conveniently  be  brought  to  the  depots." 

General  Flournoy,  like  General  Floyd,  appears 
to  have  been  somewhat  too  highly  civilized  for  the 
business  in  which  he  was  engaged.  Knowing,  as  he 
did,  that  Claiborne  was  fighting  savages  who  had 
violated  every  usage  and  principle  of  civilized  war 
fare,  who  were  prowling  about  in  the  white  settle 
ments  murdering  every  white  man,  woman,  and 
child  whom  they  could  find,  and  who  had  com- 


THE   CANOE   FIGHT.  IQ3 

mitted  the  most  horrible  wholesale  butchery  at 
Fort  Mims  ;  knowing  all  this,  and  knowing  too  that 
an  army  from  Tennessee  was  already  invading  t'/ie 
Creek  country  from  the  'north,  General  Flcrarnoy 
appears  to  have  given  Claiborne  this  half-hearted 
and  closely -limited  permission  to  fight  the  Creeks 
upon  their  own  terms  and  their  o\^i  soil  with  great 
reluctance  and  with  apologetic  misgivings.  He 
set  forth  his  conviction  that  even  the  little  which 
he  was  now  permitting  Claiborne  to  do  toward 
making  the  war  real  on  the  white  side  was  not 
in  accordance  with  the  usages  of  civilized  nations 
at  war  ;  but  excused  himself  for  his  departure  from 
those  usages  by  citing  the  conduct  of  the  enemy 
in  justification  of  it.  A  stronger  man  than  Gene 
ral  Flournoy  would  have  seen  that  the  Creeks 
had  turned  complete  savages,  that  they  had  begun 
a  savage  warfare  for  the  extermination  of  the 
whites,  and  that  such  a  war  could  be  brought  to 
an  end  only  by  the  destruction  of  the  white 
people  whom  he  was  set  to  protect,  or  by  the 
prompt,  resolute,  and  complete  subjugation  of 
the  Creeks.  Seeing  this,  such  an  officer  would 
have  seen  that  the  Creeks  could  be  conquered 
only  by  the  invasion  of  their  territory  with  fire 
and  sword,  and  with  no  respect  whatever  for 
those  rights  which  were  theirs  in  peace,  but  which 


IQ4  RED    EAGLE. 

had  been  forfeited  in  the  war.  It  seems  incredi 
ble  that  General  Flournoy,  in  such  circumstances 
and  with  such  an  enemy  to  contend  with,  should 
have  muddled  his  head  and  embarrassed  his  army 
with  nice  questions  of  the  rights,  duties,  and  us 
ages  of  civilized  warfare.  This  was  so  clearly  not 
a  civilized,  but  a^i  especially  savage  war,  that  his 
hesitation,  and  the  misgivings  upon  Avhich  that 
hesitation  was  founded,  are  wholly  inexplicable. 

Claiborne  was  quick  to  use  the  small  liberty 
given  him  to  fight  the  Creeks,  while  the  settlers, 
from  their  positions  in  the  stockade  forts,  were 
already  making  frequent  expeditions  against  vul 
nerable  points. 

Early  in  October,  a  body  of  twenty-five  men, 
under  Colonel  William  McGrew,  went  in  pursuit 
of  an  Indian  force,  and  attacked  them  resolutely 
on  a  little  stream  called  Barshi  Creek.  The  In 
dians  were  in  considerable  force,  and  despite  the 
courage  and  determination  of  the  whites  the 
Creeks  got  the  best  of  the  affair,  killing  Colonel 
McGrew  and  three  of  his  men,  and  putting  the 
rest  of  the  force  to  flight. 

Much  better  success  attended  another  expedi 
tion,  which  was  undertaken  about  this  time,  and 
which  resulted  in  one  of  the  most  remarkable  in 
cidents  of  the  war,  a  sort  of  naval  battle  on  a 


THE  CANOE  FIGHT.  19$ 

very  small  scale,  but  one  that  was  contested  as 
heroically  as  the  battle  of  the  Nile  itself.  This 
was  Captain  Sam  Dale's  celebrated  canoe  fight, 
of  which  a  wrriter  has  said  : 

'  There  has  seldom  occurred  in  border  war 
fare  a  more  romantic  incident.  .  .  .  History 
has  almost  overlooked  it,  as  too  minute  in  its  de 
tails  for  her  stately  philosophy.  Yet  for  singu 
larity  of  event,  novelty  of  position,  boldness  of 
design,  and  effective  personal  fortitude  and  prow 
ess,  it  is  unsurpassed,  if  equalled,  by  any  thing  in 
backwoods  chronicles,  however  replete  these  may 
be  with  the  adventures  of  pioneers,  the  sufferings 
of  settlers,  and  the  achievements  of  that  class  who 
seem  almost  to  have  combined  the  life  and  man 
ners  of  the  freebooter  with  the  better  virtues  of 
social  man." 

When  Colonel  McGrew's  men  returned  after 
tluir  unsuccessful  conflict  with  the  Creeks,  the 
n  j\vs  they  brought  greatly  incensed  the  people  of 
Fort  Madison,  whose  friends  had  fallen  in  that 
unlucky  action.  Believing  that  the  main  body  of 
the  Creeks  was  now  south  of  the  Alabama  River, 
and  fearing  that  they  would  destroy  the  buildings 
and  the  crops  there,  Captain  Sam  Dale,  who  had 
now  nearly  recovered  from  his  severe  wound  re 
ceived  at  the  battle  of  Burnt  Corn,  organized  an 


196  RED   EAGLE. 

expedition  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  the  lower 
country,  if  possible,  of  the  hostile  bands.  The 
force  which  volunteered  for  this  service  consisted 
of  seventy-two  men.  Thirty  of  them  constituted 
Captain  Richard  Jones's  company  of  Mississippi 
yauger  men.  The  remainder  were  men  of  the 
neighborhood,  who  volunteered  for  the  expedi 
tion. 

Amon£    these  volunteers    were    three    whose 

o 

participation  in  the  canoe  fight  makes  it  neces 
sary  to  introduce  them  particularly  to  the  reader. 
One  of  them  was  a  negro,  whose  name,  Csesar, 
together  with  his  good  and  gallant  conduct  on 
this  occasion,  are  all  that  history  has  preserved 
with  respect  to  him.  Another  was  young  Jere 
miah  Austill,  the  youth  who  carried  despatches, 
as  already  related,  between  Colonel  Carson  and 
General  Claiborne,  when  that  service  was  most 
dangerous,  The  third  was  James  Smith.  We 
may  best  tell  what  is  known  of  young  Smith  in 
the  words  of  Mr.  A.  B.  Meek,  wiiose  volume  of 
sketches,  from  which  we  shall  quote  here,  is  un 
fortunately  out  of  print.  Mr.  Meek  writes  thus  : 
14  In  Dale's  command  was  a  private  soldier  who 
already  had  a  high  reputation  as  an  expert,  dar 
ing  and  powerful  Indian  fighter.  Born  in  Geor 
gia  in  1787,  this  scion  of  the  universal  Smith 


•  THE   CANOE   FIGHT.  197 

family  was  now  a  very  stout,  finely-proportioned 
man,  five  feet  eight  inches  high,  weighing  one 
hundred  and  sixty  pounds.  Residing  near  Fort 
Madison,  he  took  refuge  there  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  war.  His  fearless  and  adventurous  character 
may  be  indicated  by  an  incident.  One  day  he 
determined  to  visit  his  farm,  about  eight  miles 
distant,  to  see  what  injury  the  Indians  had  done. 
Proceeding  cautiously,  he  came  to  a  house  in 
which  he  heard  a  noise,  and,  stealing  up  to  the 
door,  he  found  two  Indians  engaged  in  bundling 
up  tools  and  other  articles  to  carry  them  off.  Lev 
elling  his  gun  at  them  he  made  them  come  out  of 
the  house  and  march  before  him  toward  the  fort. 
In  a  thicket  of  woods  the  Indians  suddenly  sepa 
rated,  one  on  each  hand,  and  ran.  Smith  fired  at 
one  of  them  and  killed  him,  and,  dropping  his 
rifle,  pursued  the  other,  and,  catching  him, 
knocked  him  down  with  a  light- wood  *  knot  and 
beat  out  his  brains.  .  .  .  This,  and  similar 
deeds  of  daring  and  prowess,  gave  to  James 
Smith  a  high  position  acnong  his  frontier  friends 
and  neighbors." 

Mr.  Meek  writes  more  fully  of  young  Austill. 

"  Light- wood  "  is  a  term  used  in  the  South  to  signify  richly 
resinous  pine,  of  the  kind  sometimes  called  "  pitch-pine"  in  other 
parts  of  the  country. 


EAGLE, 

He  describes  him  as  a  youth  nineteen  years  of 
age,  dark,  tall,  sinewy,  and  full  of  youthful  dar 
ing.  The  stories  of  his  courageous  performances 
were  many,  and  during  the  war  he  won  the  spec 
ial  commendation  of  his  superiors  on  many  occa 
sions  for  his  bravery  and  his  devotion  to  duty. 

Dale  marched  from  Fort  Madison  on  the  nth 
of  November,  with  Tandy  Walker,  a  noted  fron 
tiersman,  for  his  guide.  Marching  to  the  south 
east,  the  column  crossed  the  Alabama  River  at  a 
point  about  thirty  miles  above  Mims's  ferry,  and 
about  twenty  miles  below  the  site  of  the  present 
town  of  Claiborne. 

Dale  was  thoroughly  well  acquainted  with  the 
habits  of  the  Indians,  among  whom  indeed  he  had 
lived  frequently  for  long  periods.  He  was  there 
fore  keenly  alive  to  the  necessity  of  unremitting 
vigilance,  and,  determined  to  suffer  no  surprise, 
he  refused  to  permit  any  of  his  men  to  sleep  dur 
ing  the  night  after  his  passage  to  the  south-east 
bank  of  the  river.  During  the  next  day  he  ad 
vanced  up  the  river  very  cautiously,  sending  Au- 
still,  with  six  men,  in  two  canoes  which  he  had 
found,  while  the  rest  of  the  force  marched  through 
the  woods  on  the  bank. 

At  a  place  called  Peggy  Bailey's  bluff  the  first 
signs  of  the  presence  of  Indians  were  discovered. 


THE   CANOE   FIGHT.  IQ9 

Following  the  trail  well  in  advance  of  his  men, 
Dale  discovered  ten  Indians  at  breakfast.  The 
first  intimation  these  Indians  had  of  the  presence 
of  white  men  on  that  side  of  the  river  came  to 
them  in  the  shape  of  a  bullet  from  Dale's  rifle, 
which  killed  one  of  the  party,  and  caused  the  rest 
of  them  to  abandon  their  provision  pack,  and 
flee  precipitately  through  the  woods. 

Securing  the'  abandoned  provisions,  Dale 
marched  on  a  mile  or  two,  but  finding  no  further 
traces  of  Indians,  he  determined  to  recross  the 
river  and  scour  the  country  on  the  other  side. 

The  work  of  crossing  was  necessarily  slow. 
Only  two  canoes  were  to  be  had,  and  the  river 
was  nearly  a  fourth  of  a  mile  wide,  but  little  by 
little  the  force  was  paddled  across,  until  only 
about  a  dozen  of  the  men  remained  with  Dale  on 
the  eastern  bank.  These  men  were  at  breakfast 
when  suddenly  they  were  startled  by  a  volley 
from  the  rifles  of  an  Indian  force.  This  force,  as 
was  afterward  learned,  was  the  advance  party  ol 
about  three  hundred  warriors.  Dale  and  his 
handful  of  men  protected  themselves  as  well  as 
they  could  among  the  trees,  and  returned  the  fire. 
Had  the  savages  known  the  weakness  of  their 
force,  they  might  easily  have  destroyed  the  little 
party  by  making  a  determined  dash  ;  but  Dale  and 


200  RED   EAGLE. 

his  men  were  so  well  concealed  among  the  trees 
and  in  the  bushes,  that  their  enemies,  in  ignorance 
of  their  numbers,  did  not  dare  charge  them.  The 
nature  ol  the  ground  served  also  to  favor  Dale. 
The  river  here  had  what  is  called  a  double  bank 
—that  is  to  say,  there  were  two  plateaus,  one 
above  the  other,  each  breaking  rather  suddenly 
at  its  edge.  These  banks,  covered  with  dense 
undergrowth,  served  the  purpose  of  rude  natural 
breastworks. 

The  first  assault  was  made  by  about  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  of  the  savages,  who  were  speedily 
joined  by  others,  and  Dale  quickly  saw  that  his 
position  was  an  extremely  critical  one.  The  In 
dians  must  soon  discover  from  the  infrequency  of 
the  fire  from  the  bank  that  the  force  there  was 
small,  and  it  was  certain  that  they  would  make  a 
charge  as  soon  as  this  should  be  discovered — a 
charge  which  the  dozen  men  there  could  not 
possibly  withstand.  Dale's  first  thought  was  of 
escape  across  the  river  to  the  main  body  of  his 
little  company  ;  but  this  was  clearly  out  of  the 
question.  There  was  but  one  canoe  on  his  side 
of  the  river,  so  that  to  cross  at  all  the  little  com 
pany  on  the  bank  must  separate,  half  of  it  going 
over  at  one  trip  and  half  at  another.  If  half  of 
them  should  embark,  the  Indians,  seeing  the 


THE    CANOE    FIGHT.  201 

canoe  in  the  river  with  its  cargo  of  fugitives 
would  know  at  once  that  the  band  on  the  bank 
was  unable  to  resist  them,  and  hence  would  de 
stroy  the  men  left  behind  before  the  canoe  could 
return  to  bring  them  away. 

Dale  called  to  his  men  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river  to  recross  and  render  him  assistance,  but 
they  seemed  to  be  for  the  time  fairly  panic- 
stricken,  so  that  none  of  them  moved  to  answer 
the  call.  After  a  time  their  courage  appeared 
to  return,  and  eight  of  them  manned  a  canoe  and 
began  the  passage.  When  the  man  who  led  this 
detachment  saw  the  great  superiority  of  the  In 
dian  force,  he  became  panic-stricken  again  and 
ordered  a  retreat,  so  that  even  this  little  attempt 
to  reinforce  Dale's  tremendously  overmatched 
company  failed  to  bring  relief. 

Meantime  a  new  danger  appeared,  coming  this 
time  upon  the  rear.  A  large  canoe  holding 
eleven  Indian  warriors  shot  out  from  the  bank  a 
little  way  up  the  river  and  paddled  down  to 
Dale's  position.  Here  an  attempt  was  made  to 
land.  Should  this  be  accomplished,  the  fight 
must  end  at  once  in  the  destruction  of  the  whole 
detachment  on  the  river  bank.  To  ward  off  this 
danger  Dale  was  compelled  to  fight  both  ways— 
to  the  rear  and  to  the  front.  He  himself,  with  all 


202  RED  EAGLE, 

of  his  men  but  three,  kept  up  not  a  brisk,  but  a 
very  destructive,  fire  in  front,  picking  their  men 
and  shooting  with  all  the  precision  of  skilled 
marksmen  ;  while  Smith,  Austill,  and  one  other 
man  devoted  their  attention  to  the  warriors  in 
the  canoe,  preventing  them  from  approaching  the 
shore. 

Being  kept  thus  at  a  distance,  two  of  the  most 
daring  of  the  Indians  in  the  canoe  resolved  to  risk 
an  attempt  to  swim  ashore.  Leaping  overboard 
only  their  heads  were  exposed,  mi  course  ;  but 
Smit%h  succeeded  in  sending  a  bullet  into  even 
that  small  target,  killing  one  of  the  swimmers  in 
stantly.  The  other  reached  the  bank,  where  he 
was  met  by  Austill,  who  unluckily  tripped  and 
fell  into  the  water,  and  before  he  could  regain 
his  footing  the  savage  had  escaped. 

His  escape  brought  matters  to  a  head.  Dale 
knew  that  this  Indian  had  seen  how  small  his 
force  was,  and  that  he  would  report  its  weakness, 
thereby  making  an  immediate  charge  certain. 
He  therefore  resolved  upon  a  desperate  attempt. 
He  called  to  his  men,  declaring  his  purpose  to 
man  the  little  canoe  that  remained  with  him,  and 
attack  the  Indian  canoe  party.  For  this  perilous 
service  he  asked  who  would  volunteer.  Smith, 
Austill,  and  the  negro  man  Csesar  at  once  offered 


THE    CANOE    FIGHT.  203 

themselves  ;  and  with  this  little  force  Dale  speed 
ily  put  his  plan  into  execution.  Caesar  took  the 
stern  of  the  canoe  as  steersman,  and  the  three 
white  men  grasped  their  paddles. 

The  Indians  had  fired  all  their  ammunition 
away,  else  it  would  have  gone  hard  with  Dale 
when  his  own  and  his  comrades'  guns  failed  to 
fire  as  they  did,  because  the  powder  in  their  pans 
had  become  wet.  When  this  fact  was  discovered 
the  two  canoes  were  near  each  other,  and  Dale 
had  no  thought  of  flinching  from  the  hand-to- 
hand  conflict  which  must  ensue  between  himself 
and  his  three  companions  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  nine  remaining  Indians  on  the  other.  He 
ordered  Caesar  to  bring  the  canoe  alongside  the 
enemy's  boat,  and  to  hold  it  firmly  there.  As  this 
was  done  the  Indians  leaped  to  their  feet,  with 
their  war-clubs  and  knives,  ready  for  the  combat. 
When  the  boats  touched,  Dale  instantly  leaped 
into  that  of  his  enemy,  for  the  double  purpose  of 
crowding  the  enemy  close  together  and  giving 
his  own  companions  abundant  room  in  which  to 
swing  their  clubbed  guns.  It  was  a  mere  question 
of  brute  strength  between  men  determined  to  club 
each  other  to  death.  Austill  was  knocked  down 
with  a  war-club  once,  but  recovered  himself. 
Dale  advanced  in  the  boat,  knocking  over  one 


2O4  RED   EAGLE. 

Indian  after  another  with  his  rapid  blows.  A 
few  minutes  sufficed  to  bring  the  action  to  a  close. 

It  is  said  that  the  last  of  the  Indians  was  a 
young  warrior  with  whom  Dale  had  lived  and 
hunted  as  a  friend  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
This  young  Indian  and  his  former  friend  now 
confronted  each  other  in  the  boat.  Dale  recog 
nized  the  man  with  whom  he  had  sat  at  the  camp- 
fire  and  passed  long  days  in  the  hunt  ;  he  hesi 
tated,  and  was  about  to  lower  his  raised  weapon 
when  the  young  savage,  calling  him  by  the  name 
he  had  borne  among  the  Indians,  which  meant 
"  Big  Sam,"  cried,  "  Sam  Thlucco,  you  are  a 
man,  I  am  another — now  for  it  !"  He  spoke  in 
the  Muscogee  tongue,  with  which  Dale  was  fa 
miliar,  and  as  he  spoke  he  attempted  to  grapple 
with  Dale,  but  the  active  white  man  was  too  quick 
of  movement  for  him.  Stepping  back  suddenly, 
he  brained  his  Indian  antagonist  with  a  single 
blow,  and  the  canoe-fight  was  ended.  The  nine 
Indians  were  corpses,  and  Dale  had  not  lost  a 
single  man,  although  Austill  was  severely 
wounded  in  the  head. 

There  was  perilous  work  yet  to  do,  however. 
The  brave  men  in  the  boat  had  no  thought  ot 
abandoning  their  friends  on  the  bank.  Their  own 
guns  were  broken,  and  they  were  under  a  severo 


THE    CANOE    FIGHT.  CO", 

fire  from  the  savages  on  shore,  but  in  spite  of 
this  they  cleared  the  large  canoe  by  throwing 
the  dead  Indians  overboard,  and,  with  the  two 
boats,  paddled  back  to  the  bank  under  a  galling 
fire,  and  brought  off  the  remainder  of  the  party 
in  safety.  If  they  had  not  conquered,  they  had 
at  least  baffled  the  Indians,  inflicting  considerable 
loss  upon  them  without  suffering  any  loss  in  their 
turn.  That  night  the  expedition  returned  to  Fort 
Madison. 

Dale  was  so  typical  a  frontiersman,  so  perfect  a 
model  of  the  daring  and  wily  warrior  of  the  bor 
der,  that  as  long  as  he  lived  he  was  a  man  about 
whom  the  interest  of  curiosity  hung.  A  writer 
who  knew  him  well  wrote  of  him  thus  * 

"  In  person  General  Dale  was  tall,  erect,  raw- 
boned,  and  muscular.  In  many  respects,  physical 
and  moral,  he  resembled  his  antagonists  of  the 
woods.  He  had  the  square  forehead,  the  high 
cheek-bones,  the  compressed  lips,  and  in  fact  the 
physiognomy  of  an  Indian,  relieved,  however, 
by  a  firm,  benevolent,  Saxon  eye.  Like  the  red 
man,  too,  his  foot  fell  lightly  upon  the  ground 
and  turned  neither  to  the  right  nor  left.  He  was 
habitually  taciturn  ;  his  face  grave ;  he  spoke 
slowly  and  in  low  tones,  and  he  seldom  laughed. 
I  observed  of  him  what  I  have  often  noted  as 


206  RED    EAGLE. 

peculiar  to  border  men  of  high  attributes  —  he 
entertained  the  strongest  attachment  for  the  In 
dians,  extolled  their  courage,  their  love  of  coun 
try,  and  many  of  their  domestic  qualities  ;  and  I 
have  often  seen  the  wretched  remnant  of  the 
Choctaws  camped  around  his  plantation  and  sub 
sisting  on  his  crops.  In  peace  they  felt  for  him 
the  strongest  veneration  ;  he  had  been  the  friend 
both  of  Tecumseh  and  Weatherford  ;  and  in  war 
the  name  of  '  Big  Sam  '  fell  on  the  ear  of  the 
Seminole  like  that  of  Marius  on  the  hordes  of  the 
Cimbri."  * 

*  From  a  sketch  by  General  John  H.  F.  Claiborne,  published 
in  the  Natchez  (Miss.)  Free-Trader,  on  the  occasion  of  Dale's 
death  in  the  year  1841. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  GEORGIANS— THE 
BATTLE  OF  AUTOSSE. 

WHEN  the  call  was  made  by  General  Claiborne 
upon  Tennessee  for  assistance,  a  similarly  earnest 
appeal  was  sent  to  Georgia,  and  the  response 
from  that  State  was  equally  prompt.  The  troops 
raised  .there  were  under  command  of  General 
Floyd,  who  had  been  superseded  in  the  command 
of  the  Department  of  the  South-west  by  General 
Flournoy  some  months  earlier.  General  Floyd 
was  an  energetic  soldier,  and  he  quickly  found 
work  to  do. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  as  soon  as  Red 
Eagle  learned  that  he  would  not  be  permitted  to 
attack  and  burn  Mobile  he  turned  his  attention 
to  the  country  north  and  east  of  the  Creek  Na 
tion,  and  sent  two  bodies  of  his  warriors  to  ha 
rass  the  borders,  one  force  threatening  Tennes 
see  and  the  other  seeking  to  find  some  vulner 
able  point  on  the  Georgia  frontier.  Jackson's 
advance  with  an  overwhelming  force  and  his  vig 
orous  blows  at  Tallushatchee  and  Talladega  com- 


208  RED   EAGLE. 

pelled  the  Creeks  to  abandon  their  designs  upon 
Tennessee  and  stand  upon  the  defensive.  They 
saw  the  full  significance  of  his  advance,  and  knew 
that  he  had  come  not  merely  to  garrison  forts 
and  protect  settlers,  but  to  carry  the  war  to  the 
heart  of  the  Creek  Nation,  and  to  throttle  the 
Creek  power  in  its  stronghold.  This  was  what 
Claiborne  wanted  to  do  by  a  resolute  movement 
from  the  south,  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
if  he  could  have  had  permission  to  do  so  he 
would  have  saved  the  Tensaw  and  Tombigbee 
settlements  from  the  worst  of  their  sufferings,  by 
making  the  Creeks  the  hunted  rather  than  the 
hunters,  precisely  as  Jackson  saved  the  people  of 
Tennessee  by  an  aggressive  policy.  The  other 
column,  which  threatened  Georgia,  was  met  in  like 
manner  by  General  Floyd,  and  with  like  results. 

Floyd's  army  consisted  of  nine  hundred  and 
fifty  militiamen  and  four  hundred  friendly  In 
dians,  part  of  them  being  Cowetas  under  com 
mand  of  Major  Mclntosh,  one  of  the  half-breeds 
whom  High  Head  Jim  had  planned  to  kill  as  a 
preparation  for  the  war,  and  the  rest  Tookabat- 
chas  under  Mad  Dragon's  Son.  Floyd  was  bet 
ter  equipped  than  Jackson  had  been  in  his  first 
battles,  'having  some  small  pieces  of  artillery 
with  him. 


THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  GEORGIANS.    2OQ 

Having  learned  that  a  large  force  of  the  Creeks 
was  at  High  Head  Jim's  town,  Autosse,  on  the 
south-east  side  of  the  Tallapoosa  River,  about 
t  \venty  miles  above  the  point  at  which  that 
stream  unites  with  the  Coosa,  General  Floyd 
marched  against  them  in  the  latter  part  of  No 
vember.  McAfee,  who  is  usually  a  very  careful 
historian,  gives  the  28th  of  September  as  the 
date,  but  this  is  clearly  wrong.  Crossing  the 
Ockmulgee,  Flint,  and  Coosa  rivers  under  the 
guidance  of  a  Jewish  trader  named  Abram  Mor- 
decai,  Floyd  arrived  in  the  neighborhood  of  Au 
tosse  early  in  the  morning  on  the  2Qth  of  Novem 
ber. 

His  plan  of  battle  was  precisely  the  same  as 
that  which  Coffee  had  adopted  at  Tallushatchee, 
and  Jackson  at  Talladega — that  is  to  say,  he 
planned  to  surround  the  town  and  destroy  the 
fighting  force  within  ;  but  in  this  case  the  scheme 
miscarried.  In  the  first  place,  Mclntosh  and  Mad 
Dragon's  Son  were  ordered  to  cross  the  river 
and  cut  off  retreat  to  the  opposite  shore,  and  they 
failed  to  do  what  was  required  of  them.  Whether 
this  was  due  to  the  unforeseen  difficulties  of 
crossing,  as  the  Indians  alleged  ;  or  to  the  reluc 
tance  of  the  Indians  to  swim  the  river  on  a  cold, 
frosty  morning,  as  some  historians  say;  or  to  a 


210  RED    EAGLE. 

failure  of  their  courage,  as  was  charged  at  the  time 
— there  are  now  no  means  of  determining,  and  it 
is  not  important.  It  is  enough  to  know  that  they 
did  not  cross  the  river  as  ordered,  and  hence 
when  the  attack  was  made  the  bank  of  tLe  stream 
opposite  the  town  was  unguarded. 

This  was  not  the  only  way,  however,  in  which 
the  original  plan  of  attack  was  prevented.  The 
real  position  and  strength  of  the  Indian  force  had 
been  misapprehended,  and  when,  early  in  the  ac 
tion,  this  was  discovered,  General  Floyd  was 
obliged  to  alter  his  disposition  of  troops  accord 
ingly.  The  advance  was  made  as  soon  as  there 
was  sufficient  light,  on  the  morning  of  the  2Qth 
of  November,  with  Booth's  battalion  on  the 
right,  Watson's  on  the  left.  The  flanks  were 
guarded  by  riflemen,  and  Thomas  with  his  artil 
lery  accompanied  Booth's  battalion.  Booth  was 
instructed  to  march  until  he  could  rest  the  head 
of  his  column  upon  the  little  creek  at  the  mouth 
of  which  the  town  stood,  while  Watson  was  to 
stretch  his  column  around  to  the  left  in  a  curve, 
resting  its  left  flank  upon  the  river  just  below  the 
town.  If  this  could  have  been  done  as  intended, 
and  the  friendly  Indians  had  occupied  the  oppo 
site  side  of  the  river,  the  encircling  of  the  place 
would  have  been  complete  ;  but  besides  the  fail- 


THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  GEORGIANS.    211 

lire  of  the  Indians  another  difficulty  stood  in  the 
\vay.  Instead  of  one  town  there  were  two,  the 
second  lying  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  further 
clown  the  river,  immediately  in  rear  of  the  posi 
tion  to  which  Watson  had  been  ordered. 

To  avoid  the  clanger  of  an  attack  in  the  rear  of 
his  left  flank,  which  might  have  resulted  disas 
trously,  General  Floyd  sent  Lieutenant  Hendon 
with  Merriweather's  riflemen,  three  companies 
of  infantry  and  two  of  dragoons  to  attack  the 
lower  town,  while  he  threw  the  remainder  of  the 
army,  now  reinforced  by  the  friendly  Indians 
under  Mad  Dragon's  Son  and  Mclntosh,  against 
the  larger  upper  town. 

The  fighting  began  about  sunrise,  and  speedily 
became  extremely  severe.  The  prophets  had 
enchanted  the  place,  making  it  sacred  ground, 
and  they  had  assured  the  warriors  that  any 
white  force  which  should  attack  them  would  be 
utterly  exterminated.  9  In  this  belief  the  savages 
resisted  the  attack  with  terrible  determination, 
contesting  every  inch  of  the  ground  which  they 
believed  to  be  sacred. 

Soon  after  the  battle  began,  the  artillery — an 
arm  which  was  particularly  dreaded  by  the 
Creeks  with  something-  of  superstitious  horror — 
was  brought  forward  and  unlimbered.  Its  rapid 


212  RED   EAGLE. 

discharges  soon  turned  the  tide  of  battle,  which 
until  now  had  not  gone  against  the  Indians. 
When  the  Indians  began  to  waver  before  the 
cannon-shot,  Major  Freeman  with  his  squadron 
of  cavalry  charged  and  broke  their  lines.  They 
Avere  closely  pressed  by  the  infantry,  while  the 
friendly  Indians  who  had  now  crossed  the  creek 
cut  off  retreat  up  the  river,  leaving  the  broken 
and  flying  Creeks  no  road  of  escape  except  across 
the  river.  At  nine  o'clock  both  towns  were  in 
flames,  and  there  was  no  army  in  Floyd's  front. 
He  was  victor  in  the  action,  and  his  success  in 
attacking  a  sacred  stronghold  was  certain  to 
work  great  demoralization  among  the  supersti 
tious  Creeks  ;  but  prudence  dictated  a  retreat 
nevertheless.  The  country  round  about  was 
populous  with  Indians,  and  the  force  which 
fought  at  Autosse  although  broken  was  not  de 
stroyed.  It  was  certain  that  if  the  army  should 
remain  in  the  neighborhood  it  would  be  con 
stantly  harassed,  and  perhaps  beaten  by  the  su 
perior  force  which  the  Creeks  could  speedily 
muster. 

Besides  all  this,  Floyd  had  only  a  scanty  sup 
ply  of  provisions,  and  his  base  of  supplies  was 
sixty  miles  away,  on  the  Chattahoochie  River. 
He  determined,  therefore,  to  begin  his  return 


THE   ADVANCE   OF  THE   GEORGIANS.          213 

march  as  soon  as  he  could  bury  his  dead  and  ar 
range  for  the  care  of  his  wounded,  of  whom  he 
was  himself  one. 

The  return  march  was  perhaps  hastened  by  the 
determination  and  spirit  of  the  Indians,  who, 
notwithstanding  their  defeat,  attacked  Floyd's 
rear  within  a  mile  of  their  burned  town  on  the 
day  of  the  battle.  The  attack  was  made  with 
spirit,  but  the  numbers  of  the  Indians  were  not 
sufficient  to  enable  them  to  maintain  it  long. 

In  this  battle  of  Autosse  Floyd  lost  eleven 
white  men  killed  and  fifty-four  wounded,  besides 
some  losses  among  his  friendly  Indians.  Coffee 
not  being  there  to  count  the  dead  Creeks,  the 
exact  number  of  the  slain  \varriors  of  the  enemy 
was  not  ascertained,  but  it  was  estimated  at  about 
two  hundred. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

HOW  CLAIBORNE  EXECUTED  HIS  ORDERS 
—THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  HOLY  GROUND- 
RED  EAGLE'S  FAMOUS  LEAP. 

GENERAL  CLAIBORNE  construed  as  liberally 
as  he  dared  the  order  from  General  Flournoy 
which  permitted  him  to  drive  the  Creeks  across 
the  border,  and  to  pursue  them  as  far  as  the 
neighboring  towns.  He  adopted  the  frontier 
notion  of  nearness  when  deciding  whether  or  not 
a  particular  town  that  he  wanted  to  strike  was 
sufficiently  near  the  dividing  line  between  the 
white  settlements  and  the  Creek  Nation. 

His  orders  were  to  establish  a  fort  at  Weather- 
ford's  Bluff,  and  to  remain  in  that  neighborhood 
until  he  should  be  joined  by  Jackson's  army  and 
the  Georgia  troops,  who  were  now  advancing 
under  command  of  General  Floyd. 

The  force  with  which  he  advanced  to  execute 
this  order  was  a  rnotley  one.  There  were  three 
hundred  volunteers,  who  were  the  main  reliance 
of  the  commander.  There  was  a  small  dragoon 
force,  composed  of  good  men.  Pushmatahavv, 


HOW  CLAIBORNE  EXECUTED   HIS  ORDERS.    215 

the  Choctaw  warrior,  with  his  followers  accom 
panied  the  expedition,  and  a  small  force  of  militia 
men  completed  the  little  army. 

Arriving  at  Weatherford's  Bluff  on  the  i/th 
of  November,  Claiborne  proceeded  without  delay 
to  build  a  stockade  fort  inclosing  nearly  an  acre 
of  ground,  within  which  he  built  three  block 
houses,  while  for  defence  against  an  assault  from 
the  river  side  of  the  encampment  he  established 
a  battery  on  the  bank.  The  work,  when  finished, 
was  christened  Fort  Claiborne,  and  from  it  the 
present  town  of  Claiborne  on  the  same  spot  in 
herited  the  commander's  name. 

Here,  on  the  28th  of  November,  Claiborne 
was  reinforced  by  the  Third  Regiment  of  United 
States  Infantry,  under  command  of  Colonel  Rus 
sell,  and  in  order  that  concert  of  action  might  be 
secured,  he  wrote  hence  to  General  Jackson  at 
the  Ten  Islands,  reporting  the  situation  of  affairs 
c:i  the  southern  side  of  the  field,  and  informing 
tlie  Tennessee  commander,  of  whose  starvation  he 
had  heard,  that  abundant  supplies  of  food  awaited 
his  coming. 

His  activity  knew  no  bounds.  He  sent  trust 
worthy  messengers  to  Pensacola  to  learn  the  sit 
uation  of  affairs  there,  and  ascertained  through 
them  that  the  British  were  there  with  a  consid- 


2l6  RED   EAGLE. 

erable  fleet  and  abundant  supplies  both  for  the 
Indians  and  for  their  own  troops,  whose  presence 
there  threatened  a  descent  upon  Mobile  or  New 
Orleans.  He  wrote  at  once  to  Governor  Blount, 
of  Tennessee,  informing  him  of  these  facts.  He 
sent  messengers  also  to  Mount  Vernon,  instruct 
ing  Colonel  Nixon,  who  commanded  there,  to 
garrison  Fort  Pierce,  a  little  post  a  few  miles 
from  the  ruins  of  Fort  Mims,  and  suppress  a 
recently  awakened  activity  among  the  Indians 
in  that  quarter. 

The  alertness  of  Claiborne's  intelligence  and 
his  unwearied  devotion  to  duty  made  him  an  es 
pecially  fit  man  for  the  important  charge  that  was 
laid  upon  him.  A  close  study  of  his  career  shows 
him  to  have  been  indeed  so  capable  a  man  in  mili 
tary  affairs,  that  we  may  fairly  regret  that  his  field 
of  operations  was  too  small  and  too  remote  from 
the  centres  of  American  life  to  permit  him  to  se 
cure  the  fame  which  he  fairly  earned. 

General  Claiborne  was  not  thinking  of  fame, 
however,  but  of  making  fierce  war  upon  the 
Creeks  and  reducing  them  to  subjection.  He 
knew  that  Red  Eagle  with  a  strong  force  was  at 
Econachaca,  or  the  Holy  Ground,  and  he  deter 
mined  to  attack  him  there.  The  Holy  Ground 
was  one  hundred  and  ten  miles  from  Fort  Clai- 


HOW  CLAIBORNE   EXECUTED  HIS  ORDERS.   2I/ 

borne,  and  it  could  not  be,  with  any  strictness  of 
construction,  considered  a  M  neighboring"  town  ; 
but  the  order  whicl  restricted  Claiborne's  excur 
sions  into  the  Creek  Nation  to  the  neighboring 
towns  was  couched  in  terms  which  did  not  admit 
of  precise  definition,  and  as  he  really  wanted  to 
march  to  the  Holy  Ground,  the  gallant  general 
determined  to  regard  it  as  a  place  within  his 
immediate  neighborhood.  He  did  not  know,  in 
truth,  precisely  where  it  was,  and  there  were 
neither  roads  nor  paths  through  the  woods  to 
guide  him  to  it,  but  he  believed,  with  Suwarrow, 
the  Russian  commander,  that  a  general  can  al 
ways  find  his  enemy  when  he  really  wants  to  do 
so,  and  in  this  case  Claiborne  very  earnestly 
wished  to  find  and  to  fight  Weatherford. 

Accordingly  he  prepared  to  march.  He  was 
in  poor  condition  for  such  an  undertaking  cer 
tainly,  his  force  being  weak  in  numbers,  ill  as 
sorted,  and  in  fact  rather  unwilling  to  go.  Nine 
of  his  captains,  eight  lieutenants,  and  five  ensigns 
sent  him  a  written  remonstrance  against  what 
they  believed  to  be  the  mad  undertaking.  These 
officers  directed  their  commander's  attention  to 
several  ugly  facts  with  respect  to  his  situation. 
They  reminded  him  that  the  weather  was  cold 
and  inclement  ;  that  the  troops  were  badly  shod 


2l8  RED   EAGLE. 

and  insufficiently  supplied  with  clothing'  ;  that 
there  was  scarcely  a  possibility  of  feeding  them 
regularly  upon  so  long  a  march  into  the  literally 
pathless  forest  ;  and  finally  that  the  term  of  ser 
vice  for  which  many  of  the  men  had  enlisted 
would  soon  come^to  an  end. 

The  remonstrance   was    earnest,  but  perfectly 
respectful.     The  officers  who  signed  it  assured 
General  Claiborne  that  if  he  should  adhere  to  his 
determination   they  would  go  with  him  without 
murmuring,  and   do  their   duty.      As  there  was 
nothing    set    forth    in    the   remonstrance    which 
Claiborne  did  not  know  or  had  not  duly  consid 
ered  already,  it  made  no  change  in  his  mind.    He 
set  his  motley  army  in  motion,  determined  to  take 
all  responsibility,  dare  all  clangers,    and   endure 
all  hardships  for  the  sake  of  accomplishing  the 
purpose  which  he  had  so  long  cherished,  of  carry 
ing  the  war  into  the  centre  of  the  Creek  Nation. 
How  heavy  the  load  of  responsibility  which  he 
thus  took  upon  himself   was,   and   how  firm  his 
courage  in  assuming  it  must  have  been,  we  may 
understand  when  we  reflect  that  defeat  in  his  at 
tempt  would  certainly  have  subjected  him  to  a 
charge  of  criminal  and  reckless  disobedience  of 
orders  in  undertaking  such  an  expedition  at  all. 
No  such  charge  was  ever  preferred,  because  offi- 


HOW  CLAIBORNE  EXECUTED  HIS  ORDERS.   2IQ 

cers  are  not  usually  haled  before  a  court-martial 
for  winning  battles. 

The  force  with  which  he  set  out  consisted  of 
the  Third  Regiment  of  United  States  troops,  un 
der  Colonel  Russell ;  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  com 
manded  by  Major  Cassels  ;  one  battalion  of  mili 
tia,  led  by  Major  Smoot,  whom  the  reader  will 
remember  as  one  of  the  leaders  at  the  battle  of 
Burnt  Corn  ;  Colonel  Carson's  Mississippi  volun 
teers,  and  Pushmatahaw's  Choctaws,  to  the  num 
ber  of  one  hundred  and  fifty,  making-  a  total  of 
about  one  thousand  men.  Dale  was  a  captain 
now  in  Smoot's  command,  and  accompanied  the 
expedition  in  that  capacitv. 

The  march  was  begun  early  in  December, 
through  a  country  without  roads,  infested  with 
Indians  whose  force  could  never  be  guessed,  and 
in  weather  which  was  extremely  unfavorable. 
Toilsomely  the  column  advanced  north-eastward  - 
ly,  or  nearly  so,  to  a  point  eighty  miles  from 
Fv)rt  Claiborne,  in  what  is  now  Butler  County, 
Alabama.  There  Claiborne  took  the  precaution 
to  build  a  stockade  fort,  which  he  named  Fort 
Deposit,  and  placed  within  it  his  baggage,  his  ar 
tillery,  his  supply  wagons,  and  his  sick  men. 

Leaving  this  fort  with  a  garrison  of  one  hun 
dred  men,  Claiborne  marched  on  toward  the 


220  RED  EAGLE. 

Holy  Ground,  which  lay  some  thirty  miles  away. 
His  men  speedily  consumed  the  three  days'  ra 
tions  of  flour  which  they  had  drawn  before  begin 
ning  the  march  from  Fort  Deposit,  and  when  the 
army  arrived  at  the  Indian  stronghold  its  supply 
of  pork,  the  only  remaining  article  of  food,  was 
nearly  exhausted.  Whatever  was  to  be  done  must 
be  done  quickly,  in  order  that  the  troops  might 
not  starve  before  reaching  Fort  Deposit  on  the 
return  march. 

The  Holy  Ground  was  a  newly-established 
town,  upon  a  spot  chosen  by  Red  Eagle  because 
of  its  natural  strength  as  a  defensive  position. 
It  lay  upon  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Alabama 
River,  just  below  what  is  now  Powell's  Ferry, 
in  the  present  Lowndes  County,  Alabama.  The 
site  of  the  town  was  a  high  bluff  overlooking  the 
river,  and  protected  on  [the  land  side  by  marshes 
and  deep  ravines. 

Here  Red  Eagle  had  gathered  his  forces  in 
considerable  strength,  and  hither  had  fled  the 
remnants  of  various  defeated  bodies  of  Creeks, 
with  their  women  and  children.  The  prophets 
Sinquista  and  Josiah  Francis,  who  were  present, 
declared  the  soil  to  be  sacred,  and  assured  their 
comrades  that  no  white  troops  would  be  permit- 


HOW  CLAIBORNE  EXECUTED  HIS  ORDERS.    221 

ted  by  the  Great  Spirit  to  cross  the  swamps  and 
ravines  which  surrounded  it. 

Red  Eagle,  having  more  faith  in  defensive 
works  than  in  supernatural  interferences  at  the 
behest  of  his  prophets,  whose  characters  he  prob 
ably  understood  pretty  accurately,  added  to  the 
natural  strength  of  the  place  by  picket  and  log 
fortifications,  making  it  as  difficult  to  assault  suc 
cessfully  as  he  could. 

In  this  central  camp  of  refuge  there  were  as 
many  as  two  hundred  houses,  and  during  the  two 
or  three  months  which  had  elapsed  since  the 
town  was  established  many  of  the  prisoners  taken 
by  the  Indians  in  battle  had  been  brought  hither 
and  murdered.  When  Claiborne  advanced  to 
attack  the  place,  preparations  were  making  in  the 
public  square  for  the  burning  of  a  number  of  un 
fortunate  captives,  among  whom  were  one  white 
woman,  Mrs.  Sophia  Durant,  and  several  half- 
breeds. 

Claiborne  arrived  on  the  23d  of  December,  and 
made  his  dispositions  for  the  assault  without  de 
lay.  He  advanced  in  three  columns,  leading  the 
centre  in  person.  The  Indians,  as  soon  as  they 
learned  of  Claiborne's  approach,  made  prepara 
tions  for  defence.  They  carried  their  women  and 


RED   EAGLE. 


children  across  the  river  and  concealed  them  in 
the  thick  woods  on  the  other  side. 

The  savages  made  the  first  attack,  falling  vio 
lently  upon  the  right  column  of  Claiborne's  force 
under  Colonel  Carson.  The  onset  was  repulsed 
after  a  brief  engagement,  the  Indians  becoming 
panic-stricken  for  some  reason  never  explained, 
and  retreating.  Weatherford  led  the  attack,  and 
for  a  time  contested  the  field  very  stubbornly  ; 
but  his  men  failing  in  courage  in  spite  of  all  that 
he  could  do,  he  was  powerless  to  maintain  his 
ground. 

Major  Cassels,  who  with  his  squadron  of  cav 
alry  had  been  ordered  to  occupy  the  river  bank, 
failed  to  do  so,  and  fell  back  instead  upon  Car 
son's  regiment  ;  and  that  gallant  officer,  seeing  the 
gap  thus  produced,  advanced  his  line  and  occu 
pied  the  ground.  Meantime,  however,  the  mis 
chief  had  been  done.  Casscls's  failure  had  left  a 
road  of  escape  open  to  the  Indians  at  the  critical 
moment,  and  hundreds  of  them  fled  and  swam 
the  river  to  the  thick  woods  on  the  other  side. 

When  the  Indian  line  broke  and  the  retreat  be- 
p;an,  the  nature  of  the  ground,  crossed  as  it  was 
by  ravines  and  dotted  with  marshes,  made  any 
thing  like  vigorous  and  systematic  pursuit  impos 
sible.  Perhaps  their  consciousness  that  escape  by 


HOW  CLAIBORNE  EXECUTED   HIS  ORDERS.    223 

flight  was  easy  helped  to  induce  the  Indians  to 
abandon  the  struggle  when  they  did.  However 
that  may  be,  they  fled,  and  Weatherford  could 
not  rally  them.  Seeing  himself  left  alone,  with  no 
followers  to  maintain  the  struggle,  he  was  forced 
to  choose  between  flight  and  capture.  Flight,  how 
ever,  was  not  now  by  any  means  easy.  He  was 
mounted  upon  a  superb  gray  horse  which  carried 
him  in  his  flight  with  the  speed  of  the  wind,  but 
he  was  not  long  in  discovering  that  Carson  had 
closed  the  gap  through  which  he  had  hoped  to 
escape.  His  enemies  were  on  every  side  of  him 
but  one,  and  on  that  side  was  the  high  bluff. 

O 

The  story  of  what  he  did,  as  it  is  commonly 
told,  is  a  very  marvellous  one.  A  bluff  about  one 
hundred  feet  high  at  the  Holy  Ground  is  shown 
to  travellers,  who  are  told  that  Red  Eagle,  see 
ing  no  other  way  of  escape,  boldly  dashed  spurs 
into  his  horse  and  forced  him  to  make  the  fearful 
leap  to  the  river  below  !  As  the  story  is  usually 
told  in  print  it  is  somewhat  less  marvellous,  but  is 
still  sufficiently  so  to  serve  the  purposes  of  a  pop 
ular  legend.  It  is  that  a  ravine  passed  through 
the  upper  part  of  the  bluff,  reducing  its  height  to 
about  fifty  feet,  and  that  Red  Eagle  made  a  leap 
on  his  horse  from  that  height.  This  version  of 
the  story  is  so  gravely  told  in  books  that  are  not 


224  RED    EAGLE. 

romances,  that  the  author  of  the  present  volume 
once  cited  it  in  print  in  justification  of  an  incident 
in  a  work  of  fiction,  believing  at  the  time  that  the 
legend  was  well  authenticated.  In  examining 
authorities  more  carefully,  as  he  was  bound  to  do 
before  writing  of  the  incident  in  a  serious  work 
of  this  kind,  he  finds  that  the  leap  was  much  less 
wonderful  than  has  been  represented.  Mr.  Pick- 
ett,  in  his  History  of  Alabama,  gives  us  the  fol 
lowing  account,  which  he  assures  us  he  had  from 
Red  Eagle's  own  lips  : 

"  Coursing  with  great  rapidity  along  the  banks 
of  the  Alabama,  below  the  town,  on  a  gray  steed 
of  unsurpassed  strength  and  fleetness,  which  he 
had  purchased  a  short  time  before  the  commence 
ment  of  hostilities  of  Benjamin  Baldwin,  late  of 
Macon  County,  [he]  came  at  length  to  the  ter 
mination  of  a  kind  of  ravine,  where  there  was  a 
perpendicular  bluff  ten  or  fifteen  feet  above  the 
surface  of  the  river.  Over  this  with  a  mighty 
bound  the  horse  pitched  with  the  gallant  chief, 
and  both  went  out  of  sight  beneath  the  waves. 
Presently  they  rose  again,  the  rider  having  hold 
of  the  mane  with  one  hand  and  his  rifle  firmly 
grasped  in  the  other.  Regaining  his  saddle,  the 
noble  animal  swam  with  him  to  the  Autauga 
side." 


HOW  CLAIBORNE  EXECUTED  HIS  ORDERS.   225 

The  battle  over,  Claiborne  found  his  loss  to  be 
one  man  killed  and  six  others  wounded.  Thirty 
Indians  were  found  dead  on  the  ground.  The 
number  of  their  wounded  is  not  known.  Clai 
borne  destroyed  the  town,  with  every  thing  in  it. 

The  army  was  now  reduced  almost  to  starva 
tion,  their  only  food  being  a  little  corn,  which  they 
parched  and  ate  as  they  could.  An  alarm  having 
been  given  by  a  party  of  men  who  were  sent 
up  the  river  in  pursuit  of  fugitives,  however, 
Claiborne  marched  in  that  direction  during  the 
night  of  December  24th,  and  pitched  his  tent 
on  Weatherford's  plantation,  where  he  ate  his 
Christmas  breakfast  of  parched  corn.  Having  de 
stroyed  all  the  buildings  in  the  neighborhood, 
Claiborne's  work  in  this  region  was  done,  and  he 
hastened  back  to  Fort  Deposit,  where  he  fed  his 
troops  before  beginning  his  return  march  to  Fort 
Claiborne.  The  army  had  been  nine  days  with 
out  meat. 

The  term  of  service  for  which  Carson's  volun 
teers  had  enlisted  had  now  expired,  and  as  soon 
as  the  column  arrived  at  Fort  Claiborne  the  men 
were  mustered  out.  In  a  letter  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  Claiborne  reported  that  these  men 
went  home  nearly  naked,  without  shoes,  and  with 
their  pay  eight  months  in  arrears.  Their  devo- 


226  RED  EAGLE. 

tion  to  the  cause,  as  it  was  shown  in  their  cheer 
fulness  and  good  conduct  during  their  toilsome 
march,  was,  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances, 
highly  honorable  to  them. 

Leaving  Colonel  Russell  in  command  of  Fort 
Claiborne,  General  Claiborne  returned  to  Mount 
Vernon,  partly  because  he  had  fully  accomplished 
all  that  his  orders  from  Flournoy  permitted  him  to 
do,  and  partly  because  the  discharge  of  his  Mis 
sissippi  volunteers  had  reduced  his  army  to  sixty 
men,  and  even  these  had  but  a  month  longer  to 
serve  ! 

Colonel  Russell  was  no  sooner  left  in  command 
at  Fort  Claiborne  than  he  instituted  proceedings 
designed  to  fix  the  responsibility  for  the  suffer 
ings  of  the  men  during  the  campaign  and  for  the 
blunder  at  the  Holy  Ground  where  it  belonged. 
He  ordered  a  court  of  inquiry  in  each  case,  but 
Major  Cassels  was  permitted  to  escape  censure 
on  the  ground  that  his  guide  had  misled  him. 
For  the  failure  of  the  food  supply  the  contractor 
was  held  responsible,  as  it  was  shown  that  Gen 
eral  Claiborne  had  given  him  strict  orders  to  pro 
vide  abundant  supplies  for  the  expedition. 

In  order  that  the  story  of  the  Fort  Claiborne 
army  may  be  finished  here  before  returning  to 
the  Ten  Islands  and  following  Jackson  through 


HOW  CLAIBORNE  EXECUTED  HIS  ORDERS.    227 

his  more  important  part  of  the  campaign,  we  may 
depart  for  the  moment  from  the  chronological 
order  of  events  to  tell  the  story  of  an  unsuccess 
ful  attempt  which  Colonel  Russell  made  to  in 
vade  the  Creek  Nation  from  Fort  Claibornc,  in 
the  February  following  the  events  already  de 
scribed. 

It   was    Colonel    Russell's    purpose    to    march 
to  the  Old  Towns  on  the  Cahawba  River,  and 
thence  to  attack  the  Indians  wherever  he  could 
find  them,  establishing  his  base  of  supplies  at  that 
point.     He  provided  a  barge,  loaded  it  with  food 
for  the  troops,  and  putting  Captain  Denkins  in 
command  of  it,  with  a  piece  of  artillery   as   his 
armament,  he  directed  that  officer  to  ascend  the 
Alabama  River  to  the  mouth  of    the  Cahawba 
River,  and  thence  to  make  his  way  up  the  Cahaw 
ba  to  Old  Towns,  where  the    army  would  meet 
him.     Then,  with  his  regiment  reinforced  by  an 
infantry  company  from  the  neighborhood  of  Fort 
Madison   under  command  of  Captain  Evan  Au- 
still,  and  a  cavalry  company  commanded  by  Cap 
tain  Foster — the  two  forming  a  battalion  under 
the  lead  of  Sam   Dale, 'who  was  now  a  Major- 
Colonel  Russell  marched  to  the  appointed  place 
of  rendezvous. 

There  he  learned  that  the  barge  had  not  ar- 


228  RED   EAGLE. 

rived,  and  as  he  had  marched  with  but  six  days' 
provisions  his  situation  was  a  critical  one.  To 
hasten  the  coming  of  the  barge  he  despatched  a 
canoe  manned  by  Lieutenant  Wilcox  and  five 
men  in  search  of  Captain  Denkins.  This  party, 
while  making  its  way  down  the  river,  travelling 
at  night  and  hiding  in  the  cane  on  the  banks  by 
day,  was  attacked  by  Indians.  Lieutenant  Wil 
cox  and  three  of  his  companions  were  made  pris 
oners,  the  other  two  escaping  and  making  their 
way  through  many  hardships  to  the  settlements, 
where  they  arrived  in  a  famished  condition. 

Captain  Denkins  had  passed  the  mouth  of  the 
Cahawba  River  by  mistake,  and  had  gone  a  con 
siderable  distance  up  the  Alabama  River  before 
discovering  his  error.  When  he  did  discover  it, 
he  knew  that  it  was  now  too  late  for  him  to  think 
of  carrying  out  his  original  instructions.  He 
knew  that  before  he  could  possibly  reach  the  Old 
Towns,  the  army  would  be  starved  out  and  com 
pelled  to  retreat. 

He  therefore  determined  to  return  to  Fort 
Claiborne.  On  his  way  down  the  river  he  dis 
covered  the  canoe,  and  found  in  it  Wilcox 
scalped  and  dying,  and  his  two  companions  al 
ready  dead. 

Meantime  Colonel  Russell  had  waited  two  days 


HOW  CLAIBORNE  EXECUTED   HIS  ORDERS.    1 

at  the  Old  Towns  for  the  coming  of  the  barge, 
and  then,  being  wholly  without  provisions,  be 
gan  his  return  march,  saving  his  army  from 
starvation  by  killing  and  eating  his  horses  on  the 
route. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

HOW  JACKSON  LOST  HIS  ARMY. 

WE  now  return  to  General  Jackson's  camp  at 
Fort  Strother,  near  the  Ten  Islands.  The  situa 
tion  there  was  bad  from  the  time  of  the  Talla- 
dega  expedition,  and  it  grew  steadily  worse.  The 
army  was  nearly  starved,  and  Jackson  was  shar 
ing  their  hunger  with  them.  When  a  few  lean 
kine  were  secured,  seeing  that  the  supply  was 
sufficient  only  to  give  to-  each  man  a  very  scant 
portion,  Jackson  declined  to  take  any  part  of  the 
beef  for  his  own  table,  and  took  some  of  the  en 
trails  instead,  saying  with  cheerfulness  that  he 
had  always  heard  that  tripe  was  nutritious  and 
savory  food.  He  lost  no  opportunity  to  secure 
such  provisions  as  could  be  had  from  the  sur 
rounding  country,  but  these  were  barely  suffi 
cient  to  keep  famine  at  bay  from  day  to  day,  and 
Jackson  busied  himself  with  the  writing  of  let 
ters  to  everybody  who  could  in  any  way  contrib 
ute  to  hasten  forward  adequate  supplies.  He 
wrote  to  one  contractor,  saying  : 

11  1  have  been  compelled  to  return  here  for  the 


HOW   JACKSON   LOST   HIS   ARMY.  231 

want  of  supplies  when  T  could  have  completed  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy  in  ten  days  ;  and  on  my 
arrival  I  find  those  1  had  left  behind  in  the  same 
starving  condition  with  those  who  accompanied 
me.  For  God's  sake  send  me  with  all  despatch 
plentiful  supplies  of  bread  and  meat.  We  have 
been  starving  for  several  days,  and  it  will  not  do 
to  continue  so  much  longer.  Hire  wagons  and 
purchase  supplies  at  any  price  rather  than  defeat 
the  expedition.  General  White,  instead  of  form 
ing  a  junction  with  me,  as  he  assured  me  he 
would,  has  taken  the  retrograde  motion,  after 
having  amused  himself  with  consuming  provi 
sions  for  three  weeks  in  the  Cherokee  Nation, 
and  left  me  to  rely  on  my  own  strength."  * 

Nothing  that  the  perplexed  commander  could 
do  or  say  or  write,  however,  could  help  him. 
Day  by  day  food  became  scarcer,  poorer,  and 
more  difficult  to  get,  and  the  men  were  becoming 
mutinous,  as  volunteers  are  sure  to  do  when  left 
to  starve  in  inaction.  If  the  enemy  had  appeared 
in  his  immediate  neighborhood,  Jackson  would 
certainly  have  cured  all  the  disorders  of  the  camp 
and  removed  its  discontent  by  giving  the  men 
constant  occupation  for  their  minds  in  conflicts 
with  the  foe.  As  it  was,  there  was  neither  food 

*  Parton's  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson. 


232  RED   EAGLE. 

nor   fighting   to   be   had   at   Fort   Strother,   and 

• 

General  Jackson  did  not  dare  to  attempt  a  march 
upon  the  nearest  Indian  stronghold,  about  sixty 
miles  away,  without  supplies. 

Not  many  days  had  passed  after  the  return  to 
the  Ten  Islands  when  information  reached  Jack 
son  that  the  men  of  the  militia  regiment  intended 
to  return  to  their  homes  with  or  without  permis 
sion,  and  that  they  had  appointed  the  next  day 
as  the  time  of  starting.  Luckily  he  believed  that 
he  could  still  depend  upon  the  volunteers.  He 
knew,  too,  that  in  this  matter  he  had  to  deal  with 
bodies  of  men,  not  with  individuals.  The  power 
of  public  sentiment,  which  in  this  case  was  corps 
sentiment,  was  the  power  arrayed  against  him. 
He  knew  that  the  men  would  not  desert  singly, 
that  their  pride  would  restrain  them  from  deser 
tion  unless  they  could  act  together,  each  being 
sustained  by  the  opinion  and  the  common  action 
of  all  his  fellows.  The  militia  had  determined  to 
march  home  in  a  body  ;  Jackson  determined  to 
restrain  them  in  a  body. 

On  the  appointed  day  he  called  the  volunteers 
to  arms,  and  at  their  head  placed  himself  in  the 
way  of  the  mutinous  militiamen.  He  plainly  in 
formed  the  men  that  they  could  march  homeward 
only  by  cutting  their  way  through  his  lines,  and 


HOW   JACKSON   LOST   HIS   ARMY.  233 

this  was  an  undertaking  which  they  were  not  pre 
pared  for.  Being  unable  to  overcome  Jackson, 
thcv  had  no  choice  but  to  yield  to  him  and  return 
to  their  tents,  which  they  did  at  once,  with  what 
cheerfulness  they  could  command. 

The  volunteers  whose  power  Jackson  was  thus 
able  to  use  in  arresting  the  departure  of  the  mi 
litia  were  scarcely  less  discontented  than  they. 
On  the  very  day  on  which  they  stopped  the 
march  of  the  militia  they  resolved  themselves  to 
go  home,  and  prepared  to  depart  on  the  following 
morning.  Jackson  had  information  of  what  was 
going  on,  and  he  prepared  to  reverse  the  order 
of  things  by  using  the  militia  in  their  turn  to  op 
pose  the  volunteers.  The  militia  having  returned 
to  their  duty  obeyed  the  commands  of  their  gen 
eral,  and  opposed  a  firm  front  to  the  mutinous 
volunteers.  The  affair  wore  so  much  of  the  ap 
pearance  of  a  practical  joke  that  it  put  the  whole 
force  into  momentary  good-humor. 

With  his  men  in  this  mood,  however,  Jackson 
knew  that  he  had  merely  gained  a  very  brief  time 
by  his  firmness,  and  that  the  discontent  of  which 
the  mutiny  was  born  existed  still  in  undimin- 
ished  force.  He  therefore  sent  the  cavalry  to 
Huntsville  to  recruit  their  horses,  first  exacting 
a  promise  that  they  would  return  as  soon  as  that 


234  RED   EAGLE. 

end  could  be  accomplished — a  promise  which  the 
men  afterward  violated  shamelessly.  He  then 
called  all  the  officers  of  the  army  together,  and, 
after  giving  them  all  the  facts  in  his  possession 
upon  which  he  founded  the  confident  hope  that 
provisions  in  plenty  would  soon  arrive,  he  made 
a  speech  to  them,  trying  to  win  them  back  to 
something  of  their  old  devotion  to  duty.  He 
had  good  reason  to  believe  that  supplies  both  of 
meat  and  of  breadstuffs  were  now  actually  on 
their  way  to  him,  and  his  chief  present  purpose 
was  to  gain  time,  to  persuade  his  followers  to 
patience  and  obedience  for  the  two  or  three  days 
which  he  thought  would  end  the  period  of  short 
rations.  According  to  Eaton's  report  of  the 
speech,  Jackson  said  to  his  officers  : 

"  What  is  the  present  situation  of  our  camp? 
A  number  of  our  fellow-soldiers  are  wounded  and 
unable  to  help  themselves.  Shall  it  be  said  that 
we  are  so  lost  to  humanity  as  to  leave  them  in 
this  condition  ?  Can  any  one,  under  these  circum 
stances  and  under  these  prospects,  consent  to  an 
abandonment  of  the  camp  ;  of  all  that  we  have 
acquired  in  the  midst  of  so  many  difficulties,  pri 
vations,  and  dangers  ;  of  what  it  will  cost  us  so 
much  to  regain  ;  of  what  we  never  can  regain 
— our  brave  wounded  companions,  who  will  be 


HOW  JACKSON   LOST   HIS   ARMY.  235 

murdered     by   our   unthinking,    unfeeling-   inhu 
manity  ?     Surely  there  can  be  none  such  !     N .), 
we  will  take  with  us  when  we  go   our  wounded 
and  sick.     They  must  not,  shall  not  perish  by  our 
cold-blooded  indifference.     But  why  should  you 
despond  ?     I  do  not  ;  and  yet  your  wants  are  not 
greater  than   mine.     To  be  sure  we  do  not  live 
sumptuously  ;  but  no  one  has  died  of  hunger  or 
is  likely  to  die.     And  then  how  animating   are 
our  prospects  !     Large  supplies  are  at  Deposit, 
and  already  are    officers    despatched  to  hasten 
them  on.    Wagons  are  on  the  way  ;  a  large  num 
ber  of  beeves  are  in  the  neighborhood,  and  de 
tachments  are  out  to  bring  them  in.     All  these 
resources  cannot  fail.     I  have  no  wish  to  starve 
you,  none  to  deceive  you.   Stay  contentedly,  and 
if  supplies  do  not  arrive  in  two  days  we  will  all 
march  back  together,  and  thro\v  the  blame  of  our 
failure  where  it  should  properly  lie  ;  until  then 
we  certainly  have  the  means  of  subsisting,  and  if 
we  are  compelled  to  bear  privations,  let  us  re 
member  that  they  are  bftrne  for  our  country,  and 
are  not  greater  than  many,  perhaps  most,  armies 
have  been  compelled  to  endure.     I   have  called 
you  together  to  tell  you  my  feelings  and  wishes. 
This  evening  think  on  them  seriously,  and  let  me 
know  yours  in  the  morning." 


236  RED    EAGLE. 

To  this  appeal  the  response  was  not  satisfac 
tory.  The  militia  indeed  agreed  to  remain  dur 
ing  the  stipulated  two  days,  and  promised  that  if 
the  expected  provisions  should  come  within  that 
time  they  would  cease  to  murmur,  and  go  on 
with  the  campaign  ;  but  the  volunteers  were  now 
wholly  given  over  to  mutiny.  They  insolently 
informed  General  Jackson  that  they  were  going 
to  march  back  to  the  borders  of  Tennessee,  and 
that  if  he  refused  to  yield  immediately  to  their 
will  in  the  matter,  without  waiting  for  the  allotted 
two  days  to  expire,  they  would  go  without  per 
mission  and  would  use  force  if  necessary  to  ac 
complish  that  end. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  about  the 
nature  of  the  reply  which  Jackson  would  have 
made  to  this  message  if  he  had  had  even  a  small 
force  upon  which  he  could  rely  at  his  back.  In 
that  case  the  volunteers  must  have  chosen  be 
tween  submission  to  his  will  and  a  battle  with 
him.  As  it  was,  he  was  one  man  against  the 
whole  force.  He  could  not  oppose  the  mutinous 
volunteers  with  arms,  and  he  felt  that  he  must 
in  some  way  prevent  the  abandonment  of  all  that 
had  been  gained  in  the  campaign.  He  there 
fore  resorted  to  a  compromise,  which  he  hoped 
would  solve  the  perplexing  problem.  He  com- 


HOW  JACKSON   LOST   HIS   ARMY.  237 

munded  the  militia  and  one  regiment  of  the  vol 
unteers  to  remain  in  the  fort  as  a  gafrison,  and 
ordered  the  other  volunteer  regiment  to  march 
toward  Fort  Deposit  until  it  should  meet  the  pro 
vision  train,  and  then  to  countermarch  and  return 
with  it.  In  this  way  he  lost  immediately  only  one 
half  of  the  volunteers,  winning  the  rest  of  them  to 
his  proposition  for  a  delay  of  two  days  ;  and  even 
the  regiment  which  had  been  sent  away  might 
yet  return  with  the  provisions,  as  the  lack  of  food 
was  the  only  plea  that  had  been  urged  in  defence 
of  the  mutiny. 

The  discontent  really  lay  much  deeper  than 
that  :  it  had  come  as  much  from  idleness  in  camp 
and  from  home-sickness  as  from  hunger,  and  it 
had  eaten  into  the  soldierly  characters  of  the  men, 
honeycombing  them  with  sedition  and  insubordi 
nation  ;  but  while  the  plea  of  starvation  remained 
to  them  the  men  urged  no  other,  and  Jackson's 
memory  of  their  courage  and  good  conduct  on 
former  occasions,  led  him  to  hope  that  with  this 
cause  of  trouble  removed  the  trouble  itself  would 
disappear. 

When  the  two  days  of  waiting  had  passed, 
and  no  supplies  had  come,  a  new  difficulty  lay  in 
Jackson's  path,  namely,  his  own  voluntary  prom 
ise.  He  had  asked  for  two  days'  delay,  promising 


238  RED   EAGLE. 

to  permit  the  men  to  march  away  if  food  did  not 
arrive  within  that  time.  The  promise  now  fell 
due  and  the  men  exacted  its  fulfilment.  In  his 
sore  distress  he  could  do  nothing  further  to  com 
pel  obedience.  He  had  even  relinquished  his 
right  to  command  the  men  to  remain  and  his 
privilege  to  bargain  for  further  delay.  He  must 
let  them  go  now,  but  there  was  no  reason  why 
any  of  them  who  chose  to  do  so  might  not  vol 
untarily  remain  to  defend  the  fort.  It  was  a  slen 
der  hope,  but  Jackson  was  grasping  at  straws 
now.  He  set  out  to  seek  volunteers,  declaring 
that  if  even  two  men  should  consent  to  stay  with 
him  he  would  not  abandon  Fort  Strother  and  the 
campaign,  but  would  stay  there  and  wait  for  the 
corning  of  reinforcements.  One  of  his  captains 
at  once  offered  himself  as  one  of  this  army  of  two, 
and  by  an  earnest  effort  they  succeeded  in  swell 
ing  the  number  of  volunteers  to  one  hundred  and 
nine  men. 

This  was  all  that  was  left  of  Jackson's  army, 
and  the  campaign  lay  mostly  before  him.  A  man 
of  less  stubborn  resolution  would  have  despaired  ; 
but  Jackson  held  on  in  the  hope  of  gaining 
strength  after  awhile  and  gathering  men  enough 
around  him  to  make  a  resumption  of  operations 
possible. 


HOW   JACKSON   LOST   HIS  ARMY.  239 

He  permitted  the  rest  of  his  troops  to  leave  the 
post,  first  exacting1  a  promise  that  they  would 
return  if  they  should  meet  the  supply  train,  and 
in  order  the  more  effectually  to  enforce  this  de 
mand  Jackson  accompanied  the  column,  leaving 
his  army,  one  hundred  and  nine  strong,  to  hold 
the  fort  until  his  return. 

Twelve  miles  from  the  fort  the  column  met  the 
provision  train.  Jackson  called  a  halt  and  ordered 
rations  to  be  distributed  to  the  men.  It  was  now 
his  turn  to  insist  upon  the  faithful  fulfilment  of  a 
promise.  He  had  kept  his  word  in  permitting  his 
men  to  abandon  Fort  Strother  at  the  time  ap 
pointed  ;  he  could  now,  with  especially  good 
grace,  insist  that  the  men  should  keep  their  prom 
ise  and  return  with  the  provision  train. 

Now  for  the  first  time  the  mutiny  began  to  as 
sume  its  true  colors.  With  stomachs  filled  with 
good  beef  and  bread — for  a  large  drove  of  beef 
c:ittle  was  with  the  provision  train,  and  Jackson 
hnd  given  the  men  beef  rations — it  was  no  longer 
possible  to  urge  hunger  in  excuse  for  abandon 
ment  of  duty  ;  but  the  men  had  set  out  intending 
to  go  home,  and  they  had  no  thought  of  relin 
quishing  that  intention  rr-rely  because  the  excuse 
by  which  they  had  justified  their  conduct  would 
no  longer  serve  their  purpose. 


240  RED    EAGLE. 

When  ordered  to  take  up  the  line  of  march  to 
ward  the  fort  the  men  rebelled  and  started  home 
ward  instead. 

Then  ensued  one  of  the  most  impressive  scenes 
in  Jackson's  career.  Raving  with  rage,  his  thin 
lips  set  and  his  frame  quivering  with  anger,  the 
commander's  face  and  mien  were  terrible.  His 
left  arm  was  still  carried  in  a  sling,  and  the  hard 
ships,  hunger,  fatigue,  and  ceaselesss  anxiety  to 
which  he  had  been  subject  ever  since  he  quitted 
his  sick-becl  to  come  upon  this  campaign  had  not 
made  his  \vasted  frame  less  emaciated  ;  he  was  a 
sick  man  who  ought  to  have  been  in  bed  :  but  the 
illness  was  of  the  body,  not  of  the  soul.  The  spirit 
of  the  man  was  now  intensely  stirred,  and  when 
Jackson  was  in  this  mood  there  were  few  men 
who  had  the  courage  to  brave  him. 

Riding  after  the  head  of  the  column,  he  placed 
himself  with  a  few  followers  in  front  of  it,  and 
drove  the  men  back  like  sheep.  Then  leaving 
the  officers  who  were  with  him  he  rode  alone 
down  the  road,  until  he  encountered  a  brigade 
which  was  dra\vn  up  in  column,  resolved  to  con 
quer  its  way  by  a  regular  advance  against  any 
body  of  men  who  might  oppose  its  homeward 
march.  If  a  company  or  a  battalion  had  under 
taken  to  arrest  the  march  of  these  men  there 


HOW  JACKSON    LOST   HIS   ARMY.  241 

would  have  been  a  battle  there  in  the  road  with 
out  question.  They  were  prepared  to  fight  their 
comrades  to  the  death  ;  they  \vere  ready  to  meet 
a  force  equal  to  their  own.  They  met  Andrew 
Jackson  instead — Andrew  Jackson  in  a  rage,  An 
drew  Jackson  with  all  the  blood  in  his  frail  body 
boiling  ;  and  that  was  a  force  greatly  superior  to 
their  own. 

Snatching  a  musket  from  one  of  the  men  Jack 
son  commanded  the  mutineers  to  halt.  He  broke 
forth  in  a  torrent  of  vituperation,  and  declared 
that  they  could  march  toward  home  only  over 
his  dead  body  ;  he  declared,  too,  with  an  empha 
sis  which  carried  conviction  with  it,  that  while  he 
could  not,  single-handed,  overcome  a  brigade  of 
armed  msn,  he  at  least  could  and  would  shoot 
down  the  first  man  who  should  dare  to  make  the 
least  motion  toward  advancing. 

The  men  were  overawed,  terrified,  demoralized 
by  the  force  of  this  one  resolute  man's  fierce  de 
termination.  They  stood  like  petrified  men,  not 
knowing  what  to  do.  It  was  now  evident  that 
no  man  there  would  dare  to  make  himself  Jack 
son's  target  by  being  the  first  to  advance.  Jack 
son  had  beaten  a  brigade,  literally  single-handed, 
for  he  had  but  one  hand  that  he  could  use. 

By  this  time  General  Coffee  and  some  staff  offi- 


242  RED   EAGLE. 

cers  had  joined  Jackson,  and  now  a  few  of  the 
better  disposed  men,  seeing  their  general  oppos 
ing  a  brigade  of  mutineers,  ranged  themselves 
by  his  side,  prepared  to  assist  him  in  any  en 
counter  that  might  come,  however  badly  over 
matched  they  might  be.  The  mutineers  were 
already  conquered,  however,  and  sullenly  yield 
ing  they  were  sent  back  to  the  fort. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

A  NEW  PLAN  OF  THE  MUTINEERS. 

HAVING  thus  succeeded  in  sending-  what  re 
mained  of  his  army  back  to  Fort  Strother,  with 
abundant  food  at  least  for  present  uses,  Jackson 
hastened  to  Fort  Deposit  and  succeeded  there  in 
effecting  arrangements  for  a  constant  supply  of 
bread  and  meat. 

Then  he  mounted  his  horse  and  rode  back  to 
Fort  Strother,  determined  to  collect  what  force  he 
could  without  delay,  and  by  vigorous  measures 
to  bring  the  campaign  to  a  speedy  and  successful 
end. 

His  first  measure  was  to  order  General  Cocke 
t)  join  him  with  the  East  Tennessee  troops,  say 
ing  in  his  letter  to  that  officer  that  if  he  could  ar 
rive  at  Fort  Strother  by  the  I2th  of  December, 
b.inging  with  him  all  the  provisions  he  could 
gather,  the  Creeks  could  be  crushed  within  three 
weeks.  This  was  a  most  inspiriting  prospect, 
and  Jackson  was  apparently  all  the  more  elated 
because  of  his  recent  depression. 

His  good  fortune  was    destined    to   be    short- 


244  RED   EAGLE. 

lived,  however.  He  had  scarcely  reached  Fort 
Strother  on  his  return  from  Fort  Deposit  Avhen 
he  discovered  that  his  volunteers  were  planning 
a  new  mutiny,  or,  as  they  stoutly  maintained, 
were  preparing  to  leave  him  with  legal  right  and 
justice  on  their  side. 

The  state  of  the  case  may  be  briefly  summed 
up  as  follows  :  These  volunteers  had  been  mus 
tered  into  service  on  the  loth  of  December,  1812, 
the  terms  of  their  enlistment  being  that  they 
should  serve  for  one  year  within  the  next  t\vo 
years,  unless  sooner  discharged  ;  that  is  to  say, 
they  were  to  be  discharged  as  soon  as  they  should 
have  served  a  year  ;  or,  if  their  actual  service  in 
the  field  should  not  amount  to  a  full  year  they 
should  be  discharged  on  uie  loth  of  December, 
1814.  They  were  called  into  service  when  Jack 
son  made  his  march  with  them  to  Natchez,  which 
has  been  spoken  of  in  a  former  chapter.  After  a 
few  months,  their  services  not  being  needed,  they 
were  dismissed  from  actual  service  to  their  homes, 
subject,  however,  to  a  call  at  any  time  until  their 
time  of  service  should  expire. 

Under  this  enlistment  they  were  recalled  to  the 
field  in  September,  1813,  as  we  have  seen,  and 
were  under  obligation  to  serve  for  a  sufficient 
time  to  complete  their  term  of  one  year  in  the 


A   NEW   PLAN   OF  THE   MUTINEERS.  245 

field  ;  but  as  it  had  been  supposed  when  they 
were  enlisted  that  their  services  would  be  needed 
C3iitinuously  for  a  year,  they  had  thought  little 
about  the  alternative  condition.  They  now  held 
that  their  enlistment  would  expire  just  one  year 
after  it  had  begun — that  is  to  say,  on  the  loth  of 
December,  1813,  a  date  now  at  hand.  They  were 
determined  to  permit  no  allowance  to  be  made 
for  the  months  which  they  had  passed  at  homo, 
and  insisted  that  as  they  had  enlisted  for  one  year 
they  would  go  home  when  the  year  should  end. 

In  this  demand  for  discharge  the  officers,  who 
should  have  been  the  men's  instructors  in  such  a 
case,  made  the  matter  hopeless  by  joining  the  dis 
contented  soldiery.  With  their  colonels  and  ma 
jors  and  captains  to  second  them,  the  men  were 
doubly  certain  to  persist  in  their  interpretation  of 
the  contract  of  service. 

Not  long  before  the  disputed  date  the  colonel 
of  one  of  the  volunteer  regiments  laid  their  case 
before  Jackson  in  a  letter,  in  which  he  assured 
him  that  the  volunteers  would  demand  their 
honorable  discharge  from  service  on  the  loth  of 
December,  the  anniversary  of  their  enlistment. 
The  appeal  made  in  this  letter  was  an  adroit  effort 
to  play  upon  next  to  the  strongest  feeling  in  Jack 
son's  heart — his  fatherly  affection  for  the  men 


246  RED   EAGLE. 

\vho  had  followed  him  into  battle.  We  say  next 
to  the  strongest  feeling  in  his  heart,  because  the 
strongest  was,  undoubtedly,  his  desire  to  serve 
his  country  by  accomplishing  the  utter  suppres 
sion  of  the  Creeks.  The  colonel  told  Jackson  that 
the  volunteers  looked  to  their  loved  and  honored 
general  to  protect  them  in  this  their  right,  and  to 
secure  justice  to  them  ;  that  they  lamented  the  ne 
cessity  of  leaving  the  field  at  such  a  time,  but  that 
their  families  and  their  private  affairs  required 
their  return  to  their  homes  ;  that  upon  him,  to 
whom  they  looked  with  reverence  as  to  a  father, 
depended  the  question  whether,  after  their  hard 
service  under  his  leadership  they  should  be  per 
mitted  to  go  home  with  the  certificates  of  honor 
able  discharge  to  which  they  were  entitled,  or 
should  be  forced  to  carry  with  them  the  ill-repute 
of  deserters.  He  was  strongly  implored  not  to 
reward  their  devotion  to  the  cause  and  to  him  by 
fixing  this  brand  of  disgrace  upon  them  and  their 
children  after  them. 

The  appeal  was  adroit  we  say,  and  a  masterly 
piece  of  special  pleading  ;  but  the  officer  who 
wrote  it  must  have  known  when  he  did  so  that 
the  demand  which  he  sought  to  enforce  was  un 
just  ;  that  even  if  it  had  been  just,  Jackson  had 
no  more  authority  than  he  himself  had  to  ;;rant 


A  NEW   PLAN   OF  THE   MUTINEERS.  247 

it  ;  and  that  the  disputed  question  had  already 
been  submitted  formally  and  fully  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  who  had  decided  it  adversely  to  the 
men,  and  had  accompanied  that  decision  by  the 
assurance  that  as  the  matter  was  governed  by  an 
express  act  of  Congress,  no  power  short  of  that 
of  the  national  legislature — neither  the  Secretary 
nor  the  President  himself — was  competent  to 
change  the  terms  of  the  enlistment,  or  to  discharge 
the  troops  until  either  they  had  given  a  year  to 
actual  service,  or  the  two  years  during  which 
they  were  subject  to  a  call  had  expired.  For  the 
men,  and  perhaps  also  for  the  subordinate  offi 
cers,  there  may  have  been  the  excuse  of  an  hon 
est  misunderstanding,  but  for  this  colonel,  whose 
letter  shows  him  to  have  been  a  man  of  high  in 
telligence,  there  can  have  been  no  excuse  at  all. 

Jackson  replied  to  this  letter  in  one  of  the 
ablest  documents  which  has  come  from  his  hand. 
Eaton  has  preserved  it  in  his  Life  of  Jackson, 
and  Mr.  Parton  has  copied  it.  Let  us  see  what 
the  commander,  touched  without  doubt  by  the 
argument  um  ad  Jiomincm  that  was  used,  had  to  say 
by  way  of  answer  : 

"  I  know  not  what  scenes  will  be  exhibited  on 
the  loth  instant,  nor  what  consequences  are  to 
flow  from  them,  here  or  elsewhere  ;  but  as  I  shall 


248  RED   EAGLE. 

have  the  consciousness  that  they  are  not  imput- 
able  to  any  misconduct  of  mine,  I  trust  I  shall 
have  the  firmness  not  to  shrink  from  a  discharge 
of  my  duty. 

"  It  will  be  well,  however,  for  those  who  intend 
to  become  actors  in  those  scenes,  and  who  are 
about  to  hazard  so  much  on  the  correctness  of 
their  opinions,  to  examine  beforehand  with  great 
caution  and  deliberation  the  grounds  on  which 
their  pretensions  rest.  Are  they  founded  on  any 
false  assurances  of  mine,  or  upon  any  deception 
that  has  been  practised  toward  them  ?  Was  not 
the  act  of  Congress,  under  which  they  are  en 
gaged,  directed  by  my  general  order  to  be  read 
and  expounded  to  them  before  they  enrolled 
themselves  ?  That  order  will  testify,  and  so  will 
the  recollection  of  every  general  officer  of  my  di 
vision.  It  is  not  pretended  that  those  who  now 
claim  to  be  discharged  were  not  legally  and  fairly 
enrolled  under  the  act  of  Congress  of  the  6th  of 
February,  1812.  Have  they  performed  the  ser 
vice  required  of  them  by  that  act,  and  which  they 
then  solemnly  undertook  to  perform  ?  That  re 
quired  one  year's  service  out  of  two,  to  be  com 
puted  from  the  day  of  rendezvous,  unless  they 
should  be  sooner  discharged.  Has  one  year's 
service  been  performed  ?  This  cannot  be  seri- 


A  NEW   PLAN  OF  THE   MUTINEERS.  249 

ously  pretended.  Have  they  then  been  dis 
charged  ?  It  is  said  they  have,  and  by  me.  To 
account  for  so  extraordinary  a  belief,  it  may  be 
necessary  to  take  a  review  of  past  circumstances. 
"  More  than  twelve  months  have  elapsed  since 
we  were  called  upon  to  avenge  the  injured  right 
of  our  country.  We  obeyed  the  call.  In  the 
midst  of  hardships,  which  none  but  those  to 
whom  liberty  is  dear  could  have  borne  without 
a  murmur,  we  descended  the  Mississippi.  It  was 
believed  our  services  were  wanted  in  the  prose 
cution  of  the  ju.;t  war  in  which  our  country  was 
engaged,  and  we  were  prepared  to  render  them. 
But  though  we  were  disappointed  in  our  expec 
tations  wre  established  for  Tennessee  a  name  which 
will  long  do  her  honor.  At  length  we  received 
a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War  directing  our 
dismission.  You  will  recollect  the  circumstances 
of  wretchedness  in  which  this  order  was  calculated 
to  place  us.  By  it  we  were  deprived  of  every 
article  of  public  property  ;  no  provision  was  made 
for  the  payment  of  our  troops  or  their  subsist 
ence  on  their  return  march  ;  while  many  of  our 
sick,  unable  to  help  themselves,  must  have  per 
ished.  Against  the  opinion  of  many  I  marched 
them  back  to  their  homes  before  I  dismissed 
them.  Your  regiment,  at  its  own  request,  was 


250  RED  EAGLE. 

dismissed  at  Columbia.  This  was  accompanied 
with  a  certificate  to  each  man,  expressing  the 
acts  under  which  he  had  been  enrolled  and  the 
length  of  the  tour  he  had  performed.  This  it  is 
which  is  now  attempted  to  be  construed  '  a  final 
discharge. '  But  surely  it  cannot  be  forgotten  by 
any  officer  or  soldier  how  sacredly  they  pledged 
themselves,  before  they  were  dismissed  or  re 
ceived  that  certificate,  cheerfully  to  obey  the 
voice  of  their  country,  if  it  should  re-summon 
them  into  service  ;  neither  can  it  be  forgotten,  I 
dare  hope,  for  what  purpose  that  certificate  was 
given  ;  it  was  to  secure,  if  possible,  to  those  brave 
men,  who  had  shown  such  readiness  to  serve 
their  country,  certain  extra  emoluments,  speci 
fied  in  the  seventh  section  of  the  act  under  which 
they  had  engaged,  in  the  event  they  were  not 
recalled  into  servics  for  the  residue  of  their  term. 
'  Is  it  true,  then,  that  my  solicitude  for  the  in 
terest  of  the  volunteers  is  to  be  made  by  them  a 
pretext  for  disgracing  a  name  which  they  have 
rendered  illustrious  ?  Is  a  certificate,  designed 
solely  for  their  benefit,  to  become  the  rallying 
word  for  mutiny  ?  Strange  perversion  of  feeling 
and  of  reasoning  !  Have  I  really  any  power  to 
discharge  men  whose  term  of  service  has  not  ex 
pired  ?  If  I  were  weak  or  wicked  enough  to  at- 


A  NEW   PLAN   OF   THE   MUTINEERS.  251 

tempt  the  exercise  of  such  a  power,  does  any  one 
believe  the  soldier  would  be  ttiereby  exonerated 
from  the  obligation  he  has  voluntarily  taken  upon 
himself  to  his  government  ?  I  should  become  a 
traitor  to  the  important  concern  which  has  been 
intrusted  to  my  management,  while  the  soldier 
who  had  been  deceived  by  a  false  hope  of  lib 
eration  would  be  still  liable  to  redeem  his  pledge. 
I  should  disgrace  myself  without  benefiting  you. 
;'  I  can  only  deplore  the  situation  of  those  offi 
cers  who  have  undertaken  to  persuade  their  men 
that  their  term  of  service  will  expire  on  the  loth. 
In  giving  their  opinions  to  this  effect  they  have 
acted  indiscreetly  and  without  sufficient  author 
ity.  It  would  be  the  most  pleasing  act  of  my 
life  to  restore  them  with  honor  to  their  families. 
Nothing  could  pain  me  more  than  that  any  other 
sentiments  should  be  felt  toward  them  than  those 
of  gratitude  and  esteem.  On  all  occasions  it  has 
been  my  highest  happiness  to  promote  their  inter 
est,  and  even  to  gratify  their  wishes,  where  with 
propriety  it  could  be  done.  When  in  the  lower 
country,  believing  that  in  the  order  for  their  dis 
missal  they  had  been  improperly  treated,  I  even 
solicited  the  government  to  discharge  them  finally 
from  the  obligations  into  which  they  had  entered. 
You  know  the  answer  of  the  Secretary  of  War  : 


RED   EAGLE. 


that  neither  he  nor  the  President,  as  he  believed, 
had  the  power  to  discharge  them.  How  then 
can  it  be  required  of  me  to  do  so  ? 

'  The  moment  it  is  signified  to  me  by  any  com 
petent  authority,  even  by  the  Governor  of  Ten 
nessee,  to  whom  I  have  written  on  the  subject,  or 
by  General  Pinckney,  who  is  now  appointed  to  the 
command,  that  the  volunteers  may  be  exonerated 
from  further  service,  that  moment  I  will  pro 
nounce  it  with  the  geatest  satisfaction.  I  have 
only  the  power  of  pronouncing  a  discharge,  not 
of  giving  it,  in  any  case—  a  distinction  which  I 
would  wish  should  be  borne  in  mind.  Already 
have  I  sent  to  raise  volunteers  on  my  own  re 
sponsibility,  to  complete  a  campaign  which  has 
been  so  happily  begun,  and  thus  far  so  fortu 
nately  prosecuted-  The  moment  they  arrive,  and 
I  am  assured  that,  fired  by  our  exploits,  they  will 
hasten  in  crowds  on  the  first  intimation  that  we 
need  their  services,  they  will  be  substituted  in  the 
place  of  those  who  are  discontented  here.  The 
latter  will  then  be  permitted  to  return  to  their 
homes  with  all  the  honor  which,  under  such  cir 
cumstances  they  can  carry  along  with  them.  But 
I  still  cherish  the  hope  that  their  dissatisfaction 
and  complaints  have  been  greatly  exaggerated. 
I  cannot,  must  not,  believe  that  the  '  volunteers 


A    XI-;\V    PLAN   OF  THE   MUTINEERS.  253 

of  Tennessee, '  a  name  ever  dear  to  fame,  will  dis 
grace  themselves  and  a  country  which  they  have 
honored,  by  abandoning  her  standard  as  mutineers 
and  deserters  ;  but  should  I  be  disappointed  and 
compelled  to  resign  this  pleasing  hope,  one  thing 
I  will  not  resign — my  duty.  Mutiny  and  sedition, 
so  long  as  I  possess  the  power  of  quelling  them, 
shall  be  put  down  ;  and  even  when  left  destitute 
of  this,  I  will  still  be  found  in  the  last  extremity 
endeavoring  to  discharge  the  duty  I  owe  my 
country  and  myself." 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

JACKSON'S  SECOND  BATTLE  WITH  HIS  OWN 
MEN. 

WHEN  troops  unused  as  these  men  were  to 
systematic  obedience  make  up  their  minds  to 
abandon  the  service  they  are  of  very  little  ac 
count  thereafter,  as  soldiers.  If  one  pretext  for 
mutiny  and  desertion  fails  them,  they  quickly  find 
another,  as  the  men  had  done  in  this  case.  While 
famine  lasted,  famine  was  the  best  possible  ex 
cuse  for  wishing  to  go  home,  and  the  men 
thought  of  no  other.  They  even  protested  their 
devotion  to  the  cause  and  their  willingness  to  re 
main  in  service  if  food  could  be  found  for  them  ; 
but  no  sooner  were  their  mouths  stopped  with 
abundant  supplies  of  beef  and  bread  than  they 
tried  to  leave,  as  has  been  described,  without  any 
pretext  whatever.  Failing  in  that,  they  picked 
this  flaw,  or  this  pretended  flaw,  in  their  contract 
of  enlistment,  and  Jackson  probably  knew  that  ro 
far  as  their  restoration  to  the  condition  of  good 
soldiers  was  concerned,  he  was  wasting  words  in 
arguing  the  case  ;  but  it  was  necessary  to  detain 


JACKSON'S  SECOND  BATTLE  WITH  HIS  MEN.  255 


^  men  until  the  others  for  whom  he  had  sent 
to  Tennessee  should  arrive  to  take  their  places. 
They  were  useless  for  any  thing  like  offensive 
operations,  else  he  would  have  marched  with 
them  at  once  toward  the  Creek  strongholds  ;  but 
while  they  should  remain  at  Fort  Strother  he 
could  depend  upon  them  to  defend  that  post 
against  any  assault  that  might  be  made  upon  it, 
simply  because  in  the  event  of  an  attack  they 
must  defend  themselves,  and  to  do  that  would 
have  been  to  defend  the  fort. 

Jackson  had  ordered  the  enlistment  of  a  new 
force  to  take  the  place  of  these  discontented  men, 
but  until  the  new*  army  should  come  he  was  bent 
upon  keeping  the  old  one. 

Precisely  what  arrangements  he  had  made  to 
meet  trouble  on  the  loth  of  December  we  have 
no  means  of  knowing.  He  was  not  permitted  to 
wait  for  the  coming  of  that  day.  On  the  even 
ing  of  the  Qth,  word  was  brought  to  him  that  the 
men  were  already  strapping  their  knapsacks  on 
their  backs  and  getting  ready  to  march  imme 
diately. 

It  was  time  to  act.  Jackson  issued  one  of  the 
shortest  cf  all  his  proclamations,  ordering  all  good 
soldiers  to  assist  in  putting  down  the  mutiny. 
Then  he  ordered  the  militia  to  parade  at  once 


2$6  RED   EAGLE. 

under  arms.  Placing  his  cannon  in  a  command 
ing  position,  he  drew  up  the  militia  in  line  of 
battle  and  confronted  the  mutinous  volunteers. 

Riding  to  the  front  he  made  a  speech  to  the 
volunteers,  beginning  by  assuring  them  that  they 
could  march  only  over  his  dead  body  ;  that  he 
had  done  with  entreaty,  and  meant  now  to  use 
force  ;  that  they  must  now  make  their  choice  be 
tween  returning  to  their  tents  and  remaining  qui 
etly  upon  duty,  and  fighting  him  and  his  troops 
right  where  he  stood  ;  the  point,  he  said,  could 
be  decided  very  quickly  by  arms  if  they  chose  to 
submit  the  question  to  that  kind  of  argument. 
He  told  them,  too,  that  he  was  expecting  new 
troops  to  take  their  places,  and  that  until  these 
new  troops  should  arrive  not  a  man  present  should 
quit  the  post  except  by  force. 

He  was  now  terribly  in  earnest,  and  bent  upon 
no  half-way  measures.  He  had  drawn  his  men 
up  in  line  of  battle,  not  as  a  threat,  but  for  pur 
poses  of  battle.  He  was  ready  to  fight,  and 
meant  to  fight,  not  defensively,  but  offensively. 
He  wanted  no  negotiation,  asked  no  man  upon 
what  terms  he  would  submit.  He  had  dictated 
the  terms  himself  and  meant  now  to  enforce 
them.  He  had  given  the  volunteers  a  choice- 
cither  to  remain  peaceably  until  he  shoulS  send 


JACKSON'S  SECOND  BATTLE  WITH  HIS  MEN.  257 

them  home,  or  to  fight  a  battle  with  him  right 
there  in  the  road  and  right  then  on  the  Qth  of 
December  ;  he  had  offered  them  this  choice,  and 
they  must  choose  and  say  what  their  choice  was. 
\Vhen  he  ended  his  speech  the  volunteers  stood 
grimly,  sullenly  silent.  They  did  not  offer  to 
advance,  but  that  was  not  enough.  They  must 
say  whether  they  would  remain  and  obey,  or  ac 
cept  battle.  If  they  would  promise  to  remain 
without  further  attempts  of  this  kind,  he  was  con 
tent  ;  if  not,  the  battle  would  begin. 

"  I  demand  an  explicit  answer, "he  said  ;  an  1 
no  reply  coming,  he  turned  to  his  artillerymen 
and  ordered  them  to  stand  to  their  guns  with 
lighted  matches. 

It  was  now  a  question  merely  of  seconds. 
Jackson  gave  the  men  time  to  answer,  but  not 
many  moments  would  pass  before  he  would  speak 
the  only  words  which  were  left  to  him  to  speak 
—the  words  "commence  firing,"  those  words 
which  in  every  battle  are  the  signal  for  the  trans 
formation  of  iron  or  brazen  guns  from  harmless 
cylinders  of  metal  into  bellowing  monsters,  belch 
ing  fiery  death  from  their  throats. 

There  was  silence  for  a  moment — that  awful 
silence  which  always  precedes  the  turmoil  of  bat 
tle,  doing  more  to  appall  men  than  all  the  demo- 


258  RED   EAGLE. 

niac  noises  of  the  contest  do  ;  then  a  murmur  was 
heard  as  of  men  hastily  consulting  ;  then  the 
officers  of  the  volunteer  brigade  stepped  a  pace 
to  the  front  and  delivered  the  answer  which  Jack 
son  had  demanded. 

They  had  made  their  choice,  and  the  answer 
was  that  they  would  return  to  duty,  and  remain 
at  the  fort  until  the  new  men  should  come,  or 
until  their  commander  should  receive  authority 
to  discharge  them. 

This  affair  of  the  Qth  of  December,  1813,  is 
nowhere  set  down  in  the  list  of  Jackson's  battles  ; 
but  nowhere  did  he  win  a  more  decided  victory 
or  display  his  qualities  as  a  great  commander  to 
better  advantage. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

JACKSON    DISMISSES    HIS    VOLUNTEERS 
WITHOUT  A  BENEDICTION. 

JACKSON  had  not  deceived  himself  with  respect 
to  these  mutinous  men.      He  knew  very  well  that 
their  usefulness  as  soldiers  was  hopelessly  gone, 
and  he   had  no  thought  of  undertaking  a  cam 
paign  with  them.     Evrea  before  this  last  trouble 
came  he  had  abandoned  all  hopjj  of  this,  and  had 
ceased  to  regard  the  army  he  had  with  him  as 
worth  keeping,    except    as    a  garrison   for   Fort 
Strother,  during  the  period  of  waiting  for  a  new 
arm  y  to  be  raised  to  take  its  place.      It  was  his 
purpose  to  send  this  army  back  to  Tennessee  as 
soon  as  he  could  replace  the  men  with  others  fit 
to  fight  with,    and   to   get  those  others  he   was 
working  in  every  possible  way.     He  had  sent  to 
Tennessee  for  the  enlistment  of  a  new  force,  and 
had   written  to  everybody   he  knew   there    who 
had  aught  of   influence — preachers,  doctors,  law 
yers,  and  men  of  affairs — urging  them  to  stir  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  young  men  and  persuade  them 
to  volunteer.     He  had  already  ordered  General 


260  RED   EAGLE. 

Cocke  to  join  him  with  his  force,  and  that  offi 
cer  had  promised  to  do  so  immediately.  As  this 
would  give  him  a  sufficient  garrison  for  ti^e  fort 
almost  immediately,  Jackson  determined  to  send 
home  at  once  every  man  who  could  not  be 
stirred  to  a  proper  sense  of  his  duty,  every  man 
who  could  not  be  induced,  by  a  fair  and  earnest 
statement  of  the  case,  to  remain  voluntarily  and 
finish  the  campaign.  In  order  to  separate  any 
such  sheep,  if  there  were  any,  from  the  homesick 
goats,  the  commander  on  the  I3th  of  December 
issued  a  final  appeal,  which  was  read  to  the 
troops.  It  was  as  follows  : 

"  On  the  1 2th  day  of  December,  1812,  you 
assembled  at  the  call  of  your  country.  Your 
professions  of  patriotism  and  ability  to  endure 
fatigue  were  at  once  tested  by  the  inclemency  of 
the  weather.  Breaking  your  way  through  sheets 
of  ice  you  descended  the  Mississippi  and  reached 
the  point  at  which  you  were  ordered  to  be  halted 
and  dismissed.  All  this  you  bore  without  mur 
muring.  Finding  that  your  services  were  not 
needed,  the  means  for  marching  you  back  were 
procured  ;  every  difficulty  was  surmounted,  end 
as  soon  as  the  point  from  which  you  embarked 
was  regained,  the  order  for  your  dismissal  WM-, 
carried  into  effect.  The  promptness  with  which 


JACKSON   DISMISSES   HIS   VOLUNTEERS.       26 1 

you  assembled,  the  regularity  of  your  conduct, 
your  attention  to  your  own  duties,  the  deter 
mination  manifested  on  every  occasion  to  carry 
into  effect  the  wishes  and  will  of  your  govern 
ment,  placed  you  on  elevated  ground.  You  not 
only  distinguished  yourselves,  but  gave  to  your 
state  a  distinguished  rank  with  her  sisters,  and 
led  your  government  to  believe  that  the  honor  of 
the  nation  would  never  be  tarnished  when  en 
trusted  to  the  holy  keeping  of  the  volunteers  of 
Tennessee. 

'  In  the  progress  of  a  war  which  the  implacable 
and  eternal  enemy  of  our  independence  induced 
to  be  waged,  we  found  that  without  cause  on  our 
part  a  portion  of  the  Creek  Nation  was  added  to 
the  number  of  our  foes.  To  put  it  down,  the 
first  glance  of  the  administration  fell  on  you,  and 
you  were  again  summoned  to  the  field  of  honor. 
In  full  possession  of  your  former  feelings,  that 
summons  was  cheerfully  obeyed.  Before  your 
enemy  thought  you  in  motion  you  were  at  Tal- 
lushatchee  and  Talladega.  The  thunder  of  your 
arms  was  a  signal  to  them  that  the  slaughter  of 
your  countrymen  was  about  to  be  avenged.  You 
fought,  you  conquered  !  Barely  enough  of  the 
foe  escaped  to  recount  to  their  savage  associates 
your  deeds  of  valor.  You  returned  to  this  place 


262  RED   EAGLE. 

loaded  with  laurels   and   the   applause    of   your 
country. 

"  Can  it  be  that  these  brave  men  are  about  to 
become  the  tarnishers  of  their  own  reputation, 
the  destroyers  of  a  name  which  does  them  so 
much  honor  ?  Yes,  it  is  a  truth  too  well  disclosed 
that  cheerfulness  has  been  exchanged  for  com 
plaints.  Murmurings  and  discontents  alone  pre 
vail.  Men  who  a  little  while  since  were  offering 
tip  prayers  for  permission  to  chastise  the  merci 
less  savage,  who  burned  with  impatience  to  teach 
them  how  much  they  had  hitherto  been  indebted 
to  our  forbearance,  are  now,  when  they  could 
so  easily  attain  their  wishes,  seeking  to  be  dis 
charged.  The  heart  of  your  general  has  been 
pierced.  The  first  object  of  his  military  affec 
tions  and  the  first  glory  of  his  life  were  the  vol 
unteers  of  Tennessee.  The  very  name  recalls  to 
him  a  thousand  endearing  recollections.  But 
these  brave  men,  these  volunteers,  have  become 
mutineers.  The  feelings  he  would  have  in 
dulged,  your  general  has  been  compelled  to  sup 
press  ;  he  has  been  compelled,  by  a  regard  to 
that  subordination  so  necessary  to  the  support  of 
every  army,  and  which  he  is  bound  to  have  ob 
served,  to  check  the  disorder  which  would  have 
destroyed  you.  He  has  interposed  his  authority 


JACKSON   DISMISSES   HIS   VOLUNTEERS.       263 

for  your  safety — to  prevent  you  from  disgracing 
yourselves  and  your  country.  Tranquillity  has 
been  restored  in  our  camp  ;  contentment  shall 
also  be  restored.  This  can  be  done  only  by  per 
mitting  those  to  retire  whose  dissatisfaction  pro 
ceeds  from  causes  that  cannot  be  controlled. 

"  This  permission  will  now  be  given.  Your 
country  will  dispense  with  your  services  if  you  no 
longer  have  a  regard  for  that  fame  which  you  have 
so  nobly  earned  for  yourselves  and  her.  Yes, 
soldiers  !  You  who  were  once  so  brave,  and  to 
whom  honor  was  so  dear,  shall  be  permitted  to 
return  to  your  homes,  if  you  still  desire  it.  But 
in  what  language,  when  you  arrive,  will  you  ad 
dress  your  families  and  friends  ?  Will  you  tell 
them  that  you  abandoned  your  general  and  your 
late  associates  in  arms  within  fifty  miles  of  a  sav- 
n^e  enemy,  who  equally  delights  in  shedding  the 
blood  of  the  innocent  female  and  her  sleeping 
babe  as  that  of  the  warrior  contending  in  battle  ? 
Lamentable,  disgraceful  tale  !  If  your  disposi 
tions  are  really  changed,  if  you  fear  an  enemy 
you  so  lately  conquered,  this  day  will  prove  it. 
I  now  put  it  to  yourselves  ;  determine  upon  the 
part  you  will  act,  influenced  only  by  the  sugges 
tions  of  your  own  hearts  and  your  own  under 
standings.  All  who  prefer  an  inglorious  retire- 


264  RED   EAGLE. 

mcnt  shall  be  ordered  to  Nashville,  to  be  dis- 
( barged  as  the  President  or  the  Governor  may 
clircct.  Those  who  choose  to  remain  and  unite 
with  their  general  in  the  further  prosecution  oi 
the  campaign  can  do  so,  and  will  thereby  fur 
nish  a  proof  that  they  have  been  greatly  tra 
duced,  and  that  although  disaffection  and  cow 
ardice  have  reached  the  hearts  of  some,  it  has 
not  reached  theirs.  To  such  my  assurance  is 
given  that  former  irregularities  will  not  be  at 
tributed  to  them.  They  shall  be  immediately 
organized  into  a  separate  corps,  under  officers  of 
their  own  choice  ;  and  in  a  little  while  it  is  con 
fidently  believed  an  opportunity  will  be  afforded 
of  adding  to  the  laurels  you  have  already  won." 

If  these  men  had  had  a  single  spark  of  soldierly 
spirit  left  in  them— if  the  manhood  itself  had  not 
all  gone  out  of  them— such  an  appeal  as  this  would 
have  shamed  them  into  their  duty.  It  is  incrcci- 
blc  that  men  who  had  once  had  spirit  enough  to 
volunteer  in  the  service  of  their  country  should 
have  lost  it  so  utterly  that  they  could  resist  this 
plea  to  their  pride,  their  duty,  and  their  regard 
for  their  own  good  name  ;  but  such  was  the  fact. 
Out  of  the  whole  brigade,  officers  and  men,  only 
one  was  found  with  manliness  enough  to  stay. 
That  one  man  was  a  Captain  Wilkinson,  the  men- 


JACIvSOX    DISMISSES    HIS   VOLUNTEERS.       265 

tion  of  whose  name  is  only  a  just  tribute  to  his 
soldierly  manhood.  The  rest  were  no  longer 
men  in  spirit,  but  homesick  wretches,  lusting  for 
the  flesh-pots  of  Tennessee,  the  ease,  the  indj- 
lence,  the  comfort  of  home. 

Public  opinion  is  particularly  strong  in  a  new 
country,  where  every  man's  history  is  known  to 
all  his  neighbors,  and  few  men  in  such  a  case  can 
successfully  brave  it.  Public  opinion  in  Ten 
nessee  sharply  condemned  these  volunteers  for 
their  abandonment  of  the  service  upon  a  mere 
technicality,  at  a  time  when  the  enemy  was  in 
their  front.  How  sorely  they  smarted  under  the 
taunts  of  their  neighbors  we  may  easily  imagine  ; 
and  when  they  could  silently  endure  the  censure 
no  longer,  they  prepared  a  plea  in  their  own  jus 
tification,  which  was  published  in  March  of  the 
following  year.  This  plea  was  offered  in  the  form 
of  a  statement,  signed  by  the  brigadier-general 
who  commanded  the  disaffected  brigade,  one  col 
onel,  two  lieutenant-colonels,  two  majors,  an 
aide-de-camp,  and  the  brigade-quartermaster. 
These  officers  in  their  statement  recount  the  his 
tory  of  their  service,  and  rest  their  case  upon  the 
dates  used  in  their  muster-rolls,  and  the  techni 
cality  that  in  dismissing  them  after  their  Nat 
chez  expedition  Jackson  had  used  the  word  "  dis- 


266  RED    EAGLE. 

charge"  instead  of  "  dismiss."  They  assert  that 
they  and  their  men  were  fully  and  finally  dis 
charged  at  the  end  of  that  expedition,  and  ex 
plain  their  readiness  to  answer  the  call  to  march 
against  the  Creeks,  when  Jackson  assembled  them 
a  second  time,  by  a  confession  that  they  thought 
they  saw  a  chance  to  secure  pay  for  service  not 
rendered.  They  declare  that  they  returned  to 
the  service,  believing  that  their  term  could  only 
last  till  the  loth  of  December  in  any  case,  and 
that  by  doing  so  they  could  compel  the  govern 
ment  to  give  them  soldiers'  pay  for  all  the  time 
which  they  had  passed  at  home. 

Read  carelessly,  their  plea  seems  to  palliate 
their  misconduct  ;  read  at  all  carefully,  it  adds  to 
their  shame. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

HOW    JACKSON     LOST    THE     REST    OF     HIS 
ARMY. 

HAVING  begun  the  work  of  getting  rid  of  men 
upon  whom  he  could  not  depend  for  active  ser 
vice,  Jackson  was  disposed  to  complete  it  as 
speedily  as  possible,  in  order  that  he  might  re 
sume  the  active  operations  of  the  campaign, 
knowing  precisely  what  he  could  count  upon  in 
the  way  of  an  army  and  governing  his  measures 
accordingly. 

He  had  counted  upon  General  Cocke's  force 
for  at  least  half  his  strength,  but  here  again  he 
WPCS  doomed  to  disappointment.  General  Cocke 
cine,  it  is  true,  according  to  the  appointment, 
and  brought  an  army  of  two  thousand  men  with 
him  ;  but  they  were  three-months'  men,  and  they 
had  already  served  more  than  two  months  ! 
General  Cocke  has  declared  in  a  printed  letter 
that  he  had  asked  these  men  to  give  up  the 
thought  of  going  home  at  the  expiration  of  their 
term  of  service,  and  voluntarily  remain  until  the 
end  of  the  campaign,  and  that  the  men  had 


r68  RED  EAGLE. 

promised  him  to  do  so.  He  expressed  in  that 
letter  surprise,  not  unmixed  with  indignation,  that 
Jackson  did  not  take  them  at  their  word  ;  but 
when  we  remember  what  Jackson  had  just  gone 
through,  and  reflect  that  these  men  would  have 
ceased  to  be  soldiers  and  become  citizens  when 
their  time  should  expire  ;  that  their  promise  to 
remain  till  the  end  of  the  campaign  would  have 
had  no  binding  force  whatever  ;  that  they  would 
have  had  the  fullest  right,  individually  or  in  bod 
ies,  to  abandon  the  army  at  any  moment,  how 
ever  critical  the  situation  might  be  ;  and  that 
Jackson  would  have  had  absolutely  no  authority 
over  them,  even  to  command  obedience  to  orders 
in  camp  or  battle,  we  cannot  wonder  that  he 
declined  to  begin  a  campaign  in  the  wilderness 
against  a  savage  and  wily  foe,  with  an  army 
which  might  dissolve  at  any  moment  and  go 
home,  and  which,  even  while  it  should  remain 
with  him,  would  be  free  to  disobey  orders  at  its 
own  sweet  will.  Campaigns  are  not  successfully 
carried  on,  battles  are  not  won,  with  mobs.  Jack 
son  meant  to  have  an  army  before  setting  out 
again  to  crush  the  Creeks,  and  accordingly  he 
sent  Cocke's  men  home,  retaining  only  Colonel 
Lillard's  regiment  as  a  temporary  garrison  for 
the  fort. 


HOW   JACKSON    LOST   HIS   ARMY.  269 

He  then  ordered  General  Cocke  to  return  to 
East  Tennessee  and  enlist  a  new  force,  and  ur^ed 

o 

the  returning-  men  to  volunteer  again  as  soon  as 
they  should  have  provided  themselves  at  home 
v  ith  suitable  clothing  for  a  winter  campaign. 

It  was  his  hope  that  two  thousand  men  or 
more  would  be  secured  in  East  Tennessee  and  a 
like  number  in  West  Tennessee,  and  with  such  a 
force  he  could  march  into  the  Creek  Nation  and 
crush  the  savages,  he  believed,  within  a  very  brief 
time. 

General  Cocke  obeyed  the  order  very  reluc 
tantly,  as  he  has  himself  told  the  public.  His 
confidence  in  his  men  was  so  great,  that  he 
thought  it  unnecessary  and  unwise  to  dismiss 
them  and  search  for  others  to  take  their  place. 
He  did  as  he  was  bidden,  however,  returning  to 
East  Tennessee  and  speedily  securing  a  new 
force  two  thousand  strong.  These  men  volun 
teered  for  six  months,  and  were  mustered  into 
service  in  time  to  march  on  the  i/th  of  January. 

On  the  march,  however,  these  six-months'  men 
learned  that  the  new  levies  from  the  western  part 
of  the  State — men  between  whom  and  the  East 
Tennesseeans  a  wretched  jealousy  prevailed — 
were  to  be  enlisted  for  only  three  months,  and 
this  bred  sore  discontent  in  General  Cocke 's 


270  RED    EAGLE. 

camp.  General  Cocke  met  this  difficulty  reso 
lutely,  and  in  a  published  letter  he  has  given  an 
account  of  what  he  did. 

"I  overtook  the  troops,"  he  says,  "at  the 
Lookout  Mountain,  when  I  found  a  dissatisfaction 
among  the  troops  amounting  almost  to  mutiny. 
They  declared  their  determination  to  return 
hom^  at  the  end  of  three  months.  I  made  them 
a  speech,  in  which  I  told  them  that  if  they  left 
the  army  without  any  honorable  discharge,  they 
would  disgrace  themselves  and  families  ;  that 
much  of  their  time  had  already  expired,  and  for 
all  the  good  they  could  do,  if  they  intended  to 
leave  at  the  end  of  three  months  they  had  better 
go  home  then,  but  appealed  to  their  magnanim 
ity  and  patriotism  to  go  on  like  brave  men  and 
good  soldiers,  and  serve  until  the  expiration  of 
the  term  for  which  they  were  ordered  into  ser 
vice. " 

These  troops  were  certainly  not  in  a  mood  to 
become  soldiers  fit  for  the  work  they  had  to  do. 
Meantime  the  work  of  enlistment  in  West  Ten 
nessee  had  gone  on  very  slowly  and  unsatisfac 
torily,  and  even  Coffee's  troopers,  whom  Jackson 
had  sent  to  Iluntsville  to  recruit  their  horses, 
exacting  a  promise  from  them  that  they  would 
return  as  soon  as  they  should  accomplish  that 


HOW   JACKSON    LOST   HIS   ARMY.  2/1 

object,  had  broken  faith  and  deserted  in  a  body 
in  spite  of  all  that  their  gallant  leader  could  do  to 
restrain  them. 

Even  this  was  not  the  end  of  Jackson's  troubles. 
The  men  whom  he  fiad  retained  from  Cocke's 
command  were  ready  to  leave  as  soon  as  their 
term  of  service  should  expire,  and  the  date  of  its 
expiration  was  near  at  hand.  This  would  dimm 
ish  the  force  in  Fort  Strother  from  fourteen  hun 
dred  to  six  hundred  men.  These  six  hundred 
were  militiamen,  and  now,  as  if  to  break  down 
what  remained  of  Jackson's  hopes,  these  troops 
managed  to  find  an  excuse  for  quitting  the  ser 
vice  and  going  home  presently.  The  act  of  the 
legislature  by  which  they  had  been  called  int:> 
service  was  bunglingly  drawn,  and  upon  ex 
amining  it  the  militia  officers  discovered  that 
nothing  whatever  had  been  said  in  the  law  with 
respect  to  the  length  of  time  for  which  they 
should  serve.  Then  the  question  arose,  How 
long  have  these  men  engaged  to  serve  ?  The 
men  held  that  as  no  term  was  set  by  the  law 
the  lawgivers  must  be  held  to  have  meant  the 
shortest  time  for  which  it  was  customary  to  call 
out  the  militia,  namely,  three  months,  and  that 
time  would  end  on  the  4th  of  January.  Jackson, 
on  the  other  hand,  held  that  the  law  set  no  other 


2/2  RED    EAGLE. 

limit  to  the  term  of  service,  because  it  meant  that 
the  service  should  continue  as  long  as  the  war 
did.  The  men  had  been  called  out,  he  said,  to 
suppress  the  Creeks,  and  their  term  of  service 
would  end  when  they  had  Sone  that,  and  not  be 
fore — whether  that  should  be  three  months  or 
three  years  after  their  enlistment.  Jackson  had 
fourteen  hundred  men,  of  whom  eight  hundred 
had  an  unquestioned  right  to  quit  in  the  middle 
of  January,  while  the  remaining  six  hundred  as 
serted  their  right  to  retire  at  the  beginning  of 
that  month.  The  new  East  Tennessee  troops 
who  were  on  their  way  to  him  had  enlisted  for  six 
months,  but,  as  we  know,  were  determined  to 
serve  only  half  of  that  term,  a  considerable  part 
ol  whicH  had  already  expired.  Never  was  a  com 
mander  in  a  sorer  strait.  Sent  to  fight  a  cam 
paign  and  held  responsible  for  its  success,  he  was 
denied  an  army  with  which  to  fight  at  all.  His 
commanding  general  urged  him  to  activity,  on 
the  ground  that  the  British  must  at  any  cost  be 
shorn  of  the  strength  they  had  sought  to  secure 
by  stimulating  Indian  hostilities  ;  the  British  were 
already  in  Florida,  threatening  Mobile  and  New 
Orleans  ;  the  Seminoles  in  the  Spanish  province 
and  the  runaway  negroes  there  Avere  ready  to 
take  up  arms  and  assail  the  Georgia  borders  ; 


HOW  JACKSON   LOST   HIS  ARMY.  273 

while  in  the  North  and  West  the  war  was  pros 
ecuted  by  the  enemy  with  untiring  perseverance. 

But  what  was  Jackson  to  do?  The  troops  he 
had  were  about  to  leave  him,  and  it  began  to  ap 
pear  that  no  others  were  likely  to  come  to  him. 
Even  Governor  Blount  advised  him  to  yield  to 
the  demands  both  of  the  six-months'  volunteers 
who  wanted  to  quit  the  service  at  the  end  of  three 
months,  and  of  the  militia  who  wanted  to  quit  al 
most  immediately.  Governor  Blount  sent  Jack 
son  a  letter  in  which  he  urged  this  course  upon 
him,  advising  him  to  regard  the  campaign  as  at 
an  end,  retire  to  the  borders  of  Tennessee  and 
protect  that  state  as  well  as  he  could,  abandon 
the  attempt  to  raise  a  new  force  by  enlisting  vol 
unteers,  and  quietly  wait  until  the  National  Gov 
ernment  should  provide  him  with  an  army  by 
ordering  a  draft  or  by  some  other  means. 
Governor  Blount  believed  that  he  had  no  au 
thority  to  raise  further  forces,  and  that  any  at 
tempt  which  he  might  make  to  do  so  must  injure 
rather  than  help  the  service. 

Then  Jackson  rose  to  the  occasion,  and  showed 
that  he  was  no  less  able  as  a  debater  than  as  a 
fighter.  He  wrote  a  letter  to  Governor  Blount 
which  changed  the  whole  face  of  affairs,  con 
verted  that  executive  officer  to  views  the  op 


274  RED   EAGLE, 

posite  of  those  that  he  had  held,  and  led  to  the 
creation  of  a  new  army,  or  rather  of  two  new 
armies,  one  bcin  ^  a  temporary  supply  OL  short- 
term  men,  with  whom  Jackson  did  some  work, 
and  the  other  coming  immediately  to  take  its 
place. 

This  letter,  for  the  text  of  which  we  are  in 
debted  to  Mr.  Parton,  is  called  by  that  writer 
"the  best  letter  he  [Jackson]  ever  wrote  in  his 
life — one  of  those  historical  epistles  which  do  the 
work  of  a  campaign."  Jackson  wrote  : 

11  Had  your  wish  that  I  should  discharge  a  part 
of  my  force  and  retire  with  the  residue  into  the 
settlements  assumed  the  form  of  a  positive  order,  it 
might  have  furnished  me  some  apology  for  pursu 
ing  such  a  course,  but  by  no  means  a  full  justifica 
tion.  As  you  would  have  no  power  to  give  such 
an  order,  I  could  not  be  inculpable  in  obeying, 
with  my  eyes  open  to  the  fatal  consequences 
that  would  attend  it.  But  a  bare  recommenda 
tion — founded,  as  I  am  satisfied  it  must  be,  on  the 
artful  suggestions  of  those  fireside  patriots  who 
seek  in  a  failure  of  the  expedition  an  excuse  for 
their  own  supineness,  and  upon  the  misrepresen 
tations  of  the  discontented  from  the  army,  who 
wish  it  to  be  believed  that  the  difficulties  which 
overcame  their  patriotism  are  wholly  insur- 


HOW   JACKSON    LOST   HIS  ARMY.  275 

mountable — would  afford  me  but  a  feeble  shield 
against  the  reproaches  of  my  country  or  my 
conscience.  Believe  me,  my  respected  friend, 
the  remarks  I  make  proceed  from  the  purest 
personal  regard.  If  you  would  preserve  your 
reputation  or  that  of  the  State  over  which  you 
preside,  you  must  take  a  straightforward,  deter 
mined  course,  regardless  of  the  applause  or  cen 
sure  of  the  populace,  and  of  the  forebodings  of 
that  dastardly  and  designing  crew  who  at  a  time 
like  this  may  be  expected  to  clamor  continually 
in  your  ears.  The  very  wretches  who  now  be 
set  you  with  evil  counsel  will  be  the  first,  should 
the  measures  which  they  recommend  eventuate 
in  disaster,  to  call  down  imprecations  on  your 
head  and  load  you  with  reproaches. 

'  Your  country  is  in  danger ;  apply  its  re 
sources  to  its  defence.  Can  any  course  be  more 
plain  ?  Do  you,  my  friend,  at  such  a  moment  as 
the  present,  sit  with  your  arms  folded  and  your 
heart  at  ease,  waiting  a  solution  of  your  doubts 
and  definitions  of  your  powers  ?  Do  you  wait  for 
special  instructions  from  the  Secretary  of  War, 
which  it  is  impossible  for  you  to  receive  in  time 
for  the  danger  that  threatens  ?  How  did  the 
venerable  Shelby  act  under  similar  circumstances, 
or  rather  under  circumstances  by  no  means  so 


276  RED   EAGLE. 

critical  ?  Did  he  wait  for  orders  to  do  what  every  . 
man  of  sense  knew,  what  every  patriot  felt  to  be 
right  ?  He  did  not ;  and  yet  how  highly  and  justly 
did  the  government  extol  his  manly  and  energetic 
conduct  !  and  how  dear  has  his  name  become  to 
every  friend  of  his  country  ! 

"  You  say  that  an  order  to  bring  the  necessary 
quota  of  men  into  the  field  has  been  given,  and 
that  of  course  your  power  ceases  ;  and  although 
you  are  made  sensible  that  the  order  has  been 
wholly  neglected,  you  can  take  no  measure  to 
remedy  the  omission.  I  consider  it  your  imperi 
ous  duty,  when  the  men  called  for  by  your  author 
ity,  founded  upon  that  of  the  government,  are 
known  not  to  be  in  the  field,  to  see  that  they  be 
brought  there  ;  and  to  take  immediate  measures 
with  the  officer  who,  charged  with  the  execution 
of  your  order,  omits  or  neglects  to  do  it.  As  the 
executive  of  the  State,  it  is  your  duty  to  see  that 
the  full  quota  of  troops  be  constantly  kept  in  the 
field  for  the  time  they  have  been  required.  You 
are  responsible  to  the  government ;  your  officer 
to  you.  Of  what  avail  is  it  to  give  an  order  if 
it  be  never  executed  and  may  be  disobeyed  with 
impunity  ?  Is  it  by  empty  mandates  that  we  can 
hope  to  conquer  our  enemies  and  save  our  de 
fenceless  frontiers  from  butchery  and  devasta- 


HOW   JACKSON   LOST   HIS   ARMY.  277 

tion  ?  Believe  me,  my  valued  friend,  there  are 
times  when  it  is  highly  criminal  to  shrink  from 
responsibility  or  scruple  about  the  exercise  of 
our  powers.  There  are  times  when  we  must  dis 
regard  punctilious  etiquette,  and  think  only  of 
serving  our  country.  What  is  really  our  present 
situation  ?  The  enemy  we  have  been  sent  to 
subdue  may  be  said,  if  we  stop  at  this,  to  be  only 
exasperated.  The  commander-in-chief,  General 
Pinckney,  who  supposes  me  by  this  time  pre 
pared  for  renewed  operations,  has  ordered  m3 
to  advance  and  form  a  junction  with  th^ 
Georgia  army  ;  and  upon  the  expectation  that  I 
will  do  so  are  all  his  arrangements  formed  for 
the  prosecution  of  the  campaign.  Will  it  do  to 
defeat  his  plans  and  jeopardize  the  safety  of  the 
Georgia  army  ?  The  General  Government,  too, 
believe,  and  have  a  right  to  believe,  that  we 
have  now  not  less  than  five  thousand  men  in  the 
heart  of  the  enemy's  country,  and  on  this 
opinion  are  all  their  calculations  bottomed  ;  and 
must  they  all  be  frustrated,  and  I  become  the  in 
strument  by  which  it  is  done  ?  God  forbid  ! 

"  You  advise  me  to  discharge  or  dismiss  from 
service,  until  the  will  of  the  President  can  be 
known,  such  portion  of  the  militia  as  have  ren 
dered  three  months'  service.  This  advice  as- 


2/8  RED   EAGLE. 

tonishes  me  even  more  than  the  former.  I  have 
no  such  discretionary  power  ;  and  if  I  had,  it 
woul.l  be  impolitic  and  ruinous  to  exercise  it. 
I  believed  the  militia  who  were  not  specially  re 
ceived  for  a  shorter  period  were  engaged  for  six 
months,  unless  the  objects  of  the  expedition 
should  be  sooner  attained  ;  and  in  this  opinion  I 
was  greatly  strengthened  by  your  letter  of  the 
1 5th,  in  which  you  say,  when  answering  my 
inquiry  upon  this  subject,  '  The  militia  are  de 
tached  for  six  months'  service  ;'  nor  did  I  know 
or  suppose  you  had  a  different  opinion  until  the 
arrival  of  your  last  letter.  This  opinion  must, 
I  suppose,  agreeably  to  your  request,  be  made 
known  to  General  Roberts'  brigade,  and  then 
the  consequences  are  not  difficult  to  be  foreseen. 
Every  man  belonging  to  it  will  abandon  me  on  the 
4th  of  next  month  ;  nor  shall  I  have  the  means 
of  preventing  it  but  by  the  application  of  force, 
which  under  such  circumstances  I  shall  not  be  at 
liberty  to  use.  I  have  labored  hard  to  reconcile 
these  men  to  a  continuance  in  service  until  they 
could  be  honorably  discharged,  and  had  hoped 
I  had  in  a  great  measure  succeeded  ;  but  your 
opinion,  operating  with  their  own  prejudices, 
will  give  a  sanction  to  their  conduct,  and  render 
useless  any  further  attempts.  They  wiH  go  ;  but 


HOW   JACKSON    LOST   HIS   ARMY.  2/9 

I  can  neither  discharge  nor  dismiss  them.  Shall 
I  be  told  that,  as  th^v  will  go,  it  may  as  well  be 
peaceably  permitted  ?  Can  that  be  any  good 
reason  why  1  should  do  an  unauthorized  act  ?  Is 
it  a  good  reason  why  I  should  violate  the  order 
of  my  superior  officer  and  evince  a  willingness 
to  defeat  the  purposes  of  my  government  ? 
And  wherein  does  the  '  sound  policy '  of  the 
measures  that  have  been  recommended  consist  ? 
or  in  what  way  are  they  '  likely  to  promote  the 
public  good  '  ?  Is  it  sound  policy  to  abandon  a 
conquest  thus  far  made,  and  deliver  up  to  havoc 
or  add  to  the  number  of  our  enemies  those  friend 
ly  Creeks  and  Cherpkees  who,  relying  on  our 
protection,  have  espoused  our  cause  and  aided 
us  with  their  arms  ?  What  !  Retrograde  under 
such  circumstances  ?  I  will  perish  first.  No.  I 
will  do  my  duty  ;  I  will  hold  the  posts  I  have  es 
tablished,  until  ordered  to  abandon  them  by  the 
commanding  general,  or  die  in  the  struggle  ; 
long  since  have  I  determined  not  to  seek  the  pre 
servation  of  life  at  the  sacrifice  of  reputation. 

"  But  our  frontiers,  it  seems,  are  to  be  de- 
lended  ;  and  by  whom  ?  By  the  very  force  that 
is  now  recommended  to  be  dismissed  :  for  I  am 
first  told  to  retire  into  the  settlements  and  pro 
tect  the  frontiers  ;  next  to  discharge  my  troops  ; 


28O  RED    EAGLE.  ' 

and  then  that  no  measures  can  be  taken  for  rais 
ing  others.  No,  my  friend,  if  troops  be  given 
me,  it  is  not  by  loitering  on  the  frontiers  that  I 
will  seek  to  give  protection  :  they  are  to  be 
defended,  if  defended  at  all,  in  a  very  different 
manner — by  carrying  the  war  into  the  heart  of 
the  enemy's  country.  All  other  hopes  of  defence 
are  more  visionary  than  dreams. 

"What,  then,  is  to  be  done?  I'll  tell  you 
what.  You  have  only  to  act  with  the  energy  and 
decision  the  crisis  demands,  and  all  will  be  well. 
Send  me  a  force  engaged  for  six  months  and  I 
will  answer  for  the  result  ;  but  withhold  it  and 
all  is  lost — the  reputation  of  the  State,  and  yours 
and  mine  along  with  it. ' ' 

Fortunately,  Governor  Blount  had  not  only 
the  sense  to  see  into  what  errors  he  had  fallen, 
when  the  real  state  of  the  case  and  the  obliga 
tions  it  placed  upon  him  .were  thus  pointed  out, 
but  the  courage  also  to  act  inconsistently  and  to 
do  that  which  he  had  once  solemnly  declared  that 
he  ought  not  to  do.  It  was  too  late  to  undo  the 
mischief  he  had  done  by  advising  the  discharge 
of  the  discontented  militia,  but  he  set  to  work  at 
once  to  provide  men  to  take  their  places.  The 
militia  left  in  spite  of  all  that  Jackson  cared  to 
do  to  detain  them,  and  Cocke's  volunteers  fol- 


HOW   JACKSON   LOST   HIS   ARMY.  281 

lowed  them  ten  days  afterward,  but  in  the  mean 
time  a  force  of  nine  hundred  new  men  had  ar 
rived.  They  had  enlisted  in  part  for  two  and  in 
part  lor  three  months,  and  were  therefore  of  com 
paratively  little  value  ;  bat  Jackson  resolved  to 
use  them  at  least  while  waiting-  for  the  arrival  of 
the  larger  and  better  force  which  had  been 
ordered  to  gather  at  Fayetteville  on  the  28th  of 
January.  He  meant  to  strike  a  blow  \vith  what 
force  he  had  while  its  enlistment  should  continue, 
so  that  no  more  men  might  be  paid  for  service  as 
soldiers  without  doing  any  fighting.  The  volun 
teers  whose  term  had  expired  marched  out  of 
camp  on  the  I4th  of  January,  and  on  the  next 
day  Jackson  set  his  new  men  in  motion  for  work. 
They  were  undrilled,  undisciplined,  and  weak 
in  numbers,  but  Jackson  was  now  bent  upon 
fighting  with  any  thing  that  he  could  get  which 
remotely  resembled  an  army. 


CHAPTER   XXVII. 

BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTACHOr- 
CO— HOW  THE  CREEKS  "WHIPPED  CAP 
TAIN  JACKSON." 

IN  an  earlier  chapter  of  this  book  the  author 
expressed  the  opinion  that  if  the  Creeks  could 
have  had  an  equal  share  with  their  enemies  in 
writing  the  history  of  the  war  their  story  would 
have  given  us  very  different  impressions  from 
those  that  we  now  have  with  respect  to  many  of 
the  events  of  the  struggle.  Perhaps  no  better 
illustration  of  the  truth  of  this  assumption  could 
be  given  than  that  which  is  furnished  by  the  story 
of  Jackson's  short  campaign  with  his  two  and 
three  months'  men.  The  Creek  chiefs  who 
fought  this  force  in  the  battles  of  Emuckfau  and 

o 

Enotachopco  always  declared,  in  talking  of  the 
matter  after  the  war,  that  they  "  whipped  Cap 
tain  Jackson  and  ran  him  to  the  Coosa  River," 
and  while  neither  Jackson's  report  of  the  cam 
paign  nor  any  other  of  the  written  accounts  of  it, 
admit  the  truth  of  this  Indian  version  of  the 
story,  they  furnish  a  good  many  details  which 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTACIIOPCO.    283 

strongly  suggest  that  the  Creek  chiefs  may  not 
have  been  altogether  wrong  in  their  interpreta 
tion  ot  events. 

But  as  they  had  no  historians  to  put  their  ac 
count  upon  record,  except  by  reporting  their 
verbal  assertion  which  we  have  quoted,  the  wri 
ter  is  compelled  to  rely  upon  the  testimony  of 
the  other  side  exclusively  for  all  information 
about  matters  of  detail. 

The  force  which  had  come  from  Tennessee 
consisted  of  about  nine  hundred  men  in  all,  of 
whom  eight  hundred  and  fifty  were  fit  for  duty. 
They  were  in  two  regiments,  one  commanded 
by  Colonel  Perkins,  the  other  by  Colonel  Hig 
gins. 

With  this  small  force  Jackson  at  once  began 
his  march.  Crossing  the  Coosa  River  on  the 
day  after  their  arrival,  he  pushed  forward  to 
Tallade^-a,  where  he  was  reinforced  by  a  body  of 

O       7 

friendly  Indians  consisting  of  sixty-five  Chero- 
kees  and  about  two  hundred  Creeks.  He  had 
with  him  an  artillery  detachment  with  a  single 
iron  six  pounder  cannon  ;  a  company  of  spies 
under  Captain  Russell,  and  another  under 
Captain  Gordon  ;  and  one  company  composed 
.  exclusively  of  officers.  These  were  officers  of 
various  grades  whose  men  had  gone  home. 


284  RED   EAGLE. 

General  Coffee,  whose  troops  also  had  left  him, 
had  gathered  these  officers  together  and  com 
manded  them  in  person.  General  Jackson  said 
in  his  report  that  his  force  numbered  exactly 
nine  hundred  and  thirty  men,  exclusive  of  the 
friendly  Indians  who  accompanied  him.  These 
Indians  are  said  to  have  been  somewhat  alarmed 
when  they  saw  how  small  a  force  Jackson  had 
with  him,  but  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  they 
in  the  least  faltered  in  their  duty  or  hesitated  to 
march  when  ordered  to  do  so. 

General  Floyd  was  already  moving  to  strike 
the  Creeks  again,  having  recovered  from  his 
wound.  Of  this  movement  and  of  the  nature  of 
Floyd's  plans  Jackson  was  advised,  in  order  that 
he  might  as  far  as  possible  arrange  his  own  in 
accordance  with  them. 

At  Talladega  General  Jackson  received  a 
despatch  from  Colonel  Snodgrass,  commanding 
at  Fort  Armstrong,  that  a  force  of  Creeks  had 
assembled  at  Emuckfau,  in  a  bend  of  the  Talla- 
poosa  River,  near  the  mouth  of  Emuckfau  Creek, 
in  what  is  now  Tallapoosa  County,  Alabama,  and 
that  these  Indians,  now  about  nine  hundred 
strong,  were  preparing  to  attack  Fort  Arm 
strong.  Jackson  resolved  to  find  and  fight  this 
Creek  force  at  once.  His  men,  as  he  tells  us  in 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTACHOPCO.   285 

his  report,  were  both  undrilled  and  insubordinate, 
and  their  officers  were  without  skill  or  experi 
ence  ;  but  the  troops  were  really  anxious  to  fight 
a  battle,  and  in  this  particular  their  general  was 
disposed  to  gratify  them  as  speedily  as  possible. 
Luckily  he  had  a  few  good  men  upon  whom  he 
could  depend,  and  his  company  of  brave  and  ex 
perienced  officers  who  were  serving  as  private  sol 
diers  with  General  Coffee  for  their  captain  were 
his  special  staff  of  reliance. 

Pushing  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible,  the 
army  arrived  at  Enotachopco,  about  a  dozen  miles 
from  Emuckfau,  on  the  afternoon  of  January  2oth. 
The  march  was  resumed  the  next  morning,  and 
early  in  the  day  signs  were  discovered  of  the 
proximity  of  a  large  Creek  force.  Well- beaten 
trails  wrere  found,  and  a  few  Indians  seen. 

It  was  necessary  now  to  reconnoitre  before 
proceeding  further,  in  order  to  avoid  a  surprise 
in  some  unfavorable  spot.  Jackson  selected  a 
halting-place  and  ordered  the  men  to  encamp  in 
the  form  of  a  hollow  square,  taking  great  pains 
to  surround  the  camp  with  a  line  of  well-placed 
picket-guards.  Then  he  sent  out  his  spies  to  dis 
cover  the  whereabouts  and  the  strength  of  the 
Indian  force. 

Before  midnight  the  spies  reported  that  a  large 


2r6  RED   EAGLE. 

Indian  encampment  lay  within  about  three  miles 
of  Jackson's  position,  and  that  the  Indians  were 
removing  their  \vomen  and  evidently  preparing 
for  battle.  It  was  probable  that  they  did  not 
intend  to  await  Jackson's  attack,  but  intended  t® 
fall  upon  his  camp  during  the  night,  but  the 
careful  commander,  having  already  taken  every 
precaution  against  surprise,  contented  himself 
with  warning  the  pickets  against  neglect  of  vigil 
ance  and  the  men  against  panic  in  the  event  of  a 
night  attack. 

The  Indians  advanced  as  morning  approached, 
and  at  six  o'clock,  while  it  was  not  yet  light, 
fell  upon  Jackson's  left  flank  with  great  fury. 
The  men,  raw  as  they  were,  behaved  well  and  met 
the  assault  with  spirit.  General  Coffee  rode  at 
once  to  the  point  at  which  the  firing  was  heaviest, 
and  both  by  his  presence  and  his  words  animated 
the  men  ;  but  the  struggle  was  a  severe  one,  and 
for  a  time  the  left  flank  was  so  hard  pressed  that 
their  ability  to  hold  their  position  was  a  matter 
of  some  doubt.  As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough 
to  see,  and  hence  light  enough  to  move  troops 
from  one  part  of  the  line  to  another  without 
danger  of  producing  confusion  and  panic,  a  fresh 
company  of  infantry  was  ordered  to  reinforce  the 
left ;  and  Coffee,  who  with  the  adjutant-general, 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTACHOPCO.    287 

Colonel  Sitler,  and  the  inspector-general,  Col 
onel  Carroll,  for  his  aids,  had  assumed  the  im 
mediate  command,  ordered  the  whole  line  for 
ward,  leading-  the  men  to  one  of  the  most  gallant 
and  determined  charges  of  the  war.  Thus  as 
saulted  the  Creeks  gave  way,  and  after  a  few 
moments  of  irregular  resistance  fled  precipitately, 
closely  pressed  both  by  the  troops  and  by  the 
friendly  Indians.  Coffee  with  his  usual  vigor 
followed  the  broken  and  retreating  savages  for 
two  miles,  inflicting  considerable  damage  upon 
them. 

Then  Jackson  ordered  Coffee  to  take  four  hun 
dred  men  and  march  to  the  Indian  encampment, 
about  three  miles  away,  and,  if  it  should  be 
practicable,  to  destroy  it.  He  cautioned  the 
gallant,  and  perhaps  too  daring  general — who 
w  is  said  by  one  of  his  contemporaries  to  have 
been  "a  great  soldier  without  knowing  it" — to 
avoid  unnecessary  risk,  and  not  to  attack  the 
place  if  it  should  prove  upon  inspection  to  be 
strong. 

Coffee  marched  at  once,  taking  the  single  piece 
of  artillery  with  him  ;  but  upon  arriving  at 
Emuckfau  he  found  the  place  so  well  fortified  and 
the  force  there  so  strong  that  he  deemed  it  im 
portant  not  only  to  withdraw  without  attacking, 


288  RED    EAGLE. 

but  to  hasten  his  return  to  the  camp  lest  the 
army  thus  divided  should  be  attacked  and  beaten 
in  detail.  It  was  soon  made  plain  that  the  attack 
of  the  morning-  had  been  not  much  more  than  a 
beginning  of  the  Indian  attempt  to  overwhelm 
Jackson. 

Half  an  hour  after  Coffee  returned  the  Creeks 
renewed  the  battle.  A  considerable  force  began 
the  action  by  making  an  assault  upon  Jackson's 
right  flank.  As  soon  as  their  line  was  developed 
Coffee  asked  permission  to  turn  their  left  flank- 
moving  from  the  rear  of  Jackson's  right — with 
two  hundred  men.  Through  some  misunder 
standing  only  fifty-four  men  accompanied  Coffee, 
but  that  particularly  enterprising  officer,  not  to 
be  balked  of  his  purpose  or  delayed  in  executing 
it,  dashed  on  though  the  woods  with  his  little 
force,  which  consisted  chiefly  of  his  own  officer 
company,  and  fell  upon  the  flank  of  the  savages 
nei  cely.  Jackson  seeing  with  how  small  a  force 
Coffee  was  making  this  critical  movement,  mov 
ed  two  hundred  friendly  Indians  to  the  right 
to  assist  the  flanking  party  by  attacking  that  part 
of  the  Indian  line  in  front. 

Had  the  Indian  attack  been  what  it  appeared 
to  be,  the  battle  would  have  been  decided  by  the 
results  of  this  combined  blow  upon  the  Indian  left 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTACHOrcO.    289 

—from  Jackson's  right  and  Coffee's  position  be 
yond  ;  but  it  was  presently  apparent  that  the  at 
tack  upon  the  right  of  Jackson's  line  was  merely 
a  feint  designed  to  distract  attention  from  tli3 
real  object  of  the  savage  leader,  and  to  lead  Jack 
son  to  strengthen  his  right  at  the  expense  of  his 
left,  upon  which  the  savages  intended  then  to  fall 
with  crushing  force. 

Jn  this  scheme  the  Indians  were  baffled.  Jack 
son,  anticipating  something  of  the  sort,  not  only 
avoided  weakening  his  left,  but  specially  com 
manded  the  officers  there  to  expect  an  attack  in 
force  and  prepare  to  meet  it. 

As  soon  as  the  right  was  fully  engaged,  the 
main  body  of  the  Indians  advanced  with  spirit 
and  confidence  against  the  left.  The  assault  was 
well  made,  the  shock  falling  upon  the  whole  front 
of  the  left  flank  at  once  ;  but  it  was  equally  well 
received.  For  a  time  the  firing  was  very  heavy 
and  at  short  range  ;  then,  knowing  that  raw 
troops  can  stand  any  amount  of  active  work  bet 
ter  than  a  strain  which  must  be  borne  passively, 
Jackson,  who  had  ridden  to  this  part  of  the  field 
as  soon  as  the  alarm  was  given,  ordered  his  men 
to  cease  firing  fix  bayonets,  charge,  and  sweep 
the  field.  The  men  behaved,  Jackson  tells  us, 
with  "  astonishing  intrepidity,"  and  quickly 


2QO  RED   EAGLE. 

cleared  their  front,  Colonel  Carroll  leading-  the 
charge.  The  Indians  wavered,  gave  way,  and 
then  broke  and  fled  in  confusion,  under  a  de 
structive  fire,  and  with  their  pursuers  close  upon 
their  heels. 

The  friendly  Indians  did  good  work  whenever- 
actual  fighting  was  going  on  in  their  front,  but 
being  without  that  habit  of  unquestioning  obe 
dience  which  more  than  any  thing  else  makes  the 
difference  between  a  good  soldier  and  a  raw  re 
cruit,  they  could  never  be  depended  upon  to  exe 
cute  an  order  the  ulterior  purpose  of  which  they 
could  not  see.  In  this  battle  of  Emuckfau  their 
habit  of  acting  for  the  good  of  the  cause  upon 
their  own  judgment  and  without  regard  to 
orders  came  near  involving  Coffee  and  his  com 
pany  of  officers  in  serious  disaster.  When  Jack 
son  ordered  them  to  the  right  to  co-operate  with 
Coffee,  they  went  gladly  and  fought  well,  enabling 
Coffee  to  drive  the  savages  in  his  immediate  front 
into  the  swamps  ;  but  when  the  firing  began  on 
the  left  they  quickly  withdrew  from  the  position 
they  had  been  ordered  to  occupy,  and  went  to 
join  in  the  mclcc  at  the  other  end  of  the  line, 
without  pausing  to  think  of  what  might  befall 
Coffee  in  consequence. 

No  sooner  had  they  gone  than  the  Creeks  ral- 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTACHOPCO.   2ql 

lied  and  attacked  Coffee  again,  well-nigh  ovcr- 
v.-hclming  his  small  force  \vith  their  greater  num 
bers.  Luckily,  Coffee  was  both  an  able  and  an 
experienced  officer,  and  it  was  equally  a  fortu 
nate  circumstance  that  his  followers,  the  ex-offi 
cers,  were  the  very  best  troops  in  the  army,  else 
the  whole  of  the  little  band,  including  Coffee,  an 

C5 

officer  whom  Jackson  could  ill  have  spared,  must 
have  been  destroyed.  The  little  band  fought 
with  desperate  determination,  holding  their 
ground  and  keeping  the  Indians  at  bay,  but  hav 
ing  to  fight  on  every  side  at  once.  Coffee  fell 
severely  wounded,  but  continued  to  direct  the 
operations  of  his  men.  His  aide-de-camp  and 
three  others  of  his  followers  were  killed. 

Jackson,  hearing  the  firing  on  that  flank,  re 
called  the  friendly  Indians  from  the  pursuit  at  the 
1  jft  as  soon  as  he  could,  and  sent  them  at  double- 
quick  to  rescue  Coffee.  They  carne  up  at  a  run 
and  with  a  yell,  headed  by  their  chief,  Jim  Fife. 
As  soon  as  Coffee  was  thus  reinforced  he  ordered 
a  charge,  before  which  the  foe  gave  way  and  fled, 
followed  for  miles  by  the  relentless  Jim  Fife  and 
his  Indians. 

Thus  ended  the  battle  of  Emuckfau.  Whether 
or  not  it  ended  in  victory  for  Jackson  is  a  ques 
tion  with  two  sides  to  it,  even  when  the  evidence 


292  RED   EAGLE. 

comes  to  us  altogether  from  one  side.  Jackson 
held  the  field,  it  is  true,  but  he  did  not  think  it 
prudent  to  advance  a  few  miles  and  destroy  the 
Indian  encampment.  He  determined,  on  the 
contrary,  to  retreat  without  delay  to  Fort  Stro- 
ther,  and  even  for  the  single  night  that  he  was  to 
remain  on  the  battle-field  he  deemed  it  neces 
sary  to  fortify  his  camp.  Certainly  he  did  not 
regard  the  Indians  as  very  badly  beaten  on  this 
occasion.  They  were  still  so  dangerously  strong 
that  the  American  commander  thought  it  neces 
sary  to  provide  camp  defences,  which  he  had  not 
thought  of  on  the  preceding  night.  In  view  of 
these  things  and  of  the  retreat  and  pursuit  which 
followed,  we  may  fairly  acquit  the  Indians  of  the 
charge  of  unduly  boasting  when  they  said,  as 
already  quoted,  "  We  whipped  Captain  Jackson 
and  ran  him  to  the  Coosa  River." 

In  his  official  report  of  the  affair,  Jackson  ex 
plained  his  determination  to  retreat  by  saying  : 
"  Having  brought  in  and  buried  the  dead  and 
dressed  the  wounded,  I  ordered  my  camp  to  be 
fortified,  to  be  the  better  prepared  to  repel  any 
attack  which  might  be  made  in  the  night,  deter 
mining  to  make  a  return  march  to  Fort  Strother 
the  following  day.  Many  causes  concurred  to 
make  such  a  measure  necessary.  As  I  had  not 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTAGHOPCO.   293 

set  out  prepared  or  with  a  view  to  make  a  per 
manent  establishment,  I  considered  it  worse  than 
useless  to  advance  and  destroy  an  empty  encamp 
ment.  I  had,  indeed,  hoped  to  have  met  the 
enemy  there  ;  but  having  met  and  beaten  them  a 
little  sooner,  I  did  not  think  it  necessary  or  pru 
dent  to  proceed  any  further — not  necessary,  be 
cause  I  had  accomplished  all  I  could  expect  to 
effect  by  marching-  to  their  encampment,  and 
because,  if  it  was  proper  to  contend  with  and 
weaken  their  forces  still  farther,  this  object  would 
be  more  certainly  attained  by  com  n  Dicing  a  re 
turn,  which  having  to  them  the  appearance  of  a 
retreat,  would  inspirit  them  to  pursue  me  :  not 
prudent,  because  of  the  number  of  my  wounded  ; 
of  the  reinforcements  from  below,  which  the 
enemy  might  be  expected  to  receive  ;  of  the 
starving  condition  of  my  horses,  they  having  had 
neither  corn  nor  cane  for  t\vo  days  and  nights  ; 
of  the  scarcity  of  supplies  for  my  men,  the  Indians 
who  joined  me  at  Talladega  having  drawn  none 
and  being  wholly  destitute  ;  and  because  if  the 
enemy  pursued  me,  as  it  was  likely  they  would, 
the  diversion  in  favor  of  General  Floyd  would  be 
the  more  complete  and  effectual." 

The  retreat  began  the  next  morning,  and  was 
conducted  with  all  the  caution  and  care  possible. 


2Q4  RED   EAGLE. 

Jackson  knew  very  well  that  the  fight  of  the  day 
before  had  been  really  little  better  than  a  drawn 
battle.  He  knew  that  he  had  not  broken  the 
strength  of  the  Indian  force  which  he  had  been 
fighting,  and  that  their  running  away  was  the 
running  away  of  Indians,  not  of  regular  soldiers  ; 
that  it  indicated  no  demoralization  or  loss  of 
readiness  to  renew  the  fight,  but  merely  their 
conviction  that  for  the  moment  they  had  better 
run  away.  This  distinction  is  an  important  one 
to  be  made.  When  a  disciplined  army  breaks  be 
fore  the  enemy  and  runs  away,  the  fact  proves 
their  utter  discomfiture  ;  it  shows  that  they  have 
lost  spirit  and  abandoned  their  standards  in  panic, 
and  in  such  a  case  it  is  certain  that  they  are  in  no 
fit  condition  to  renew  the  battle  either  offensively 
or  defensively.  But,  in  the  case  of  Indians,  run 
ning  away  indicates  nothing  of  the  kind.  Indians 
hght  in  a  desultory  way,  advancing  and  retiring 
equally  without  regard  to  regular  principles. 
They  run  away  if  they  think  that  to  be  the  best 
thing  to  do  for  tli2  moment,  whether  they  are 
frightened  or  not ;  and  the  moment  they  see  an 
opportunity  to  strike  their  foes  successfully,  they 
arc  as  ready  to  turn  and  fight  as  they  were  to 
run. 

Jackson  knew  this,  and   hence  he  made  his  re- 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTACHOPCO.    295 

treat  with  all  points  guarded  against  surprise. 
Before  nightfall  he  had  reached  Enotachopco,  and 
there  he  selected  a  camp  with  reference  to  its  de 
fensive  capabilities,  and  strongly  fortified  it  before 
permitting  his  men  to  go  to  rest  for  the  night. 
The  Indians  were  discovered  to  be  in  the  neigh 
borhood,  having  dogged  the  retreating  army's 
footsteps  through  the  day,  but  the  precautions 
taken  to  strengthen  the  camp  deterred  them  from 
attacking  during  the  night. 

The  next  morning,  January  24th,  Jackson  had 
even  greater  reason  than  on  the.preceding  day  to 
anticipate  an  attack.  His  pursuers  had  shown 
themselves  rather  boldly  during  the  night,  and 
were  evidently  contemplating  an  assault  upon  his 
column  during  the  day's  march.  Knowing  that 
the  deep  Enotachopco  Creek  between  two  hills 
lay  just  ahead  of  him,  and  that  the  road  by  which 
he  was  retreating  crossed  this  creek  in  a  defile 
which  offered  his  pursuers  every  opportunity  to 
attack  him  with  advantage,  Jackson  ordered  his 
guides  to  seek  a  more  favorable  place  of  crossing, 
and  they  chose  a  place  where  the  banks  were 
clear  of  reeds  and  underbrush,  and  where,  if  at 
tacked,  the  army  could  defend  itself  better  than 
at  the  regular  place  of  crossing.  When  the 
guides  reported  Jackson  moved  out  of  his  camp 


296  RED    EAGLE. 

in  the  order  of  a  harassed  general  in  retreat. 
He  moved  in  three  columns,  with  strong  front 
and  rear  guards  out,  the  wounded  men  in  the 
centre,  and  light  companies  on  the  flanks.  He 
had  even  taken  the  precaution,  so  confident  was 
he  that  his  enemy  would  attack  him  that  morn 
ing,  of  making  his  dispositions  for  battle,  issuing 
a  general  order  instructing  the  men  in  what  order 
to  form  in  the  event  of  an  attack  in  front,  in  rear, 
or  on  either  flank. 

Can  we  wonder  that  the  Indians  who  saw  all 
these  precautions  taken  believed  that  they  had 
14  whipped  Captain  Jackson"  and  were  "  driving 
him  to  the  Coosa  River"  ? 

The  army  moved  forward  in  this  cautious  way 
and  arrived  at  the  creek.  The  advance-guard 
crossed  first,  and  after  them  the  wounded  were 
carried  to  the  opposite  shore.  Having  cared  for 
the  helpless  wounded  men,  the  solitary  gun  in  the 
army's  possession  became  the  next  most  im 
portant  object  of  solicitude,  and  the  artillery 
company  advanced  to  cross.  Just  as  they  were 
entering  the  water  a  shot  in  the  rear  announced 
that  the  enemy  was  pressing  Colonel  Carroll,  who 
had  command  there.  According  to  Jackson's 
orders  for  the  formation  of  a  line  of  battle  in  the 
event  of  an  attack  from  the  rear,  Carroll,  with 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  ANTD  ENTOTACIIOPCO.   2?f 

t!i3  centre  column  of  the  rear-guard,  was  to  face 
about  and  maintain  his  position  with  his  front  to 
the  rear  of  the  line  of  march  ;  Colonel  Perkins, 
commanding"  the  right  column  of  the  rear-guard, 
was  to  face  to  the  right  and  wheel  to  the  right, 
using  Carroll's  flank  as  a  pivot  ;  while  Colonel 
Stump,  with  the  left  column  of  the  rear-guard, 
was  to  execute  a  corresponding  movement,  thus 
inclosing  the  enemy's  fores  within  three  sides  of 
a  hollow  square,  and  attacking  him  simultane 
ously  in  front  and  on  both  flanks. 

Colonel  Carroll  executed  his  part  of  the  ma 
noeuvre  perfectly.*  The  moment  that  the  savages 
attacked  the  rear  company  in  the  column,  he 
faced  his  men  about,  deployed  them  in  line,  and 
received  the  shock  of  the  onset  manfully  ;  but 
the  right  and  left  columns  behaved  badly,  break 
ing  and  fleeing  precipitately  without  firing  a  gun. 
The  worst  of  it  was  that  their  flight  bred  a  panic 
among  the  troops  of  the  centre,  and  nearly  the 
whole  force  fled  like  a  mob,  Colonel  Stump  ac 
tually  leading  the  retreat,  riding  frantically  into 
and  across  the  creek.  As  he  passed  by  Jackson, 
the  infuriated  general,  who  had  chosen  the 
ground  in  the  hope  that  he  might  crush  the  enemy 
here  by  attacking  him  on  all  sides,  made  an  effort 


298  RED   EAGLE. 

to    cut   the   coward    down   with   his  sword,  but 
without  success. 

The  Might  had  effectually  dissipated  all  hopes  of 
winning  a  victory,  and  it  had  done  more— it  had 
left  the  worthy  men  of  the  army,  very  nearly  all 
of  them  who  were  worth  having  in  an  army  at 
all,  exposed  to  destruction.  Colonel  Carroll  had 
only  twenty-five  men  left,  with  Captain  Quarles 
in  direct  command,  but  he  stood  firm  and  held 
his  ground  like  a  soldier.  Jackson  says,  in  his 
elaborate  report  : 

'  There  was  then  left  to  repulse  the  enemy 
the  few  who  remained  of  the  rear-guard,  the  ar 
tillery  company,  and  Captain  Russell's  company 
of  spies.  They,  however,  realized  and  exceeded 
my  highest  expectations.  Lieutenant  Armstrong, 
who  commanded  the  artillery  company  in  the 
absence  of  Captain  Deaderick  (confined  by  sick 
ness),  ordered  them  to  form  and  advance  to  the 
top  of  the  hill,  whilst  he  and  a  few  others 
dragged  up  the  six-pounder.  Never  was  more 
bravery  displayed  than  on  this  occasion.  Amidst 
the  most  galling  fire  from  the  enemy,  more  than 
ten  times  their  number,  they  ascended  the  hill, 
and  maintained  their  position  until  their  piece 
was  hauled  up,  when  having  levelled  it  they 
poured  upon  the  enemy  a  fire  of  grape,  reloaded 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTACHOPCO.    299 

and  fired  again,  charged  and  repulsed  them.  The 
most  deliberate  bravery  was  displayed  by  Constan- 
tine  Perkins  and  Craven  Jackson,  of  the  artillery, 
acting  as  gunners.  In  the  hurry  of  the  moment, 
in  separating  the  gun  from  the  limbers,  the  ram 
mer  and  picker  of  the  cannon  were  left  tied  to 
the  limber.  No  sooner  was  this  discovered  than 
Jackson,  amidst  the  galling  fire  of  the  enemy, 
pulled  out  the  ramrod  of  his  musket  and  used  it 
as  a  picker,  primed  with  a  cartridge,  and  fired 
the  cannon.  Perkins,  having  pulled  off  his  bay 
onet,  used  his  musket  as  a  rammer  and  drove 
down  the  cartridge  ;  and  Jackson,  using  his  for 
mer  plan,  again  discharged  her.  The  brave 
Lieutenant  Armstrong,  just  after  the  first  fire  of 
the  cannon,  with  Captain  Hamilton  of  East  Ten 
nessee,  Bradford,  and  McGavock,  all  fell,  the 
lieutenant  exclaiming  as  he  lay,  '  My  brave  fel 
lows,  some  of  you  may  fall,  but  you  must  save 
the  cannon  !  ' 

The  charge  made  by  the  artillery  company 
was  seconded  by  Captain  Gordon's  spies,  who, 
marching  at  the  head  of  the  column,  had  crossed 
the  creek  wrhen  the  action  began,  but  who 
quickly  turned  and  recrossed,  striking  the  ene 
my  in  the  left  flank.  A  number  of  other  men 
had  now  rallied  and  regained  their  positions  in 


3°° 


RED    EAGLE. 


the  line,  and  as  soon  as  a  determined  assault  was 
made  the  enemy  gave  way  and  the  field  was 
cleared,  leaving  Jackson  free  to  resume  his  re 
treat  toward  the  Coosa  River. 

In  the  two  battles  of  Emuckfau  and  Enota- 
chopco  the  Indian  loss  was  heavy,  one  hundred 
and  eighty-nine  bodies  being  found  on  the  field. 
Jackson's  loss  was  twenty  men  killed  and  seventy- 
five  wounded,  some  of  them  mortally.  Among 
the  killed  was  Captain  Quarles,  who  fell  at  the 
head  of  his  brave  twenty-five  rear-guardsmen, 
who  checked  the  enemy  and  prevented  utter 
disaster  from  overtaking  the  army  by  their  cour 
age  and  coolness. 

General  Coffee  was  moving  forward  on  a  litter 
when  the  battle  at  Enotachopco  began,  suffering 
from  the  wound  he  had  received  at  Emuckfau  ; 
but  when  the  army  broke  into  a  confused  and  fly 
ing  mass  he  mounted  his  horse  in  spite  of  his 
condition,  and  to  his  exertions  chiefly  Major 
Eaton  attributes  the  rallying  of  the  men  and  the 
ultimate  repulse  of  the  enemy. 

It  became  Coffee's  duty  to  write  a  letter  break 
ing  the  news  of  Captain  Donelson's  death  to  his 
friends,  and  in  that  letter,  the  manuscript  of  which 
is  preserved  in  the  archives  of  the  Tennessee 


BATTLES  OF  EMUCKFAU  AND  ENOTACIIOPCO.    30! 

Historical  Society,  he  says  of  the  ill-luck  of  the 
expedition  : 

"Our  great  loss  has  been  occasioned  by  our 
troops  being  raw  and  undisciplined,  commanded 
by  officers  of  the  same  description.  Had  I  had  my 
old  regiment  of  cavalry  I  could  have  driven  the 
enemy  wherever  I  met  them,  without  loss.  But 
speculation  had  taken  them  out  of  the  field,  and 
thus  we  have  suffered  for  them.  Their  advisers 
ought  to  suffer  death  for  their  unwarrantable 
conduct,  and  I  hope  our  injured  citizens  will 
treat  them  with  the  contempt  they  so  justly 

merit." 

Jackson  had  no  sooner  reached  his  camp  at 
Fort  Strother,  than  he  called  Colonels  Perkins 
and  Stump  to  account  for  their  conduct  at  Eno- 
tachopco,  preferring  charges  against  them  and 
sending  them  before  a  court-martial  for  trial. 
The  court,  upon  the  evidence  submitted,  ac 
quitted  Colonel  Perkins,  but  found  Colonel 
Stump  guilty  of  the  charge  of  cowardice,  and 
sentenced  him  to  be  cashiered. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

HOW  RED  EAGLE  WHIPPED  "CAPTAIN 
FLOYD" —  THE  BATTLE  OF  CALEBEE 
CREEK. 

WE  left  Floyd  retiring  upon  his  base  of  sup 
plies  on  the  Chattahoochee  River  after  the  battle 
of  Autosse,  suffering  from  a  wound  received  in 
that  action.  After  a  few  weeks  of  inaction  he  re 
sumed  operations,  with  the  town  of  Tookabatcha 
for  the  objective  point  of  his  campaign.  Jack 
son's  chief  purpose  in  his  expedition  to  Emuckfau 
had  been  to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  Floyd, 
and  so  help  to  the  accomplishment  of  that  gen 
eral's  purpose.  In  his  report  of  the  operations 
detailed  in  the  last  chapter,  Jackson,  apparently 
feeling  that  it  was  necessary  to  vindicate  the 
wisdom  of  the  movement,  laid  special  stress  upon 
the  fact  that  his  operations  had  tended  thus  to 
assist  Floyd.  If  Floyd  had  attained  the  objects 
of  his  expedition,  this  might  have  been  full  re 
compense  for  Jackson's  ill-success  ;  but  almost  at 
the  very  time  when  the  Red  Sticks— for  that 
vvas  the  term  by  -which  the  hostile  Creeks  were 


THE   BATTLE   OF  CALEBEE   CREEK.  303 

called,  because  Tecumseh  had  given  sticks  painted 
red  to  all  the  Creeks  who  would  "  take  his  talk  " 
• — almost  at  the  very  time,  we  say,  when  the 
Red  Sticks  were  "whipping  Captain  Jackson  " 
at  Emuckfau  and  Enotachopco,  they  were  also 
"whipping  Captain  Floyd  "  —they  always  called 
commanders  captains — at  Calebee  Creek,  not  de 
feating  him  in  battle,  but  so  hurting  him  as  to 
compel  him  to  retire  and  abandon  the  purpose 
with  which  he  set  out,  even  more  entirely  than 
they  had  compelled  Jackson  to  abandon  his. 

Floyd  made  his  advance  slowly  and  cautiously, 
pausing  to  establish  forts  at  intervals  so  that  a 
line  of  defensive  posts  should  lie  like  a  trail  be 
hind  him,  protecting  his  line  of  communications 
and  affording  convenient  places  for  the  storage  and 
safe  keeping  of  supplies.  He  began  his  march 
with  about  twelve  hundred  infantry,  four  hundred 
friendly  Indians,  one  cavalry  company  and  his 
artillery,  making  a  total  force  of  seventeen  hun 
dred  or  eighteen  hundred  men.  It  was  his  pur 
pose  to  push  his  column  into  the  Creek  country, 
not  rapidly,  but  resistlessly  ;  so  firmly  establish 
ing  it  as  to  make  it,  as  it  were,  a  permanent 
wedge  of  invasion. 

When  he  arrived  at  a  point  on  Calebee  Creek, 
in  what  is  now  Macon  County,  Alabama,  he  de- 


304  RED   EAGLE. 

termined  to  establish  one  of  his  fortified  posts  upon 
some  high  ground  there.  Here,  however,  Red 
Eagle  entered  his  protest  against  the  plans  of  the 
Georgia  general.  Leading  a  force  of  Creeks  in 
person,  the  commander  of  the  Indians  was  dog 
ging  Floyd's  footsteps  for  several  days  before  his 
arrival  at  Calebee  Creek,  but  having  selected 
that  as  the  ground  on  which  he  would  give  battle 
to  the  whites,  the  shrewd  Indian  general  adroitly 
concealed  his  presence,  so  handling  his  force  as 
to  keep  himself  fully  informed  of  Floyd's  move 
ments  without  permitting  that  officer  to  know  in 
return  that  the  enemy  was  near.  Floyd  took  all 
those  precautions  which  prudence  dictates  to  a 
commander  marching  through  an  enemy's  coun 
try,  but  he  does  not  appear  to  have  discovered 
Red  Eagle's  presence,  or  to  have  expected  the 
attack  that  wTas  made  upon  him  on  the  morning 
of  January  27th. 

Adopting  the  tactics  \vhich  had  so  often  been 
used  against  the  Indians,  Red  Eagle  moved  his 
men  under  cover  of  darkness  into  position  on 
three  sides  of  Flood's  camp,  and  fell  upon  the 
post  by  surprise,  making  his  attack  simultaneously 
in  front  and  upon  both  flanks.  In  order  to  effect 
this  surprise,  Red  Eagle  and  his  men  had  lain 
concealed  in  the  swamps  until  about  half  after 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CALEBEE  CREEK.     305 

five  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  thsn,  while  it 
was  still  entirely  dark,  made  their  assault  quickly, 
silently,  and  so  violently  as  to  crowd  the  sentries 
biici.  ind  reach  the  lines  of  the  camp  itself  before 
Floyd's  msn  could  form.  The  troops,  thus  rudely 
and  suddenly  awakened  from  their  slumbers  by 
an  attack  which  does  not  appear  to  have  bjsn 
in  the  least  expected,  behaved  particularly  well, 
forming  without  confusion  and  maintaining  a 
firm  front  in  the  darkness. 

The  assault  of  the  savages  was  fierce  and  deter 
mined.  They  always  fought  better  under  Red 
Eagle's  eye  than  at  other  times.  Even  when 
Captain  Thomas  brought  his  artillery  to  the 
front,  supported  by  Captain  Adams's  riflemen, 
and  opened  that  fire  of  grapeshot  which  Indians 
have  everywhere  found  it  most  difficult  to  stand 
against,  the  Red  Sticks  not  only  held  their 
ground,  but  gallantly  advanced  their  line  until  it 
was  not  more  than  thirty  yards  distant  from  the 
guns,  and  there,  at  short  pistol  range,  endured 
the  murderous  discharges  from  the  cannon. 

The  friendly  Indians  in  camp  did  little  during 
this  part  of  the  action,  being  panic-stricken  by 
the  suddenness  of  the  alarm,  but  the  whites 
everywhere  behaved  well. 

Captain    Broadnax,    in   command   of   a   picket 


306  RED   EAGLE. 

post,  was  passed  by  the  Indian  line  at  the  first 
assault,  and  was  thus  cut  off  from  the  camp  and 
the  army,  but  refusing  to  surrender,  he  and  his 
squad  cut  their  way  through  the  lines  of  the  en 
emy  and  reached  their  friends  in  safety. 

While  darkness  lasted  Floyd  could  do  nothing 
more  than  stand  on  the  defensive.  As  soon  as 
the  light  was  sufficient  to  justify  an  attempt  to 
shift  the  positions  of  his  battalions,  he  ordered  his 
right  and  left  wings  to  swing  round  to  the  front 
upon  their  pivots,  so  as  to  reverse  the  order  of  the 
battle  and  inclose  the  Indian  force  within  three 
sides  of  a  parallelogram.  As  soon  as  this  move 
ment  was  executed  he  ordered  a  charge,  which 
quickly  drove  the  savages  back  to  the  swamps, 
whither  they  were  pursued  by  the  cavalry,  the 
light  companies,  and  the  friendly  Indians,  who 
had  now  recovered  their  courage. 

In  the  battle  Floyd's  horse  was  killed  under 
him.  His  loss  was  seventeen  white  men  and  five 
friendly  Indians  killed,  and  one  hundred  and 
thirty-two  white  men  and  fifteen  friendly  Indians 
wounded.  He  was  sorely  hurt,  and  it  was  not 
known  how  much  damage  he  had  inflicted  in 
return,  although  it  is  pretty  certain  that  Floyd 
had  greatly  the  worst  of  the  affair.  He  held 
the  battle-field,  it  is  true,  but  the  Indians  were 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CALEBEE  CREEK.     307 

manifestly  disposed  to  renew  the  attack,  and  for 
that  purpose  were  still  hovering  around  his 
camp  and  threatening-  it.  It  was  clear  that  they 
believed  themselves  to  be  the  winners  in  the 
action,  and  that  they  were  preparing  to  renew 
it  and  to  crush  the  Georgia  army. 

Floyd  feared  they  might  accomplish  this. 
His  respect  for  Red  Eagle's  skill  as  a  com 
mander  was  so  increased  by  the  experience  of 
that  morning  that  he  abandoned  the  object  for 
which  he  had  set  out,  and  retreated  again. 

It  is  said  that  Zachariah  McGirth — whom  the 
reader  will  remember  as  the  half-breed  who,  sup 
posing  that  his  family  were  among  the  victims  at 
Fort  Mims,  became  a  despatch-bearer,  and  dared 
all  manner  of  dangers — arrived  at  Floyd's  head 
quarters  on  the  night  of  the  attack,  bearing 
a  despatch  from  Claiborne.  He  had  passed 
through  the  swamp  when  it  was  filled  with  lurk 
ing  Indians  awaiting  the  moment  of  attack. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

RED  EAGLE'S  STRATEGY. 

WHEN  Red  Eagle  established    his  camp  at  the 
Holy  Ground,  from  which  Claibornc  drove  him, 
his  purpose  was  to  provide  for  resistance  by  con 
centrating  the  warriors  of  the  nation    after  the 
manner  of  civilized  armies.     The  Indian  practice 
of  breaking  into  small,  roving  bands  and  concen 
trating  only  when  some  special  occasion  arose, 
was  in  favor  among  the  Creek  chiefs,  but  Red 
Eagle  was  too  capable  a  soldier  not  to  see  how 
fatal  this  practice  must  be  in  the  end.     After  the 
massacre  at  Fort  Minis   it  was  his  wish  to  keep 
his  army   together  and   operate   with  persistent 
vigor  against   Mobile  if  he  could  gain   Spanish 
consent,   and  if  not,    against   Georgia  and   Ten 
nessee.     If  he  could  have  done  this,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  he  would  have  driven  Jackson 
from   Fort  Strother  during  the  days  of   starva 
tion  and  mutiny,  by  bringing  a  strong  force  for 
ward    to   the   attack.       His   influence    had    been 
greatly   weakened,   however,   by   his  attempt  to 
restrain  the  demoniac  fury  of  his  men  at  Fort 


RED   EAGLE'S   STRATEGY.  309 

Mims,  and  in  spite  of  all  that  he  could  do,  his 
army  dissolved  into  small  wandering  bands  be 
fore  he  could  strike  an  effective  blow.  The  war 
riors  were  still  willing  enough  to  serve  under 
his  command  whenever  occasion  for  an  immedi 
ate  fight  should  arise,  but  he  could  not  restrain 
their  natural  tendencies,  or  convert  them  from 
their  practice  of  desultory  warfare  to  a  policy 
of  systematic  operations.  Hence  Jackson  had 
time  for  his  lonof  strusrsfle  with  his  mutinous  men. 

o  d>  o 

and  escaped  the  destruction  which  must  other 
wise  have  threatened  him  for  want  of  an  efficient 
army . 

Seeing  how  impossible  it  was  to  convert  the 
savage  Creeks  into  a  cohesive  body  of  civilized 
troops,  and  to  use  them  as  an  aggressive  army, 
Red  Eagle  sought  to  do  the  next  best  thing— 
namely,  to  establish  strong  posts  at  certain  strat 
egic  points,  collect  his  warriors  around  them, 
and  moving  out  from  them,  as  occasion  should 
offer,  strike  sudden  blows  at  advancing  columns 
of  whites. 

In  pursuance  of  this  policy  he  fortified  the 
Holy  Ground,  from  which  Claiborne  drove  him 
on  the  23d  of  December,  as  has  been  related  in 
a  former  chapter.  The  Holy  Ground  was  only 
one  of  Red  Eagle's  strategic  points,  however. 


3IO  RED   EAGLE. 

He  established  the  post  at  Emuckfau,  against 
which  Jackson  marched  with  the  slender  suc 
cess  already  described,  and  a  still  more  important 
one  a  few  miles  away — at  Tohopeka,  or  the  Horse 
Shoe.  This  Horse  Shoe  is  a  peninsula  formed 
by  a  sharp  bend  in  the  Tallapoosa  River,  enclos 
ing  about  one  hundred  acres  of  ground,  high  in 
the  middle  and  marshy  along  the  river  -  bank. 
This  peninsula,  together  with  an  island  in  the 
river,  Red  Eagle  selected  as  the  central  strong 
hold  of  the  nation,  and  he  strengthened  it  by 
every  means  in  his  power.  Of  that,  however, 
we  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  more  fully 
hereafter  ;  just  now  we  are  concerned  only  with 
Red  Eagle's  general  disposition  of  his  force. 

When  Jackson  advanced  from  Fort  Strother 
and  Floyd  from  the  Chattahoochee  River,  the 
wisdom  of  the  Indian  commander's  arrange 
ments  was  made  manifest.  From  his  central  posi 
tions  he  was  able  to  send  five  hundred  warriors 
against  Jackson  ;  for  notwithstanding  the  asser 
tions  frequently  made  that  Jackson  was  outnum 
bered  at  Emuckfau  and  Enotachopco,  it  is  ap 
parently  a  well-established  fact  that  the  Indian 
force  there  was  only  five  hundred  strong,  while 
he  himself  led  a  larger  force  against  Floyd's 
larger  and  better  organized  army.  He  was  thus 


RED  EAGLE'S  STRATEGY.  311 

able  to  defeat  the  plans  of  both  generals,  getting 
the  best  of  both,  and  compelling  both  to  abandon 
the  objects  with  which  they  had  set  out.  He 
struck  them  in  detail,  after  the  best  modes  of 
grand  tactics,  and  his  plan  of  operations  bears 
the  test  of  the  soundest  military  criticism.  His 
first  purpose  was  to  strike  the  two  armies  sepa 
rately  ;  his  second  to  interpose  his  own  forces 
between  them,  so  that  if  he  should  be  forced  back 
toward  the  point  of  convergence  of  the  two  lines 
of  march  his  own  divided  force  would  be  united 
before  his  enemies  could  form  a  junction  with 
each  other.  This  was  thoroughly  good  grand 
tactics  ;  it  was  precisely  the  course  which  any 
trained  military  commander  in  like  circumstances 
would  have  adopted. 

It  would  perhaps  be  too  much  to  say  that  Red 
Eigle  either  overcame  his  two  skilled  opponents 
in  battle  or  outgeneralled  them  in  his  strategy  ; 
but  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  he  read  their 
purpose,  and  thwarted  them,  or  that  he  fairly 
matched  their  tactics  with  his  own,  and  inflicted 
upon  them  in  battle  at  least  as  severe  damage  as 
he  himself  suffered.  They  outnumbered  him  in 
both  instances  ;  their  men  were  civilized  and 
organized,  while  his  were  savages  without  or 
ganization,  discipline,  or  training  ;  they  had  ar- 


312 


RED    EAGLE. 


tillery  to  aid  them  and  he  had  none,  many  of  his 
men  having  no  better  arms  than  bows  and  war- 
clubs  ;  yet  he  managed   so  firmly  to  resist  their 
advance  as   to   turn  both  of  them  back  in  worse 
condition  than  they  left  him.     Shall  we  hesitate 
to  recognize  this  man    as  a  thoroughly   capable 
military  commander,  who,   with  very  imperfect 
means  and   against  tremendous  odds,   acquitted 
himself  well?       It   would    be   idle   to   speculate 
upon  what  Red  Eagle  might  have  accomplished 
if  he  could  have  had  means  equal  to  those  of  his 
enemies  ;  but  it  is  only  just  to  recognize  his  ge 
nius  as  it  was  shown  in  what  he  did  with  the  inad 
equate  means  at  his  command.   He  was  an  Indian 
and  the  commander  of  savages  ;  but  he  was  a  pa 
triot,  who  fought  for  what  he  believed  to  be  the 
interest  of  his  country,  and   he  fought  with   so 
much  skill  and  so   much   courage  as  to  win  the 
admiration  and   even  the  friendship  of  Jackson, 
whose  manly  spirit  recognized  a  brother  in  the 
not  less  manly  spirit  of  the  Creek  chieftain. 

Red  Eagle's  success  was  necessarily  but  tem 
porary.  It  was  not  in  the  nature  of  things  that 
he  should  win  the  war,  although  he  might  win  a 
campaign.  He  had  matched  the  Creek  Nation 
against  the  United  States,  and  the  contest  was  a 
hopelessly  unequal  one.  For  him  to  overcome  one 


RED   EAGLES   STRATEGY.  313 

army  and  drive  it  back,  broken  and  discouraged, 
was  only  to  make  certain  the  coming  of  another 
army,  stronger  and  larger,  against  him.  He  knew 
this  perfectly,  and  he  had  known  it  probably  from 
the  beginning.  He  had  never  intended  to  make 
the  unequal  match  in  which  he  was  engaged  ;  he 
had  meant  to  lend  the  strength  of  the  whole 
Creek  Nation  to  an  English  army  of  invasion,  and 
as  we  know  had  tried  to  avoid  the  contest  when 
he  learned  that  it  must  be  fought  by  a  part  of  the 
Creeks  only,  and  without  the  expected  assistance 
from  without.  Having  entered  the  war,  how 
ever,  he  was  determined  to  fight  it  out,  with  all 
his  might,  to  the  very  end.  In  order  that  his 
resistance  might  be  as  determined  as  possible, 
and  that  the  whites  might  be  made  to  pay  a 
high  price  for  their  ultimate  victory,  he  was 
now  gathering  men  from  ever}7  available  quar 
ter,  and  strengthening  his  fortified  posts,  in 
which  he  intended  to  make  his  last  desperate 
stand.  He  had  persuaded  the  warriors  of  the 
Ocfuske,  Hillabee,  Oakchoie,  Eufaulahatchee, 
New  Yauca,  Fishpond,  and  Hickory  Ground 
towns  to  join  his  forces,  and  they  were  now  at 
the  Horse  Shoe.  The  end  of  the  war  was  draw 
ing  near,  but  a  fierce  battle  remained  to  be  fought 
before  the  power  of  the  Creeks  could  be  broken. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

JACKSON  WITH  AN  ARMY  AT  LAST. 

JACKSON'S  long  and  earnest  entreaty  ior  an 
army  with  which  to  carry  on  the  campaign  at 
last  produced  its  desired  effect.  He  who  had 
so  long  and  vainly  begged  for  men,  getting  only 
a  handful  at  a  time,  and  getting  even  them  upon 
terms  which  made  it  impossible  to  use  them 
with  full  effect,  now  saw  men  coming  in  great. 
numbers  from  every  quarter  to  fight  under  his 
standard.  How  far  this  was  merely  the  accumu 
lated  result  of  his  successive  pleas,  and  how  far 
the  return  of  the  militiamen  who  had  fought  at 
Emuckfau  and  Enotachopco,  bearing  with  them 
their  general's  warm  commendation,  was  influ 
ential  in  behalf  of  enlistments,  it  is  difficult  to 
determine  ;  but  in  some  way  an  enthusiasm  for 
Jackson  and  for  the  service  had  sprung  up  in 
Tennessee,  and  the  long  baffled  and  weary  gen 
eral  at  last,  saw  coming  to  him  an  army  five 
thousand  strong  an  army  so  greatly  outnumber 
ing  any  force  which  the  Creeks  could  now  put 


JACKSOX   WITH   AN   ARMY   AT  LAST.          315 

into  the  field,  that  its  coming  promised  the  speedy 
overthrow  of  what  remained  of  the  Creek  power. 

Two  thousand  men  came  from  West  Tennessee, 
two  thousand  more  from  the  eastern  half  of  that 
State.  Coffee  succeeded  in  gathering  together 
a  part  of  his  old  brigade,  backed  by  whom  he 
always  felt  himself  to  be  capable  of  accomplish 
ing  any  thing,  and  at  the  head  of  these  trained 
and  trusted  veterans  the  general  who  had  made 
himself  Jackson's  right  hand  in  all  difficult  enter 
prises  galloped  into  the  camp  at  Fort  Strother, 
amid  the  cheers  of  all  the  men  assembled  there. 

Better  still,  if  any  thing  could  be  better  in  Jack 
son's  eyes  than  Coffee's  coming  with  his  hard- 
fighting  old  brigade,  Colonel  Williams  arrived 
on  the  6th  of  February  with  the  Thirty-ninth 
Regiment  of  regular  troops,  a  body  of  men  six 
hundred  strong,  whose  example  of  discipline  as 
regular  soldiers  was  of  incalculable  advantage 
in  the  work  of  converting  volunteers  into  some 
thing  better  than  raw  recruits. 

As  if  to  verify  the  adage  that  "  it  never  rains 
but  it  pours,"  a  messenger  came  from  the  chiefs 
of  the  Choctaw  Nation  offering  the  services  of  all 
their  warriors  for  the  campaign. 

Thus  at  last  Jackson  had  an  army  as  large  as 
he  needed  or  wanted,  but  before  moving  such  a 


316  RED   EAGLE. 

force  it  was  necessary  to  provide  an  abundant 
supply  of  food  for  them,  and  this  was  no  light 
task.  The  winters  in  North  Alabama  are  rainy, 
with  alternate  freezings  and  thawings,  which  ren 
der  roads  almost  impassable  ;  and  in  addition  to 
the  usual  difficulty  of  securing  the  food  needed 
there  was  the  still  greater  difficulty  of  transport 
ing  the  supplies  from  Fort  Deposit  to  Fort  Stro- 
ther  to  be  overcome. 

Jackson  bent  all  his  energies  to  this  task.  He 
set  large  forces  of  his  men  at  work  upon  the  road, 
paving  it  in  the  worst  places  with  logs,  making 
what  is  called  in  the  South  a  corduroy  road  of  it. 
In  spite  of  all  that  could  be  clone,  however,  the 
road  Remained  a  bad  one,  and  it  was  with  great 
difficulty  that  wagons  moved  over  it  at  a  snail's 
pace,  even  when  drawn  by  four  horses  and  very 
lightly  loaded.  Seven  days  were  consumed  upon 
each  wagon  journey  from  Fort  Deposit  to  the 
Ten  Islands,  although  a  force  of  men  accompanied 
each  wagon  to  lift  it  out  of  mires  and  hurry  it 
forward.  The  wagons  were  lightly  loaded  too, 
else  they  could  not  have  made  the  journey  at 
all.  The  strongest  of  the  teams  could  draw  no 
more  than  sixteen  hundred  pounds. 

Little  by  little  the  supplies  were  brought  up  in 
this  laborious  fashion,  and  meantime  boats  were 


JACKSON   WITH   AN   ARMY   AT    LAST.  317 

built,  with  which  Jackson  intended  to  send  his 
provisions  down  the  Coosa  River,  while  he  should 
m.irch  his  men  overland  to  an  appointed  place  of 
rendezvous. 

At  last  all  was  ready.  Jackson  had  a  satisfac 
tory  army  and  a  satisfactory  supply  of  food  for 
his  men,  and  he  wras  now  at  last  prepared  to 
crush  the  Creeks  by  an  irresistible  blow,  deliv 
ered  at  the  centre  of  their  strength .  There  was 
no  chance  now  for  any  Creek  force  to  "  whip 
Captain  Jackson." 

Sending-  his  wounded  and  sick  men  to  Tennes 
see,  Jackson  sent  his  flatboats  down  the  river, 
accompanied  by  the  regiment  of  United  States 
regular  troops  as  a  guard.  Then,  leaving  Colonel 
Steele  with  a  garrison  of  four  hundred  men  to 
hold  Fort  Strother,  and  if  necessary  to  co-op 
erate  with  the  troops  left  between  that  point  and 
Fort  Deposit  in  protecting  the  army's  commu 
nications,  Jackson  began  his  final  march  into  the 
Creek  Nation,  at  the  head  of  three  thousand  effec 
tive  men. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

THE  GREAT  BATTLE  OF  THE  WAR. 

THE  Indians  were  now  concentrated  at  Toho- 
peka,  or  the  Horse  Shoe,  the  peninsula  already 
mentioned,  which  was  formed  by  a  sharp  bend 
of  the  Tallapoosa  River,  as  the  reader  will  see 
by  reference  to  any  good  map  of  Alabama,  as  the 
place  has  not  lost  its  name.  This  bend  incloses 
about  one  hundred  acres  of  ground,  and  the  dis 
tance  across  its  neck  or  narrowest  part  is  between 
three  hundred  and  four  hundred  yards.  Across 
this  isthmus  the  Indians  had  constructed  a  strong 
breastwork  composed  of  heavy  timbers  built  up 
into  a  thick  wall,  and  designed,  unlike  the  ordi 
nary  Indian  stockade,  to  withstand  artillery  fire. 
This  breastwork  was  provided  with  port-holes 
through  which  the  fire  of  the  garrison  could  be 
delivered,  and  the  angles  of  the  fortification  were 
so  well  and  so  regularly  drawn  after  the  manner 
of  educated  military  engineers,  that  any  force 
which  should  approach  it  in  assault  must  do  so 
at  cost  of  marching  under  a  front  and  an  enfilad 
ing  fire.  Care  was  taken  also  so  to  dispose  the 


THE   GREAT   BATTLE   OF   THE   WAR.  319 

houses  within  the  inclosure,  the  log-heaps,  felled 
trees,  and  even  the  earth  in  some  places,  as  to 
make  additional  fortifications  of  all  of  them  ;  and 
about  one  hundred  canoes  were  fastened  along 
the  river-bank  as  a  means  of  retreat  to  the  forest 
on  the  other  side  in  the  event  of  defeat. 

All  of  this  systematic  preparation,  and  espe 
cially  the  erecting  of  the  strong  and  well-placed 
breastworks,  were  things  wholly  new  in  Indian 
warfare.  This  is  not  the  way  in  which  the  sav 
age  warrior  prepares  himself  for  battle  :  it  is  the 
method  of  the  trained  soldier  ;  and  Mr.  Pa/ton, 
struck  with  the  unlikeness  of  the  preparations  to 
any  thing  ordinarily  seen  in  Indian  warfare,  says  : 
"  As  the  Indian  is  not  a  fortifying  creature,  it 
seems  improbable  that  Indians  alone  were  con 
cerned  in  putting  this  peninsula  into  the  state  of 
defence  in  which  Jackson  found  it."  To  which 
we  may  add,  that  Red  Eagle  was  not  only  an  In 
dian  chief  :  he  was  on  one  side  the  white  man, 
William  Weatherford,  and  the  white  man  in 
him  was  essentially  a  civilized  white  man.  He 
had  been  trained  by  that  old  soldier,  General  Alex 
ander  McGillivray,  and  by  that  other  soldier, 
General  Le  Clerc  Milfort  ;  he  had  visited  Mobile 
and  Pensacola,  and  must  have  learned  both  the 
nature  and  the  elementary  principles  of  fortifica- 


320  RED   EAGLE. 

tion  there.  It  was  he  who  planned  the  establish 
ment  of  the  strongholds  of  which  Tohopcka  was 
one,  and  what  is  more  probable  than  that  he 
planned  the  defences  whose  fitness  for  their  pur 
pose  was  so  remarkable  ? 

The  fighting  force  of  the  Creeks  at  Tohopeka 
is  believed  to  have  been  about  one  thousand 
strong.  They  had  with  them,  of  course,  their 
women  and  children,  and  they  had  news  of  Jack 
son's  approach  ;  but  notwithstanding  the  over 
whelming  numbers  opposed  to  them,  they  re 
mained  in  their  stronghold  determined  to  await 
their  enemy's  attack  there,  instead  of  hanging 
upon  his  flank  after  their  usual  manner,  and  seek 
ing  to  surprise  him. 

The  road  was  long  and  difficult  over  which 
Jackson  marched.  Rather  there  was  no  road, 
and  Jackson  had  to  cut  one  through  an  unbroken 
wilderness,  establishing  a  depot  of  supplies  and 
garrisoning  it  before  he  dared  advance  to  the 
work  he  had  to  do. 

Finally,  on  the  morning  of  March  27th,  1814, 
the  Tennessee  commander  found  himself,  after  all 
his  toils  and  harassing  difficulties,  in  front  of  the 
enemy  he  had  so  long  wished  to  meet  in  a  deci 
sive  struggle.  He  had  about  two  thousand  effec 
tive  men  with  him,  the  rest  having  been  left  in 


THE  GREAT  BATTLE  OF  THE  WAR.          321 

garrison  at  the  different  posts  \vhichit  was  neces 
sary  to  defend. 

Having  made  himself  acquainted  with  the  na 
ture  of  the  ground,  he  sent  General  Coffee  with  a 
force  of  seven  hundred  cavalry  and  six  hundred 
friendly  Indians  down  the  river,  with  orders  to 
cross  two  miles  below  and  march  up  the  eastern 
bank  to  the  bend,  where  he  was  directed  to  oc 
cupy  a  continuous  line  around  the  curve,  and  thus 
cut  off  retreat  across  the  river. 

Then  with  the  main  body  of  his  army  and  his 
two  light  field -pieces— one  of  them  a  three- 
pounder  and  the  other  a  six-pounder—Jackson 
himself  marched  up  the  river  and  formed  his  line 
of  battle  across  the  isthmus,  facing  the  breast 
works. 

About  ten  o'clock,  Coffee  arrived  at  the  bend, 
and  directed  his  Indians  under  Morgan  to  oc 
cupy  the  margin  of  the  river.  This  they  quickly 
did,  deploying  along  the  stream  until  their  line 
stretched  all  the  way  around  the  bend,  leaving 
no  gap  anywhere.  With  the  mounted  men  Coffee 
posted  himself  upon  a  hill  just  in  rear,  for  the 
double  purpose  of  intercepting  any  Creeks  who 
might  come  from  below  to  the  assistance  of  their 
beleaguered  friends,  and  of  being  in  position  him- 


322  RED   EAGLE. 

self  to  reinforce  any  part  of  his  Indian  line  which 
might  be  hard  pressed. 

When  all  was  ready,  Coffee  signified  the  fact  tq 
Jackson  by  means  which  had  been  agreed  upon 
between  them,  and  the  commander  advanced  his 
line  to  give  the  enemy  battle.  The  artillery  un 
der  Captain  'Bradford  was  advanced  to  a  point 
within  eighty  yards  of  the  breastwork,  with  the 
hope  that  its  fire  at  short  range  might  make  a 
breach  in  the  formidable  line  of  fortification.  The 
position  was  a  fearfully  exposed  one  for  the  can- 
noniers,  but  they  were  gallant  fellows,  under 
command  of  a  brave  officer,  and  they  held  their 
ground  manfully  under  a  most  galling  fire,  bom 
barding  the  \vorks  ceaselessly.  The  riflemen 
added  their  fire  to  that  of  the  artillery,  not  be 
cause  it  was  likely  to  have  any  effect  upon  the 
thick  breastworks,  but  because  its  maintenance 
would  prevent  the  concentration  of  the  enemy's 
fire  upon  the  artillery. 

The  cannon-shot  plunged  into  the  fortification 
at  every  discharge  ;  but  the  parapet  was  too  thick 
to  be  penetrated,  and  except  when  a  missile 
chanced  to  pass  through  a  port- hole,  the  artillery 
fire  accomplished  very  little  beyond  making  the 
Creeks  yell  a  little  more  fiercely  than  usual  in 


THE  GREAT  BATTLE  OF  THE  WAR.     323 

their  exultation  over    the  ineffectiveness  of  the 
means  employed  for  their  destruction. 

Meantime  Coffee  could  not  contentedly  stand 
still  while  all  this  work  was  going  on  just  in  his 
front.  Like  Ivanhoe  in  the  castle,  he  chafed  at 
his  compulsory  inaction  while  others  were  doing 
"deeds  of  derring-do."  In  the  absence  of  any 
thing  else  to  be  about,  he  conceived  the  notion 
of  capturing  the  enemy's  fleet,  and  ordered  the 
best  swimmers  in  his  command  to  cross  the  river 
and  bring  away  the  canoes.  Having  thus  se 
cured  the  means  of  transporting  men  to  the  other 
side,  he  eould  not  resist  the  temptation  to  make 
an  attack  in  the  enemy's  rear.  If  he  might  have 
spared  enough  men  for  the  purpose  and  led  them 
in  person,  Coffee  would  have  brought  the  battle 
to  an  early  close  by  this  means,  saving  a  deal  of 
bloodshed  ;  but  his  orders  were  to  maintain  a  line 
all  along  the  shore,  and  to  resist  the  approach  of 
reinforcements  from  below.  He  could  neither 
detach  a  strong  force  for  the  attack  in  rear  nor 
leave  his  appointed  post  to  lead  them  in  person. 
But  he  could  at  least  make  a  diversion  in  Jack 
son's  favor,  and  this  he  proceeded  to  do.  He 
sent  Morgan  across  in  the  canoes,  with  as  many 
men  as  could  be  withdrawn  with  propriety  from 
the  line,  ordering  him  to  set  fire  to  the  houses  b^ 


324  RED    EAGLE. 

the  river-bank  and  then  to  advance  and  attack  the 
savages  behind  the  breastwork. 

Morgan  executed  this  order  in  fine  style,  and 
although  his  force  was  too  small  to  enable  him 
to  maintain  his  attack  for  any  considerable  time, 
the  movement  was  of  great  assistance  to  Jackson. 
The  burning  buildings  and  the  crack  of  Morgan's 
rifles  indicated  to  Jackson  what  his  active  and 
sagacious  lieutenant  was  doing,  and  he  resolved 
to  seize  the  opportunity,  while  the  Creeks  were 
somewhat  embarrassed  by  the  fire  in  their  rear, 
to  make  the  direct  assault  upon  the  works  which 
it  was  now  evident  must  be  made  before  any  thing 
effective  could  be  done. 

To  storm  such  a  work  was  sure  to  be  a  costly 
way  of  winning,  even  if  it  should  succeed,  while 
if  it  should  fail,  its  failure  would  mean  the  utter 
destruction  of  the  army  attempting  it.  The 
general  hesitated  to  make  so  hazardous  an  at 
tempt,  but  the  men  clamored  to  be  led  to  the 
charge.  It  was  the  only  way,  and  the  army  was 
evidently  in  the  best  possible  temper  for  the  doing 
of  desperate  deeds. 

Jackson  gave  the  order  to  storm  the  works. 

Then  was  seen  the  grandest,  awfullest  thing 
which  war  has  to  show.  The  long  line  of  men, 
pressing  closely  together,  advanced  with  quick, 


THE   GREAT   BATTLE   OF  THE   WAR.  325 

cadenced  step,  every  man  knowing  that  great 
rents  would  be  made  in  that  line  at  every  second, 
a  ad  none  knowing  what  his  own  fate  might  be. 

Without  wavering,  but  with  compressed  lips, 
the  Tennesseeans,  in  line  with  Colonel  Williams' s 
regulars,  rushed  upon  the  breastwork,  which 
flashed  fire  and  poured  death  among  them  as 
they  came.  Pushing  the  muzzles  of  their  rifles 
into  the  port-holes  they  delivered  their  fire,  and 
then  clambered  up  the  side  of  the  works,  fighting 
hand  to  hand  with  the  savages,  who  battled  to 
beat  them  back.  The  first  man  upon  the  parapet, 
Major  Montgomery,  stood  erect  but  a  single 
second,  when  he  fell  dead  with  a  bullet  in  his 
brain.  His  men  were  close  at  his  heels,  and 
surged  like  a  tide  up  the  slope,  pouring  in  a  tor 
rent  over  the  works  and  into  the  camp.  The 
breastwork  was  carried,  and  in  ordinary  circum 
stances  the  battle  would  have  ended  almost  im 
mediately  in  the  enemy's  surrender  ;  but  this 
enemy  had  no  thought  of  surrendering.  The 
consequences  of  a  blunder  committed  so  long  be 
fore  as  the  1 8th  of  November  were  felt  here. 
General  White's  attack  upon  the  Hillabees  when 
they  had  submitted  and  asked  for  peace  had 
taught  these  men  to  expect  nothing  but  cruellest 
treachery  at  the  hands  of  Jackson,  whom  they  con- 


326  RED   EAGLE. 

fidently   believed   to   be  the  author  of  that  most 
unfortunate  occurrence.      Havi-j;^  no  faith  in  his 
word,  the  Creeks  believed  that  he  and  his  men 
offered  quarter  only  to  save  themselves  the  work 
of  killing  warriors  who  could  yet  fight.     They 
believed   that  to  surrender    was    only   to    spare 
their  enemies,  who,  as  soon  as  the  prisoners  could 
be  disarmed,  would  butcher  them  in  cold  blood, 
paying  no  recompense  in  the  death  of  any  of  their 
own  number.     Convinced  of  this,  the  men  at  the 
Horse  Shoe  simply  refused  to  be  taken  prisoners, 
either  in  a  body   or  singly  ;    they   would    yield 
only  to  death,  not  to  their  enemies.    They  fought 
for  every  inch  of  ground.     Wounds  were  noth 
ing  to  them,  as  long  as  they  could  level  a  gun  or 
hurl  a  tomahawk.     Jackson's  men  had  to  drive 
them  slowly  back,  dislodging  them  from  brush 
heaps  and  felled  trees,  and  suffering  considerable 
loss  in  doing  so.     They  had   carried  the  works, 
but  had  not  yet  conquered  the  defenders  of  the 
place.     To  do  that  they  had  simply  to  butcher 
them. 

It  was  horrible  work,  but  it  must  be  done. 
Brave  men  revolted  from  it,  but  whenever  one 
of  them  sought  to  spare  even  a  badly- wounded 
enemy  his  reward  was  a  bullet,  or  a  blow  from 
the  fallen  but  still  defiant  warrior's  club. 


THE   GREAT   BATTLE   OF  THE   WAR.  327 

Little  by  little  the  savages  were  driven  to  the 
river  bank,  where  the  remnant  of  them  made  a 
last  stand  under  strong  cover,  from  which  even 
a  well-directed  artillery  fire  at  short  range  failed 
to  dislodge  them.  They  were  driven  out  at  last 
only  by  the  burning  of  the  heap  of  timber  in 
and  behind  which  they  had  taken  refuge.  When 
their  situation  was  most  desperate,  Jackson  made 
a  last  effort  to  spare  them.  Sending  a  friendly 
Indian  forward,  he  assured  them  of  his  disposi 
tion  to  save  them  alive  if  they  would  surrender, 
but  they  answered  only  by  firing  upon  the  mes 
senger  and  riddling  his  body  with  bullets.  When 
at  last  they  were  driven  out  by  the  flames  they 
were  shot  down  like  wild  beasts. 

Night  finally  came  to  stop  the  slaughter  of 
hiding  warriors,  but  it  was  renewed  in  the  morn 
ing,  sixteen  warriors  being  found  then  concealed 
in  the  underbrush.  They  refused  even  then  to 
surrender,  and  were  slain. 

It  was  in  this  battle  that  Samuel  Houston,  after 
ward  the  president  of  the  Republic  of  Texas,  and 
still  later  a  Senator  in  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  first  distinguished  himself  by  his  valor, 
and  fell  so  severely  wounded  that  his  recovery 
was  always  thought  to  be  little  less  than  mirac- 

.>  o 

ulous. 


328  RED    EAGLE. 

When  the  battle  was  ended  five  hundred  and 
fifty-seven  dead  warriors  were  found  upon  the 
field,  but  even  this  was  by  no  means  the  total 
number  of  the  slain.  Many  of  them  had  tried  to 
escape  by  swimming,  and  for  a  long  time  Coffee's 
men  were  busy  shooting  them  in  the  water,  where 
when  killed  they  sank  out  of  sight. 

Mr.  Pickett  tells  us  that  one  brave  old  chief, 
Manowa,  escaped  in  an  ingenious  and  wonderful 
way,  after  being  literally  shot  to  pieces.  '  He 
fought  as  long  as  he  could.  He  saved  himself 
by  jumping  into  the  river  where  the  water  was 
four  feet  deep.  He  held  to  a  root  and  thus  kept 
himself  beneath  the  waves,  breathing  through 
the  long  joint  of  a  cane,  one  end  of  which  he 
held  in  his  mouth,  while  the  other  end  came 
above  the  surface  of  the  water.  When  night  set 
in  the  brave  Manowa  rose  from  his.  watery  bed 
and  made  his  way  to  the  forest  bleeding  from 
many  wounds." 

Mr.  Pickett  conversed  with  Manowa  many 
}ears  after  the  war,  and  heard  the  story  of  his 
escape  from  his  own  lips. 

Jackson's  loss  was  thirty-two  white  men  and 
twenty-three  friendly  Indians  killed,  ninety-nine 
white  men  and  forty-seven  friendly  Indians 
wounded. 


CHAPTER   XXXII. 

RED    EAGLE'S    SURRENDER. 

THE  power  of  the  Creek  Nation  was  crushed 
at  the  battle  of  Tohopeka.  The  force  which 
fought  so  desperately  there  represented  not  all, 
but  by  far  the  larger  part,  of  what  was  left  of  the 
fighting  force  of  the  nation,  and  they  were  so 
utterly  beaten  that  there  was  nothing  to  encour 
age  an  effort  to  assemble  the  scattered  warriors 
again  for  a  struggle.  The  slight  cohesion  which 
trioes  of  Indians  have  was  gone,  and  Jackson 
knew  very  well  that  no  more  severe  battles  need 
be  fought  if  the  present  one  was  properly  fol 
lowed  up  with  measures  designed  to  convince 
the  Creeks  of  the  uselessness  of  further  resistance. 
He  prepared,  therefore,  to  establish  his  army  in 
the  heart  of  the  Creek  Nation,  to  overawe  what 
ever  bands  might  remain,  to  strike  at  roving  par 
ties,  and  to  reduce  the  tribes  to  submission  and 
peacefulness. 

Sinking  the  bodies  of  his  dead  in  the  river,  in 
stead  of  burying  them,  he  withdrew  with  his 
army  to  Fort  Williams,  the  place  he  had  estab- 


330  RED   EAGLE. 

lished  and  garrisoned  as  his  supply  depot,  for  the 
double  purpose  of  putting  his  wounded  men  into 
hospital  and  of  replenishing  his  supply  of  food, 
for  he  had  carried  nothing  with  him  beyond  Fort 
Williams  except  one  week's  provisions  in  the 
men's  haversacks. 

After  a  tedious  march  lasting  five  days,  Jack 
son  rested  his  worn-out  men  at  Fort  Williams, 
and  there  wrote  the  following  address,  which  was 
ordered  to  be  read  to  the  army  : 

"  You  have  entitled  yourselves  to  the  gratitude 
of  your  country  and  your  general.  The  expedi 
tion  from  which  you  have  just  returned  has,  by 
your  good  conduct,  been  rendered  prosperous 
beyond  any  example  in  the  history  of  our  war 
fare  ;  it  has  redeemed  the  character  of  your  State, 
and  of  that, description  of  troops  of  which  the 
greater  part  of  you  are. 

"  You  have,  within  a  few  days,  opened  your 
way  to  the  Tallapoosa,  and  destroyed  a  confed 
eracy  of  the  enemy,  ferocious  by  nature  and  who 
had  grown  insolent  from  impunity.  Relying  on 
their  numbers,  the  security  of  their  situation,  and 
the  assurances  of  their  prophets,  they  derided  our 
approach,  and  already  exulted  in  anticipation  of 
the  victory  they  expected  to  obtain.  But  they 
were  ignorant  of  the  influence  and  effect  of  r>;ov- 

O  *  * 


RED  EAGLE'S  SURRENDER.  33 l 

ornment  on  the  human  powers,  nor  knew  what 
brave  men  and  civilized  could  effect.  By  their 
yells  they  hoped  to  frighten  us,  and  with  their 
wooden  fortifications  to  oppose  us.  Stupid  mor 
tals  !  Their  yells  but  designated  their  situation 
the  more  certainly,  while  their  walls  became  a 
snare  for  their  own  destruction.  So  will  it  ever 
be  when  presumption  and  ignorance  contend 
against  bravery  and  prudence. 

"The  fiends  of  the  Tallapoosa  will  no  longer 
murder  our  women  and  children,  or  disturb  the 
quiet  of  our  borders.  Their  midnight  flambeaux 
will  no  more  illumine  their  council-house  or 
shine  upon  the  victim  of  their  infernal  orgies.  In 
their  places  a  new  generation  will  arise  who  will 
know  their  duty  better.  The  weapons  of  warfare 
will  be  exchanged  for  the  utensils  of  husbandry  ; 
and  the  wilderness,  which  now  withers  in  ster 
ility  and  mourns  the  desolation  which  over 
spreads  her,  will  blossom  as  the  rose  and  become 
the  nursery  of  the  arts.  But  before  this  happy 
day  can  arrive  other  chastisements  remain  to  be 
inflicted.  It  is  indeed  lamentable  that  the  path  to 
peace  should  lead  through  blood  and  over  the 
bodies  of  the  slain  ;  but  it  is  a  dispensation  of 
Providence,  and  perhaps  a  wise  one,  to  inflict 


332  RED   EAGLE. 

partial  evils,  that  ultimate  good  may  be  pro- 
duced. 

11  Our  enemies  are  not  sufficiently  humbled  ; 
the}-  do  not  sue  for  peace.  A  collection  of  them 
await  our  approach,  and  remain  to  be  dispersed. 
Buried  in  ignorance,  and  seduced  by*  the  false 
pretences  of  their  prophets,  they  have  the  weak 
ness  to  believe  they  will  still  be  able  to  make  a 
decided  stand  against  us.  They  must  be  unde 
ceived,  and  made  to  atone  their  obstinacy  and 
their  crimes  by  still  further  suffering.  Those 
hopes  which  have  so  long  deluded  them  must  be 
driven  from  their  last  refuge.  They  must  be  made 
to  know  that  their  prophets  are  impostors,  and 
that  our  strength  is  mighty  and  will  prevail. 
Then,  and  not  till  then,  may  we  expect  to  make 
with  them  a  peace  that  shall  be  permanent." 

Ten  days  after  the  battle  of  the  Horse  Shoe 
the  army  again  advanced,  the  men  carrying  pro 
visions  in  their  haversacks  as  before.  A  long 
march  brought  them  to  the  confluence  of  the 
Coosa  and  Tallapoosa  rivers,  where  a  junction 
with  the  southern  army  was  effected  and  supplies 
were  abundant. 

There  Jackson  established  his  camp  and  for 
tified  it.  The  force  of  Creeks  which  he  had  expect 
ed  to  strike  had  dispersed,  and  there  was  now  no- 


RED  EAGLE'S  SURRENDER.  333 

where  a  body  of  Indians  for  him  to  march  against 
or  fight.  His  presence  with  a  strong  army, 
well  supplied  with  food  and  able  to  maintain  it 
self  there  in  the  very  heart  of  the  nation,  did  the 
rest.  Seeing  the  utter  hopelessness  of  contend 
ing  further  with  such  an  army  so  commanded,  and 
hearing  through  friendly  Indians,  who  were  sent 
out  for  the  purpose,  that  Jackson  Avished  to  make 
peace,  the  savages  rapidly  flocked  to  his  camp 
and  surrendered  themselves. 

Peter  McQueen,  Josiah  Francis,  and  several 
other  chiefs  fled  to  Florida,  but  the  greater  num 
ber  of  the  Creek  leaders  preferred  to  sue  for  Jack 
son's  clemency. 

To  them  Jackson  replied  that  he  had  no  further 
desire  to  make  war,  but  that  peace  would  not 
be  granted  to  the  nation  until  Red  Eagle — or 
Weatherford,  for  by  that  name  only  the  whites 
called  the  Creek  commander — should  be  brought 

O 

to  him  bound  hand  and  foot.  It  was  his  purpose 
to  hang  Red  Eagle  as  a  punishment  for  the 
massacre  of  women  and  children  at  Fort  Mims,  he 
knowing  nothing,  of  course,  of  the  warrior's  dar 
ing  efforts  to  prevent  that  bloody  butchery,  and 
to  make  of  the  affair  a  battle,  not  a  massacre. 

News  of  Jackson's  determination  was  carried 
to  Red  Eagle,  and  he  was  warned  to  fly  the  coun- 


334  RED   EAGLE. 

try  and  make  his  escape  to  Florida,  as  many  of  his 
companion  chiefs  had  done.  There,  of  course,  he 
would  have  been  safe  beyond  the  jurisdiction  ol 
Jackson  and  of  the  government  which  Jackson 
represented  ;  but  Red  Eagle  was  a  patriot,  and 
when  he  was  told  that  the  fierce  commander  of 
the  whites  would  give  no  terms  to  the  Creeks 
under  which  the  women  and  children  now  starv 
ing  in  the  woods  could  be  saved,  except  upon  his 
surrender,  that  the  price  of  peace  for  his  people 
was  his  own  ignominious  death — he  calmly  re 
solved  to  give  himself  to  suffer  for  his  race,  to 
purchase  with  his  blood  that  peace  which  alone 
could  save  his  people  from  destruction. 

Mounting  his  famous  gray  horse — the  one 
which  had  carried  him  over  the  bluff  at  the  Holy 
Ground,  he  rode  away  alone  toward  Jackson's 
camp. 

The  author  of  that  history  of  Alabama  which 

has  been  quoted  frequently  in  these  pages  gives 

the  following  account  of  what  followed,  drawn, 

he  assures  us,  from  Red  Eagle's  own  narrative  in 

conversations  had  with  him  : 

"  He  rode  within  a  few  miles  of  Fort  Jackson, 
when  a  fine  deer  crossed  his  path  and  stopped 
within  shooting  distance,  which  he  fired  at  and 
killed.  Reloading  his  rifle  with  two  balls,  for  the 


RED  EAGLE'S  SURRENDER.  335 

purpose  of  shooting  the  Big  Warrior,  should  he 
give  him  any  cause,  at  the  fort,  he  placed  the  deer 
behind  his  saddle  and  advanced  to  the  American 
outposts.  Some  soldiers,  of  whom  he  politely  in 
quired  for  Jackson's  whereabouts,  gave  him  some 
unsatisfactory  and  rude  replies,  when  a  gray- 
headed  man  a  few  steps  beyond  pointed  him  to 
the  marquee.  Weatherford  rode  up  to  it  and 
checked  his  horse  immediately  at  the  entrance, 
where  sat  the  Big  Warrior,  who  exultingly  ex 
claimed  : 

4  Ah  !  Bill  Weatherford,  have  we  got  you  at 
last?'  " 

'  The  fearless  chieftain  cast  his  keen  eyes  at  the 
Big  Warrior,  and  said  in  a  determined  tone  : 

'  You  -  -  traitor,  if  you  give  me  any  inso 
lence  I  will  blow  a  ball  through  your  cowardly 
heart.' 

"  General  Jackson  now  came  running  out  of 
the  marquee  with  Colonel  Hawkins,  and  in  a 
furious  manner  exclaimed  : 

'  How  dare  you,  sir,  to  ride  up  to  my  tent 
after  having  murdered  the  women  and  children 
at  Fort  Mims  ?  ' 

'  Weatherford  said  : 

'  General  Jackson,  I  am  not  afraid  of  you.  I 
fear  no  man,  for  I  am  a  Creek  warrior.  I  have 


336  RED    EAGLE. 

nothing  to  request  in  behalf  of  myself ;  you  can 
kill  me  if  you  desire.  But  I  come  to  beg  you  to 
send  for  the  women  and  children  of  the  war 
party,  who  are  now  starving  in  the  woods.  Their 
fields  and  cribs  have  been  destroyed  by  your  peo 
ple,  who  have  driven  them  to  the  woods  without 
an  ear  of  corn.  I  hope  that  you  will  send  out 
parties  who  will  safely  conduct  them  here,  in 
order  that  they  may  be  fed.  I  exerted  myself  in 
vain  to  prevent  the  massacre  of  the  women  and 
children  at  Fort  Minis.  I  am  now  done  fighting. 
The  Red  Sticks  are  nearly  all  killed.  If  1  could 
fight  you  any  longer  I  would  most  heartily  do  so. 
Send  for  the  women  and  children.  They  never 
did  you  any  harm.  But  kill  me,  if  the  white  peo 
ple  want  it  done. ' 

"  At  the  conclusion  of  these  words  many  per 
sons  who  had  surrounded  the  marquee  ex- 
qlaimed  : 

"  '  Kill  him  !  kill  him  !  kill  him  !  ' 

"  General  Jackson  commanded*  silence,  and  in 
an  emphatic  manner  said  : 

"  '  Any  man  who  would  kill  as  brave  a  man  as 
this  would  rob  the  dead  !  ' 

"  He  then  invited  Weatherford  to  alight,  drank 
a  glass  of  brandy  with  him,  and  entered  into  a 
cheerful  conversation  under  his  hospitable  mar- 


RED  EAGLE'S  SURRENDER.  337 

quee.  Weatherford  gave  him  the  deer,  and  they 
were  then  good  friends. ' ' 

Mr.  Pickett  discredits  the  accounts  of  this  affair 
which  were  given  by  persons  who  were  present 
at  its  occurrence,  but  they  have  been  accepted 
by  so  many  writers  of  repute,  including  Eaton 
and  Meek,  whose  opportunities  for  learning  the 
truth  were  as  good  as  his,  that  Mr.  Parton  re 
gards  them  as  trustworthy  at  least  in  their  main 
features.  Following  him  in  this,  we  give  the  re 
mainder  of  the  conversation  between  Jackson  and 
the  heroic  chieftain.  Jackson  told  Weatherford 
what  terms  he  had  offered  to  the  Creeks,  and 
added  : 

"  As  for  yourself,  if  you  do  not  like  the  terms, 
no  advantage  shall  be  taken  of  your  present  sur 
render.  You  are  at  liberty  to  depart  and  re 
sume  hostilities  when  you  please.  But,  if  you 
are  taken  then,  your  life  shall  pay  the  forfeit  of 
your  crimes." 

Straightening  himself  up,  the  bold  warrior  an 
swered  : 

"  I  desire  peace  for  no  selfish  reasons,  but  that 
my  nation  may  be  relieved  from  their  sufferings  ; 
for,  independent  of  the  other  consequences  of  the 
war,  their  cattle  are  destroyed  and  their  women 
and  children  destitute  of  provisions.  But  I  may 


338  RED   EAGLE. 

well  be  addressed  in  such  language  now.     There 
was  a  time  when  I  had  a  choice  and  could  have 
answered  you.     I   have  none  now.     Even  hope 
has  ended.     Once   I   could  animate  my  warriors 
to  battle.     But  I  cannot  animate  the  dead.     My 
warriors  can  no  longer  hear   my  voice.     Their 
bones  are  atTalladega,  Tallushatchee,  Emuckfau, 
and  Tohopeka.     I  have  not  surrendered  myself 
thoughtlessly.       While    there    were    chances   of 
success   I   never  left     my    post  nor    supplicated 
peace.     But  my  people  are  gone,  and  I  now  ask 
peace  for  my  nation  and  myself.    On  the  miseries 
and    misfortunes    brought  upon   my    country    I 
look  back  with  the  deepest  sorrow,  and  wish  to 
avert  still  greater  calamities.     If   I  had  been  left 
to  contend  with  the  Georgia  army  I  would   have 
raised   my   corn  on  one  bank  of  the   river,  and 
fought  them  on  the  other.    But  your  people  have 
destroyed  my  nation.      General  Jackson,  you  are 
a  brave  man  ;  I  am  another.     I   do  not  fear  to 
die.     But    I    rely    upon   your   generosity.     You 
will  exact  no  terms  of  a  conquered  and  helpless 
people   but  those  to   which  they  should  accede. 
Whatever  they  may  be,  it  would  now  be  folly 
and  madness  to  oppose  them.     If  they  are  op 
posed,  you  shall  find  me  among  the  sternest  en 
forcers  of  obedience.       Those   who    would  still 


RED  EAGLE'S  SURRENDER.  339 

hold  out  can  only  be  influenced  by  a  mean  spirit 
of  revenge.  To  this  they  must  not  and  shall  not 
sacrifice  the  last  remnant  of  their  country.  You 
have  told  us  what  we  may  do  and  be  safe. 
Yours  is  a  good  talk,  and  my  nation  ought  to 
listen  to  it.  They  shall  listen  to  it. " 

Jackson  was  too  brave  a  man  not  to  discover 
the  hero  in  this  courageous,  self-sacrificing  man, 
who,  knowing  that  an  ignominious  death  had 
been  determined  upon  for  him,  calmly  refused  to 
save  himself,  and  boldly  placed  his  life  in  his 
enemy's  hands  for  the  sake  of  his  people.  When 
two  men  so  brave  as  these  meet  there  is  fellow 
ship  between  them,  because  there  is  brotherhood 
between  their  souls.  When  Red  Eagle  thus 
faced  Jackson  and  offered  to  accept  death  at  his 
hands  in  return  for  peace  for  the  now  helpless 
Creeks  there  was  peace  between  the  two  great- 
souled  men,  who  knew  each  other  by  the  free 
masonry  of  a  common  heroism,  a  common  cour 
age,  and  a  common  spirit  of  self-sacrifice. 

Seeing  Weatherforcl  in  this  transaction,  do  we 
need  to  remember  his  battles  as  proof  that  he  was 
a  great  man  in  the  larger  and  better  sense  of  the 
word  ;  that  he  did  his  duty,  as  he  understood  it, 
without  regard  to  his  personal  welfare  ;  that  he 
was  a  patriot  as  well  as  a  soldier  ? 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

RED  EAGLE  AFTER  THE  WAR. 

HAVING  made  peace  with  Red  Eagle,  Jack 
son  afforded  him  that  protection  which  was 
necessary  while  he  was  in  a  camp  filled  with 
the  friendly  Indians,  whose  hatred  of  the  warrior 
was  undying.  Big  Warrior  even  tried  to  take 
his  life  in  spite  of  Jackson's  orders,  and  was  re 
strained  only  by  the  general's  personal  interfer 
ence. 

Red  Bade  busied  himself  at  once  in  the  paci- 

O 

fication  of  the  country,  as  he  had  assured  Jackson 
that  he  would  do,  and  to  his  great  influence,  in 
a  large  measure,  the  prompt  acquiescence  of  the 
Creeks  in  the  terms  of  peace  was  due. 

As  soon  as  the  country  was  pacified  Red  Eagle 
sought  to  return  to  the  ways  of  peace,  and  for 
that  purpose  went  to  his  plantation  near  Fort 
Mims,  and  tried  to  gather  together  his  property 
which  had  become  scattered,  and  resume  his  busi 
ness  as  a  planter. 

He  was  not  long  in  learning,  however,  that 
his  foes  among  the  half-breeds  and  Indians  who 


RED   EAGLE  AFTER  THE   WAR.  341 

had  sided  with  the  whites  were  implacable,  and 
that  their  thirst  for  ijis  blood  made  his  peaceful 
stay  there  impossible.  He  therefore  went  to  Fort 
Claiborne  and  put  himself  under  the  protection 
of  the  commanding  officer  there,  who  assigned 

o  o 

him  a  tent  near  his  own  and  a  body-guard  for  his 
protection.  Here  Weatherford  remained  for 
ten  or  fifteen  days,  but  there  were  so  many  per 
sons  in  the  camp  who  had  l*st  friends  at  Fort 
Minis,  and  who  were  determined  to  take  the 
Creek  chieftain's  life,  that  his  protector  feared 
to  keep  him  at  the  fort  longer,  even  under  the 
constant  protection  of  a  strong  guard  detail.  But 
it  was  dangerous  to  remove  him,  except  secretly; 
so  determined  was  the  enmity  of  the  men  who 
sought  to  kill  him  ;  and  therefore  the  com 
mander  of  the  post  ordered  an  aide-de-camp  at 
midnight  to  take  the  great  chieftain  beyond  the 
camp  lines  and  there  to  arrange  for  his  escape, 
through  Captain  Laval,  who  was  instructed  to 
escort  him  to  a  tree  outside  of  the  line  of  out 
posts.  There  a  powerful  horse  had  been  pro 
vided,  and  Red  Eagle,  mounting  the  animal,  gal 
loped  away  in  the  darkness. 

Upon  his  arrival  at  Jackson's  camp  he  was  re 
ceived  by  the  Tennessee  general  with  the  respect 
due  to  so  gallant  a  soldier,  and  there  lie  remained 


342  RED    EAGLE. 

under  Jackson's  watchful  care  until  after  the  sign 
ing  of  the  treaty  of  August  9th,  1814,  by  which 
the  Creeks  gave  up  all  the  southern  part  of  their 
territory.  This  was  exacted  nominally  as  an  in 
demnity  to  the  government  for  the  expenses  of 
the  war,  but  the  real  purpose  was  to  plant  a 
strong  and  continuous  line  of  white  settlements 
between  the  Creeks  and  their  bad  advisers,  the 
Spanish,  at  Pensacola.  By  these  means  Jack 
son,  who  managed  the  affair,  made  impossible  any 
future  renewal  of  the  war  to  which  he  had  put 
an  end  by  arms. 

When  the  treaty  was  concluded,  Jackson's 
mission  was  done,  and  he  returned  to  his  Ten 
nessee  home— the  Hermitage— taking  Red  Eagle 
with  him  as  his  guest,  and  in  order  that  the  chief 
tain  might  be  safe  from  the  assassination  with 
which  he  was  still  threatened,  Jackson  carefully 
concealed  the  fact  of  his  presence.  For  nearly  a 
year  the  two  commanders  who  had  fought  each 
other  so  fiercely  lived  together  as  friends  under 
one  roof,  the  conquered  the  guest  of  the  con 
queror. 

Then  Weatherford  returned  to  Alabama  and 
established  himself  as  a  planter.  His  relatives  had 
saved  much  of  his  property,  which  they  returned 
to  him,  and  bv  wise  management  he  recovered 


RED   EAGLE   AFTER   THE  WAR.  343 

his  fortunes  and  became  again  a  man  of  consid 
erable  wealth. 

His  influence  was  always  on  the  side  of  law 
and  order,  and  how  valuable  the  influence  of  such 
a  man,  so  exerted,  is  in  a  new  country,  where  two 
races  are  constantly  brought  into  contact,  we  may 
easily  conceive. 

Red  Eagle  had  been  overcome  in  war,  and  was 
disposed  to  maintain  the  peace,  in  accordance 
with  his  promise  ;  but  his  spirit  was  not  broken, 
and  none  of  his  courage  had  gone  out  of  him. 

On  one  occasion  a  very  brutal  assassination 
was  committed  at  a  public  sale  by  two  ruffians 
of  the  most  desperate  border  type.  A  magistrate 
summoned  the  people  as  a  posse  comitatus  to  ar 
rest  the  offenders,  but  they  so  violently  swore 
that  they  would  kill  any  one  who  should  approach 
them,  that  no  man  dared  attempt  the  duty. 
Red  Eagle,  who  was  present,  expressed  his  in 
dignation  at  the  murder,  and  his  contempt  for  the 
fears  of  the  bystanders,  and  volunteered  to  make 
the  arrest  if  ordered  by  the  magistrate  to  do  so. 

The  magistrate  gave  the  order,  and  drawing  a 
long,  silver-handled  knife,  which  was  his  only 
weapon,  Weatherford  advanced  upon  the  mur 
derers,  who  warned  him  off,  swearing  that  they 
would  kill  him  if  he  should  advance.  Without 


344  RED   EAGLE. 

a  sign  of  hesitation,  and  with  a  calm  look  of  reso 
lution  in  his  countenance  which  appalled  even  his 
desperate  antagonists,  he  stepped  quickly  up  to 
one  of  them  and  seized  him  by  the  throat,  call 
ing  to  the  bystanders  to  "  tie  the  rascal."  Then 
going  up  to  the  other  he  arrested  him,  the  des 
perado  saying  as  he  approached  :  ' '  I  will  not  re 
sist  you,  Billy  Weatherford." 

Weatherford 's  plantation  was  among  the  white 
settlements,  and  the  country  round  about  him 
rapidly  filled  up  with  white  people,  among 
whom  the  warrior  lived  in  peace  and  friendship. 
Mr.  Meek  writes  of  him  at  this  time  in  these 
words  : 

"The  character  of  the  man  seemed  to  have 
been  changed  by  the  war.  He  was  no  longer 
cruel,  vindictive,  idle,  intemperate,  or  fond  of  dis 
play  :  but  surrounded  by  his  family  he  preserved 
a  dignified  and  retiring  demeanor  ;  was  industri 
ous,  sober,  and  economical ;  and  was  a  kind  and 
indulgent  master  to  his  servants,  of  whom  he  had 
many.  A  gentleman  who  had  favorable  oppor 
tunities  of  judging  says  of  him  that  '  in  his  inter 
course  with  the  whites  his  bearing  was  marked 
by  nobleness  of  purpose,  and  his  conduct  was 
always  honorable.  No  man  was  more  fastidious 
in  complying  with  his  engagements.  His  word 


RED  EAGLE  AFTER  THE  WAR.       345 

was  by  him  held  to  be  more  sacred  than  the  most 
binding  legal  obligation.  Art  and  dissimulation 
formed  no  part  of  his  character.  Ever  frank  and 
guileless,  no  one  had  the  more  entire  confidence 
of  those  among  whom  he  lived  ?  '  Another  gen 
tleman  who  knew  Weatherford  intimately  for  a 
number  of  years  informs  me  that  '  he  possessed 
remarkable  intellectual  powers  ;  that  his  percep 
tions  were  quick  almost  to  intuition,  his  memory 
tenacious,  his  imagination  vivid,  his  judgment 
strong  and  accurate,  and  his  language  copious, 
fluent,  and  expressive.  In  short,'  he  says,  '  Weath 
erford  possessed  naturally  one  of  the  finest  minds 
our  country  has  produced/  These  traits  of  char 
acter  exhibited  for  a  number  of  years  won  for 
their  possessor  the  esteem  and  respect  of  those 
who  knew  him,  notwithstanding  the  circum 
stances  of  his  earlier  life.  Indeed  those  circum 
stances  threw  around  the  man  a  romance  of 
character  which  made  him  the  more  attractive. 
After  the  bitterness  which  the  war  engendered 
had  subsided  his  narratives  were  listened  to  with 
interest  and  curiosity.'  Though  unwilling  gen 
erally  to  speak  of  his  adventures,  he  would, 
when  his  confidence  was  obtained,  describe  them 
with  a  graphic  particularity  and  coloring  which 
gave  an  insight  into  conditions  of  life  and  phases 


346  RED   EAGLE. 

of  character  of  which  we  can  now  only  see  the 
outside.  He  always  extenuated  his  conduct  at 
Fort  Minis  and  during  the  war  under  the  plea 
that  the  first  transgressions  were  committed  by 
the  white  people,  and  that  he  was  fighting  for  the 
liberties  of  his  nation.  He  also  asserted  that  he 
was  reluctantly  forced  into  the  war." 

Red  Eagle  died  on  the  Qth  of  March,  1824,  from 
over-fatigue  incurred  in  a  bear  hunt.  He  left  a 
large  family  of  children,  who  intermarried  with 
the  whites,  well-nigh  extinguishing  all  traces  of 
Indian  blood  in  his  descendants. 


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